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Abstract 
This thesis calls upon ideas from Immanuel Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason to disrupt readings of the plays and prose of 
Samuel Beckett predicated upon metaphysical presuppositions. 
The Introduction focuses upon such presuppositions in the 
criticism of Martin Esslin. In Chapter one, substantial passages 
of Kantian exposition are given to prepare the ground for a 
parallel between Kant's critique of metaphysics and those Beckett 
texts examined through Chapters One, Two, Three and Four. In 
this first chapter, the limits which Kant places on possible 
knowledge are compared to the frustrations imposed upon the 
investigative duo of Beckett's Rough for Theatre II. Chapter Two 
considers Krapp's Last Tape as a parody of both Proustian and 
Manichaean metaphysical profundities. Chapter Three examines the 
consequences of staging the fabrication of a recognizably 
`Beckettian' image of the human condition in Catastrophe. 
Chapter Four engages with the textual specifications of The Lost 
Ones via an `immanent' method of analysis, in opposition to 
`transcendent' or allegorical readings capable of promoting 
themes of metaphysical import. 
Chapter Five marks a turning-point in the thesis. it 
investigates why analysis of The Lost ones should prove as 
troublesome as it does in Chapter Four. As a response, it 
details Beckett's efforts toward narrative $indetermination' and 
V 
links this process to the equally troublesome `noumenon' of 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Chapter Six reassesses the 
parallels drawn between Beckett and Kant thus far. The paradoxes 
and flat contradictions contained in Chapters One to Four provide 
the materials for Chapters Six's re-appraisal of the main thesis 
pursued here, that a critique of metaphysics can be found in 
Beckett's works analogous to that supplied by Kant. A secondary 
thesis is that a tendency toward self-defeat during such an 
interpretation is inevitable. The Conclusion reassesses this 
contention. 
I 
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Note on the text 
Three dots in square brackets [... ] are used here to signal 
omissions from citations. Where three dots occur alone, the 
citation reproduces this usage from the source text. 
QUESTIONS: 
[... ] 
9. Has the work, for you, a metaphysical dimen- 
sion? Yes () No () 
10. What is it (twenty-five words or less)? 
(Barthelme, 1968, p. 82) 
Introduction 
i. Beckett and Kant 
There are several worthy things that this thesis'does not 
attempt to be. It is not a scholarly study of Kantian references 
in Beckett's manuscripts, typescripts or published works. It 
undertakes no archival research. It does not even try to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that Kant's critical philosophy directly 
influenced Beckett's thought. Its intention rather is to 
interpret four pieces of Beckett's work, Rough for Theatre II, 
Krapp's Last Tape, Catastrophe and The Lost ones, in the light 
of Kant's critique of metaphysics. Those Beckett texts 
considered most amenable to Kantian interpretation receive the 
greatest emphasis here. A deliberate bias may be admitted. 
Evidence exists of Beckett's acquaintance with Kant's 
philosophy, but no effort is made here to contribute to the stock 
of available biographical facts. Between 1938 and 1939, Knowison 
finds Beckett `reading eclectically but critically' among 
Descartes, Johnson, Renard and Kant (Knowlson, 1996, p. 295). It 
is specifically Kant `whom Beckett had been reading 
enthusiastically in German since his copies had arrived at the 
beginning of January from Germany' (Knowison, 1996, p. 761, 
n. 161). The year in question would seem to be 1938. This is 
unlikely, however, to have been Beckett's first encounter with 
Kant. Pilling takes issue with Ludovic Janvier for dating 
Beckett's initial interest in Kant to 1930, for `his lecture "Le 
concentrisme" refers to Kant and may well be earlier' (Pilling, 
1 
1993, p, 26, n. 16). If the basis of the interpretation of 
Beckett's works via Kant were dependent upon conscious authorial 
intention, the Kantian influence would need to be maintained 
across almost half a century in order to reach into Catastrophe 
as produced in 1982.1 As reported by Knowlson, however, the 
ultimate fate of Beckett's volumes of Kant's philosophy was to 
be given away to Avigdor Arikha (Knowlson, 1996, p. 761, n. 162). 
Knowlson only considers this fact worthy of a small footnote in 
a major biography of Beckett because the manuscript of `Petit 
sot', perhaps Beckett's-least-known poem, was discovered between 
the pages of Beckett's edition of Kant when in Arikha's 
possession. From the fact of Beckett dispensing with his Kantian 
volumes, one may urge either that such a saturation in Kantian 
themes had been achieved that further reference to sources was 
superfluous or, - alternatively, that a strong measure of 
indifference to Kant's philosophy and the . books containing it had 
been acquired. Neither -option is provable nor refutable. 
Instead, responsibility for bringing together Beckett and Kant 
will be borne by this thesis, with its justification resting upon 
interpretative felicity rather than. biographical imperatives. 
Interestingly, Pilling does find in Beckett's `Murphy 
notebook' (or MS 3000/1 of the International Beckett Foundation's 
archive at the University of Reading), evidence of `a very nearly 
inexhaustible dialogue between the Beckett of the mid-1930s and 
the post-war Nobel prizewinner' (Pilling, 1992, p. 6). Also, as 
Pilling confirms, 
the Murphy notebook provides unambiguous evidence - long 
suspected, but never so well authenticated - of the 
importance to Beckett of a distinctively German tradition, 
especially in regard to philosophy. 
(Pilling, 1992, p. 14) 
This tradition is `massively present, the key figures being Kant, 
Schopenhauer and Fritz Mauthner' (Pilling, 1992, p. 3). 
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Despite biographers' considered inattention to this matter, 
the presence of Kant in the works of Beckett can be 
demonstrated. ' The reference to Kant in `Le concentrisme' is as 
explicit as could be wished: 
what is crystal clear is that, if you insist on rigidifying 
the Idea of which [Chas] speaks, on concretizing Kant's 
Thing-in-itself, you would-be devaluing to the level of a 
vaudeville by Labiche the art which, like a resolution of 
Mozart's, is perfectly intelligible and perfectly 
inexplicable. 
(Beckett, 1990b, MenCard 118) 
The contrast between the latter two descriptions can be resolved 
by an appreciation that the `intelligible' is, in Kantian terms, 
entirely unknowable, and, as a consequent, `inexplicable'. There 
are other direct references. Beckett's Three Dialogues with 
Georges 
-Duthuit refers to `Kant's cosmological proof of the 
existence of God' (Beckett, 1965, 
-p. 112) notwithstanding Kant's 
concern, at least in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
-to refute the 
cosmological proof, as actually and notably deployed instead by 
Descartes. The Addenda 'to Watt includes a phrase from Kant's 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, `das fruchtbare Bathos der 
2 Here, at least, ' finding Kant in Beckett is better 
favoured than Beckett's own assessment as to finding Vico in 
Joyce: 
These [... ] aspects of Vico have their reverberations, their 
reapplications 
- 
without, however, receiving the faintest 
explicit illustration 
- 
in `Work in Progress. ' 
(Beckett, 1961, p. 5) 
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Erfahrung' (Beckett, 1976, p. 254) or `the fruitful bathos of 
experience' (Kant, 1950, p. 122, n. 2). Chapter Two will, show a 
further interest in this. The Unnamable adopts some `pigsty 
Latin', `De nobis ipsis silemus' (`Of myself I say nothing'), 
which, according to its narrator, `should have been my motto' 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 332). It is in fact part of Kant's motto or 
epigraph to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason 
(Kant, 1933, Bii, p. xviii). 3 The presence of a recognizably 
Kantian philosophical vocabulary can be discerned. Variations 
upon `pure reason' are a Beckettian standard; Company is Kantian 
in its first judgement: 
Pure reason? Beyond experience. God is love. Yes or no? 
No. 
(Beckett, 1980, p. 73) 
A professor, shared between Dream of Fair to Middling Women and 
More Pricks than Kicks, is concerned with "'the violated matrix 
of pure reason"' (Beckett, 1993, pp. 234-235; Beckett, 1970b, 
p. 84). Macmann of Malone Dies `was rather of the earth and ill- 
fitted for pure reason' (Beckett, 1959, pp. 243-244). Murphy's 
losses following the consumption of his biscuits by Miss Dew's 
dog Nelly amounts to "'Twopence [... ] and a critique of pure 
love"' (Beckett, 1963, p. 60). Switching to Kant's Critique of 
Judgement, `Unfortunate Belacqua', in Dream. of Fair to Middling 
Women, fails to appreciate the Kantian distinction between 
As Pilling points out, the phrase previously belonged to 
Bacon's Novum Organum (1620) (Pilling, 1992, p. 5). 
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conceptual and aesthetic judgement, whereby 'beauty,, in the final 
analysis, is not subject to categories, is beyond categories' 
(Beckett, 1993, p. 35). Malone, on the other hand, will not `say 
the vital parts, but at least the sensibility and understanding' 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 244); the-latter terms mark the. most vital 
distinction of-the human faculties made in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. This distinction between the sensory and the conceptual 
was earlier exploited by Arsene in Watt: 
[... ] I-perceived it with"-a'perception so sensuous that in 
comparison the impressions of a man buried alive in Lisbon 
on Lisbon's great day seem a frigid and artificial 
construction of the understanding. " 
(Beckett, 1976, p. 42) 
For Poeme VIII of Beckett's Poemes 1937-1939, however, the 
requisite contrast is between `Lisbonne fumante' and `Kant 
froidement penche' (Beckett, 1977, p. 46). 
Each reference, borrowing or allusion above could have 
reached Beckett via Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's entanglement 
in Kantian presuppositions, systems and vocabulary and Beckett's 
well-documented entanglement in Schopenhauer, further 
problematize any impulse to cite Kant as a direct philosophical 
source for Beckett. ` In addition to incorporating many aspects 
` For an examination of the importance of Schopenhauer to 
Beckett, see, for example, `Beckett, Proust and Schopenhauer' 
(Acheson, 1978, pp. 165-179); `Schopenhauer and Beckett's ! Oq ' (Jones, 1986, pp. 71-81) and 'Beckett's Schopenhauerian Reading 
of Proust: The Will as Whirled in Re-Presentation' (O'Hara, 1988, 
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of the Kantian system into his own philosophy, Schopenhauer also 
wrote directly upon Kant's critique of metaphysics. 
Schopenhauer's The World'as Will and Representation includes a 
substantial Appendix devoted entirely to `Criticism of the 
Kantian Philosophy' ý (Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 1, pp. 413-534). 
This. thesis does not seek to dispute the possibility that each 
Kantian theme explored below could have been inculcated by a 
subtle reading of Schopenhauer. 5 
Nevertheless, it is Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
Prolegomena to any Future Metaihysics and Critique of Judgement 
which predominantly supply this thesis' idea of an appropriately 
`Kantian' critique of metaphysics in Beckett. 6_ Substantial 
pp. 273-292). 
s Sources of Kantian concepts expand as one looks for them; 
according to Yack, `Stripped of their rhetorical masks, Marx and 
Nietzsche are, in a very important sense, left Kantians' (Yack, 
1986, pp. 30-31). A recognizably Kantian critique of metaphysics 
can be found in Wittgenstein, Russell, Ayer and Logical 
Positivism. The `separation of valid cognition and metaphysics' 
(Adorno, 1973, p. 381) has not, before or since 1781, been 
restricted to the critique of Pure Reason. Proponents of such 
a distinction are not themselves sufficiently separable for the 
game of source-hunting invoked in Dream of Fair to Middling Women 
to be successfully concluded: 
We stole that one. Guess where. (Beckett, 1993, pp. 191-192) 
6 The pretence is maintained throughout that an attribution 
to `Kant' means that all citations, whatever their particular 
location in Kant's works, are of equal validity in an exposition 
of the Kantian. To the scholar, the sector of the Critique of 
Pure Reason from which citations originate is of the first 
importance, given the philosophical notoriety or respectability 
of the arguments deployed therein. Here, citations are 
referenced merely to Section A or Section B, or both, to 
designate 
-their origin from the First or Second Editions 
respectively of the Critique of Pure Reason. Arguments as to the 
merits of and relationship between these editions are not entered into. 
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passages of exposition of Kant's philosophy are given in the 
initial sections of Chapter One, are extended in Chapter Five and 
re-visited in the concluding sections of Chapter Six. The early 
stages of Chapter one prepare the ground for a parallel between 
Kant's critique of metaphysics and those Beckett texts examined 
through Chapters One, Two, Three and Four. The first chapter 
outlines Kant's theory of the two `forms' of the intuition, space 
and time, which necessarily define human perception as empirical, 
and subsequently examines the incommensurability which Kant urges 
between empirical evidence and metaphysical conclusions. The 
limits which Kant places on possible knowledge are compared to 
the frustrations imposed upon the investigative duo of Theatre 
. 
Chapter Two assesses the relationship between KrapD's Last 
Tape and the issues it can invoke from Proust's A la recherche 
du temps perdu, including the essential continuity of the 
subject, the workings of involuntary memory and the possibility 
of an exit from the flow of-linear time. Chapter Two considers 
app's Last Tape a parody of these 
-Proustian metaphysical 
profundities. The Manichaean metaphysical system, the binary 
terms of which are used by Krapp as a means of organizing thought 
and experience, is judged by Chapter Two to receive even harsher 
tests to its dignity in Krapp's Last Tape. Chapter Three 
attempts to analyse the consequences of staging the fabrication 
of a recognizably `Beckettian' image of the human condition in 
Catastrophe. Chapter Four engages with the detailed textual 
specifications of The Lost Ones- via an `immanent' method of 
analysis which seeks to establish itself in opposition to 
`transcendent' or allegorical readings capable of promoting 
7 
themes of metaphysical import. Such readings can only retain 
their coherence by transcending the contradictions, 
inconsistencies and aporiai apparent in the stated terms of I 
Lost Ones itself. Accordingly, the reader may doubt whether 
Chapter Four, by seeking to avoid such transcendence, can retain 
its coherence. 
Chapter Five marks a turning-point, in the thesis. It 
investigates why analysis of the terms of The Lost Ones as 
undertaken in Chapter Four should prove so extraordinarily 
troublesome. As a response, it details Beckett's efforts toward 
narrative `indetermination', especially in Watt and Murphy, and 
links this process to the equally troublesome `noumenon' of 
Kant's Critique of'Pure Reason. Chapter Six reassesses in detail 
the-parallels drawn between Beckett and Kant in the first four 
chapters here. The shortcomings, paradoxes and flat 
contradictions contained in Chapters One to Four provide the 
materials for Chapters Six's re-appraisal of the main thesis 
pursued here, that a critique of metaphysics can be found in 
Beckett's 'works analogous with that supplied by Kant. The 
secondary thesis is that certain errors and impasses encountered 
during such an interpretation of Beckett's texts are inevitable 
rather than disgraceful to the offices of criticism. This is 
also the point where a temptation toward critical transcendence 
of the details of Beckett's texts, rejected by Chapter Four, 
might re-assert itself. Charitably, this structure may be 
considered `bien balance' with, as Beckett recommends, 
`affirmation d'abord, negation ensuite' (Beckett, 1983a, 
8 
P. 122). " 
ii. Beckett criticism 
The Beckett-and-philosopher scenario is a staple of Beckett 
criticism. Kant's critique of metaphysics, however, can hamper 
the smooth operation of the philosophies of Beckett's more usual, 
companions, Descartes, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Sartre or Heidegger, 
in so far as their thought involves metaphysical commitments. 
If metaphysics has always been subject to `the rifle-fire of 
scepticism', the Critique of Pure Reason represents the battery 
of `the heavy artillery' against such philosophical systems 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 168). Consequently, an analogy 
between Kant and Beckett can be deployed against readings of. 
Beckett pursued from a Cartesian, Schopenhauerian, Hegelian, 
Sartrean or Heideggerian metaphysical basis. With Kant taken 
into-account, the relationship between Beckett's writings and 
other philosophical systems appears critical and parodic. It is 
not so much a matter of disputing these established philosophical 
links, 
-as re-interpreting the evaluative attitude taken towards 
them. 
Much Beckett criticism is content to reach the conclusion 
that metaphysical insight constitutes the greater glory of the 
There will be little other citation of Beckett in French. 
Some limited comparison of the French and English versions of Tg 
Lost ones is undertaken in Chapter Six; Chapters one to Four, 
however, are not concerned with the alternative intricacies of the French Fragment de theatre II, La derniLre bande, Catastrophe 
or Le Ddpeupleur. This thesis restricts itself to the English 
side of the linguistic divide in Beckett's oeuvre. 
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works of Samuel Beckett. Critics writing from a cultural 
materialist perspective recommend impatience with Beckett 
precisely because of the essentialism, and typically pessimism, 
endemic in the above criticism. The first phase of Beckett's 
reception in East Germany-exemplifies such disapproval: 
Beckett was blamed for presenting `alienation' and the 
Absurd as ontological and historically irreversible 
conditions. With a view to his booming reception in the 
West Beckett's work was seen as an apologia for late 
bourgeois capitalism. What irritated the theorists and 
propagandists of socialist realism most were his lack of 
perspective, his pessimism, and his nihilism. In a manner 
of speaking he had become a class enemy. 
(Huber, 1993, p. 50) 
It is precisely Beckett's supposed metaphysical content, that 
which is `ontological and historically irreversible', which 
provoked disdain. Despite playing a relatively minor role in 
Lukdcs' diagnosis of the" distortion of reality inherent in 
Modernism, Beckett's Molloy does emerge with a particular 
distinction; the catalyst for condemnation is again Modernism's 
putative investment in the metaphysical: 
What served, with Musil, as the ideological basis of a new 
typology 
- 
escape into neurosis as a protest against" the 
evils of society 
- 
becomes with other modernist writers an 
immutable condition humaine. Musil's statement loses its 
10 
conditional `if' and becomes a simple description of 
reality. Lack of objectivity in the description of the 
outer world finds its complement in the reduction of reality 
to a nightmare. Beckett's Molloy is perhaps the ne plus 
ultra of this development [... ]. 
(Lukäcs, 1962, p. 31) 
A historically contingent situation is mistakenly elevated to the 
irremediable status of an eternal metaphysical condition. This 
mis-recognition occurs when `the modernist writer identifies what 
is necessarily a subjective experience with reality as such' 
(Lukäcs, 1962, p. 51). The distinction which Modernism blurs had 
already been drawn by Nietzsche: 
Modern pessimism is an expression of the uselessness of the 
modern world - not the world of existence. 
(Nietzsche, 1968, §34, p. 23) 
In Modernism, Lukäcs sees instead the ambition to achieve a 
`revelation of the human condition', grounded upon the assumption 
that `Man is now what he has always been and always will be' 
(Lukäcs, 1962, p. 21). For Edward Bond such an ambition, such an 
assumption and such a wholesale neglect of the historical, 
signals the `decadence of that literature': 
Writers of the theatre of the absurd in our time write only 
from weakness because they are 'trapped in the decadence of 
our time and have no rational view of the future or of 
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anything else. 
(Bond, 1978, p. x) 
If the human condition is essential and fixed, if it is a matter 
of metaphysical import, any attempt at amelioration or alteration 
of such an eternal state must necessarily be futile. Such is the 
stated position of Ionesco, taken up by 
- 
Sinfield° as 
representative of a shared-attitude in the theatrical Absurd:, 
Such plays challenge conventional assumptions about the 
world, but politically. [... ] they are conservative, for they 
tend to deny the relevance of political commitment [... ]. 
This tendency was attacked by Tynan in his review of Tg 
Chairs and The Lesson at the Royal Court (1958). Ionesco 
replied: 'No society has. been able to abolish human sadness, 
no political system can deliver us from the pain of living, 
from our fear of death, our thirst for the absolute. ' He 
reversed Marx's dictum that social being determines 
consciousness: 'it is the human condition that. directs the 
social condition, not vice versa. ' 
(Sinfield, 1983, p. 183) 
"'Absurdist" theatre', Sinfield writes, echoing Lukäcs' critique 
of Modernism, `purports to present the ultimate human condition' 
(Sinfield, 1983, p. 183). As the `ultimate human condition', 
whatever its baleful consequences, cannot be subject to revision, 
the `overall drift' in Absurdist drama may thus be diagnosed as, 
by default, `complicit with existing society' (Sinfield, 1983, 
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p. 184). Having been placed among the ranks of Absurdist 
dramatists, ' despite never issuing remarks of comparable 
generality to those of Ionesco, ' Beckett is subject to the same 
charges. As Sinfield reports, George Devine, the director of the 
English Stage Company, `distrusted political commitment and 
valued most his theatre's work with-Samuel Beckett' (Sinfield, 
1989, p. 261). These options are presented as mutually exclusive. 
`With few exceptions', Stephen Watt records, `most Marxist 
critics have echoed Georg Lukdcs' disdain for the-ahistorical, 
allegorical, bourgeois work of Beckett, Kafka, and others' (Watt, 
1987, p. 103). 10 It is a disdain predicated upon the alleged 
metaphysical pretensions of each writer. 
Such is one of Martin Esslin's achievements; ' `Both 
Ionesco and Beckett', Esslin is assured, `are concerned with 
communicating to their audiences their sense of the absurdity of 
the human condition' (Esslin, 1960, p. 671). The Theatre of the 
Absurd (first published 1961) placed Beckett and Ionesco within 
the same dramatic genre. 
9 Ionesco wrote of a fixed human condition; consider by 
contrast Beckett's comments on the experience of the Irish Red- 
Cross workers in Saint-L6 in his post-war radio broadcast `The 
Capital of Ruins' (1946): 
they got at least as good as they gave, [... ] they got 
indeed what they could hardly give, a vision and sense of 
a time-honoured conception of humanity in ruins, and perhaps 
even an inkling of the terms in which our condition is to 
be thought again. 
(Beckett, 1990a, pp. 27-28) 
When a `conception of humanity' can `be thought again' under the 
pressure of concrete experience, that conception is defined as 
contingent rather than metaphysical. 
1° The most notable exception was Adorno. 'Beckett's =gq 
Homo is what human beings have 
. 
become' (Adorno, 1980, p. 190), 
Adorno argues, not as a result of any metaphysical necessity, but 
rather as a response to actual, and contingent, historical and 
social circumstances. 
13 
It is these very metaphysical pretensions which operate to 
the delight of other strands of Beckett criticism. O'Hara turns 
the evaluative criteria of the cultural materialist position 
upside down: 
The nouvelles foreshadow the trilogy in achieving a point 
of view from which mere social criticism is excluded. To 
blame the hero's plight on society [ 
... 
] would be as absurd 
as blaming it on his nationality. It is existence itself 
that victimizes him. 
-, 
(O'Hara, 1970, 
-p. 5) 
4 
As Hamm, not Beckett, laments in Endgame, `you're°on earth, 
there's no cure for that! ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 118). Butler 
expands discursively upon Hamm's portentous proclamation: 
Beckett seems to be in violent revolt against the nature of 
this world and it is clearly not something political or 
psychological that he is revolting against. It is something 
ontological. In general terms it is la condition humaine 
that is wrong, there is something wrong at the root of the 
human situation, something wrong that no amount of love or 
donations to-relief agencies will cure, something wrong 
ontologically. 
- 
(Butler, 1984, p. 151) 
The assurance that aid of any kind must always prove useless can 
provide a comforting justification for Hamm's decision to hand 
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over neither oil, bread nor corn to his various supplicants. The 
bad terms of human existence are not his responsibility. But the 
narrative which leads up to Hamm's metaphysically resonant 
statement of the incurability of the evils of the human situation 
does include details of a human situation which is open to 
amelioration: 
Enough of that, its story time, where was I? [Pause. 
Narrative tone. ] The man came crawling towards me, on his 
belly. [... ] He raised his face to me, black with mingled 
dirt and tears. [.. I Come on, man, speak up, what is it you 
want from me, I have to put up my holly. ' [Pause. ] Well to 
make it short it finally transpired that what he wanted from 
me was 
... 
bread for his brat. Bread? But I have no bread, 
it doesn't agree with me. Good. Then perhaps a little 
corn? [... ] Corn, yes, I" have corn, it's true, in my 
granaries. But use your head. I give you some corn, a 
pound, a pound and a half, you bring it back to your child 
and you make him - if he's still alive -a nice pot of 
porridge [NAGG reacts], a nice pot and a half of porridge, 
full of nourishment. Good. The colours comeback into his 
little cheeks 
- 
perhaps. And then? [Pause. ] I lost 
patience. [Violently. ] Use your head, can't you, use your 
head, you're on earth, there's no cure for that! 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 116-118) 
Considered as an explanation as to why his granaries should not 
be depleted of a pound and a half of corn begged on behalf of a 
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starving child, Hamm's metaphysical diagnosis loses some of its 
disinterested philosophical grandeur. " Yet, according to 
Rosen, it is precisely the kind of ease that Hamm seeks via a 
self-serving metaphysical pessimism that Beckett himself 
recommends. `His works describe', Rosen maintains, `a quest for 
effective calm, an acceptance of life's inevitable sorrows' 
(Rosen, 1976, p. 66); the familiar assurance of futility returns: 
To secure this peace of mind, it is necessary to maintain 
that all efforts are futile, because all conditions of life 
are essentially similar. Distinctions of milieu are not 
only irrelevant to this sort of vision, but, as local 
accidents suggesting irrelevant meanings and explanations, 
contraindicated; hence the general lack of concrete details 
in Beckett's writing. 
(Rosen, 1976, p. 66) 
There is, amongst proponents of `this sort of vision', a distinct 
lack of attention to the `concrete details in Beckett's writing'. 
It is the details of Endgame which serve to re-define its 
metaphysical gestures from authorially-sanctioned assertions into 
parodic pricks against episodes of staged metaphysical 
11 Consider also the metaphysical overtones of Hamms 
warning that `Outside of here it's death' (Beckett, 1986, p. 96). 
Before such an assertion is cited as confirmation of the wreck 
of nature or universal holocaust in Endgame, it should be taken 
into account that Hamm above all else wishes to dissuade Clov 
from abandoning him. The mundane self-interested motives of the 
statement are clear when it is interpreted in the context of the 
play. Only when detached from the situation in which it occurs 
can it can be unproblematically presented as a metaphysical diagnosis. 
16 
exposition 
. 
12 
The details of Becketts work must be underplayed by critics 
seeking to extract a metaphysical vision of the human condition. 
Each Beckett text is reduced by them to the provision of an 
identical metaphysical lesson. For Butler, Beckett's work `is 
a whole, a unified and self-consistent statement about existence' 
(Butler, 1984, p. 154), indeed, `the series of ontological 
parables we read into Beckett may in the end resolve themselves 
into one unified statement' (Butler, 1984, p. 155). The 
significance of Beckett's works could be subsumed, Butler thinks, 
under this one abstract metaphysical message. Thus Beckett's 
theatre, through all its variations, can be ultimately valued for 
its `dramatized metaphors for human existence' (Hesla, 1971, 
p. 151). `In the case of Beckett', Hesla confirms, `what is being 
revealed in and through his art is simply the condition of man' 
(Hesla, 1971, p. 164). The prose texts are thus identical to the 
drama in subject-matter. `For Beckett', Baldwin concurs, `there 
is one story and one, story only that is worth telling,. and that 
is the story of quest, of man in search of the ground of his 
13 A metaphysical set-piece speech in Waitina for Godot is 
similarly afflicted by a note of bathos: 
VLADIMIR: [... ] Astride of a grave and a difficult birth. 
Down in the hole, lingeringly, the grave-digger puts 
on the forceps. We have time to grow old. The air is 
full of our cries. [He listens. ] But habit isa great 
deadener. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 84) 
The lack of empirical substantiation provided as Vladimir's 
refers the audience to `The air [... ] full of our, cries' 
introduces a parodic tone, consistently under-exploited by 
commentators, which lightens the metaphysical weight consistently 
attached to this passage. 
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being' (Baldwin, 1981, p. 8). The Trilogy accordingly `speaks for 
mankind' (Levy, 1980, p. 62): 
The narrator must always speak as Beckettian Man with the 
vestigial voice of his species. " 
Malone's stories demonstrate this clearly. Their 
characters have experiences to be sure, yet these concern 
not personal problems but the unmitigated suffering of human 
existence. That is the denominator to which all individuals 
are reduced. ' 
(Levy, 1980, p. 63) 
Beckett does not supply `the private wail of one man in pain, but 
that of humanity, 'the human species' (Levy, 1980, p. 62), all of 
whom, presumably, suffer equally under the burden of the human 
condition. Yet the scenario of Catastrophe, for example, is 
extraordinarily inappropriate as an illustration of any such 
1' If Levy is correct in this contention, then the laxity 
of `pupil Mahood' in his study of mankind is outrageously 
indulged by the narrator of The Unnamable: 
Frankly, between ourselves, what the hell could it matter 
to pupil Mahood, that man was this rather than that? (Beckett, 1959, p. 340) 
The narrator is barely more respectful of the grave subject- 
matter upon which critics consider him also engaged: 
it might sometimes almost be wondered if all their ballocks 
about life and death is not as foreign to their nature as 
it is to mine. (Beckett, 1959, p. 388) 
Metaphysicians should not so doubt the efficacy of their project, 
but as Malone commiserates, `It's vague, life and death' (Beckett, 1959, p. 225). Whatever else it does, the Trilogy does 
not unproblematically confirm its credentials as a work with 
metaphysical intent. 
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equalization of suffering. Müller confesses that critics also 
took some little time to overcome the specificity of the problems 
trailed by Catastrophe's dedication to Väclav Havel: 
At first Catastrophe seems to have been written for a very 
specific group, occasion and situation, like Ohio Impromptu, 
until its universal significance is revealed. 
(Müller, 1993, p. 263) 
Concrete specificity is assumed to represent a fault needing 
correction. The singularly strange, text How It'Is must, like 
Catastrophe, also-be raised to universality: 
Through his vocabulary and his bits and scraps of remembered 
knowledge, the narrator of How It Is subsumes all humanity. 
(Brienza, 1987b, p. 93) 
According to Brienza, `our timeless-narrator can represent all 
human beings' (Brienza, 1987b, p. 95). t4 Yet the narrator of ýºc 
It Is specifically states that , `of the-four three quarters of our 
total life only three lend themselves to communication' (Beckett, 
1964, p. 143). The narrator is unable to represent the totality 
of his own experience, let alone that of `all human beings' 
(Brienza, 1987b, p. 95). How It Is comes `complete with missing 
parts' (Beckett, 1965, p. 101). The next scene in the sequence 
initiated, that of the-narrator tormented by Bom in Part Four, 
14 In case the category of `all human beings' does not 
contain them, Brienza further contends that the narrator also 
represents `all writers' (Brienza, 1987b, p. 95). 
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the companion piece to his own tormenting of Pim in Part Two, 
cannot be narrated. The story cannot be told from the position 
of the victim, for he is permitted to utter according only to the 
whims of his tormenter. The Protagonist of Catastrophe is staged 
and spotlighted enduring an equally enforced silence. We may 
speculate as to the experiences of the Protagonist; they are not 
communicated from his perspective. We may inquire as to `Bom and 
me part four what that will be' (Beckett, 1964, p. 133), but the 
narrator can offer no statement of it:. 
but we shall never, see Born at work I shall pant on in 
abeyance in the dark the mud the-voice being so ordered I 
quote that-of; our total life it states only three quarters 
(Beckett, 1964, p. 142) 
The narrator of How It Is actively rejects the universality which 
Brienza nevertheless awards him., Metaphysical generality and the 
details of Beckett's texts do not make common cause. 1-5 
iii. Martin Esslin, metaphysics and self-defeat 
is Note in contrast the terms-in which Beckett approves 
Vico: 
We notice that there is little or no attempt at subjectivism 
or abstraction, no attempt at metaphysical generalisation. 
We are presented with a statement of the particular. (Beckett, 1961, pp. 16-17) 
It is attention to awkward detail, disruptive to generalization 
and thus metaphysical readings, which criticism has often been 
disinclined to pay to Beckett's texts. Chapter Four attempts an 
analysis of the 'statement'of the particular' in regard to fg 
Lost Ones, to the necessary detriment, as will be seen, of its 
own argumentative coherence. 
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According to Cohn, writing in 1990, one should remain 
`appreciative of the formative impact of Martin Esslin's Theatre 
of the Absurd' (Cohn, 1990, p. 8) on the study of twentieth- 
century drama. 16 The Theatre of the Absurd, as directed by 
Esslin, is also dedicated to the provision of metaphysical 
propositions. Absurdity incorporates an essential metaphysical 
aspect; `the avant-garde theatre of our-time is concerned with 
the Absurd', according to Esslin, 
- 
`the Absurd in its 
metaphysical sense' (Esslin, 1960, p. 670). This twentieth- 
century avant-garde, in a manner disconcertingly similar to 
Tillyard's Elizabethan dramatists, supplies a metaphysical world- 
picture to its audience. Esslin perceives that a `sense of 
metaphysical anguish at the absurdity of the human condition is, 
broadly speaking, the theme of the plays of Beckett, Adamov, 
Ionesco, Genet' (Esslin, 1968b, pp. 23-24). Particularity is 
again devalued, for Esslin requires `man stripped of the 
accidental circumstances of social position or historical 
context', the better to be `confronted with the basic choices, 
16 The extent of Esslin's influence on the study of Beckett 
is demonstrated in a survey of teachers of Waiting for Godot 
undertaken by Schlueter and Brater and published in 1991: 
The work to which teachers most frequently send their 
students (with some caution regarding terminology) is Martin 
Esslin's Theatre of the Absurd, a study that provides both 
a theatrical and a philosophical context for the play. In 
fact, every respondent who recommended secondary works 
mentioned Esslin, and several who resisted secondary 
materials conceded that if they did require ancillary 
reading, it would be Esslin. 
(Schlueter and Brater, 1991, p. 4) 
Esslin has been more influential than any other critic in his identification of Beckett's literary works with metaphysical tracts. Accordingly, he is commended within major strands of Beckett criticism. 
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the basic situations of his existence' (Esslin, 1968b, p. 391). 17 
It would be difficult to frame a version of Beckett more 
provocative to the sensibilities of cultural materialist critics. 
It is the precise nature of the metaphysical reality 
represented by the Absurd which manoeuvres Esslin toward logical 
self-defeat, an impasse which will become familiar as this thesis 
proceeds. It is established by Esslin that metaphysical reality 
is so constituted as to render metaphysical discoveries 
impossible. The Absurd can reveal nothing concerning 
metaphysical reality except that it is mysterious, meaningless 
and. purposeless. As Esslin interprets these discoveries, they 
signal the end of metaphysical speculation as such. By the 
reckonings of the Absurd, `the world has lost its central 
explanation and meaning' (Esslin, 1968b, p. 389); there is now no 
`firm foundation of revealed certainty about the purpose of man 
in the universe' (Esslin, 1968b, p. 390). Esslin neglects to 
1' Initially, Esslin judges that such a `process of 
contraction' has been `carried out triumphantly' in Endgame, a 
play which may be considered `a shaft driven deep down into the 
core of being' (Esslin, 1968b, p. 67). Attention to Beckett's 
later and greater minimalism, however, provides grounds for an 
unexpected critique of the play's newly discovered inessential 
opulence: 
Nell, after all, is Hamm's mother, and he hears her voice (no doubt not literally) emerging from a dustbin. That bin 
is merely there as a picturesque illustrative detail. In 
Footfalls the mother's voice remains; the dustbin, and the 
mother's face protruding from it, have been dispensed with 
as inessentials. 
(Esslin, 1980, p. 119) 
Esslin's revised evaluation of Nell's dustbin as a 'picturesque illustrative detail' is arguably the most comic remark in Beckett 
criticism. 
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notice that he now implies new certainties and firm foundations, 
those of meaninglessness and purposelessness. There are `many', 
according to Esslin, 
searching for a way in which they can, with dignity, 
confront a universe deprived of what was once its centre and 
its living purpose, a world deprived of a generally accepted 
integrating principle, which has become disjointed, 
purposeless 
- 
absurd. 
(Esslin, 1968b, p. 389). 
Unexpectedly, such a new non-centred world-disorder can yet be 
encapsulated in a single word 
- 
`absurd'. Esslin installs 
absurdity as a replacement `integrating principle' for a world 
defined by its very deprivation of such a thing. " With regard 
to the theatre categorized as Absurd, Esslin writes: 
The hallmark of this attitude is its sense that the 
certitudes and unshakable basic assumptions of former ages 
have been swept away, that they have been tested and found 
This self-defeating lapse back into the type of thinking 
from which one wishes to break decisively is also exhibited in 
LeMay and Pitts' description of the Absurd: 
Absurdity is recognizing the world without the concepts we 
posit upon it. This is the experience 
- 
horrifying to some 
existentialists, liberating to others 
- 
of meaninglessness. 
(LeMay and Pitts, 1994, p. 61) 
The apocalypse of conceptual ordering can be postponed, however, 
for "Absurdity" is merely an alternative concept posited upon the 
world. The Absurd does not mark an exit from conceptual 
understanding as such, but offers an alternative concept for 
metaphysical deployment. 
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wanting, that they have been discredited as cheap and 
somewhat childish illusions. 
(Esslin, 1968b, p. 23) 
After this revelation of error, `life must be faced in its 
ultimate, stark reality' (Esslin, 1968b, p. 391). But as 
illusions depart to reveal the reality of absurdity, Esslin has 
merely struck a new metaphysical chord rather than achieved an 
exit from metaphysical thinking. The definition of reality as 
meaningless or Absurd remains within the frame of metaphysical 
speculation as a positive assertion. To define the world as 
inherently senseless or purposeless, is to claim metaphysical 
knowledge. The difference between knowing the universe to be 
meaningless and'knowing it to be meaningful is easily over- 
estimated: both are metaphysical assertions. This confusion is 
evident in Esslin's comments on Camus: 
In one of the great, seminal heart-searchings of our time, 
The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus tried to diagnose the human 
situation in a world of shattered beliefs [... ]. 
(Esslin, 1968b, p. 23) 
Esslin should not so easily proclaim the universal shattering of 
beliefs: his very statement concerning `a world of shattered 
beliefs' is itself a belief about the world which appears to lie 
exempt from the universal destruction it announces. Such 
internal logical tensions destabilize Esslin's assertions. 
Should he state that `In a meaningless universe, it is always 
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foolhardy to make a positive statement' (Esslin, - 1968b, p. 84), 
Esslin has supplied a positive statement against positive 
statements. To declare `the impossibility of- ever attaining 
certainty' (Esslin, 1968b, p. 85) implies the metaphysical 
certainty of an eternal state of uncertainty. Made self- 
reflexive, Esslin's statements become self-refuting. 
Surprisingly, --after issuing so many, Esslin began by 
declaring the` impossibility of establishing any metaphysical 
truths. Such is the concern of this thesis also. = Esslin's 
summary of his project is uncomfortably-close to the Kantian 
critique of metaphysics undertaken here: 
What then are some of the main features that are common 
to the work of the playwrights of the `Theatre of the 
Absurd'? 
Above all,, there is their shared basic attitude to the 
world and life: a recognition that any certainties, any 
valid insights into the essential nature of the universe or 
the purpose of human life on earth are beyond our reach, 
humankind being too short-lived, too -limited in its 
perceptual apparatus and in its intellect ever to penetrate 
these ultimate mysteries. Camus and Sartre [... ] coined the 
phrase that summed up this recognition: what is beyond 
explanation, inaccessible to any rational explanation or 
understanding must remain `senseless' and 
- 
in that special 
meaning of the word 
- 
`absurd. ' 
(Esslin, 1991, p. 44) 
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Man's inability to know is known to constitute the essential 
human condition. Esslin thus lapses back to dependence upon a 
metaphysical assertion in order°to establish why human access to 
metaphysical verities cannot occur. Notwithstanding the self- 
refuting strategies used by Esslin to support his conclusions, 
this thesis wishes to replicate Esslin's stance as to the 
incommensurability between metaphysical knowledge and the human 
faculties. What cannot be achieved in epistemology by any human 
endeavour cannot be achieved in Beckett's works either: such is 
a central part of the case here against metaphysical readings of 
Beckett. " If Beckett were issuing the metaphysical assertions 
which many critics claim to discover in his work, then the robust 
judgements of cultural materialist criticism would be justified. 
But it should be part of the cultural materialist case that the 
metaphysical dimension which Beckett is castigated for 
cultivating, is, in principle, inaccessible to him. Chapter one 
below sets out Kant's case as to why-metaphysical knowledge must 
remain unavailable and applies these arguments to Theatre II. 
Yet Chapter Six is also obliged to consider finally whether these 
Kantian arguments, upon which the main thesis here relies, do not 
themselves retain covert metaphysical presuppositions in order 
to facilitate, contradictorily, a critique of metaphysics. It 
must be considered whether the self-defeating loop which 
destabilizes Esslin's critical conclusions is perceptible within 
LO Beckett himself is not given to extravagant claims to 
knowledge; witness the pulling up short of watt's Arsene: 
the fit is perfect. And he knows this. No. Let us remain 
calm. He feels it. 
(Beckett, 1976, p. 39) 
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Kant's critical philosophy and thus transported into the accounts 
offered below of-Theatre II, KraRpIs Last Tape, Catastrophe and 
The Lost Ones. Just as the logic of Esslin's arguments can be 
disputed without direct reference to the Beckett texts which are 
their occasion, Chapter Six below is primarily concerned with the 
self-defeating arguments and logical inconsistencies committed 
through the first four chapters of this thesis. Nevertheless, 
the very persistence of such internal- flaws'might demonstrate 
something about the nature of writing about Beckett, metaphysics 
and the conjunction or dissociation of each. This thesis exists 
to undermine the positions adopted by Esslin and other critics 
who encumber Beckett with metaphysical meanings, yet discovers 
that the ability to avoid. reproducing the logical impasses 
typical of Esslin's criticism is only dearly won, and perhaps 
would be better lost. The experience of writing it can at least 
bequeath an inverted insight into the gnomic terms with which 
Beckett begins the second of his Three Dialogues-with Georges 
Duthuit 
In search of the difficulty rather, than in its clutch. The 
disquiet of him who-lacks an adversary. 
(Beckett, 
-. 
1965,, p. 109) 
Disquiet in this study is provoked by the suspicion that it has 
lapsed into the clutches of the difficulty it seeks-to address, 
that Esslira, complete with metaphysical presuppositions and self- 
defeating procedures, is not its adversary but its model. 
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Chapter One 
Rough for Theatre II: Knowledge in Leaps and Bounds 
i. Kant's critique of metaphysics 
The contribution of Kant to exercises in metaphysics 
consists principally in the deletion of their epistemological 
security. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason recommends that 
philosophy be more frugal in the number of propositions it 
permits to reside within the bounds of `knowledge'. Provoked by 
metaphysical extravagance, Kant demands retrenchment: 
The greatest and perhaps sole use of all philosophy of pure 
reason is [ 
... 
] only negative; since it serves not as an 
organon for the extension but as a discipline for the 
limitation of pure reason# and, instead of discovering 
truth, has only the modest, merit of guarding against error. 
(Kant, 1933, A795/B823, p. 629) 
In the `formal-determination, on principle, of the boundary of 
the use of our reason' (Kant, 1950, §57, p. 100), empiricism will 
lie within the limits, metaphysics without. -A strict logical 
division is to be maintained between empirical knowledge and 
metaphysical speculation. The metaphysical concept `cannot be 
an object of sensuous intuition', which is precisely what the 
empirical object must be (Kant, 1950, §57, p. 101). Kant removes 
`any point or line of contact' (Kant, 
-1950, §57, p. 101) between 
these two areas of philosophical inquiry., Infinitely extended 
empirical inquiries cannot bridge this qualitative division. 
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Henceforth, speculative leaps across the empirical-metaphysical 
boundary are outlawed. 
The investigators in Beckett's Rough for Theatre II are 
charged with the task of discovering whether a suitable exit from 
the bounds of the disastrous empirical experience of their case- 
study, C, may be made via a leap. Theatre II designs a situation 
which is peculiarly explicit in its willingness to put itself at 
the mercy of metaphysical interpretations. The means of exit 
from an existence of unrelieved suffering, a `high double window 
open on bright night sky', is strategically positioned `Upstage 
centre' (Beckett, 1986, p. 237). C, `Standing motionless before 
left half of window with his back to the stage' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 237), contemplating the exterior `void' (Beckett, 1986, p. 245) 
is, as befits a `Croker', " apparently at the very point of 
suicide. A `briefcase crammed with documents' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 237) contains the material for an extensively researched and 
minutely detailed suicide-note. Disinterested third-party 
investigators have identified `Work, family, third-fatherland, 
cunt, finances, art and nature, heart and conscience, health, 
housing conditions, God and man' as, one and all, `so many 
disasters' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238). A wider acknowledgement of 
the futility of existence is recommended on humanitarian grounds, 
for `How many unfortunates would be so still today-if they had 
known in time to what extent they were so? ' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 247). In readiness for a more general inclination to suicide, 
Beckett has thought to provide additional capacity; C has at his 
disposal, after all, a `double window' (Beckett, 1986, p. 237). 
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In the assessment of the advisability of suicide, the 
evidence is overwhelmingly on one side. The symmetry of the 
stage set is breached by this single factor: `Downstage audience 
left' a `small table and chair' and `extinguished reading-lamp' 
is complemented by the `briefcase crammed with documents'; 
`Downstage right, forming symmetry' an `identical table and 
chair' receives the distinction of `Extinguished lamp only' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 237). C has positioned himself on the side of 
the evidence, before the `left half of window' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 237). The evidence of the Testimonies, besides documenting a 
catalogue of adversities, also emphasizes C's resolute attention 
to them: 
B: I quote again: `Of our national epos he remembered only 
the calamities, which did not prevent him from winning 
a minor scholarship, in the subject. ' Testimony of Mr 
Peaberry, market gardener in 
- 
the Deeping. Fens and 
lifelong friend. [Pause. ] `Not a tear was known to fall 
in our family, and God knows they did in torrents, that 
was not caught up and piously preserved in that 
inexhaustible reservoir of sorrow, with the date, the 
hour and occasion, and not a joy, fortunately they were 
few, that was not on the contrary irrevocably 
dissolved, as by a corrosive. In that he took after 
me. ' Testimony of the late Mrs Darcy-Croker, woman of 
letters. [Pause. ] Care for more? 
A: Enough. 
B: I quote: `To hear him talk [... ] you would have thought 
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he had never set foot outside hell [... ]. ' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 240) 
Despite due amplification of `that incident of the lottery,, 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 240), permission is granted for C to jump. 
Although the volume of evidence exceeds A's estimation of 
`Enough' to furnish a definite recommendation, neither the 
investigation nor Theatre II itself are- able to discover a 
procedure for finishing which would install a sense of 
completeness. The play remains amongst the `Roughs'; C declines 
to make his meticulously justified leap within the allotted stage 
time. ' Reduced ultimately to 
, 
matches as a source of 
enlightenment, A reintroduces C as a character he is finally 
unable to assess or touch. According to a reading informed by 
Kantian strictures on the limits of possible knowledge, the task 
of the investigators in Theatre II is one which must necessarily 
lack conclusion in just this way. Entering the stage space 
defined by Theatre II, A and B are immediately assigned positions 
which emphasize its physical, limits: A `sits with his back to 
1 The Unnamable must be a similar disappointment to those 
kind enough to attempt to persuade him to take his `last step': 
They can't do everything. They have put you on the right 
road, led you by the hand to the very brink of the 
precipice, now it's up to you, with an unassisted last step, 
to show them your gratitude. [... ] Through the splendours 
of nature they dragged a paralytic and now there's nothing 
more to admire it's my duty to jump, that it may be said, 
There goes another who has lived. 
(Beckett, 1959, pp. 335-336) 
But they ask too much: `The last step! I who could never manage 
the first' (Beckett, 1959, p. 336). 
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right wall', B `with his back to left wall' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 237). 2 Dutifully, A and B push to the limits of their 
permitted area of investigation; yet the nature of their 
assignment demands transcendence of these necessary limits. The 
metaphysical potentialities of Theatre II do not require 
extravagant critical guile to abstract. The investigators A and 
B, and by implication the play itself, seek to establish a 
substantive position on the nature and value of the human 
condition. The concrete experiences of the case-study C 
constitute the evidence for deliberation. The verdict is in 
accord with venerable strains of philosophical pessimism. ' But 
Theatre II, thus `worked [... ] up' and primed to go `down well' 
in the context of Beckett's presupposed allegiance to systems of 
metaphysical pessimism, retains disconcerting links with the 
2 The curious idea of being trapped in space is found also 
in the tale of Macmann in Malone Dies, where `space hemmed him 
in on every side and held him in its toils' (Beckett, 1959, 
p. 280). The inability of the subject to escape the frame of 
space, in the Kantian system, will indeed prove a restriction. 
3 Beckett's acknowledged familiarity with the works of 
Schopenhauer, perhaps the most determined exponent of 
metaphysical pessimism, should consolidate such a reading. The 
condition of `men's lives', varying between `emptiness and 
monotony' and the `unpleasant and repulsive' (Schopenhauer, 1974, 
§396, p. 652) does not admit amelioration. Schopenhauer will be 
comforted by `neither constitutions, legal systems, steam- 
engines, nor telegraphs', none of which `can ever make anything 
that is essentially better' (Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 443). 
Even examples of happiness are set as traps by a duplicitous 
fate: 
The comparatively happy are often only apparently so, or 
else, like those of long life, they are rare exceptions; the 
possibility of these still had to be left, as decoy-birds. (Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 573) 
As Schopenhauer superfluously confesses, `It is not [... ] my 
purpose here to write a Utopia' (Schopenhauer, 1974, §125, 
p. 247). 
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`skit' (Beckett, 1986, p. 240). 4 Contrasted with the boundaries 
imposed by Kant on the proper uses of pure reason, the nature of 
the metaphysical investigation dramatized in Theatre II 
reclassifies the play as a comedy of errors. 
Metaphysical inquiry is concerned with `those highest ends 
that most concern humanity' (Kant, 1933, A464/B492, p. 423), with 
delineating `the conditions of existence in general' (Kant, 1933, 
A483/B511, p. 435). The faculty of pure speculative reason, 
discounting the circumstantial and contingent, aims at the 
abstraction of eternal verities, whether ontological or 
evaluative. 5 Philosophical dignity is at stake here; as Kant 
acknowledges, metaphysics comprises `those enquiries which owing 
to their importance we consider to be far more excellent, and in 
their purpose far more lofty, than all that the understanding can 
learn in the field of appearances' (Kant, 1933, A3/B7, p. 46). 
In this investigation `we prefer to run every risk of error 
rather than desist from such urgent enquiries, on the ground of 
Its situation is also aligned with the early play 
Eleutheria which, presumably judged to be even less than a 
`skit', Beckett refused to see published in his lifetime. As the 
`condition' of `Man' is `repugnant to him 
- 
more or less' (Beckett, 1996, p. 161), the play again explores the question of 
suicide. Dr Piouk is the prime advocate of `The great refusal [... ] that only man is capable of, the most glorious one he is 
capable of, the refusal of Existence! ' (Beckett, 1996, p. 161). 
Theatre II revisits this territory. 
Beckett's titular formulation How It Is (1964, first 
published 1961) signals both senses simultaneously. As Abbott 
notes, without redundancy, `there is considerable critical 
support for the position that How It is is indeed about how it 
is' (Abbott, 1973, p. 141). An attempt to `tell the ultimate 
truth' is promised by this title (Bishop, 1986, p. 27). Saul 
Bellow's Mr Sammler-'s Planet employs the same phrase with the 
same overtones: 'All metaphysicians please note. Here is how it is' (Bellow, 1971, p. 12). 
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their dubious character, or from disdain and indifference' (Kant, 
1933, A3/B7, p. 46). The character of metaphysics, as delineated 
in the Critique of Pure Reason thus unites obligation with 
ultimate impossibility. 
The particular statements of metaphysics must themselves 
exhibit necessity; `trifling about probability and conjecture', 
according to Kant, `are suited as little to metaphysics as to 
geometry' (Kant, 1950, pp. 117-118). Geometry, mathematics and 
metaphysics are, for Kant, modes of knowledge comprised of 
synthetic a priori propositions. The force of the boundary 
between metaphysics and empiricism imposes itself here: to 
qualify as a priori a proposition must be necessary; propositions 
drawn from the empirical sphere are, by definition, a posteriori 
and contingent. Thus, under Kant's direction: 
we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge 
independent of this or that experience, but knowledge 
absolutely independent of"all experience. Opposed to it is 
empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible only a 
posteriori, that is, through experience. A priori modes of 
knowledge are entitled pure when there is no admixture of 
anything empirical. 
(Kant, 1933, B2-3, p. 43) 
The a priori status of propositions, `as is requisite in 
metaphysics' (Kant, 1950, p. 119), is the guarantee of their 
necessity. `Experience teaches us what is, but does not teach 
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us that it could not be other than what is It'; thus, it follows, 
`no empirical grounds of proof can ever amount to apodeictic 
proof' (Kant, 1933, A734/B762, p. 590). Necessity, and hence 
metaphysics itself, `cannot be derived from experience' (Kant, 
1933, B14-15, p. 52). 6 
Kant further subdivides modes of knowledge between the 
analytic and the synthetic a priori; metaphysics is to partake 
exclusively of the latter. The analytic a priori merely makes 
explicit what is necessarily contained in a given concept; its 
prerogative is to state trivial, although necessary, truths. 
Avoidance of offence against the principle of contradiction 
necessitates its validity; no extension of knowledge is 
involved. ' The synthetic a priori, the mode of metaphysics and 
mathematics, ` purports to make a substantive contribution to 
knowledge; these propositions must `add to the concept of the 
subject a predicate which has not been in any wise thought in it, 
and which no analysis could possibility extract from it' (Kant, 
6 Scientific research into the necessary constitution of 
natural elements supplies a difficulty for Kant. A substance 
with the constitution `two parts hydrogen to one part oxygen' is, 
a priori, water; this would seem to be, to the confusion of 
Kant's divisions, a necessary empirical fact derived from 
empirical investigations. 
' That `all bachelors are unmarried' is an example of an 
analytic a priori truth. Chapter Four below applies `analysis' 
in this Kantian sense to The Lost Ones. 
The classification of mathematics as a system of 
synthetic a priori propositions continues to be a controversy 
that exercises Kantian commentators. Kant maintains that the 
proposition 7+5= 12 is synthetic: `The concept of 12 is by no 
means already thought in merely thinking this union of 7 and 51 (Kant, 1933, B15, p. 53), a contention which is indeed `more 
evident, if we take larger numbers' (Kant, 1933, B16, p. 54). 
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1933, A7/B11, p. 48). Here, the contemplation of concepts is 
insufficient; attention to a Kantian antinomy of pure reason 
sharpens the point: 
Consider the conclusion that the world is eternal and 
consider the opposing conclusion that the world has existed 
for a limited period of time. By reflecting on the concept 
of the world it cannot be made out which of these 
conclusions is true. The concept of the world leaves it 
unspecified whether the world has always existed. Each of 
these conclusions thus affirms of the world a predicate not 
contained in the concept of the world. Kant points out that 
these conclusions are thus not only a priori; they are also 
synthetic. 
(Dryer, 1966, p. 48) 
Since the function of the synthetic a priori `is not merely to 
analyse concepts which we make ourselves a priori of things' but 
also to `add to the given concept something that was not 
contained in it' (Kant, 1933, B18, p. 54), the principle of 
contradiction alone cannot determine the validity of such 
assertions. Non-contradiction, `beyond the sphere of analytic 
knowledge', has `as a sufficient criterion of truth, no authority 
and no field of application' (Kant, 1933, A151/B191, pý190). 
Systems of metaphysics, in Kant's critique, may be `free from all 
inner contradiction' and yet be `either false or groundless' 
(Kant, 1933, A150/B190, p. 190). Exploiting their a priori 
freedom from empirical restriction, internally consistent 
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metaphysical statements risk dismissal as `empty', their concepts 
being without purchase on any sensible or even super-sensible 
object. 
ii. Space and time 
The security of empirical knowledge, with its concepts 
derived from objects available to sensuous intuition, is always 
to be contrasted with the unanchored conceptual flights of 
speculative metaphysics, manipulating concepts for which no 
object can be given. Exploration of the conditions which render 
empirical experience possible, however, is itself to yield 
.4 
priori and synthetic knowledge. Kant's `legitimate' metaphysics 
of empiricism is constituted by knowledge independent of but 
necessary to the possibility of experience. In Kant's account, 
it is an a priori deduction that the intuition of all empirical 
objects must take place within the frame of time and space. 
Space and time constitute the irreducible `form' of empirical 
sensibility: 
If we remove from our empirical concept of a body, one by 
one, every feature in it which is [merely] empirical, the 
colour, the hardness or softness, the weight, even the 
impenetrability, there still remains the space which the 
body (now entirely vanished) occupied, and this cannot be 
removed. 
(Kant, 1933, B5-6, p. 45) 
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A position in space is not a contingent empirical feature of the 
object, but an a priori condition of its availability to sensuous 
intuition. Similarly, `all appearances whatsoever, that is, all 
objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in 
time-relations' (Kant, 1933, A34/B51, p. 77). What appears is 
contingent, but it must appear within time: 
We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, remove time 
itself, though we can quite well think time as void of 
appearances. Time is, therefore, given a priori. In it 
alone is actuality of appearances possible at all. 
Appearances may, one and all, vanish; but time (as the 
universal condition of their possibility) cannot itself be 
removed. 
(Kant, 1933, A31/B46, p. 75) 
Among all the contingent possibilities of empirical intuition, 
`The only intuition that is given a priori is that of the mere 
form of appearances, space and time' (Kant, 1933, A720/B748, 
p. 581). 9 While `the matter of knowledge [obtained] from the 
senses' is entirely contingent, `the form for the ordering of 
this matter' is necessarily that of the spatio-temporal frame 
9 Space and time are inextricably linked by Kant as twin 
forms of the intuition. Their relationship is also acknowledged 
in The Unnamable: 
And even should the notion of time dawn on his darkness, at 
this punctual image of the countenance everlasting, who 
could blame him? Involving very naturally that of space, 
they have taken to going hand in hand, in certain quarters, 
it's safer. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 366) 
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(Kant, 1933, A86/B118, p. 121). 
This frame is `the subjective condition of sensibility, 
under which alone outer intuition is possible for' us' (Kant, 
1933, A26/B42, p. 71). Space and time are the necessary 
impositions of the subject upon the empirical object. What this 
object'may be in itself, `without regard to the constitution of 
our sensibility' (Kant, 1933, A28/B44, p. 72) through which it is 
perceived remains unknown: 
The transcendental concept of appearances in space [... ] is 
a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a 
thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things 
in themselves as their intrinsic property, that objects in 
themselves are quite unknown to us, and that what we call 
outer objects are nothing but mere representations of our 
sensibility, the form of which is space. The true correlate 
of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not known and cannot 
be known, through these representations; and in experience 
no question is ever asked in regard to it. 
(Kant, 1933, A30/B45, pp. 73-74) 
Empiricism can only intuit its object under conditions of its own 
manufacture. The object cannot be intuited independently of the 
conditions of intuition. To be perceived at all, all empirical 
objects must be perceived within space and time; consequently, 
the apprehension of all empirical objects is conditioned by these 
forms of intuition and therefore cannot be identical with the 
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thing-in-itself, or `noumenon', that which is unconditioned. It 
is the province of metaphysics to raise questions concerning the 
nature of objects unconditioned by the form of human intuition. 
Empirical intuition, as the very source of these conditions, can 
offer it no assistance. 
The security of empirical knowledge is based upon its very 
restriction to appearances. Empirical appearances are a function 
of the a priori constitution of human sensibility and cognition; 
in consequence, `the order and regularity in the appearances, 
which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce' (Kant, 1933, 
A125, p. 147). In Kant's `Copernican Revolution', the 
constitution of the subject determines appearances; rather than 
passively representing nature, human perception imposes form upon 
it. Now, as Deleuze asserts, `it is we who are giving the 
orders' (Deleuze, 1984, p. 14). At once restricted and empowered 
by its inability to access things-in-themselves, `the 
understanding [... ] is itself the lawgiver of nature' (Kant, 
1933, A126, p. 148), organizing appearances according to its own 
constitution. This Kantian form of idealism is distinguished as 
transcendental: it is a priori and shared by each human subject. 
These `subjective conditions of though' furnish, via their 
universal operation in human cognition, `objective validity' in 
the empirical realm (Kant, 1933, A89/B122, p. 124). 
Transcendental idealism is the guarantee of the security of 
empirical knowledge: 
The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical 
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realist, and allows to matter, as appearance, a reality that 
does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately 
perceived. Transcendental realism, on the other hand, [... ] 
regards the objects of outer sense as something distinct 
from the senses themselves, treating mere appearances as 
self-sufficient beings, existing outside us. On such a view 
as this, however clearly we may be conscious of our 
representation of these things, it is still far from certain 
that, if the representation exists, there exists also the 
object corresponding to it. In our system, on the other 
hand, these external things, namely matter, are in all their 
configurations and alterations nothing but mere appearances, 
that is, representations in us, of the reality of which we 
are immediately conscious. 
(Kant, 1933, A371-372, p. 347) 
Here, the gap between intuition and the `real' independent 
object, the source of Cartesian scepticism concerning the 
empirical, is dissolved; the direct impression that the 
apprehended object actually produces in the human sensibility is 
the limit of what can be known about that object. Intuition is 
limited to appearances, but these appearances are immediately 
known and thus incorrigible. The Kantian subject knows its own 
impressions of objects, not the objects themselves. The 
configuration of these appearances is similarly a function of the 
subject. The intuition supplies the forms of space and time and 
the faculty of the understanding the `categories' under which all 
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appearances must be subsumed. 1O These impositions of the 
subject comprise a conceptual scheme, but one which is 
transcendental, universal and necessary. " These appearances, 
or `phenomena', are the field of inquiry of empiricism; 
metaphysics seeks the thing-in-itself beyond appearances and the 
formal conditions imprinted by the subject. This object, the 
noumenon, is that which, a priori, cannot be encountered in 
empirical experience. 
iii. Empirical verification vs empty concepts 
Empirical intuition is necessarily in space and time; 
further, if an intuition is in space and time it is necessarily 
empirical and not metaphysical. Space and time `cannot be 
applied to things in themselves' (Kant, 1933, A149/B188, p. 189), 
for `things in space and time are given only in so far as they 
are perceptions [... ] - therefore only through empirical 
representation' (Kant, 1933, B147, p. 162). The empirical is 
necessarily conditioned, whereas metaphysics seeks the 
unconditioned. Yet under this system, metaphysical concepts are 
10 The functioning of the categories of the understanding 
will be reassessed in Chapter Five in relation to Watt and 
Murphy. Here, the emphasis is on the forms of sensuous 
intuition, space and time. 
11 Kant considers the conceptual scheme of the 
transcendental subject to have been deducted a priori in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. It details how empirical experience 
must be organized in human cognition. The conceptual schemes 
extracted from linguistic structures by later theorists differ 
in that they emphasize the disparity between organizational 
systems imposed upon `matter' by individual subjects. The latter 
support relativity; the Kantian plan seeks to guarantee 
objectivity. 
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left entirely without corresponding objects. If the 
metaphysician claims intuitive insight into `what cannot be an 
object of experience', which is the basis of his claim to go 
beyond empiricism, he will `always really change this into an 
appearance', for intuition is only possible via the imposition 
of conditions which convert noumena into phenomena (Kant, 1933, 
Bxxx, p. 29). The concepts of empiricism refer to objects 
locatable within space and time; the concepts of metaphysics, in 
so far as they are not empirical, refer to no objects of possible 
experience. Metaphysics thus violates the `principle of 
significance', a principle drawn from Kant by Logical 
Positivism" and Strawson: 
For any employment of concepts in propositions purporting 
to give knowledge of objects to be a significant 
employment, that employment must be tied to a possible 
intuition, to empirical conditions of the concept's 
application. Any employment of a concept not subject to 
this limitation, the limitation to objects of possible 
experience, is illegitimate. 
(Strawson, 1966, p. 156) 
Further, `there is no conceivable way in which concepts could be 
instantiated in our experience except by our being aware of 
instances of them in space and time' (Strawson, 1966, p. 20). 
12 In Logical Positivism and A. J. Ayer in particular, this is termed rather `the principle of verification' (Ayer, 1990, 
p. 171). It too allows only the analytic a priori and empirical 
propositions to pass the test for `meaningful' statements. 
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Dismissing that which is to be found in space and time as merely 
empirical appearance, metaphysics comprises `the propensity to 
think in terms of ideas for which no empirical conditions of 
application could be specified' (Strawson, 1966, p. 16). 13 
According to Kant, `we can never transcend the limits of possible 
experience, though that is precisely what this science is 
concerned, above all else, to achieve' (Kant, 1933, Bxix-xx, 
p. 24). 
The achievements of metaphysics are thus restricted to the 
manipulation of ideas: 
To think an object and to know an object are thus by no 
means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: 
first, the concept, through which an object in general is 
thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition, through 
which it is given. For if no intuition could be given 
corresponding to the concept, the concept would still be 
thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be 
without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be 
possible by means of it. So far as I could know, there 
would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought 
could be applied. Now, [... ] the only intuition possible 
to us is sensible; consequently, the thought of an object 
in general, by means of a pure concept of understanding, can 
become knowledge for us only in so far as the concept is 
13 Metaphysics transgresses, in Strawson's titular 
formulation, The Bounds of Sense (1966). 
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related to objects of the senses. 
(Kant, 1933, B146-147, pp. 161-162) 
Concepts which extend beyond the possibilities of empirical 
verification are `empty': `through them we have indeed thought, 
but in this thinking we have really known nothing; we have merely 
played with representations' (Kant, 1933, A155-156/B194-195, 
p. 193). If the concept is such that its object may be given in 
experience, if the concept has application, it is an empirical 
concept which can have no metaphysical repercussions. 
`Metaphysics rests on concepts alone' (Kant, 1933, Bxiv, p. 21), 
and, being cut off from all possible intuition of their objects, 
concepts which are necessarily empty. 
To be escorted beyond the boundaries of knowledge, 
metaphysical concepts do not have to be proved contradictory. 
Concepts may have sense without having reference. From an 
internally consistent arrangement of synthetic a nri concepts, 
the actual existence of anything to which those concepts relate 
is not concluded. Thinking cannot legislate that the objects of 
its concepts are brought into being: 
In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its existence is 
to be found. 
-For though it may be so complete that nothing 
which is required for thinking the thing with all its inner 
determinations is lacking to it, yet existence has nothing 
to do with all this, but only with the question whether such 
a thing be so given us that the perception of it can, if 
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need be, precede the concept. For that the concept precedes 
the perception signifies the concept's mere possibility; the 
perception which supplies the content to the concept is the 
sole mark of actuality. " 
(Kant, 1933, A225/B272-273, p. 243) 
Moreover, the nature of the metaphysical assertion ensures that 
the citation of items of empirical evidence contrary to it can 
do no damage, for `once we are outside the circle of experience, 
we can be sure of not being contradicted by experience' (Kant, 
1933, A4/B8, p. 46). Empirical evidences themselves can neither 
prove nor refute any metaphysical proposition; rather, it is in 
this very disconnection from the empirical that metaphysics 
violates the principle of significance and defines its own 
concepts as empty. 
The completion of empirical investigation in all its 
branches could provide no conclusions of metaphysical import; 
exhaustive knowledge of appearances remains `toto coelo different 
from knowledge of the object in itself' (Kant, 1933, A44/B61, 
p. 84). An overwhelming mass of evidence is inadequate: 
since premisses that are simply empirical do not lead to 
anything supersensible, nothing can supplement the 
imperfection of such an empirical series. Not the smallest 
approximation, therefore, occurs in the attempt to reach the 
14 These issues will be revisited below in Chapter Four, 
Section xii. 
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supersensible, or a knowledge of it, from such premisses; 
and consequently no probability enters into a judgement 
about the supersensible, when it rests on arguments drawn 
from experience. 
(Kant, 1952, Part II, §90, pp. 138-139) 
The a priori is not implicit in the a posteriori; the necessary 
cannot arise from the contingent; there is no means of inference 
from the sensible to the supersensible; metaphysical conclusions 
cannot have an empirical basis. The conclusion of Kant's account 
of metaphysics is that `it is useless to endeavour to prove 
transcendental propositions by examples' (Kant, 1933, A554/B582, 
p. 477). As Carnap argues too: 
Since rigorous inference can never lead from experience to 
the transcendent, metaphysical inferences must leave out 
essential steps. The appearance of transcendence stems from 
this. 
(Carnap, 1959, p. 145) 
Empirical evidence can never supply the logical steps to 
metaphysical conclusions. All leaps between these 
incommensurable orders of knowledge are illegitimate. 
iv. Theatre II: position in time and space 
The subject locates every item of its sensory experience 
within the parameters of space and time; an item that can be 
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encountered no where and at no time has removed itself from 
possible empirical manifestation. Similar conditions apply to 
the perceiving subject: empirical perception must occur at some 
time and at some place. The observer must stand in temporal and 
spatial relations to the object of his perception. It would be 
most convenient if that to be observed approximately coincided 
with the observer in time and space. " In the operation of 
empirical observation, the knowing subject occupies a particular 
and thereby limited position in space and time and is necessarily 
limited in his observations. In the terms of Thomas Nagel, the 
empirical subject bequeathed by Kant comprises a `gratuitous 
creature existing in a tiny morsel of space and time' (Nagel, 
1986, p. 61). For Nagel, objectivity requires the transcendence 
of position itself; objective observers must `alter their 
conception of the world so that it is no longer just the view 
from where they are but in a sense a view from nowhere' (Nagel, 
1986, p. 5). Nagel's paradoxes are intentional and instructive: 
in the `pursuit of objective knowledge [... ] we must get outside 
ourselves, and view the world from nowhere within it'; yet, `it 
is impossible to leave one's own point of view behind entirely 
without ceasing to exit' (Nagel, 1986, p. 67). The objective 
observer standing in no spatio-temporal relation to the empirical 
world is defined out of existence. " 
1' A more exact coincidence, if achieved at any speed, 
often results in considerable injury. 
15 In Kantian terms this observer can only be God; Nagel's 
omniscient unsituated consciousness is found (in spite of itself) 
in the brain-in-a-vat scenario. This consciousness, directly 
`fed information in words and images about what was going on in 
the world, what other people saw and heard, and so forth', claims 
`a conception of the world without having any perspective on it' 
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The investigators of `how it is' in Theatre II are 
emphatically positioned in space and time. Space is the 
condition of possibility of the symmetrical organization demanded 
by the stage set. Thus, chair and table `Downstage audience 
left' find their precise position at the point `equidistant from 
wall and axis of window' (Beckett, 1986, p. 237); `Downstage 
right' is to reproduce this pattern in mirror-image, `forming 
symmetry' (Beckett, 1986, p. 237). Whatever the symbolic 
significance of the set thus organized, it is evident that this 
organization itself can take place only in space and by utilizing 
spatial positions defined in relation to other positions. 
Alteration of the position in space of one investigator in 
relation to the other is an operation of delicate precision; 
where elsewhere B might simply go to A, in Theatre II this 
sequence is' choreographed in fraught detail: 
B: May I come to you? [Pause. ] I need animal warmth. 
[Pause. ] 
A: [Coldly. ] As you like. [B gets up and goes towards A. ] 
With your files if you don't mind. [B goes back for 
papers and briefcase, returns towards A, puts them on 
A's table. remains standing. Pause. ] Do you want me 
to take you on my knees? 
[Pause. B goes back for his chair, returns towards A, 
stops before A's table with the chair in his arms. 
Pause. ] 
(Nagel, 1986, pp. 62-63). It seems rather, that it would have 
multiple perspectives rather escape perspective as such. 
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B: [Shyly. ] May I sit beside you? [They look at each other. ] 
No? [Pause. ] Then opposite. [He sits down opposite A, 
looks at him. Pause. ] Do we continue? 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 244) 
Earlier, amidst a series of spatial modifiers, the investigators, 
quite explicitly, examine the very constitution of `space': 
A: [... ] Is that Jupiter we see? 
B: Where? 
A: Switch off. [They switch off. ] It must be. 
B: [Irritated. ] Where? 
A: [Irritated. ] There. [B cranes. 1 There, on the right, in 
the corner. 
[Pause. ] 
B: No. It twinkles. 
A: What is it then? 
B: [Indifferent. ] No idea. Sirius. " 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 239) 
17 In Beckett's Texts for Nothing, the perspective of 
Sirius is aptly characterized as taking the long view of present 
difficulties: 
the days and nights when in spite of all I was calm, 
treading back and forth the futile road, knowing it short 
and easy seen from Sirius, and deadly calm at the heart of 
my frenzies. 
(Beckett, 1984, Text VII, p. 93) 
The investigators of Theatre II, however, view Sirius from an 
earth-bound position, an inversion of the possibility of 
transcendence. 
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The demotion of an a priori assertion (`It must be') into a 
confession of ignorance (`No idea') is effected by the admixture 
of information derived from empirical observation ('It 
twinkles'). Furthermore, what may be empirically observed in 
space is determined by the point in time at which the observation 
is attempted: 
A: Full moon. 
B: Not quite. Tomorrow. 
[A takes a little diary from his pocket. ] 
A: What's the date? 
B: Twenty-fourth. Twenty-fifth tomorrow. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 238) 
A's diary, a physical register of the course of time, is 
complemented by a timetable, an abstract of the expected position 
in space of certain empirical items at determinate points in 
time. " The movements in space and time of A and B are to be 
relative to the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of these crucial 
objects: 
18 In Watt, the inter-relation of trains, their pre- 
determined movements in time and the movements required to catch 
them, form the basis of a hypothetical solution to one of the 
many impasses afflicting the eponymous hero: 
The thought of leaving town was most painful to him, 
said Mr. Hackett, but the thought of not doing so no less 
so. So he sets off for the station, half hoping he may-miss 
his train. 
You may be right, said Mr. Nixon. 
Too fearful to assume himself the onus of a decision, 
said Mr. Hackett, he refers it to the frigid machinery of 
a time-space relation. 
Very ingenious, said Mr. Nixon. (Beckett, 1976, p. 19) 
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B: [... ] Let"s go. 
[A consults his watch. ] 
A: It is now 
... 
ten 
... 
twenty-five. We have no train 
before eleven twenty. Let us kill the time here, 
talking of this and that. 
B: What do you mean, eleven twenty? Ten fifty. 
[A takes a time-table from his pocket, opens it at 
relevant page and hands it to B. ] 
A: Where it's marked with a cross. 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 246-247) 
With so many calculations as to correct timings, the watch is a 
privileged object in Theatre II. With A's entrance and 
positioning in space ('back to right wall') negotiated, `jig 
switches-on lamp. takes out his watch. consults it and laus it 
on the table' (Beckett, 1986, p. 237). The investigators' 
position in time is thus marked throughout the course of their 
deliberations. The main entry under the `positive elements' of 
C's biography, the `incident of the lottery' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 240), is similarly scored by allusions to time and space: 
B: I quote: `The last time I laid eyes on him I was on my 
way to the Post Office to cash an order for back-pay. 
[... ] He was seated [... ] with his back to the 
Thompson works. To all appearances down and out. He 
sat doubled in two, [ 
... 
] on drawing nearer I could see 
he was merely scrutinizing, between his feet, a lump 
of dogshit. I moved it slightly with the tip of my 
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umbrella and observed how his gaze followed the 
movement and fastened on the object in its new 
position. This at three o' clock in the afternoon if 
you please! I confess I had not the heart to bid him 
the time of day, I was overcome. I simply slipped into 
his hip pocket a lottery ticket [... ]. When two hours 
later I emerged from the Post Office, having cashed my 
order, he was at the same place and in the same 
attitude. I sometimes wonder if he is still alive. ' 
Testimony of Mr Feckman, certified accountant and 
friend for better and for worse. 
[Pause. ] 
A: Dated when? 
B: Recent. 
A: It has such a bygone ring. 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 241-242) 
The single notable success of C's life is procured in this game 
of coincidence, where, notably, the `winner receives high class 
watch' (Beckett, 1986, p. 241). The prize is a precision piece 
of equipment to calculate and manifest time, a `marvel of 
accuracy, showing year, month, date, day, hour, minute and 
second', `solid gold' and `super chic' (Beckett, 1986, p. 241). 
With its `unbreakable hair spring' and `anti-shock, anti- 
magnetic, airtight, waterproof' constitution (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 241), this is a mechanism guaranteed to repulse all 
interference with its proper operations. Moreover, `he didn't 
procure it himself. It was a gift' (Beckett, 1986, p. 241); as 
Kant seeks to prove, time is an inescapable given. The lottery 
of empirical events is played out within the a priori framework 
of time. 
For A and B, future time coincides with the modification of 
their position in space for `Tomorrow we're at Bury St Edmunds' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 242). If C's empirical existence is to 
persist, -this too has its spatio-temporal organization, as has 
been brought to the attention of the investigators: `At the end 
of the month shoosh back to the barge' (Beckett, 1986, p. 239). 
If suicide is preferred, this must be executed within the same 
spatio-temporal constraints: 
B: Let him jump. 
A: When? 
B: Now. 
A: From where? 
B: From here will do. Three to three and a half metres per 
floor, say twenty-five in all. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 238) 
Position of take-off and landing is crucial to the successful 
rearrangement of the constitution of the empirical subject; B's 
preference is that he should `land on his arse, the way he lived. 
The spine snaps and the tripes explode' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238). 
In the empirical sphere, such effects follow from such causes. 
The task of isolating the metaphysical cause which is to set this 
train of determinate empirical events in motion, however, focuses 
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on more intricate problems of entailment. 
v. Empirical evidence 
The insistence upon spatio-temporal form which pervades 
Theatre II19 emphasizes that every item of evidence produced on 
this restricted stage in support of a metaphysical test-case is 
empirical and contingent. Every testimony drawn upon is the 
report of a subject positioned in time and space. Each 
respondent appends to their testimony some combination of three 
items, any of which destroys-the possibility of their access to 
the unconditioned: their particular position in space (otherwise 
recognizable as one's address),, the nature of their relationship 
with C and a summary of the restricted area of their empirical 
expertise, or occupation. The insight of `Mrs Aspasia Budd- 
Croker, button designer in residence, Commercial Road East' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 240), is necessarily limited to the empirical. 
Every testimony is assessed by the investigators in time and 
19 In Horn Came Always, the narrator is amenable enough to 
explain his emphasis upon temporal relations: 
These allusions to now, to before and after, and all such 
yet to come, that we may feel ourselves in time. (Beckett, 1984, p. 193) 
Details as to time and date do damage to metaphysical 
pretensions; Barthelme's `Marie, Marie, Hold on Tight' concisely 
hits the note of bathos cultivated in Theatre II between mundane 
particularity and universalist ambition: 
Henry Mackie, Edward Asher and Howard Ettle braved a 
rainstorm to demonstrate against the human condition on 
Wednesday, April 26 [... ]. 
(Barthelme, 1961, p. 115) 
They, or others, could have done so anytime: the timeless is not 
topical. 
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space. Every testimony relates empirical events of times and 
spaces past: 
A: [ 
... 
] `Aged ten, runs away from home first time, brought 
back next day, admonished, forgiven. ' (Pause. ] `Aged 
fifteen, runs away from home second time, dragged back 
a week later, thrashed, forgiven. ' [Pause. ] `Aged 
seventeen, runs away from home third time, slinks back 
six months later with his tail between his legs, locked 
up, forgiven. ' [Pause. ] `Aged seventeen runs away from 
home last time, crawls back a year later on his hands 
and knees, kicked out, forgiven. ' 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 244-245) 
The severity of C's punishment increases in proportion to his 
duration in time and persistence in spurning a designated spatial 
position; it is the vengeance of the relatives against the 
contingent. 
Investigator A, whilst signalling the investigators' 
occupation of a 'position in time, briefly considers an 
alternation in space, and the concomitant abandonment of their 
mission: 
A: [... ] What a night! [... ] Shall we go? [B switches on. 
rummages in his papers. ] The crux. [B rummages. ] 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 237) 
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The `crux', as a point of intersection, demands that two points 
on separate lines (or on a line recoiling across itself) coincide 
in time and space; relationships in time and space are indeed the 
crux, the critical issue. While A reflects upon himself, B is 
intent on a different line of inquiry: items of evidence are lost 
among the paperwork. It is singularly difficult to lose a priori 
propositions; one should not require records but merely 
reflection to ascertain that which is necessarily the case. The 
empirical, however, as a series of facts which come into being 
only as a result of the contingent operations of experience, may, 
as history demonstrates, be so mislaid. Neither will the 
isolated facts detailed in this evidence, even if perfect in 
themselves, unite to form a single edifice: 
A: May we not be mistaken? 
B: [Indignant. ] We have been to the best sources. All 
weighed and weighed again, checked and verified. Not 
a word here [brandishing sheaf of paper] that is not 
cast iron. Tied together like a cathedral. [He flings 
Shit! 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 238) 
That which is amenable to checking and verification via sources, 
as the principles of significance and verification demand, can 
only be the empirical. B's characterization of his evidence is 
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emphatically in terms of the material and sensible. ` But 
empirical facts are contingent and thereby insufficient to 
exclude the possibility `that some day things might change, ' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 240). Individual experience is an insufficient 
guide to the eternal; as the narrator of The Unnamable 
acknowledges, `Nothing has ever changed since I have been here. 
But I dare not infer from this that nothing ever will change' 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 296). The metaphysical, the unchanging and 
unconditioned nature of things-in-themselves, cannot be derived 
from empirical experience. Investigator B is not sympathetic to 
such fine distinctions: 
B: [Violently, slapping down his hand on the pile of 
papers. ] There's the record, closed and final. That's 
what we're going on. Too late now to start saying that 
[slapping to his left] is right and that [slapping to 
his right] wrong. You're a pain in the arse. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 246) 
The phrasing of the stage directions maliciously involves B in 
cross-purposes: according to his signals, his right is wrong and 
his left is right. His evaluations and'spatial distinctions are 
faulty. In his summary of the evidence, distinctions between 
those aspects which can be confirmed within the limits of 
empirical investigation, `Work, family, third fatherland, cunt, 
20 B's choice of a `cathedral' as an apt comparison with 
the status of his evidence is notable; in each case, a hope 
exists that the merely material can be infused with spiritual 
significance (Beckett, 1986, p. 238). 
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finances'; `health, housing conditions' and `nature', and those 
which lie outside these limits, `art', `heart and conscience', 
`God and man', are equally items on the list to be subsumed under 
the category of `so many disasters' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238). All 
distinctions, between the items and between the epistemological 
status of the items, are confounded in identity. For B, the 
conclusion is self-evident: `Let him 'jump. ' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 238). A, in response to the evidence thus presented, declines 
an immediate leap to this conclusion: `[Meditative. ] Does it 
follow? [Pause. ) Does it follow? ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238). 
vi. Finite observation 
The tools granted to B to aid his metaphysical inquiries are 
`an extinguished reading-lamp and a briefcase crammed with 
documents' (Beckett, 1986, p. 237). A is supplied with a lamp 
only. A `bright night sky' (Beckett, 1986, p. 237) is without; 
inside, all is dark apart from the light of the lamps and the 
enlightenment offered by the documents as to the sufferings of 
C. In Theatre II, however, there is `No need to take everything 
literally' (Beckett, 1986, p. 246). B, the collator of the 
empirical evidence, is issued with a chronically malfunctioning 
lamp; the record of evidence emerges in fits and starts in 
parallel with the erratic behaviour of this instrument of 
observation. 31 Mirroring the nature of empirical evidence 
" Investigator B can read from his notes only when his 
lamp lights; in Horn Came Always, the relationship between light 
and speech is inverted: 
He consulted his notes by the light of an electric torch. 
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itself, B's account of the content of the documents is 
conditioned by contingent circumstances. B's conclusions and the 
fortuitous behaviour of his lamp are each the result of `a faulty 
connection' (Beckett, 1986, p. 242). B is subject to 
interruptions in his efforts to marshall the empirical evidence; 
equally, his assessment of this discontinuous evidence is 
dependent upon argumentative non sequiturs. B's metaphysical 
conclusions do not follow from his empirical premises. 
As investigator A asserts `Sternly', `To accumulate 
documents is not enough' (Beckett, 1986, p. 246). Moreover, 
enough documents can never be accumulated. The series of 
empirical incidents from which the investigators' evidence is 
drawn is necessarily incomplete. The contingency of the 
empirical implies that one item in the series is caused or 
conditioned by an antecedent item; this item similarly has its 
antecedent cause. The requirement to produce a cause for the 
cause provokes an infinite regress: in the empirical series, 
there is no unconditioned item, no uncaused cause. " The 
observer concerned not to base his verdict on incomplete evidence 
is obliged to enter this infinite regress. To seek to escape 
this sequence by the postulation of an unconditioned first cause 
Then he switched it of f and spoke in the dark. Light 
silence, dark speech. (Beckett, 1984, p. 193) 
22 In Waiting for Godot, the conclusions of the empirical inquiries made by the researchers cited in Lucky's speech are 
`established beyond all doubt all other doubt than that which 
clings to the labours of men', for these conclusions are drawn 
from `the labours unfinished of Testew and Cunard' and `the labours of Fartov and Belcher left unfinished' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 42). This contingency is itself essential to empiricism. 
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is to cease empirical inquiries and revert to the metaphysical: 
Kant makes it very clear that he regards the idea of a non- 
contingent ground of contingent existence as providing the 
main motive power behind the exorbitant claim to knowledge 
of God's existence. He pictures us as almost irresistibly 
driven to seek an escape from the endless chain of causal 
dependence of one empirical existence on another by assuming 
that there exists something upon which all that contingently 
exists depends finally for its existence but which is itself 
free from causal dependence on anything else and therefore 
does not belong to the sensible world at all. " 
(Strawson, 1966, p. 223) 
Metaphysical pessimism asserted a priori may replace God as the 
favoured exit from the empirical chain. The unverifiable nature 
of the argument remains identical. 
In contrast to the investigators of Theatre II, it is the 
prerogative of God to be omniscient. For the empirical- subject, 
the `whole' cannot be given in experience. Totality itself is 
not amenable to positioning within particular spatio-temporal co- 
ordinates, the very condition for empirical intuition. As A 
23 In Lucky's"speech, `Given the existence' of a `personal 
God', such an existence is `quaquaquaqua outside time without 
extension' (Beckett, 1986; p. 42). Empirical inquiries are not 
possible outside these parameters; no object can be given to 
intuition to substantiate the concept upon which all is based. 
The scenario required by so many philosophers and mimicked in 
Lucky's speech, "'God" at the apex as a given truth' (Nietzsche, 
1968, §17, p. 15), is absolutely indemonstrable. 
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`raises his lamp and shines it about him' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238), 
the focus moves from one point to another; as each particular 
item is picked out by the lamp's beam, another is returned to the 
general obscurity. The perception of the subject is analogous. 
The series of empirical evidences concerning C cannot be 
completed; the character of the whole cannot be apprehended. 
Theatre II can only halt at an arbitrary point, its evidences 
lacking their ultimate cause, the condition of C defined only by 
particular observations and not a general diagnosis. For the 
purposes of establishing a metaphysical proposition, the 
continued citation of empirical evidences is futile. The 
extension of the empirical investigation is considered and 
rejected: `A: [... ] [B [... ] switches on his lamp, switches it 
off again immediately. ] How end? ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 249). 
Finite observation is the obligation and defect of the 
empirical witness: 
If he or she claims to have seen everything, he or she is 
not credible. If he or she is credible, it is insofar as 
he or she has not seen everything, but has only seen a 
certain aspect. He or she is thus not absolutely credible. 
(Lyotard, 1988, p. 45) 
As Kant argues, empirical inquiry is reliable but inherently 
limited, metaphysics unbounded but unsustainable. The 
metaphysical cannot be derived from the empirical. Yet there 
remains a substitute route by which knowledge may be extended 
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beyond empirical particulars to the general or the universal: the 
procedure of induction must be given its chance to sufficiently 
incline C to take his leap. 
vii. Inductive extrapolation 
Leaps are the speciality of induction. Where premises do 
not properly entail the desired conclusion, induction works to 
fill the "'epistemic gap"', `not so much by an "inference" as by 
a leap - an "inductive leap"" (Rescher, 1980, p. 14). It is a 
tool for investigators in possession of incomplete evidence and 
obliged to produce a conclusion: 
Induction is an instrument for question-resolution in the 
face of imperfect information. It is a tool for use by 
finite intelligences, capable of yielding not the best 
possible answer (in some rarified sense of this term), but 
the best available answer, the best we can manage to secure 
in the existing conditions in which we do and must conduct 
our epistemic labors. 
(Rescher, 1980, p. 7) 
Upon the basis of regularities that are observed in a finite 
number of particulars, induction proceeds to legislate for the 
cases that remain unobserved. If all observed items exhibit a 
particular feature, inductive reasoning postulates the general 
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rule that all such items will exhibit that feature. 24 From the 
evidence of `so many disasters' in the past experience of C 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 238), the application of inductive procedures 
would issue the conclusion that future experience is likely to 
exhibit the same feature; disaster is the general rule informing 
these particulars. Inductive judgements are gambles which, in 
the absence of complete evidence, nevertheless offer `rational 
optimization in our quest for information' (Rescher, 1980, 
p. 20). 25 Future experience is necessarily unavailable at any 
given time of decision; a generalization from the available data 
in Theatre II suggests that action taken to avoid the possibility 
of future experience would, in the case of C, be advantageous. 
Induction constructs probabilities sufficiently high to secure 
rational assent and action thereupon. The irrational 
alternatives are either acceptance of the opposite conclusion, 
the probability of which is merely such that it cannot absolutely 
be excluded, or the refusal to choose. 26 
24 Inductive reasoning gives `conclusions of the form "All 
As are F_" from premises of the form "Some As are i"' (Priest, 
1990, p. 181). 
25 Induction offers the sceptic `the opportunity to acquire 
relief from agnosticism by accepting sentences as true that are 
not deductively entailed by his evidence' (Levi, 1967, p. 143). 
Rescher characterizes the problem of the rationality of inductive 
generalizations as `a fundamentally Kantian problem: How can 
limited experience of nature provide a suitable basis for the 
claims of generalized knowledge needed to render empirical 
science possible? ' (Rescher, 1980, p. 1). 
26 Moran's scrupulous rationalism, 
-for example, leads to an irrational paralysis as to `how I was to deal with Molloy, once 
I had found him': 
There was no good my saying, Let me see now, what is the 
usual thing? There were no usual things, in my 
instructions. Admittedly there was one particular operation 
that recurred from time to time, but not often enough to be, 
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However, even the sceptic's refusal to decide remains a 
decision. And if the objection to induction in general is that 
particular instances of inductive reasoning have led to erroneous 
conclusions, then the sceptic employs an inductive procedure to 
amplify doubts against induction. In regard to its application 
in Theatre II, the problem of induction take two different forms. 
In the first place, induction may be suspected of harbouring a 
hidden metaphysical clause. According to Hume, the `appeal to 
past experience decides nothing in the present case' (Hume, 1978, 
I. III. VI, p. 91) and yet induction proposes `that those instances. 
of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we 
have had experience' (Hume, 1978, I. III. VI, p. 89). To effect 
this transition, Hume charges, induction assumes the metaphysical 
proposition that `the course of nature continues always uniformly 
the same' (Hume, 1978, I. III. VI, p. 89). 27 This proposition, in 
its concern with the nature of the whole, the whole of nature, 
is not open to empirical confirmation. This `Resemblance Thesis' 
postulates the stability of (incompletely verified) natural laws, 
and requests a commitment to the belief that `the truth is 
with any degree of probability, the one I was looking for. 
But even if it had always figured in my instructions, except 
on one single occasion, then that single occasion would have 
been enough to tie my hands, I was so scrupulous. (Beckett, 1959, p. 138) 
In an inversion of inductive procedures, the exception is 
accorded sufficient weight to invalidate the rule. 
"" 
Nagel is conveniently bold in stating the metaphysical 
implications of this assumption: `Observed regularities provide 
reason to believe that they will be repeated only to the extent 
that they provide evidence of hidden necessary connections, which 
hold timelessly' (Nagel, 1986, p. 84). 
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systematic' (Rescher, 1980, p. 23). 28 In the absence of this 
presupposition, even the highest inductive probability remains 
doubtful. There is no `a priori guarantee that induction will 
succeed' (Rescher, 1980, p. 156). 
In contradistinction, `it is a necessary truth that any 
inductive inference is fallible' (Stove, 1986, p. 4). Yet the 
`working up' of this `harmless necessary truth' into a "'cosmic" 
feeling of insecurity' (Stove, 1986, p. 106) is perhaps a 
voluntary indulgence: 
to generate the pseudo-problem of justifying induction, you 
must make a mere logical possibility a source of anxiety: 
you must make the fact, which is an inseparable feature of 
inductive inferences, that the conclusion may be false 
though the premiss be true, felt to be an alarming 
contingent defect of such inferences. 
(Stove, 1986, p. 199) 
There is only one circumstantial context in which Stove will 
resign his equanimity, that of induction `plus the threat of 
death' in the case of an erroneous conclusion. 2' Induction 
2$ Inductive inferences cannot negotiate the `catastrophe', 
that which inaugurates a point of qualitative discontinuity 
between past and future experience. Here, nature declines to 
obey `a set of unchanging laws which can be inferred with 
considerable probability from our past observations' (Schlesinger, 1983, p. 218). See below Chapter Three, section vii 
and Chapter Six, Sections xxi-xxiii. 
29 Stove's given fact in this scenario is `(M) Most of the 
balls in this urn are black, and Bob is a ball about to be drawn 
from it'; charged to predict the colour of Bob, the conclusion 
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`does not preserve truth all the time; but, as you are rational, 
you cannot have meant, situated as you are, to ask for that 
degree of reassurance' (Stove, 1986, p. 205). In Theatre II, the 
candidate for suicide would prefer a conclusion guaranteeing the 
certainty of hopelessness. Upon this one may act rationally. 
In the case of death attending one's conclusions, the inclination 
to ensure one's arguments are sound is maximized. Theatre II 
sets up the optimal case for a philosophical demand for 
certainty; induction can only delineate probabilities. In this 
context, as Stove finds, `it is now the difference between valid 
and merely probable inference, not the resemblance between them, 
which is painfully vivid to my mind' (Stove, 1986, p. 204). 3° 
Induction from the empirical evidence can never give necessity. 
The investigators of Theatre II follow the procedure of induction 
as supplied by Kant: 
Several particular instances, which are one and all certain, 
are scrutinised in view of the rule, to see whether they 
follow from it. If it then appears that all particular 
instances which can be cited follow the rule, we argue to 
its universality, and from this again to all particular 
which induction recommends is `(0) Bob is black' (Stove, 1986, 
p. 203). Add the threat of death in the case of error: 
Suppose I learn, however, that I will be shot at once if Bob 
is not black. This addition to my total evidence does not (it should not be necessary to say) change the probability 
of O. But it is apt, all the same, to give a novel turn to 
my philosophy of probable inference. (Stove, 1986, p. 204) 
30 Bob remains probably black, but Stove, now losing his 
repose, interjects, in point of fact about properties, that 
`Nothing can be probably black' (Stove, 1986, p. 204). 
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instances, even to those which are not themselves given. 
(Kant, 1933, A646-647/B674-675, p. 535) 
The general ruling regarding C's experience, `so many disasters' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 238), is proposed prior to the full review of 
evidence; all particular items cited confirm the validity of the 
ruling. With the universality of this rule thus established, all 
future episodes in C's experience, which are not given, will 
conform to the general ruling. Induction concludes `Let him 
jump' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238). But this conclusion, like Lucky's, 
should arrive `not so fast and considering what is more' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 42)., If induction operates on empirical 
evidence then: 
the rule it supplies [ 
... 
] would be as contingent as the 
experience upon which it is based. Since the universality 
and necessity of the rule would not be grounded a priori, 
but only on induction, they would be merely fictitious and 
without genuinely universal validity. 
(Kant, 1933, A196/B241, p. 223) 
Induction cannot prove that all empirical items of a certain type 
must exhibit the empirical features of those so far observed. 
Necessity, a priori entailment and universality are not amongst 
its gifts. Induction aims towards but cannot guarantee 
universality: 
experience never confers on its judgements true or strict, 
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but only assumed and comparative universality, through 
induction. We can properly only say, therefore, that, so 
far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to 
this or that rule. If, then, a judgement is thought with 
strict universality, that is, in such manner that no 
exception is allowed as possible, it is not derived from 
experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. 
(Kant, 1933, B3-4, p. 44) 
The situation of Theatre II is precisely that limit case where 
the highest probability is insufficient: here, `arguments must 
be either deductive or defective' (Hudson, 1968, p. 307). 
The justification of suicide has a peculiar impact upon the 
proper functioning of induction. As a process of estimating 
probabilities, induction must always be willing to reassess its 
conclusions in the light of new evidence. The possession of `an 
inductively warranted answer in hand must never be taken as a 
basis for shutting the door to further inquiry' (Rescher, 1980, 
p. 21). Kant is similarly concerned that the assumption of 
`transcendental hypotheses' will `deprive reason of all the 
fruits that spring from the cultivation of its own proper domain, 
namely, that of experience' (Kant, 1933, A773/B801, p. 615). Upon 
the presumption that the answer has been found, the investigation 
ceases. Suicide, based upon either an inductive inference from 
past to future experience or a metaphysical principle declaiming 
a priori the disastrous character of human experience, prohibits 
absolutely the collection of any additional data to confirm or 
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deny the accuracy of the prediction or the supposedly necessary 
rule. The advantage gained by the avoidance of further 
experience is always unverifiable. Yet, as Ayer argues, `there 
can be no other justification for inductive reasoning than its 
success in practice' (Ayer, 1990, p. 42). Suicide is always too 
late or too soon: when complete information as to the course of 
experience is available it is too late to avoid its collection; 
when the course of experience is curtailed before completion, one 
is obliged to decide on cessation from the basis of incomplete 
evidence. 31 In the case of suicide, if the decision is for, one 
can never experience the pleasure of being right; if against, one 
runs the risk of being proved wrong. " 
viii. The categorical imperative 
Suicide, however, is more usually subject to ethical rather 
than epistemological strictures. In Kantian ethics, the very 
inclination towards suicide is a reason for desisting: 
It seems absurd to say that a man could wrong himself 
31 Mercier and Carrier refers directly to this impasse of 
being simultaneously too early and too late. There we encounter 
`the hour it always was and will be, one that to the beauties of 
too late unites the charms of prematurity" (Beckett, 1974, p. 77). 
The timing of the death of Malone, by contrast, falls decisively 
on one side of the divide: 
a murmur is born in the silent world, reproaching you 
affectionately with having despaired too late. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 278) 
32 Even Schopenhauer considers suicide `an awkward 
experiment', for it puts forward a question but simultaneously 
`abolishes the identity of the consciousness that would have to 
listen to the answer' (Schopenhauer, 1974, §160, p. 311). 
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(volenti non fit iniuria). Hence the Stoic thought it a 
prerogative of his (the sage's) personality to depart from 
life at his discretion (as from a smoke-filled room) with 
peace of soul, free from the pressure of present or 
anticipated ills, because he could be of no more use in 
life. But there should have been in this very courage, this 
strength of soul not to fear death and to know of something 
that man can value even more highly than his life, a still 
stronger motive for him not to destroy himself, a being with 
such powerful authority over the strongest sensible 
incentives, and so not to deprive himself of life. 
(Kant, 1991, Part II, §6, p. 219) 
In contemplating suicide, one is not `freely to act as if no 
authorization were needed for this action' (Kant, 1991, Part II, 
§6, p. 219). The investigation in Theatre II is exemplary thus 
far: A and B are primarily interested in the authorization of C's 
leap; for them it is a question, constantly, of whether they are 
to `I, him jump' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238, my emphasis). The 
subject and conclusion of their inquiries is always phrased in 
these terms, emphasizing the giving or withholding of consent. 
Furthermore, Kantian ethics will not countenance the `disposing 
of oneself as a mere means to some discretionary end' (Kant, 
1991, Part II, §6, p. 219). In the case of suicide, the `escape 
from burdensome circumstances' constitutes such a just such an 
outlawed contingent end (Kant, 1949, p. 87). The only moral 
action is that which is in accordance with the `categorical 
imperative'. 
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The categorical imperative must have an a priori basis, in 
order, to be applicable independently of all empirical 
circumstances. In Kants account, `a law, if it is to hold 
morally, i. e., as a ground of obligation, must imply absolute 
necessity' (Kant, 1949, p. 52); the categorical imperative thus 
`commands or prohibits absolutely' (Kant, 1991, Part I, p. 42). 
Again, the empirical, as contingency, cannot by definition supply 
necessity: 
all moral concepts have their seat and origin entirely a 
priori in reason. [... ] It is obvious that they can be 
abstracted from no empirical and hence merely contingent 
cognitions. In the purity of their origin lies their 
worthiness to serve us as supreme practical principles, and 
to the extent that something empirical is added to them, 
just this much is subtracted from their genuine influence 
and from the unqualified worth of actions. 
(Kant, 1949, p. 71) 
In Theatre II, the nature of the action C `ought' to take is 
assessed by A and B exclusively in regard to contingent empirical 
circumstances and the advantage to be gained by avoiding further 
experience of them. Once again, as Kant's translator puts it, 
the `a posteriori cart is placed before the a priori horse' 
(White Beck, 1949, p. 24). Actions with ethical ramifications, 
when based upon the empirical, forfeit the freedom of the moral 
agent, for his actions are determined solely by a contingent 
arrangement of circumstances. In Kant's ethics, the `free 
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action' paradoxically occurs only through `Obligation [... ] under 
a categorical imperative of reason' (Kant, 1991, Part I, p. 48): 
here, the agent is freed from all dependence upon the empirical. 
Again, no amount of empirical evidence can produce `the 
unconditional ought' required by Kant (Kant, 1991, Part II, 
p. 185). For Hume, equally, the route from a factual to an 
ethical assertion is problematic: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, 
I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some 
time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human 
affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and 
is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected 
with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. 
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation 
or affirmation, `tis necessary that it should be observld 
and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be 
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it. 
(Hume, 1978,111.1.1, p. 469) 
Even if empirical facts and circumstances are admitted to the 
extent that they are not deemed irrelevant to moral questions, 
they nevertheless cannot entail or act as a basis for the 
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deduction of specific moral conclusions. " Lyotard too locates 
the `ethical phrase' and the `cognitive phrase' under 
heterogeneous phrase regimens separated by a differend (Lyotard, 
1988, p. 123). And `Phrases obeying different regimens are 
untranslatable into one another' (Lyotard, 1988, p. 48): hence, 
`it is impossible to deduce a prescription from a description' 
(Lyotard, 1988, p. 108). " The investigators of Theatre II, 
leaping from the empirical to the metaphysical and, via 
induction, from the particular to the universal, are obliged to 
also leap Lyotard's "'abyss"' separating the empirical from the 
ethical (Lyotard, 1988, p. 123). Theirs is a triple jump over 
epistemological boundaries; C, set'in place for a leap, remains 
as yet unpersuaded to follow suit. 
Conversely, should the investigation result in the issuing 
of a true categorical imperative demanding C's suicide, the 
investigators would find themselves obliged to submit to the same 
necessity. The categorical imperative admits the moral 
credentials only of those maxims which are capable of being 
raised to the status of universal laws. The `shortest but most 
infallible way' to determine whether any action `is consistent 
" Both Kant and Hume can be cited as progenitors of what 
Fekete calls `the heritage of Western Enlightened modernity: the 
positivist-modernist tradition' Characterised by precisely this 
`antinomic "fact-value" structure' (Fekete, 1988, p. ii). 
34 Norris deprecates `the kind of postmodern aestheticist 
reading that would treat ethical issues as wholly divorced from 
questions of circumstantial warrant' (Norris, 1993, p. 74), yet 
concedes that ethical judgements remain underdetermined by 
factual researches. Given unlimited empirical data, we remain 
unable to `proceed algorithmically to determine what is right or 
wrong in any specific case' (Norris, 1993, p. 236). 
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with duty' is to consider `Would I be content that my maxim [ 
... 
] 
should hold as a universal law for myself as well as for others? ' 
(Kant, 1949, p. 63). The universal law thus derived constitutes 
a categorical imperative. Kantian ethics, in their proper 
function, necessarily create an `obligated legislator' (Lyotard, 
1988, p. 125): 
The legislator ought not to be exempt from the obligation 
he or she norms. And the obligated one is able to 
promulgate the law that obligates him or her. In speaking 
the law, the former decrees that he or she must respect it. 
In respecting the law, the latter decrees it anew. '' 
(Lyotard, 1988, p. 98) 
Kant amplifies the ramifications of two maxims which cannot be 
thought as universal laws without contradiction. In the case of 
the first, the `lying promise', `my maxim would necessarily 
destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law' (Kant, 
1949, p. 64). The second case is the maxim recommending suicide: 
A man who is reduced to despair by a series of evils feels 
a weariness with life but is still in possession of his 
reason sufficiently to ask whether it would not be contrary 
to his duty to himself to-take his own life. Now he asks 
's A certain measure of havoc will be caused in Chapter Six 
by applying the Kantian strictures upon metaphysical speculation 
expounded in this chapter to the basis of those' strictures 
itself. Applying the words of the lawgiver self-reflexively, as 
demanded by the categorical imperative, can be a source of self- 
refutation. See below Chapter Six, Sections xxvi-xxix. 
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whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law 
of nature. His maxim, however, is: For love of myself, I 
make it my principle to shorten my life when by a longer 
duration it threatens more evil than satisfaction. But it 
is questionable whether this principle of self-love could 
become a universal law of nature. One immediately sees a 
contradiction in a system of nature, whose law would be to 
destroy life by the feeling whose special office is to impel 
the improvement of life. In this case it would not exist 
as nature; hence that maxim cannot obtain as a law of 
nature, and thus it wholly contradicts the supreme principle 
of all duty. 
(Kant, 1949, p. 81) 
The suicide based upon protection of the welfare of the self, 
destroys the self in this cause, defeating its own purpose. 
Moreover, the action is not a priori but empirically determined. 
If determined a priori, the justification of one suicide would 
raise the maxim to a law demanding universal suicide. And as 
Kant remarks, no `system of nature could maintain itself in 
accordance with such a law' (Kant; 1949, p. 154). Such a system 
would be obliged to act always in accordance with the most 
expedient methods for its own destruction. This categorical 
imperative would, however, partially substantiate one of 
consolations of C in Theatre II, namely, his `... hope not dead 
of living to see the extermination of the species 
... 
' (Beckett, 
1986, p. 242). Sustained by such an anticipation, C refrains from 
making his own contribution to this end. The formulation is in 
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fact determinedly self-refuting: so long as a witness exists to 
celebrate the achievement of the extermination of his species, 
it is not achieved. We should appreciate that the sentence 
`Nobody is alive' can `only be asserted if it is not true' 
(Parsons, 1984, p. 147). 36 
Should the investigators find C justified in his suicide via 
a categorical imperative, they are involved in an even more 
virulent strain of self-defeat. As A nervously inquires, `Do you 
want me to jump too? ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 249). The legislator is 
obliged to respect his own recommendations; the categorical 
imperative does not tolerate exceptions. The investigators of 
Theatre II, if successful in ordering C's leap, may find that 
they have decreed the necessity of their own suicides. A 
previous client, `Smith', similarly suffers an accidental self- 
inflicted injury: 
A: [ 
... 
] Reputed to have lost his genitals in a shooting 
accident. His own double-barrel that went off between 
his legs in a moment of abstraction, just as he was 
getting set to let fly at a quail. 
36 Malone Dies cultivates a similar paradox in insisting 
upon the absolute erosion of the perceiving first-person subject: 
And during all this time [ 
... 
] in my head I supposed all was 
streaming and emptying away as through a sluice, to my great joy, until finally nothing remained, either of Malone or of 
the other. And what is more I was able to follow without 
difficulty the various phases of this deliverance [... ]. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 224) 
The subject, if dissolved, should not remain intact to so 
admirably describe its own dissolution. 
77 
B: Stranger to me. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 247) 
In a case of self-defeat, shooting oneself in the foot is the 
more usual metaphor. Given that `the extermination of the 
species' (Beckett, 1986, p. 242) determines the nature of A and 
B's dilemma, however, one might defer to the appropriateness of 
Mr Smith's misfortune. 
ix. Theory-laden observation 
Given these difficulties, the investigators' performance of 
their task regarding C is apt to be informed by bad grace. The 
forms of intuition or `sensibility', space and time, which 
disqualified the investigators from metaphysical ambitions, is 
important again in Kantian ethics. The moral agent is not to 
exhibit the other type of `sensibility' toward the recipients of 
his aid, for `moral import' attaches only to the "action done not 
from inclination but from duty' (Kant, 1949, p. 59). The 
investigators of Theatre II can win Kantian approval only in 
their freedom from compassion for their client and displeasure 
in carrying out their duty towards him. " `Man's greatest moral 
" According to Rousseau, `It is [... ] compassion [pfd] 
that hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are 
in distress' (Rousseau cited in Derrida, 1976, p. 173). In 
Waiting for Godot, by contrast, a blinded and fallen POZZO must 
not be aided with intemperate speed for this would constitute `an 
act arising out of inclination and so of no moral worth' (Hesla, 
1987, p. 119). In `What a Misfortune' of Mo*-e Pricks Than Kicks, 
Belacqua's ethical system, assessed by the ignorant public as 
`callousness', is similarly Kantian in its disregard of the 
empirical. It is `final, uniform and continuous, unaffected by 
circumstance, assigned without discrimination to all the undead' 
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perfection is to do his duty from duty' (Kant, 1991, Part II, 
p. 196). Under the strictures of Kant's moral philosophy, `one 
seems to be more morally worthy the less pleasure and 
satisfaction one derives from the proper performance of one's 
duties' (Solomon, 1988, p. 39). 
Investigator B's resentment of the examination of further 
evidence is thus morally exemplary: 
A: [... ] So, agreed? Black future, unpardonable 
- 
B: As"you wish. [He starts to tidy back the papers in the 
briefcase. Wearily. ] Let him jump. 
A: No further exhibit? 
B: Let him jump, let him jump. [He finishes tidying, gets 
up with the briefcase in his hand. ] Let's go. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 246) 
The irksome appointment with C has been, kept.. However, even 
the opening dialogue of the investigators is inflected by 
insinuations that their mission is concluded prior to its 
commencement: 
A: [... ] Ah well 
... 
(Pause. He switches on. ] Shall we go? 
[B switches on, rummages in his papers. ] The crux. [B 
rummages. ] We sum up and clear out. [B rummages. ] Set 
to go? 
and, in a Calvinist refinement, 'without works' (Beckett, 1970b, 
p. 125). 
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B: Rearing. 
A: We attend. 
B: Let him jump. 
A: When? 
B: Now. 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 237-238) 
`Set to go? ' inquires whether the investigation is to start and 
simultaneously whether it is finished. B, `Rearing' rather than 
`raring' to go, has formulated his conclusion as to whether C 
should jump prior to the exhibition of any evidence. " The 
suspicion must arise that it would be convenient if the evidence 
were marshalled so as to validate that preconceived verdict, that 
the evidence might fit the conclusion rather than the conclusion 
fit the evidence. Where evidence is cited not as the basis of 
a deduction but selectively to confirm a particular hypothesis, 
`There then arises a vicious circle; we are assuming just that 
very point which is mainly in dispute' (Kant, 1933, A693/B721, 
p. 564). The result thus extracted explains and unifies all the 
evidence because the only items allowed to enter the discussion 
are those which confirm the result. A, however, will not allow 
B, the keeper of the evidence, to emphasize exclusively the 
disasters of C: 
38 Compare Condillac's characterisation of metaphysical 
investigations: 
This, then, is metaphysics: a science which proposes to 
treat of everything in general before having observed 
anything in particular, i. e., to speak about everything 
before having learned anything: a vain science which bears 
on nothing and leads to nothing. (Condillac cited in Derrida, 1980, p. 35) 
80 
A: Now let's have the positive elements. 
B: Positive? You mean of a nature to make him think 
... 
[hesitates. then with sudden violence] 
... 
that some 
day things might change? Is that what you want? 
[Pause. Calmer. ] There are none. 
A: [Wearily. ] Oh yes there are, that's the beauty of it. 39 
(Pause. B rummages in his papers. ] 
B: [Looking up. ] Forgive me, Bertrand. [Pause. Rummages. 
Looks up. ] I don't know what came over me. [Pause. 
Rummages. Looks up. ] A moment of consternation. 
[Pause. Rummages. ] There is that incident of the 
lottery 
... 
possibly. Remember? 
A: No. 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 240-241) 
A consciousness of time-restraints curtail, however, the 
pondering of the `bits and scraps' (Beckett, 1964, p. 152) of 
counter-evidence: 
B: 
... 
heirless aunt 
... 
unfinished game of chess with a 
correspondent in Tasmania 
... 
hope not dead of living 
to see the extermination of the species 
... 
literary 
aspirations incompletely stifled 
... 
bottom of a dairy- 
woman in Waterloo Lane 
... 
you see the kind of thing. 
[Pause. ] 
39 According to Beckett similarly, `If there were only darkness, all would be clear. It is because there is not only darkness but also light that our situation becomes inexplicable' (Beckett cited in Driver, 1979, p. 220). 
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A: We pack up this evening, right? 
B: Without fail. Tomorrow we're at Bury St Edmunds. 4° 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 242) 
Such complications can be avoided via the application of 
inductive techniques, which are conducive to grasping observed 
regularities and shaving away irrelevant distractions. It is the 
methodology of majority rule. Yet induction as `the search for 
order' (Rescher, 1980, p. 161) should extract these regularities 
from the evidence; the prior statement of B's conclusion suggests 
that, in the fashion of the ancient metaphysicians, `principles 
are not read out of, but read into, experience' (Walsh, 1963, 
p. 169). 
Besides offending Kant in epistemological and ethical 
procedures, A and B thus cultivate problems in empiricism itself, 
where Kant positively promotes the possibility of secure 
knowledge. Their deliberations on the empirical evidence lead 
to an insistence on merely one conclusion. In principle, 
however, more than one conclusion and more than one theory can 
account for the same evidence: 
given any general theory, and any limited body of evidence 
F, (duly consonant with I in the best hypothetico-deductive 
manner), there will always be many, and generally infinitely 
many, rival theories 
- 
each contrary to I, but consonant 
40 An appropriate location for the determination of another 
suicide. 
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with E- so that no body of evidence can render I probable 
in the context of such an infinistic spectrum of 
alternatives. 
(Rescher, 1980, p. 26) 
The investigators of Theatre II run no risk of `becoming 
paralysed through having to face a superfluity of hypotheses, all 
of which account equally well for our observations' (Schlesinger, 
1983, p. 233). No rival hypothesis is permitted to diminish their 
fondness for conclusions recommending and informed by leaps. In 
the strictly scientific realm, it is contentious whether there 
is any `innocent' empiricism; for Kuhn, `Both fact collection and 
theory articulation become highly directed activities' (Kuhn, 
1962, p. 18). Branches of the philosophy of science maintain 
`our very observations are theory-infected': 
Observations are not `givens' or `data' but are always 
interpretations in the light of background assumptions. The 
idea of unambiguous objects of perception is a myth. 
(Morick, 1972, pp. 17-18) 
That the assessment of the evidence by the investigators is 
`theory-laden' does not exhaust the problem. The mass of 
evidence at the disposal of A and B is constituted by the 
`Testimonies' and C's documented `Confidences': A and B can be 
redefined as interpreters interpreting the data of interpreters 
interpreting the data. 
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x. Evidence for the evidence: infinite regress 
For empirical intuition to take place, Kant requires that 
the object be `present and given to me' (Kant, 1950, §9, p. 29). 
Kant supplies instructions as to how the expression `That an 
object be given' is to be understood, that is, as `not as 
referring to some merely mediate process, but as signifying 
immediate presentation in intuition' (Kant, 1933, A156/B195, 
p. 193). Similarly, for Lyotard, `the presentation of an object 
[... ] is required for the validation of a determinate judgment, 
that is, of a knowledge phrase' (Lyotard, 1988, p. 63). To merely 
`name the referent' is not sufficient (Lyotard, 1988, p. 42). In 
Theatre II, none of the incidents of the Testimonies or 
Confidences are directly witnessed by the investigators. In 
place of empirical knowledge, they have mediated accounts of the 
experience of C. - Thus the Testimonies inaugurate another 
infinite regress. In another context, Kant details precisely 
this problem: all pieces of evidence in favour of a given 
hypothesis require `the same justification as is necessary in the 
case of the fundamental hypothesis, and they are not, therefore, 
in a position to bear reliable testimony' (Kant, 1933, A774/B802, 
p. 616). Before the Testimonies can be employed to validate the 
conclusion, they themselves must be validated. Evidence is 
required as to the reliability of the evidence, and, 
unfortunately, further evidence as to the reliability of that 
second-order evidence. The empirical, by definition, is not A 
priori, that is, self-evident; it therefore requires external 
verification. But further empirical evidence merely pushes that 
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verification backwards: 
The problem in question concerns the overall justificatory 
structure of empirical knowledge. If what justifies an 
empirical belief in the sense of providing a reason for 
thinking that it is true is inference from some 
epistemically prior empirical belief which must itself be 
justified before it can serve as a justificatory premise, 
and if what justifies this second belief is yet a further 
empirical belief requiring justification in the same way, 
and so on, then empirical knowledge is threatened with an 
infinite and seemingly vicious regress of justifying 
beliefs. 
(Bontour, 1985, p. xi) 
Empiricism as an epistemological mode cannot be justified 
empirically without regress or circularity. Kant offers an a 
priori foundation for the empirical to halt the regress; `" A and 
B seek to give an empirical basis for the a priori. The aid that 
Kant offers, the metaphysics of empiricism, ensures that 
metaphysics cannot be grounded in empiricism. 
The empirical, even freed from these toils, can, however, 
support only itself. The "intuitive given', according to 
Lyotard, `can never do anything more than validate the phrase 
that describes it' (Lyotard, 1988, p. 164). The diligent witness 
41 See below, Chapter Six, Section xxviii for the self- 
reflexive difficulties of such a justification. 
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directly perceiving the cycle of departures from home by C, can 
validate the details described by the Testimony but not any 
generalities drawn from these, if we allow `no finicking' 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 393), facts. Empirical facts are, strictly, 
tautological. " An inductive leap is required to raise the 
individual facts of the Testimonies to the status of a 
description of the essential condition of C and another to raise 
the condition of C to the status of a description of the human 
condition. The evidence confirms only itself; to the regret of 
A, the self-knowledge of C is not extended by the review of his 
empirical experience: 
A: [Sadly. ] We'll leave him none the wiser. We'll leave him 
now, never to meet again, having added nothing to what 
he knew already. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 242) 
Only the assumption of `God's point of view' can `find everything 
full of meaning'; `from the point of view of Sirius', `the 
42 Moran's conclusions concerning absences from his son's 
stamp collection cannot, given incomplete evidence, get beyond 
tautologous particularity: 
Had he taken advantage of the opportunity to secure some of 
his favourite stamps? I had not time to check them all. 
I put down the tray and looked for a few stamps at random, 
the Togo one mark carmine with the pretty boat, the Nyassa 
1901 ten reis, and several others. [... ] They were all 
there. That proved nothing. It only proved that those 
particular stamps were there. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 121) 
Moran will permit no inductive generalization from a random 
sample. The issue of tautology is revisited below in Chapter 
Six, sections x-xi. 
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senseless tumult of history offers nothing to the understanding' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 91). The empirical series is contingent 
and incapable of providing a basis for transcendental deductions. 
As the narrator observes in `Love and Lethe', another rendition 
of an unsuccessful suicide, `We state the facts. We do not 
presume to determine their significance' (Beckett, 1970b, 
p. 104). '3 
xi. Lovebirds: the illusion of sensory immediacy 
Both Theatre II and `Love and Lethe' involve meditations 
upon the nature of birds and the apparatus required for their 
care. In the latter work, Ruby and Belacqua ponder the function 
of `the trusses': 
Right along on either hand as far as they could see 
there were fasces of bracken attached to the wire. Belacqua 
43 `Love and Lethe' shares peculiar features with Theatre 
11. Belacqua's attempted suicide, despite `diligent enquiry' and 
a `torrent of invective' (Beckett, 1970b, p. 95), is yet to 
demonstrate `his faculty for acting with insufficient motivation' 
(Beckett, 1970b, p. 94): 
How he had formed this resolution to destroy himself we are 
quite unable to discover. The simplest course, when the 
motives of any deed are found subliminal to the point of 
defying expression, is to call that deed ex nihilo and have 
done. Which we beg leave to follow in the present instance. 
(Beckett, 1970b, p. 95) 
The investigators of Theatre II restart this enquiry. The 
protagonists of `Love and Lethe' too have their problems with 
space and time. Ruby Tough's preference is for a double suicide 
simultaneous in time; yet, we are "slaves of the sand-glass. 
There is not room for us to run out arm in arm"' (Beckett, 1970b, 
p. 103). The spacious 'double window' of Theatre II goes some way 
to resolving this technical difficulty (Beckett, 1986, p. 237). 
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racked his brains for an explanation. In the end he had to 
give it up. 
`God I don't know at all' he exclaimed. 
It certainly was the most astounding thing. 
(Beckett, 1970b, p. 99) 
Inspired by momentary cares for Ruby's comfort prior to suicide, 
involving the removal of the `encumbrance' of a skirt, whereupon 
`Ruby, greatly eased, stormed the summit in her knickers', 
(Beckett, 1970b, p. 99), Belacqua sees the solution: 
`They tie those bundles to the wire' he said `so that 
the grouse will see them. ' 
Still she did not understand. 
`And not fly against the fence and hurt themselves. ' 
(Beckett, 1970b, p. 100) 
The safety of the grouse is preserved so that they may be killed 
in the proper manner. Bundles are necessary to signal the wire: 
the panoramic bird's eye view is not adapted to empirical 
nuances. 
In Theatre II, it is not the facility of empirical 
perception granted to the bird that is under examination but the 
reliability of the empirical vision of the investigators. 
Investigator B, happier with mediated documentary evidence, is 
startled by the sudden intrusion of direct sensory experience: 
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A: [... ] (Pause. ] How is Mildred? 
B: [Disgustedly. ] Oh you know, 
- 
[Brief burst of birdsong. 
Pause. ] Good God! 
A: Philomel! 
B: Oh that put the heart across me! 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 247) 
Appropriately, the involuntary empirical perception is timed to 
interrupt the assumption of established knowledge concerning the 
dire condition of another human subject. The auditory sensation 
is assuredly within time; its cause, similarly empirical, is to 
be located somewhere in space. A is obliged to take over the 
investigation when and where attention to the empirical is 
demanded: 
A: Hsst! [Low. ] Hark hark! [Pause. Second brief burst. 
louder. Pause. ] It's in the room! [He gets up, moves 
away on tiptoe. ] Come on, let's have a look. 
B: I'm scared! 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 247) 
The limitations of vision in the empirical sphere and the fearful 
tentativeness of the investigators of the metaphysical in this 
alien environment prolong the search for the object in space: 
[[... ] A advances on tiptoe upstage right, B tiptoes 
after. ] 
A: [Turning. ] Hsst! [They advance, halt in the corner. A 
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strikes a match, holds it above his head. Pause. 
Low. ] She's not here. [He drops the match and crosses 
the stage on tiptoe followed on tiptoe by B. They pass 
before the window, halt in the corner upstage left. 
Match as before. Pause. ] 
A: Here she is! 
B: [Recoiling. ] Where? 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 247) 
The object, extended and enclosed to emphasize the weight and 
awkwardness of the empirical, is manoeuvred to A's table for 
examination; the cloth is at last raised on the empirical. B is 
entrusted merely with the menial task of supporting the lamp; A 
is to be the empirical scientist: 
- 
B: There's one dead. 
[... ] 
[[... ] They Deer. A takes B's hand and changes its 
position. ] 
A: There. 
B: Is it the cock or the hen? 
A: The hen. See how drab she is. 
B: [Revolted. ] And he goes on singing! [Pause. ] There's 
lovebirds for you! 
A: Lovebirds! [Guffaw. ] Ah Morvan, you'd be the death of me 
if I were sufficiently alive! Lovebirds! [Guffaw. ] 
Finches, pinhead! Look at that lovely little green 
90 
rump! And the blue cap! And the white bars! And the 
gold breast! [Didactic. ] Note moreover the 
characteristic warble, there can be no mistaking it. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 248) 
The new dispensation of the empirical extends its own claims to 
absolute knowledge. Where B's items of empirical evidence were, 
on Kantian principle, insufficient to support metaphysical 
claims, A's attempt at empirical judgements is entirely within 
the bounds of permitted knowledge. Failure here would be through 
negligence rather than impossibility. And so, near the end of 
Theatre II, the litany of incompetence begins again. 
The details of colour characteristics supplied by A are 
insufficient to establish the determinate identity of the 
empirical object. Far from there being no mistaking it', the 
information given is compatible with many different conclusions 
concerning species. Again, an inductive judgement is made from 
incomplete evidence and merely one theory entertained. The 
colour specifications given do not exclude the identification of 
the bird as a finch, but neither do they exclude the possibility 
that it is a parrot, parakeet, canary's or any other exotic bird 
liable find itself caged. Identification based on `the 
characteristic warble' (Beckett, 1986, p. 248) introduces the 
" According to genuinely expert testimony, in addition to 
the bright yellow variety, one may encounter `beige, orange- 
yellow and red canaries, as well as spotted, patchily coloured 
forms and others with lizard-like stripes, as well as the 
cinnamon breed formerly popular in England' (Martin, 1983, 
p. 408). 
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possibility that the bird is, indeed, a warbler instead. 
Moreover, sexing finches according to colour difference is not 
infallible. In the case of some species, `in winter both sexes 
are coloured like the female' (Newton, 1973, p. 409); other cocks 
`only sport their glorious colours [... ] during the period of 
breeding' (St. Blazey, 1991, p. 47). The colour of the cock, and 
hence colour differences -exhibited between the cock and hen, 
modulate according to season. Those that know their birds better 
than investigator A declare in any case that `many finches are 
not dimorphic' at all (St. Blazey, 1991, p. 46). Many other 
species of bird are dimorphic, however: any colour difference is 
not actually sufficient either to sex the birds or define them 
as finches. One can, however, nearly always make a definite 
identification of the'finch according to its beak, which is to 
be `strong, broad and sharp' designed `for grasping and cracking 
SEEDS' (Martin, 1983, 
-p. 74). Investigator B laments that the 
particular birds in question `have no seed' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 248). But again many kinds of beak can cope with seed and, on 
this crucial matter, the shape of the beaks in question, we have 
no direct information, for neither A nor B think to supply such 
details. 
It is only `in connection with their diet' and apparatus for 
dealing with it that `any form of consistency' is exhibited by 
the finch (Martin, 1983, p. 74), although even here, 
unfortunately, there are exceptions to the general seed and beak 
rule. Some finches, to the confusion of the classifier, prefer 
a `softbilled diet' (Martin, 1983, p. 74). There are no 
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absolutely distinguishing characteristics from which definitive 
categorization of species follows. Judgements are made according 
to the differences, similarities, absences and emphases observed 
in various empirical manifestations. Identity is relational and 
progressive rather than absolute. Investigator B has 
insufficient evidence to deduce an essential human condition; 
investigator A is thwarted in the attempt to produce an account 
even of the definitive finch-condition. 
The audience witnesses this attempt at direct empirical 
investigation on the part of A and B, `5 but never sees the 
contents of the cage directly. The birdcage is `covered with a 
green silk cloth fringed with beads, '; to make his own inspection, 
A `lifts cautiously the cloth on the side away from the audience' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 248). For the audience, the alleged `finch' 
is a conceptual construct directed by the information and 
assertions of A and B. There is no empirical manifestation given 
by which to verify the accuracy of this concept. Moreover, this 
is a stage-finch, and where the audience, is not to see a prop, 
there is no requirement that any such prop should exist. The 
entire controversy concerning the status of this `finch' is an 
argument about the contents of an empty cage. We are brought 
back to Kantian `empty Ideas': 
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without 
" There are limitations to even this high point of 
attention to the empirical. Thwarted by the bars of the cage, 
A must borrow a `long pencil' in order to make contact with his 
object (Beckett, 1986, p. 248). B, the documenter, does not allow 
A to usurp his rightful property for long. 
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understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without 
content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. 
It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts 
sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, 
as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring 
them under concepts. 
(Kant, 1933, A51/B76, p. 93) 
Investigator A subsumes his supposed empirical `intuitions' under 
a concept that he has insufficient evidence to fix upon; the 
audience, denied any visual perception of the `finch', possess 
merely a concept `without content'. The audience of Theatre II 
and the metaphysician share an epistemological problem. Their 
ideas cannot be substantiated by empirical intuition; even if 
`sense' or non-contradiction is achieved, there is no 
`reference'. The idea of the `finch' imparted to the audience 
fails the test stated by the principle of significance, for the 
concept supplied, like the empty Ideas of metaphysics, has no 
object. The metaphysician, as represented in Kant, endeavours 
`to soar above the world of sense by the mere power of 
speculation' (Kant, 1933, A591/B619, p. 500), a `soaring [... ] far 
above all possible experience, on the wings of mere ideas' (Kant, 
1933, A638/B666, p. 529). The necessity of empirical intuition 
is to clip these wings. As A announces in 'Glum' mood, `All that 
splendour! ' of his `bonny wee birdie' is to be ruined by an 
insistence on the merely empirical,. the rather less elevated 
`organic waste' (Beckett, 1986, p. 248). According to Homan, in 
Theatre II `Songbirds may suggest the 'ancient notion of the 
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artist as the solitary singer, penning verses about the 
mysterious' (Homan, 1984, p. 182). In keeping with the 
limitations placed upon intuition of the `mysterious' in this 
play, one songbird is dead and both are restricted to the space 
of a cage. 
xii. Confounding objects 
The judgement of A, `there can be no mistaking it' (Beckett, 
1986, p. 248), is misapplied. Only the analytic a priori is 
amenable to this variety of self-evident certainty; the empirical 
is contingent but open to investigation. But the empirical 
expertise of A and B has further rather startling limitations. 
Their opinions as to on which floor of C's borrowed building they 
are currently standing diverge somewhat. B bases his calculation 
of C's spectacular death upon the view that he will begin his 
leap from `floor, say twenty-five'; investigator A `could have 
sworn we were only on the sixth' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238). The 
audience has no means of verifying either possibility. " A 
mistakes the date, according to B, and consequently over- 
estimates the fullness of the moon. Beckett specifies for the 
audience, `Moon invisible' 
-(Beckett, 1986, p. 237). When the 
audience is able to perceive the empirical objects subjected to 
the investigators' conceptual assertions, these conjectures are 
46 Malone, reviewing the possibility of accelerating his 
dying, is beset by an identical problem: 
If I had the use of my body I would throw it out of the 
window. [... ] Unfortunately I do not know quite what floor 
I am on, perhaps I am only on the mezzanine. (Beckett, 1959, p. 219) 
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immediately confounded. The paper evidence, B asserts, is `Tied 
together like a cathedral'; in answer, `the papers [... ] scatter 
on the floor' (Beckett, 1986, p. 238). B has ideas to explain the 
behaviour of his lamp; the object will not comply: 
B: I'll read the whole passage: `... morbidly sensitive to 
the opinion of others 
-' 
[His lamp goes out. ] Well! 
The bulb has blown! [The lamp goes on again. ] No, it 
hasn't! Must be a faulty connection. [Examines lamp, 
straightens flex. ] The flex was twisted, now all is 
well. [Reading. ] `... morbidly sensitive -' [the lamp 
goes out. ] Bugger and shit! 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 242) 
Investigator A's reasoned conceptual advice compounds B's 
difficulties: 
A: Keep your hands off the table. 
B: What? 
A: Keep your hands off the table. If it's a connection the 
least jog can do it. 
B: [Having pulled back his chair a little way. ] i... 
morbidly sensitive 
-' 
[The lamp goes out. B bangs on the table with his fist. 
The lamp goes on again. Pause. ] 
A: Mysterious affair, electricity. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 243) 
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A direct thump upon the empirical, unclouded by preconception, 
is strangely effective. 
Investigator B, distressed by the intrusion of the `finch' 
and also its `Cuttle-bone' (Beckett, 1986, p. 249), refuses to 
examine C directly. His final contribution to the investigation 
is to plead for its termination. He retrieves his briefcase and 
thereafter `sits with back to window', thereby turning away from 
C, the putative object of the inquiry (Beckett, 1986, p. 249). 
The bone, perhaps, is too bare an empirical remainder of the 
results of a pessimism attractive in its apparent conceptual 
sophistication. Investigator A, however, makes a foray to 
inspect his client: 
[Long pause. A goes to window: strikes a match, holds it 
high and inspects C's face. The match burns out, he throws 
it out of window. ] Hi! Take a look at this! [B does not 
move. A strikes another match, holds it high and inspects 
C's face. ] Come on quick! Quick! [B does not move. The 
match burns out, ,A lets it fall. ] Well I'll be 
...! 
[A takes out his handkerchief and raises it timidly towards 
C's face. 
CURTAIN 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 249) 
A has ceased to offer conclusions concerning C; following all the 
evidence, Confidences and Testimonies, C's behaviour remains 
inexplicable. The mystery centres on what he is doing; the 
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investigators have encountered- this problem in an earlier 
reconnaissance mission: 
B: Has he still got that little smile on his face? 
A: Probably. 
B: What do you mean, probably, haven't you just been looking 
at him? 
A: He didn't have it then. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 245) 
Inanimate material objects may thwart one in their behaviour, but 
their physical manifestation, at least in the case of table 
lamps, paper and buildings, does not vary significantly over 
short periods of time. Nor can they consciously modulate their 
conduct with the purpose of deceiving an observer; the human 
subject, to the consternation of A, can. Given this ability to 
dissemble, the task of adequate observation seems impossible: 
A: [Pause. Violently. ] You'd need to stare them in the 
face day and night! Never take your eyes of f them for 
a week on end! Unbeknownst to them! " 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 245) 
" Schopenhauer too wished to observe without being 
observed in the act of observation. It is only when `alone and 
left to himself, plunged in the depths of his own thoughts and 
sensations' that the chosen subject can be said to be `entirely 
and absolutely himself' (Schopenhauer, 1974, §377, p. 638). But 
as long as the subject is being observed, he is not in fact 
alone. A second subject cannot examine how the first behaves in 
solitude for the observer violates that definition. 
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Directly witnessing C's behaviour as the play ends, A can only 
exclaim upon an empirical discovery; the verb suitable to denote 
C's actions is not given. " The pursuit of a missing verb has 
caused earlier tribulations. The `Chinese' of C's own 
`Confidence' to the investigators, which flounders in 
conditionals, terminates in the emphasis of a single clause: 
B: `[... ] and truth to tell 
-' 
Shit! Where's the verb? 
A: What verb? 
B: The main! 
A: I give up. 
B: Hold on till I find the=verb and to hell with all this 
drivel in the middle. [Reading. ] `... were I but 
,.. 
could I but 
... 
' 
- 
Jesus! 
- 
`... though it be 
... 
be 
it but 
... 
' 
- 
Christ! 
- 
ah! I have it -`... I was 
unfortunately incapable 
... 
' Done it! 
A: How does it run now? 
B: [Solemnly. ] `... morbidly sensitive to the opinion of 
others at the time 
... 
'- drivel, drivel, drivel 
- 
`.. 
. 
I was unfortunately incapable 
-' 
" In relation to C, A and B could echo the pleas for 
explanation that the Glazier directs toward Victor in Eleutheria: 
There is only one thing I ask, and that is that you should 
take shape. Just the slightest glimmer of sense, enough to 
make people say, `Ah, so that's what it is, now I'm 
beginning to understand' 
- 
and then I'll disappear. (Beckett, 1996, p. 124) 
The curtain falls on Theatre II just as investigator A might have 
perceived a `glimmer of sense' via the direct apprehension of c 
which replaces the conceptual manipulation of documents 
concerning him. 
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(Beckett, 1986, p. 243) 
Incapacity, uncertainty and bafflement are perhaps the central 
impressions of this play explicitly given over to the delineation 
of investigation and inquiry. Attempts to answer the final 
problem set by Theatre II, the baffling final encounter of 
investigator and subject, reproduce the fundamental error of the 
investigators throughout the play. The audience is now invited 
to attempt the leap from physical empirical details to their 
determinate significance, whether via induction to general rules 
or via the assumption of a metaphysical structure which informs 
all evidential details. In this final scene, the precise 
positioning of the protagonists in space ensure that the audience 
is granted insufficient evidence upon which to base a conclusion. 
C's face remains turned away from his new set of examiners in the 
auditorium: the details which move A to make his exclamation are 
not within the limited perceptual range of the audience. The 
announcement of new evidence is provocation to the invention of 
a new cycle of groundless conjecture. " That which could 
substantiate `ideas' concerning the nature of C is outside the 
bounds of empirical possibility: there is no more time within 
which to perceive, there is no more play. ' 
xiii. Insufficient evidence of pessimism 
Amongst all the invalid arguments, faulty connections and 
'° Homan's reference to `the tear in C's eye', for example, is an idea which simply lacks any definite basis in the play (Homan, 1984, p. 199). 
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boundary violations of Theatre II, there is one instance of 
scrupulous `following'. C, in his borrowed room, is `only here 
to take care of the cat' (Beckett, 1986, p. 239). So strictly is 
this injunction to `only' tend to the cat respected that the 
putative number of finches surviving his necessary inattention 
shows a fifty percentage reduction. C does not overstep the 
lawful boundaries. It is questionable whether philosophers or 
critics would be willing to give up quite so much in order to 
remain within the boundaries they decree to be necessary. The 
limitations placed upon knowledge by Kant may have to be violated 
to enable those very limitations to be delineated. The rejection 
of a metaphysical diagnosis of the human condition may be obliged 
merely to replace one diagnosis with another. " The professed 
sceptic in matters epistemological has a habit of knowing too 
much concerning what he maintains cannot be known. s' The 
problems of self-defeat oblige one to revoke a significant 
percentage of cherished conclusions. Attention to the tangles 
attendant upon self-reflexive analysis in Theatre II is limited 
to the maliciously engineered incompatibility between 
investigator B's triumphant `Done it' and the nature of the 
achievement, the revelation that `I was unfortunately incapable' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 243). Theatre II is content to collapse the 
security of metaphysical assumptions, to redefine its 
6° See below Chapter Six, sections xxvii-xxviii. 
51 The knowing postmodernist and Voltaire's Secretary of 
the Paris Academy of Sciences in Micromegas share pleasure in a 
blank volume of philosophy; it is the confirmation of the 
sceptic's expertise: "'Aha [... ] just as I thought"' (Voltaire, 
1990, p. 121). Knowing one cannot know, however, has more to do 
with comfort than coherence. 
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investigative characters, as Homan perceives, `from confident 
detectives to neurotics' (Homan, 1984, p. 183). As directed by 
this hypothesis, the play can be aligned with a selection of 
Beckett's `non-fictional' statements. 52 In matters of 
metaphysical import, Beckett denies his own qualifications to 
issue declarations: 
If pessimism is a judgement to the effect that ill outweighs 
good, then I can't be taxed with same, having no desire or 
competence to judge. I happen simply to have come across 
more of one than the other. 
(Beckett cited in McMillan and Fehsenfeld, 1988, p. 13) 
Empirical contingency, despite the weight of evidence, is not 
permitted to decide `how it is'. 53 Mercier relates a similar 
52 An alignment cannot be claimed with the usual critical 
estimation of Beckett's `assertive pessimism' (Rosen, 1976, 
p. 33). According to Rosen's reading, `[... ] Beckett's ideas 
constitute a pessimistic and skeptical meaning that is not only 
definite, but highly traditional' (Rosen, 1976, p. 123). It would 
be well to notice, however, that to be pessimistic is 
incompatible with being sceptical: one mode of thought assumes 
an ability to judge the value of life, the core of the other is 
precisely an inability issue such judgements. 
a' According to Adorno: 
When a desperate man who wants to kill himself asks one who 
tries to talk him out of it about the point of living, the 
helpless helper will be at a loss to name one. (Adorno, 1973, p. 376) 
But the same lack of knowledge means that the point to dying 
cannot be delivered either; as Barth writes in `Night-Sea 
Journey', a work which insistently recalls Beckett's How It Is: 
if I have yet to join the hosts of the suicides, it is 
because (fatigue apart) I find it no meaningfuller to drown 
myself than to go on swimming. 
(Barth, 1988, p. 4) 
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claim to insufficient knowledge: 
In general, Beckett himself denies the validity of an 
extreme pessimist attitude to life. As he once said to me 
in conversation, `That would be to judge, and we are not in 
a position to judge. ' 
(Mercier, 1977, p. 175) 
Being in a position itself precludes the possibility of such a 
judgement. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason supplies an exposition 
of the possible reasons why this is so. Any relationship, 
however, which may be suggested between Beckett's writings and 
Kant, is one which will grow progressively more critical. 64 In 
Theatre II, the context proposed for an absolutist pessimism is 
as wounding to the pretensions of metaphysics as Kant could wish: 
B: I quote: `To hear him talk about his life, after a glass 
or two, you would have thought he had never set foot 
outside hell. He had us in stitches. I worked it up 
into a skit that went down well. ' Testimony of Mr 
Moore, light comedian, c/o Widow Merryweather-Moore, 
All Saints on the Wash, and lifelong friend. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 240) 
54 As examined in Chapter Five, the security of empirical knowledge 
explicitly becomes a problem in Watt and Murphy. Where the primary target is metaphysical speculation, empiricism 
receives a more sympathetic hearing; thus Enough: 
What do I know of man's destiny? I could tell you more 
about radishes. For them he had a fondness. If I saw one I would name it without hesitation. (Beckett, 1984, p. 144) 
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The liability of Theatre II to reveal too explicitly the problems 
of investigation and epistemology, and a concomitant inability 
to apply such limitations to its own exposition, its reluctance 
to throw its own polemic into doubt, bears perhaps some relation 
to the putative deficiency which kept the play filed amongst the 
`Roughs'. " This will not be allowed to happen again. 
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Chapter Two 
Proustian slips in Krapp's Last Tape 
i. A lack of vision 
Despite the obstacles to metaphysical insight encountered 
in Theatre II, the author of Krapp's Last Tape is apt to be 
credited with access to just such knowledge. Although Krapp's 
Last Tape predates Theatre II merely by months, ' Knowlson finds 
within it `philosophical issues that lead one directly into 
judgements on the nature of existence' (Knowlson, 1979, p. 91). 
The critic should discern a mobilization of `images [... ] 
carefully chosen and patterned to suggest a dualistic view of the 
world' (Knowlson, 1979, pp. 91-92). Further, Krapp is a prime 
exponent of `the dream of absolute being which constantly haunts 
Beckettian man; "Be again, be-again"' (Knowlson, 1979, p. 85). 
Whereas Knowison's identification of dualism, symbolized by the 
play of light and dark motifs in Krapp's Last Tape, owes a debt 
to Manichaean metaphysics, the latter 
-imperative `Be again' 
recalls Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu and, in 
particular, its final volume `Time Regained'. Attention, in such 
metaphysical matters, is focused on Krapp's vision on the jetty, 
an experience which is, we may choose to assume, `to do with 
"world view" or "life philosophy" or "self-knowledge, " something 
which could be called spiritual or religious' (Morrison, 1983, 
I Krapp's Last Tape began as `Magee Monologue', the 
earliest version of which Admussen finds dated 20 February 1958 (Admussen, 1979, p. 61). As for Theatre II, classified as an 
`abandoned play', `These pages were written a few months after Beckett completed Krapp's Last Tape, to which they show a vague 
resemblance' (Admussen, 1979, p. 112). 
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p. 60). Such scholarly interpretations, armed with meticulous 
textual documentation and argument as they may be, agree with the 
gestures towards metaphysical interpretation made by the first- 
night reviewer's judgement of Krapp's Last Tape as 'Beckett's 
latest [... ] dramatic poem about the old age of the world', the 
latest offering from an author `Still obsessed, with the 
alienation, vacuity, and decay of life upon a planet devoid of 
God and hope' (Brustein, 1979, p. 192). ' Yet the reviewer 
perceives a detail which is subsequently consistently, under- 
emphasized; for Krapp, in charge of the tape-recorder, `turns the 
set off in disgust in the midst of a rabid, excited account of 
a eureka insight into the meaning of life'- (Brustein, 1979, 
p. 192). 2 It is worth investigating why Beckett's interpretation 
of the human condition is to be proclaimed in reputable criticism 
while Krapp's version is included in the play only to precede its 
unceremonious rejection. 
Krapp's vision has been linked by critic and biographer 
alike with an incident during Beckett's post-war visit to 
Ireland. `Having been on the jetty at age thirty-nine is a 
feature shared by Krapp and Beckett' (Smith,. 1991, p. 195); 
according to Knowlson's version of this episode: 
2 The Complete Dramatic Works version of Krapp's Last Tabe 
directs that during the playback of the vision section, Krapp 
three times `switches off impatiently, winds tape forward, 
switches on again' (Beckett, 1986, p. 220). The `Revised Text' 
which appears in The Theatrical Notebooks of Samuel Beckett has 
Krapp fast-forward the tape while it is playing. The tape- 
recorder is not here switched-off as Brustein implies; instead 
a 'mechanical [... ] gabble' (Beckett, 1992, p. 7) interrupts the 
replay of Krapp's vision. 
Between [... ] various crucial experiences in a war-ravaged 
France, something else occurred while Beckett was staying 
in Foxrock with his mother that helped both to change him 
and to transform his approach to his own writing. The 
`revelation' that he had at that time has rightly been 
regarded as a pivotal moment in his entire career. And it 
has often been related to the `vision' that Krapp 
experiences in Beckett's play Krapp's Last Tape' and has 
been located either in Dublin harbour or in the East Pier 
in Dün Laoghaire. ` 
' According to Cronin, `the revelation that he now had' 
instructed Beckett that `he should have written about the inner 
world, with its darkness, its ignorance, its uncertainty' 
(Cronin, 1997, p. 359). For Smith, the lesson of the vision to 
Beckett was similarly `that the inner dark he had always fought 
against in order, he had believed, to write and to be was, in 
fact, the subject he was to write about' (Smith, 1991, p. 195). 
`To Ludovic Janvier', Bair maintains, `Beckett stated that the 
"dark he had struggled to keep under" was ultimately to become 
the source of his creative inspiration' (Bair, 1990, p. 373). 
Curiously, Bair has Beckett referring to himself in the third 
person to Janvier; more curiously, the words cited are to be 
found also in Krapp's Last Tape: `clear to me at last that the 
dark I have always struggled to keep under is in reality my most 
-' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 220). Most curiously, Hugh Kenner, Bair's 
source for her quotation of what Beckett `stated' to Janvier 
(Bair, 1990, p. 373; Bair, 1990, p. 721, n. 16), does not in fact 
assign these words to Beckett in communication with Janvier or 
anybody else but simply quotes them from Krapp's Last Tape, 
noting, given Krapp's rejection of his vision as `pretentious 
nonsense' (Kenner, 1973, p. 132), the `ironies' which must attach 
to speculation concerning Beckett's putative parallel vision. 
The independence of information concerning Beckett's revelation 
is thus highly debatable. If Krapp's Last Tape is used as a 
source for biographical information in this manner, it is 
unsurprising that the vision attributed to Beckett should exhibit 
apparently compelling similarities to that described in the play. 
The critical unanimity concerning the meaning of 
Beckett's revelation does not extend to its location, which, 
coincidently, is not determined in Krapp's Last Tape either. 
Bair's location for Beckett Is the `end of a jetty in Dublin 
harbour, buffeted by a winter storm' (Bair, 1990, p. 373). Smith 
prefers `the spring of 1946' and a buffeting by `an equinoctial 
thunderstorm' (Smith, 1991, p. 195). Cronin, following Eoin 
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(Knowlson, 1996, p. 351) 
Krapp and Beckett's vision is in fact shared a third way, for 
Proust's narrator in A la recherche du temps perdu may contribute 
a visionary revelation of what was to constitute his magnum opus 
too: 
The vision [Krapp] describes has an important counterpoint 
in a passage at the end of Le temps retrouve, where Proust's 
narrator too sees `the whole thing' - sees, that is, how the 
novel we know as A la recherche du temps perdu should be 
written. 
That novel is to derive, as Beckett tells us in his 
1931, essay on Proust, from the narrator's successive 
experiences of the `miracle' of involuntary memory. 
Proust's narrator ultimately dedicates himself to a religion 
O'Brien, considers this romancing to be in error: 
There had been a revelation and it had changed his attitude 
to his own writing, but it had taken place further down the 
coast on a much more humble edifice than Dun Laoghaire pier: 
the little jetty that juts into the sea at Killiney Harbour, 
which is overlooked by his brother's house. 
(Cronin, 1997, pp. 358-359) 
Knowlson cites another incompatible version provided by Beckett 
himself more than forty years after the event: 
Beckett wrote to Richard Ellmann: `All the jetty and howling 
wind are imaginary. It happened to me, summer 1945, in my 
mother's little house, named New Place, across the road from 
Cooldrinagh. ' SB to Richard Elfiman, 27 Jan. 1986 [... ). 
(Knowlson, 1996, p. 772, n. 55) 
The lack of sea and storm is capable of downgrading a mysterious 
revelation to the status of an intellectual realisation. The 
fictionalizing of this episode does not only take place in 
1r pp's Last Tape. 
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of-art 
- 
to the `vocation' of writing [... ]. Similarly, 
Krapp undertakes the task of translating i vision into a 
work of literature in a spirit of determined self-sacrifice: 
the taped memory of his excitement over that `memorable 
night in March' [... ] will, he thinks, sustain him against 
the trials and privations to come. 
(Acheson, 1990, p. 74) 
Which ever way the terms of Krapp's vision are glossed, the 
stable structure -remains an attempt to unite incommensurable 
orders, whether light and dark, mind and body or spirit and 
matter. For Krapp, for Marcel, and reputedly for Beckett, the 
vision is always regarded as the `key to the op. mag. ' (Beckett 
cited in Knowlson, 1992, p. 32). The sensuous intuition, figured 
by 'storm and night', is to become the material of the artist, 
illuminated by `the light of the understanding', (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 220). Light and night, mapped as the spiritual and the 
sensual, partake also of the evaluative symbolic divisions of the 
Manichaean system. Beckett's own production notebooks on Krapp's 
Last Tape confirm the connection explicitly. ' Under the 
Manichaean system, light denotes the intellect, spirit, knowledge 
5 Four pages of Beckett's notebook for the 1969 Schiller 
production detail the Manichaean framework of rapp's Last Tage 
(Beckett, 1992, pp. 131-141). In addition to the information he 
is thought to have extracted from the cyclopedia Britannica, 
Morot-Sir suggests the possibility that `Beckett knows Saint 
Augustine's writings against the Manichaeans, especially the 
confessions, De moribus Manichaeorum et de moribus Ecclesiae, pg 
lýbero arbitrio, and Contra Faustum' (Morot-Sir, 1976, p. 85). 
Ridicule of the metaphysical pronouncements of the Manichaeans 
is a crucial element in Augustine's critique. Krapp's Last Tape, 
Mani and Augustine are discussed in Sections vi-vii of this 
chapter. 
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and ultimate salvation; ` darkness is to evoke matter, 
sensuality, evil and earthly entrapment. In more delicate 
detail, according to Manichaean metaphysics, the `five "finer 
elements" (the Gentle Breeze, the Wind, the Light, the Water, the 
Fire)' had become `mixed' and thus `trapped' by `Five elements 
of darkness (Smoke, Burning, Darkness, Hot Wind, and Cloud' 
(Hopper, 1955, p. 151). Manichaean disciples are charged to 
liberate the entrapped light from the darkness. Mani, founder 
of the sect, was himself granted knowledge of these oppositions 
and their proper evaluation in a vision or, rather, 
"'annunciation" at the age of 24' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1975, 
p. 776). Accordingly, Mani `was persuaded [... ] that he was the 
recipient of divine revelations and that he was called to preach 
a new faith' (Hopper, 1955, p. 149). - Krapp's vision is decidedly 
second-, or given the Proustian and Manichaean filters, third- 
or even fourth-hand; if one's-being is to be blasted by visions 
of the nature of the universe, one is surely entitled to expect 
that such revelations should possess a degree of originality. 
Copied revelations barely warrant the- name. The divinity 
supplying Krapp's metaphysical insights, however, finds it 
difficult to refrain from both arch literary allusions and arcane 
philosophical references. 
Krapp's vision of the eternal, moreover, has decayed in 
6 Light as a metaphor for knowledge and insight is also 
most forcibly used by Descartes. In the Meditations, `the 
"natural light" (lumen naturale)' is invoked `whenever he wishes 
to introduce into the argument premises which are supposed to be 
self-evidently manifest to the intellect' (Cottingham, 1993, 
p. 95). "The Search for Truth' itself is `by Means of the Natural 
Light' (Descartes, 1984, vol. 2, p. 400). 
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time. This central experience, life and art's inspiration, has 
been forgotten: 
... 
Memorable 
... 
what? [He peers closer. ] Equinox, 
memorable equinox. [He raises his head, stares blankly 
front. Puzzled. ] Memorable equinox? 
... 
[Pause. He shrugs 
his shoulders [... ]. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 217) 
As Proust's Marcel records, `after a few years, we are unfaithful 
to what we once were, to what we wished to remain immortally'; 
as Krapp finds too, the conversation with `the self that we have 
been, is experienced as `merely a boring importunity' (Proust, 
1981, vol. 2, p. 888). This repudiation is retrieved by Campbell 
as merely a variant interpretation, a `new reading' attendant 
upon Krapp's review of the'tapes: 
his continual reevaluation of experience necessarily 
involves forgetting and criticizing some things which he 
once considered important. In this light, Krapp's rejection 
of these youthful epiphanies is not a failure, but a 
necessary part of intelligent interpretation: his 
willingness to ignore the things which now seem of limited 
value indicates his openness to new understanding. 
(Campbell, 1978, p. 197) 
Such contemplative serenity and intellectual progress are both 
alien to the rationale informing the textual. revisions made by 
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Beckett to the `vision' passage in the Revised Text of the 
production notebooks. The effect of these revisions instead is 
to impose upon this section a `crescendo' of `unintelligible 
gabble' from the fast-forwarded tape (Beckett, 1992, p. 229) and 
likewise to turn up the volume of Krapp's anger: ' 
Spiritually a year of profound gloom and indigence until 
that memorable night in March, at the end of the jetty, in 
the howling wind, never to be forgotten, when suddenly I saw 
the whole thing. 
([Impatient reaction from KRAPP. ]) 
The vision at last. This I fancy is what I have chiefly to 
([Violent reaction from KRAPP. ]) record this evening, 
against the day when my work will be done and perhaps no 
place left in my memory, warm or cold, for the miracle that 
... 
(hesitates). ([KRAPP thumps on table. ]) 
... 
for the 
fire that set it alight. What I suddenly saw then was this, 
that the belief I had been going on all my life, namely 
- 
(KRAPP switches off impatiently, winds tape forward, 
[mechanical with gabble, 2 seconds, ] switches on again. ) 
- 
great granite rocks the foam flying up in the light of the 
lighthouse and the wind-gauge spinning like a propeller, 
clear to me at last that the dark I have always struggled 
to keep under is in reality my most - (KRAPP curses, 
switches off, winds tape forward, [mechanical with gabble. 
3 seconds], switches on again. ) 
- 
unshatterable association 
' As the editor notes, `Text between square brackets [] has 
been added to the original English text' (Knowlson, 1992, p. 2). 
112 
until my dissolution of storm and night with the light of 
the understanding and the fire 
- 
(KRAPP curses louder, switches off, winds tape forward, 
[mechanical with gabble, 4 seconds], switches on again, 
([lowers head]. ) 
- 
my face in her breasts and my hand on 
her. 
(Beckett, 1992, pp. 7-8) 
According to Beckett's director's notes, on `namely', `most' and 
`fire', Krapp is to respond by `winding feverishly forward 
without cutting sound' (Beckett, 1992, p. 105). From `Spiritually 
a year', Krapp `Looks angrily at the tape-recorder' (Beckett, 
1992, p. 104). Krapp `Strikes table with right hand' upon the 
provocation of `Spiritually' (Beckett, 1992, p. 225). Homan's 
judgement that `the words fail' at these moments of metaphysical 
insight because `no word 
- 
not being or reality or soul or heaven 
- can be commensurate with the experience' (Homan, 1984, p. 101) 
does not recognize that the tape is wound on through `mechanical 
[... ] gabble' at each crucial point,, the points where the 
experience had indeed been converted into a verbal and linguistic 
representation by Krapp during the original recording. 
The full statement of Krapp's vision is never made. This 
statement has a supposed fictional existence on spool five from 
box three, but Krapp is willing to listen to and so concede to 
the audience' only fragments. The metaphysical moment, `when 
suddenly I saw the whole thing', `The vision at last', `the 
miracle' made `clear to me at last' (Beckett, 1986, p. 220), is 
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not reproduced, the key to the mystery deliberately withheld. 
We are provided with gestures toward metaphysical revelation but 
denied access to any positive or determinate content. This 
`vision' replicates the Kantian estimation of metaphysical 
transactions: quite literally, the content of the revelation is 
absent. For the audience, 
-it is never given to the senses. As 
in the case of Molloy's journal, the blanks `are where the action 
is' (Abbott, 1983, pp. 78-79). When the metaphysical moment is 
on the point of being fully enunciated, the tape is wound on in 
exasperation. The fundamentally fictional nature of such moments 
is itself emphasized by Kant: 
All these questions refer to an object which can be found 
nowhere save in our thoughts, namely, to the absolutely 
unconditioned totality of the synthesis of appearances. If 
from our own concepts we are unable to assert and determine 
anything certain, we must not throw the blame upon the 
object as concealing itself from us. Since such an object 
is nowhere to be met with outside our idea, it is not 
possible for it to be given. 
(Kant, 1933, A481-482/B509-510, p. 434) 
For the critic, the metaphysical `object', the content of Krapp's 
vision, must be located only in `thought' and his `own concepts, 
for it is not given in the text of Krapp's Last Tape., 
Krapp's absent metaphysical moment, `when suddenly I saw the 
whole thing' (Beckett, 1986, p. 220), claims insight into the very 
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object which Kant disallows above: `the absolutely unconditioned 
totality of the synthesis of appearances' (Kant, 1933, A481/B509, 
p. 434). Yet the vision is also paradoxically set within spatio- 
temporal restrictions which guarantee that it is in fact 
conditioned; its occurrence is limited to `that memorable night 
in March, at the end of the jetty' (Beckett, 1986, p. 220). 8 In 
the different time and space of the play's action on stage, even 
if this moment were once to be granted the status of an 
metaphysical insight, it is not to be possessed again. For 
Beckett in Proust, 'No object prolonged in this temporal 
dimension tolerates possession, meaning by possession total 
possession, only to be achieved by the complete identification 
of object and subject' (Beckett, 1965, p. 57). It is the spatio- 
temporal dimension which inaugurates this subject and object 
division. Even before `an ideal object, immutable and 
incorruptible', the very object of metaphysics, the subject 
needed to perceive it is `mobile' through time: 
Exemption from intrinsic flux in a given object does not 
change the fact that it is the correlative of a subject that 
does not enjoy such immunity. The observer infects the 
observed with his own mobility. [... ] So that whatever the 
° According to Henning, `The great, involuntary revelation 
lasted only a brief moment, outside time and space. It was, like 
every great apocalypse its description invokes, a break in 
monotonous chronology, a tear in the fabric of mundane time' (Henning, 1988, p. 149). Such, indeed, should be the conditions 
of the metaphysical moment of insight; Krapp's inclusion of date 
and location are thus a considerable blow to the dignity of his 
vision. The escape from time and space is not an easy matter in 
Beckett; even heaven, the a priori eternal, cannot escape at 
least spatial limitation: it is a "'there where there is no 
time"' (Beckett, 1970b, p. 193). 
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object, our thirst for possession is, by definition, 
insatiable. At the best, all that is realised in Time (all 
Time produce), whether in Art or Life, can only be possessed 
successively, by a series of partial annexations 
- 
and never 
integrally and at once. 
(Beckett, 1965, pp. 17-18) 
The playback of Krapp's vision asks for a double dispensation if 
it is to qualify as metaphysically significant: we must allow 
that an apprehension of the whole-was made in the past and that 
recovery of that apprehension, in all its dubious original 
integrity, is possible in the present. Neither would be allowed 
by Beckett or Kant. For each, `our vulgar perception is not 
concerned with other than vulgar phenomena' (Beckett, 1965, 
p. 17). Only empirical phenomena are available to a subject which 
is set in space and time. 
Any position in space disallows metaphysical insight; the 
site selected for Krapp's vision, however, has its own additional 
vulgar jibes to make. In `Love and Lethe' the Dün Laoghaire 
jetty, which was, according to some commentators, the location 
for Beckett's own `revelation', is brought briefly to the notice 
of Belacqua and Ruby Tough prior to their thoughts turning 
exclusively to suicide: 
The first thing they had to do of course when they got 
to the top was admire the view, with special reference to 
Dun Laoghaire framed to perfection in the shoulders of Three 
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Rock and Kilmashogue, the long arms of the harbour like an 
entreaty in the blue sea. ( 
... 
) A human turd lay within the 
rath. 
(Beckett, 1970b, p. 100) 
Kant will not permit such intimations of materiality to 
metaphysical speculation; around `metaphysically great men' 
instead, 
`there is commonly much wind' (Kant, 1950, p. 122, note 
2). In the case of impediments to one's way, one is at least 
sure of `the fruitful bathos of experience' (Kant, 1950, p. 122, 
note 2). 9 Proust is more particular in selecting for his 
narrator `the best point [... ] for seeing the most violent 
storms' (Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 417). In common with Krapp, 
Marcel requires a position `round which the winds howled and the 
sea-birds wheeled', where the observer may receive `the last 
dying foam of the uplifted waves' (Proust, vol. 1,1981, p. 708). 
Marcel even shares with Krapp a proximity to `the granite rampart 
of a Norman cliff' (Beckett, 1965, p. 40). However, according to 
Marcel, `I required also, if the storm was to be absolutely 
genuine, that the shore from which I watched it should be a 
natural shore' (Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 417). Krapp must make do 
with a jetty; Marcel will not tolerate any such `embankment 
recently constructed by a municipality' (Proust, 1981, vol. 1, 
P. 417). 
This comment from, Kant's prolegomena to any Future 
Metaphysics is cited in the Addenda to Watt in mysterious 
isolation as `das fruchtbare Bathos der Erfahrung' (Kant cited 
in Beckett, 1976, p. 254). 
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ii. Krapp `recovers himself' 
As in metaphysical revelation, transcendence of time and 
space is a vital element in Proustian involuntary memory. A 
central instance of this transcendence occurs in `Time Regained' 
with Marcel's stumble on the cobbles in the Guermantes' 
courtyard. Without such points of transcendence offered by 
involuntary memory, Marcel characterizes his experience as a 
meaningless and levelled continuum in time. Without possible 
exit from this stream, `another hundred years of life (... ] would 
merely have added a series of extensions to an already tedious 
existence, which there seemed to be no point in prolonging at 
all' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 898). Without this `miracle', 
Marcel is `not situated outside Time, but was subject to its 
laws' (Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 520). For Marcel, it is not 
mechanical equipment that can overcome `actual separation' in 
space or time; the telephone merely emphasizes for him `the 
illusoriness in the appearance of the most tender proximity' 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 2, p. 135). Krapp's tape-recorder, stabilizing 
the object, cannot retard the movement of the subject. Time and 
space intervene: 
But should a sensation from a bygone year - like those 
recording instruments which preserve the sound and the 
manner of the various artists who have sung or played into 
them 
- 
enable our memory to make us hear that name with the 
particular ring with which it then sounded in our ears, we 
feel at once, though the name itself has apparently not 
118 
changed, the distance that separates the dreams which at 
different times its same syllables have meant for us. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 2, p. 5) 
For Proust, the `communication of our present self [... ] with the 
past' is mediated only via chance meetings with that sensuous 
object wherein `the essence of the past' in stored (Proust, 1981, 
vol. 3, p. 921). In the search for 'our own past' 
It is a labour in vain to attempt to recapture it: all, the 
efforts of our intellect must prove futile. The past is 
hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of the 
intellect, in some material object (in the sensation which 
the 'material object will give us) of which we have no 
inkling. And it depends on chance whether or not we come 
upon this object before we ourselves must die. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 1, pp. 47-48) 
The first object which, in its interaction with the' senses of the 
narrator, inaugurates the transcendence of the spatio-temporal 
continuum is a madeleine infused with tea. In Beckett's 
encapsulation, `The whole of Proust's world comes out of a 
teacup' (Beckett, 1965, p. 34). 
The spell of involuntary memory is activated for Marcel 
immediately upon sensory contact between mouth and madeleine: `No 
sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my 
palate than a shudder ran through me and I stopped, intent upon 
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the extraordinary thing that was happening to me' (Proust, 1981, 
vol. 1, p. 48). The experience of the madeleine is centred upon 
`a pure form of oral sensuousness' (Kristeva, 1993, p. 43), a 
contact `which is the most infantile and archaic that a living 
being can possibly experience with an object or a person' 
(Kristeva, 1993, p. 44). Krapp duplicates the form of this 
experience in his opening routine. A blank tape is first 
rejected from the drawer in Krapp's table; a second exploration 
yields more suitable material for oral stimulation, `a large 
banana' (Beckett, 1986, 'p. 215). Krapp is to be under scrutiny 
on the fore-stage to determine the magical effects of this 
sensory experience: 
He turns, advances to edge of stage, halts, strokes banana, 
peels it, drops skin at his feet', puts end of banana in his 
mouth and remains motionless, staring vacuously before him. 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 215-216) 
Krapp is properly `motionless' during this first experiment. 
Marcel too, upon the shock of involuntary memory, must halt as 
the experience exerts its grip: 
Suddenly I stood still, unable to move, as happens when we 
are faced with a vision that appeals not to our eyes only 
but requires a deeper kind of perception and takes 
possession of the whole of our being. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 153). 
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The properly Proustian experience is one of inner tumult, a 
`palpitating in the depths of my being', a `confused and chaotic' 
struggle within a consciousness assailed by a `whirling medley 
of stirred-up colours' (Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 49). Krapp, 
banana in mouth, remains `staring vacuously before him', 
bathetically unassailed (Beckett, 1986, p. 216). 1° Involuntary 
memory does not permit second attempts at stimulation; the 
madeleine's powers of invocation are dependent upon the condition 
that it reactivates a `long-forgotten taste' (Beckett, 1965, 
p. 34). Repetition of the stimulus is subject to the law of 
diminishing returns, `a progressive diminution of strength' 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 48). As Marcel finds, `a second 
mouthful' yields `nothing more than in the first', `a third [ 
... 
] 
gives me rather less than the second': `It is time to stop; the 
potion is losing its magic' (Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 48). Krapp, 
however, desires, after many mouthfuls of the, first, a second 
banana. The chance encounter with a sensory object described by 
Proust is inverted by Krapp into a ritual to be repeated. Krapp 
returns to his starting position in order to duplicate his own 
parodic duplication of the essential Proustian incident. The 
motions of time past are mechanically and inexactly repeated in 
time present: " 
10 Oral stimulation by carrot is more successful in 
stirring Estragon's memory in Waiting for Godot: 
VLADIMIR: [... ] What was it you wanted to know? 
ESTRAGON: I've forgotten. [Chews. ] That's what annoys me. 
[He looks at the carrot appreciatively, dangles it 
between finger and thumb. ] I'll never forget this 
carrot. [He sucks the end of it meditatively. ] Ah yes, 
now I remember. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 21) 
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fie. [... ] returns t 
mo tio nl ess, nea ves ag reat sign, taxes Ke ys rr om his 
po cke ts 
, 
rai ses them to h is eyes, ch ooses key 
. 
gets up and 
mo ves t o fro nt o f ta ble, unlocks sec ond drawe r. " tak es out 
a sec ond lar ge b anan a, pe ers at it. l ocks draw er, out s back 
ke ys in poc ket, tur ns, a dvances to edge of s tage. halts 
st rok es bana na, peel s it, tosses ski n into pit 
, 
puts 
, 
end of 
ba nan a in his mou th a nd remains motionl ess, s taring 
va cuo usl y be fore him 
. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 216) 
Ironically inverting Proustian rules, Krapp's revelation is 
attendant upon this repetition of the stimulus: 
Finally he has an idea, puts banana in his waistcoat pocket 
the end emerging, " and goes with all the speed he can 
muster backstage into darkness. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 216) 
A page in Beckett's production notebook headed `CHOICE CHANCE', 
with the Proustian stipulation 'CHANCE' crossed out (and left 
legible), details the nature of Krapp's `idea': 
11 The Revised Text cuts this business with the keys; Krapp 
begins the repeat of the banana-sequence as he `returns to 
drawer' and simply `takes out second [... ] banana' (Beckett, 
1992, p. 3). 
12 Instead of preserving the banana for future use, in the 
Revised Text Krapp `throws banana backstage left' (Beckett, 1992, 
P. 3). This action will later be counted as an offence against Manichaean precepts. 
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At curtain up he is thinking of the story of 
the boat and trying to remember 
which year it was (how old he was). 
Doesn't succeed. Tries again 
during banana 1. (Reseated at 
table still tries to remember. ) 
Remembers all of a sudden as he starts banana 2 
(thanks to 39 = 13 x 3, which had 
struck him at the time) and hastens away 
to fetch the ledger that will allow him 
to identify box and tape. 
(Beckett, 1992, p. 49) 
Krapp has remembered the correct reference to a tape-recording 
of an experience, not the experience itself. Involuntary memory 
remains inaccessible; Krapp's power of recall is `an instrument 
of reference instead of an instrument of discovery' (Beckett, 
1965, p. 30), the very opposite of involuntary memory. Marcel's 
consciousness has the capacity to `miraculously' transverse 
`enormous distances', invoking the experience which will `come 
rushing upon us with almost the speed of light' (Proust, 1981, 
vol. 3, p. 950). This instantaneous mental retrieval is degraded 
into Krapp's physically difficult movements, his `Laborious walk' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 215), to collect together his rather more 
cumbersome externalized mental machinery from the darkness of the 
closet. 
The interval between the consumption of the first and second 
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banana is distinguished by Krapp's mishap with a portion of 
discarded peel. The incident properly maintains a low reputation 
as `clownish stage business', a `pratfall' (Knowlson, 1992, p. xv) 
or `a tired piece of slapstick', (Schotz, 1991, p. 48). Such a 
slip has portentous meaning in a Proustian context, however. 
Furthermore, the precise phrasing of Beckett's stage directions 
delicately doubles the allusion. Krapp has ceased to wait for 
the revelations of involuntary memory to attend banana one: 
Finally he bites off the end, turns aside and begins pacing 
to and fro at edge of stage, in the light. i. e. not more 
than four or five paces either way, meditatively eating 
banana. He treads on skin, slipss, nearly falls. recovers 
himself, stoops and peers at skin and finally pushes i 
still stooping, with his foot over edge of stage into 
pi-t. 13 
(Beckett, 19861 p. 216) 
As Beckett's Proust argues, one of the primary powers of 
involuntary memory is that which enables Marcel also to `recover 
himself'. Via an action or sensation shared by time past and 
time present, `he has recovered the lost reality of himself, the 
reality of his lost self' (Beckett, 1965, p. 41). For Marcel, the 
lost self of time past lies latent within the present 
1' As Knowlson points out, after the Schiller production of 
Krapp's Last Tape, Beckett altered the means of disposal: `after 
slipping on the skin in good circus and pantomime tradition, in 
the revised version Krapp picked it up and threw it backstage left into the darkness' (Knowlson, 1992, p. xv). The remnants of 
the second banana will follow it. 
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manifestation of the subject, `Within us [... ] but hidden from 
our eyes in an oblivion more or less prolonged': 
It is thanks to this oblivion alone that we can from time 
to time recover the person that we were, place ourselves in 
relation to things as he was placed, suffer anew because we 
are no longer ourselves but he, and because he loved what 
now leaves us indifferent. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 692) 
In time present Marcel can recover himself, that is, recover a 
past `self that I had just suddenly become once again' (Proust, 
1981, vol. 2, p. 784). Krapp's recovery of himself is a parodic 
physical manifestation` of the psychic action of Proust's 
narrator. Krapp's slip, which provokes the buried reference of 
the stage direction, " has its own peculiar Proustian 
counterpart, the `chance reduplication of a precarious 
equilibrium' (Beckett, 1965, p. 70), as Beckett puts it, 
experienced by Marcel' in the GuermantesI courtyard. This 
decisive instance of involuntary memory at last reveals to the 
narrator his literary vocation: 
" It is not the only allusion or joke contained in 
Beckett's stage directions which is available only to the reader 
and must be lost in performance. In Happy Days, Winnie is in 
possession of `a collapsible collapsed parasol' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 138); the direction can be followed, but the felicity of its 
expression cannot be reproduced for an audience. Elsewhere, 
Beckett introduces distinctions in the stage directions which 
equally cannot be made manifest during performance; in The 07d 
Tne, for example, Gorman's speech is `indistinct for want of 
front teeth, whistling sibilants', whereas Cream must have 
`Whistýing sýbi ants due to ill-fitting denture' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 337). The effect of each malady is identical; the reader only 
is privy to their distinct causes. 
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Revolving the gloomy thoughts I have just recorded, I had 
entered the courtyard of the Guermantes mansion and in my 
absent-minded state I had failed to see a car that was 
coming toward me; the chauffeur gave a shout and I just had 
time to step out of the way, but as I moved sharply 
backwards I tripped against the uneven paving-stones in 
front of the coach-house. And at that moment when, 
recovering my balance, I put my foot on a stone which was 
slightly lower than its neighbour, all my discouragement 
vanished [... ]. Just as, at the moment when I tasted the 
madeleine, all anxiety about the future, all intellectual 
doubts had disappeared, so now those that a few seconds ago 
had assailed me on the subject of my literary gifts, the 
reality even of literature, were removed as if by magic. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 898-899) 
The slip, `with the imperious suddenness of a chance happening' 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 899-900), restores to Marcel all the 
sensations experienced simultaneously with its earlier occurrence 
in the baptistery of St. Mark's and thus delivers to 
consciousness the `radiant essence' of Venice as experienced then 
(Beckett, 1965, p. 70). Beckett has reactivated this particular 
Proustian incident before; repeating the very words of Proust, 
Belacqua in Dream to Fair to Middling Women reports `The wattmen 
tittered as I tottered on purpose for radiant Venice to solve my 
life' (Beckett, 1993, p. 82). In Beckett's usage, in Dream and 
Br pp's Last Tape, the slip is relieved of all ability to disturb 
its performers by the invasion of visions or revelations. The 
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process of degeneration is sustained: in Proust, Marcel's stumble 
is enacted to `the evident amusement of the crowd of chauffeurs' 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 899); Belacqua performs to the titters 
of mere wattmen; Krapp, the source of his slip reduced to the 
banana-skin beloved of silent comedy, relinquishes his balance 
in return for the mere acknowledgement-of, buffoonery by the 
lowest crowd of spectators, Beckett's audience. 
In a play concerned with memory, time, the ageing of the 
subject, literary ambitions and the replaying of time past, one 
would not expect Beckett. to be careless with allusions to 
Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu. The minor idiosyncrasies 
shared by Krapp and Marcel are too numerous to be the result of 
merely fortuitous echoes. Krapp is endowed with the capacity for 
`an emotional rapport with material objects' (Beckett, 1992, 
p. 248); for Marcel, 
-`material objects have in themselves no 
power, but [... ] it is in our practice to bestow power' (Proust, 
1981, vol. 3, p. 889). Where Marcel reports `unpeopled vacancy' 
(Proust, vol. 1,1981, p. 462), Krapp concludes `The earth might 
be uninhabited' (Beckett, 1986, p. 223). Marcel's admission that, 
in regard to selected women, he `provided each of them with a 
legend' (Proust, vol. 1,1981, p. 462), is reproduced by, Krapp's 
enigmatic references to `A girl in a shabby green coat', the 
mysterious `Bianca in Kedar Street' (Beckett, 1986, p. 218), and 
the girl in the punt distinguished by a scratch on her thigh 
sustained while, of all things, `Picking gooseberries' (Beckett, 
1986, p. 221). 
, 
Krapp and Marcel share a: cagibi, a `place of 
refuge', especially useful as a retreat ensuring the `inviolable 
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solitude' necessary for `sensual gratification' (Proust, 1981, 
vol. 1, p. 13). In the Orsay and San Quentin productions, Krapp's 
image was seen in shadow on the wall. of the closet while taking 
progressively stronger drinks; Marcel is supplied with `a magic 
lantern' in the cagibi, projecting upon its walls `an impalpable 
iridescence, supernatural phenomena of many colours, in which 
legends were depicted as on a shifting and-transitory window' 
(Proust, vol. 1,1981, p. 9). 
. 
Later, set by the' `shore of that 
lake in the Bois', Marcel, as well as Krapp, relates an episode 
involving a rejected lover and a detail concerning the 'the 
fusion of our shadows' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 172-173). 
Marcel's asthmatic breathlessness has in Krapp's constipation a 
less aesthetic counterpart for the suggestion of artistic 
blockage and narcissistic self-enclosure. The death of Krapp's 
mother is relayed `when [... ] the blind went down' (Beckett, 
1986, 'p. 220); for Marcel, `the vision of his grandmother begins 
to fade' following her death, until `It is redeemed for a moment 
[... ] by the drawing of a blind in a railway carriage' (Beckett, 
1965, p. 43). '5 While `mother lay a-dying' (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 219), Krapp, literally and parodically, doubles Marcel's `rule 
in Marcel is struck by the gap 'between the fact of 'his grandmother's death and his emotional realization of it: 
it was only at that moment 
- 
more than a year after her burial, because of the anachronism which so often prevents the calender of facts from corresponding to the calendar of feelings 
- 
that I became conscious that she was dead. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 2, p. 783) 
In Becketts dramatic fragment, Human Wishes, Mrs Williams notes an identical phenomena: `When my father, Mr Zachariah Williams, d 
the 
ied [. 
.]I knew at once he was dead', yet `it did not come to 
1983aotice of my heart until the Christmas following' (Beckett, P"164). 
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of the three adjectives': 
It was the time when well-bred people observed the rule of 
affability and what was called the rule of the three 
adjectives. Mme de- Cambremer combined both rules. One 
laudatory adjective was not enough for her, she followed it 
(after a little dash) with a second, then (after another 
dash) with a third. But, what was peculiar to her was that, 
in defiance of the literary and social aim which she set 
herself, the sequence of the three epithets assumed in Mme 
de Cambremer's letters the aspect not of a progression but 
of a diminuendo. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 2, p. 977) 
Krapp, for the benefit of the tape, instigates the rule of six 
adjectives: `A small, old, black, hard, solid rubber ball' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 220). The `unerring dexterity' of Mme de 
Cambremer in achieving a diminishment through her three 
adjectives ('delicious 
- 
charming 
- 
nice') provokes Marcel into 
recognizing their purposeful employment as a disguised insult 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1123). Beckett goes further down the 
`descending scale' (Proust, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1123). The "bench by 
the weir' episode (Beckett, 1986, p. 219) marks Krapp's sole foray 
into society, not quite `throwing a ball' (Beckett, 1986, p. 220), 
but sufficient measure of Krapp's adherence to the `rule of 
affability': 
Hardly a soul, just a few regulars, nursemaids, infants, old 
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men, dogs. I got to know them quite well - oh by appearance 
of course I mean! One dark young beauty I recollect 
particularly, all white and starch, incomparable bosom, with 
a big black hooded perambulator, most funereal thing. 
Whenever I looked in her direction she had her eyes on me. 
And yet when I was bold enough to speak to her - not having 
been introduced 
- 
she threatened to call a policeman. As 
if I had designs on her virtue! " 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 219-220) 
Omitting the ritual of formal introduction, Krapp's social graces 
are sufficiently lacking to justify a call for the introduction 
of the police, to the scene instead. As Marcel discovers, 
Parisian society is predicated upon `appearance'; Krapp has no 
aspiration to a more intimate knowledge. 
Krapp shares two more linguistic peculiarities with Marcel. 
16 The starched nurse provides intimations of the only 
major episode of involuntary memory in A la recherche du temps 
perdu not marked in Krapp's Last Tape. The sensations 
experienced by Marcel while `holding in my hand the stiff 
starched towel' supplied by the hotel at Balbec (Proust, 1981, 
vol. 1, p. 723) are recalled at the Guermantes' reception by a 
napkin which `had precisely the same degree of stiffness and 
starchedness as the towel with which I had found it so awkward 
to dry my face [... ] on the first day of my arrival at Balbec' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 901). The sensation of touch is here the 
provocation for the resurgence of involuntary memory. In an 
earlier draft of Krapp's Last Tape, Krapp does indeed attempt a 
more exact, and simultaneously parodic, Proustian parallel: 'in 
Typescript III Beckett entertained the possibility of making 
Krapp's advances to the nurse more overt: "when I was ingenious 
enough to try and pat her on the bottom she threatened to call 
a policeman"' (Gontarski, 1977, p. 65). The nurse, `all white and 
starch' we remember, has only to be importuned. by a little of 
Krapp's pawing to provide an allusion to the missing episode of 
Proustian involuntary memory, that excited by the sense of touch 
upon starched material. 
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The `magic of names' for Marcel is attendant on `Swann': 
And then I would be obliged to catch my breath, so 
suffocating was the pressure, upon that part of me where it 
was forever inscribed, of that name which, at the moment 
when I heard it, seemed to me fuller, more portentous than 
any other, because it was heavy with the weight of all the 
occasions on which I had secretly uttered it in my mind. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 157) 
Krapp's revelry in sound swaps portentousness for vacuity: 
`Spooool! [Happy smile [... ]]' (Beckett, 1986, p. 216). But 
Marcel also experiences `that law of change which made these 
loved words unintelligible to us' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 941). 
Krapp shares this disability too: 
where mother lay a-dying, in the late autumn, after her -long 
viduity [KRAPP gives a start] and the 
- 
[KRAPP switches of f 
winds back tape a little, bends his ear closer to machine. 
switches on] 
- 
a-dying, after her long viduity, and the 
- 
[KRAPP switches off, raises his head, stares blankly before 
him. His lips move in the syllables of `viduityl. No 
sound. He gets up, goes backstage into darkness, comes back 
with an enormous dictionary, lays it on table, sits down and 
looks up the word. ]17 
" According to Kelly, `viduity' is a word `which Beckett 
found in Johnson' (Kelly, 1992, p. 29), although this fact is 
somewhat less notable if, by `in Johnson', we refer to his dictionary wherein most words can in fact be found. 
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(Beckett, 1986, p. 219) 
As Marcel discovers, `even our strongest feelings [... ] at the 
end of a few years have vanished from our heart and become for 
us merely a word which we do not understand' (Proust, 1981, 
vol. 3, p. 940). Marcel's attempts to reactivate such feelings 
through the rigours of involuntary memory and artistic 
exploration are reduced, for Krapp, to the scanning of another 
reference book, his `enormous dictionary' wherein' meanings may 
be re-discovered in an orderly fashion when erased from 
consciousness. " 
These Proustian moments, shared, images, episodes and 
peculiarities, are not simply reproduced: Krapp's Last Tape's 
remembrance of Proust, the master of fiction concerning memory, 
is faulty, distorted and parodic. To `forget' Proust in such a 
fashion is perhaps the most subtle and well-designed of literary 
insults. The image of Proust is a decidedly faint memory and 
Krapp's unerring impulse is to degrade any `moments' of Proustian 
allusion. According to Marcel, had Mme de Cambremer stretched her 
powers of diminutive description to a fourth adjective; `nothing 
would have remained of the initial amiability' (Proust, 1981, 
vol. 2, p. 978); Krapp's assessment of `moments' is permitted a 
fourth entry: 
A la recherche du temps perdu is itself one of the few 
novels which require, ironically, an aid to memory in the form 
of a referenced synopsis. Access to episodes in the novel is facilitated by a scholarly precursor to Krapp's ledger. 
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Moments. Her moments, my moments. [Pause. ] The dog's 
moments. 
- 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 220) 
In the flawed reproduction of Proust, predicated on obliquity 
rather than parallelism, nothing remains of the initial 
portentousness. The accent is exclusively upon diminuendo. 
iii. The magnum opus: empiricism and intellectual transcendence 
The grandeur of Krapp's vision of the `opus 
. 
'.. magnum' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 218) is dissipated by the location of his work 
in certain `libraries': `Seventeen copies sold, of which eleven 
at trade price to free circulating libraries beyond the seas' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 222). Marcel's vision of his literary 
vocation, commencing with the stumble on the cobbles in the 
courtyard, is instead consolidated as `He is ushered into the 
library' (Beckett, 1965, p. 70). In this location, Marcel finds 
`suddenly illuminated [... ] the whole purpose of my life and 
perhaps of art itself' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 923). Krapp and 
Marcel are brought to the same position: each has at his disposal 
a library where the volumes or tapes contain `the history of my 
own life' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 922); each has deferred the 
commencement of the prospective magnum opus in favour of sensual 
pleasures; each perceives that the 'reality' of their own 
darkness is to constitute the material of their art. Marcel, 
sharing the vision's tropology of light and darkness, realizes 
`that this life that we live in half-darkness can be illumined 
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[... ] within the confines of a book! ' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, 
p. 1088). The raw materials of art are to be found in the 
artist's own individual experience: 
And then a new light [... ] shone suddenly within me. And 
I understood that all these materials for a work of art were 
simply my past life; I understood that they had come to me, 
in frivolous pleasures, in indolence, in tenderness, in 
unhappiness, and that I had stored them up without divining 
the purpose for which they were destined or even their 
continued existence any more than a seed does when it forms 
within itself a reserve of all the nutritious substances 
from which it will feed a plant. " 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 935-936) 
Krapp's storage system of fragmented empirical experience is 
exemplary up to the point of the stage time of the play; at its 
end, Krapp's ledger and tapes are scattered on the floor, to be 
kicked aside if they should impede his path to the closet for a 
`strong measure' to dull the very senses that are charged with 
19 The end of Proust's work thus leaves us at the point 
where Marcel's is ready to begin. The Moran section in Molloy is structurally identical: 
Moran's novel adopts that typical fictional form familiar 
to us in Wordsworth's Prelude, Hegel's Logic, Proust's 
novel, and in contemporary works of fiction like Iris 
Murdoch's Under the Net. Moran's novel brings him to the 
point in his experience at which he is ready to begin 
writing the work we have just finished reading. 
(Bovd, 1982, p. 204) 
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the collection of material for the artist. 2° The materials of 
the magnum opus, gathered for assessment in the pool of light 
surrounding Krapp's table, are thrown back into the surrounding 
darkness. 
Marcel desires the transcendence and synthesis of empirical 
experience; Krapp merely consolidates the havoc and disorder of 
the undigested fragments of empirical material stored on the 
trampled tapes. Marcel as artist `remembers only things that are 
general' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 937): sensory experience, the 
individual and particular, must be processed by the understanding 
into an artistic expression of universal significance. Marcel 
can thus seize grief and unhappiness as the raw material of 
artistic creation, for the `necessary function' of the writer is 
`to extract from [... ] grief the generality that lies within it' 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 939). Marcel has a precise plan which 
could deal` with the `mere rough draft' of the punt passage on 
Krapp's tape; here `the particular and the general lie side by 
side': 
if [... ] we set ourselves to work, [... ] literature, 
recommencing the ruined work of amorous illusion, will give 
a sort of second life to sentiments which have ceased to 
exist. And certainly we are obliged to re-live our 
=O Directing Pinget's 1'Hypothese, Beckett made `concrete' 
the `relationship of a man to his manuscript' in similar terms: 
pages were to be scattered on the stage and `Beckett insisted 
that he hear the sound of the character walking through the 
leaves that have fallen on to the floor' (Chabert cited in 
McMillan and Fehsenfeld, 1988, p. 315). 
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individual suffering, with the courage of the doctor who 
over and again practises on his own person some dangerous 
injection. But at the same time we have. to conceptualise 
it in a general form which will in some measure enable. us 
to escape from its embrace, which will turn all mankind into 
sharers in our pain, and which is even able to yield us a 
certain joy. Where life immures, the intelligence cuts a 
way out [... ]. The intelligence knows nothing of those 
closed situations of life from which there is no escape. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 942-943) 
The punt passage is replayed in accordance with the experiment 
Marcel advocates, yet Krapp cannot reach the `disinterested' 
state of the, artist (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 946), where the 
particular, sensory experience is transformed into a-general 
abstraction, fit for use inýan 
-art dealing in essences and 
universality. Krapp's experience remains undigested and 
unsynthesized, fragmentary and dark in its sensuous origins; the 
light of the understanding is unable to exercise its powers of 
transformation. The episode of the-punt is merely repeated, the 
tape-recording ensuring that this material is, in itself, 
unchanged when replayed. Where Marcel achieves intellectual 
abstraction and imaginative transcendence of particular 
experiences, Krapp is equipped merely to rewind and play out the 
same raw material over again. 
For Marcel, the empirical and sensory impression is the 
ground from which the intellectual abstraction arises; that which 
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is located in time and space is the material from which a 
timeless and universal essence is to be drawn. Sounding a 
Kantian note, Marcel rejects "The ideas formed by the pure 
intelligence", which, lacking sensory counterparts, `have no more 
than a logical, a possible truth' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 914). 
Such ideas, like the empty concepts of metaphysics, are merely 
`arbitrarily chosen' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 914). Instead, 
Marcel's task is `to interpret the given sensations assigns of 
so many laws and ideas, by trying to think-[... ] what I had 
merely felt, by trying to convert it into its spiritual 
equivalent' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 912). The empirical 
impression itself should remain the basic material of the 
intellectual abstraction. Yet this abstraction of the essential 
from contingent phenomena, of the general law from analysis of 
the particular instance, replicates both the process of induction 
and the grounding of metaphysical assertions on empirical 
evidence examined in relation to Theatre II above and each 
outlawed by Kant. While Marcel avoids the unanchored 
speculations of metaphysics entirely disconnected from empirical 
evidence, the difficulty remains that no empirical evidence is 
sufficient to- properly ground his desired abstractions and 
generalities. 2t The very value of this operation for Marcel is 
21 The'tension here is evident in Kristeva's commentary: 
We can note in passing how sensation and representation 
inevitably drift apart at the very moment when the 
experience of taste, as an immediate perceptual experience, 
is transcended by the concern to illuminate its meaning. 
Taste and vision are still inseparable paramours but they 
have come unstuck [... ]. (Kristeva, 1993, pp. 46-47). 
Some conceptual violence is necessary to enable the putatively 
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that empirical fragments are transcended; the intellectual 
insight must indeed surpass its constitutive sensory experiences. 
Inevitably, the insight is then incompletely- grounded by 
empirically verifiable experience. 
In Beckett's Proust the work of conceptualization and 
intellectual transcendence demanded of the artist by Marcel, is 
recast in terms'dangerously close to that `minister of dullness' 
and `agent of security', the `old ego' (Beckett, 1965, p. 21). 
Conceptualization is redescribed as deadening `Habit' which 
filters raw experience 
-through the protective grid of a pre- 
established conceptual scheme (Beckett, 1965, p. 21). In 
Beckett's analysis, it is the pre-conceptual sensory impression 
which is the privileged element: 
when the object is-perceived as particular and unique and 
not merely the member of a family, when it appears 
independent of any general notion and detached from the 
sanity of a cause, isolated and inexplicable in the light 
of ignorance, then and then only may it be a source of 
enchantment. 
(Beckett, 1965, pp. 22-23) 
The particular impression, sensory and unique, would be subsumed 
in and thus eliminated by conceptual abstraction. The `work of 
the intelligence' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 914) recommended by 
Proust, is elided by Beckett to `the prejudices of the 
`inseparable' to `drift apart' or `come unstuck'. 
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intelligence', those processes 'which abstract [... ] from any 
given sensation [ 
... 
] whatever word or gesture, sound or perfume, 
cannot be fitted into the puzzle of a concept' (Beckett, 1965, 
pp. 71-72). 
In the double form of apprehension required for secure 
knowledge as detailed by Kant, sensory intuition, privileged by 
Beckett's Proust, and intellectual conceptualization, privileged 
by Proust himself, are both equally necessary: 
To neither of these powers may a preference be given over 
the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to 
us, 'without understanding no object would be thought. 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind. [... ] The understanding can intuit 
nothing, the senses can think nothing. ' Only through their 
union can knowledge arise. 
(Kant, 1933, A51/B75, p. 93) 
As far as Proust offends against the first stricture, via 
transcendence and abstraction towards empty concepts, Beckett's 
corrective analysis in Proust pushes against the blindness of 
pre-conceptual intuition. " Krapp's failure intellectually to 
assimilate the fragments of autobiography stored externally on 
tape is the reverse image of Marcel's ability to transcend and 
22 Beckett's position in Proust is paradoxical: the 
entirely uninterpreted sensory intuition must defy any 
commentary, so that even to declare it particular and unique is 
to place it under pre-established general concepts. See below, 
Chapter Six, Section xix. 
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spiritualize experience. Where Krapp wanders blindly among 
material remnants, Marcel risks evaporation among concepts 
emptied of their empirical content. The emphasis upon sensory 
experience in Kragp's Last Tape retains as a corollary an 
insistence upon the conditions of that intuition, the Kantian 
frames of time and space. - Beyond these boundaries, violated by 
Marcel in the pursuit of time past and his past selves, Krapp 
cannot follow. 
iv. Kantian offences: the `mystical experience' of `an extra- 
temporal being' 
Where Proust attempts to reunite a concept drawn from the 
past with a present empirical intuition, there is no Kantian 
disagreement; ' both sides of the requisite apprehension are 
fulfilled, `existence', merely with a time-lag, is added to the 
`dream': 
So often, in the course of my life, reality had disappointed 
me because at the instant when my senses had perceived it 
my imagination [ 
... 
] could not apply itself to it, in virtue 
of' that ineluctable law which ordains that we can only 
imagine what is absent. And now, suddenly, the-effect of 
this harsh law had been neutralized, temporally annulled, 
by a marvellous expedient of nature which had caused a 
sensation [... ] to be mirrored at one and the same time in 
the past, so that my imagination was permitted to savour 
it, and in the present, where the actual shock to my senses 
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of the noise, the touch of the linen napkin, or whatever it 
might be, had added to the dreams of imagination the concept 
of `existence' which they usually lack [... ]. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 905) 
However, the greater claim explicit in `Time Regained' is the 
escape from the frame of time itself. In A la recherche du temps 
perdu, according to Beckett, `Time is not recovered, it is 
obliterated' (Beckett, 1965, p. 75). The original sensation is 
not merely remembered; losing its moorings in past time and 
space, it is again immediately present to the subject. Marcel, 
in Beckett's account, is granted access to "the total past 
sensation, not its echo nor its copy, but the sensation itself', 
its return `annihilating every spatial and temporal restriction' 
(Beckett, 1965, p. 72). In the Kantian scheme, however, the very 
possibility of `sensation' or empirical intuition is dependent 
upon its occurrence within a particular spatio-temporal location. 
For Marcel, when `the returning memory [... ] remains in the 
context of its own place and date', the subject is transported 
from its present spatio-temporal context back into the empirical 
circumstances and contingent sensations associated with that past 
spatio-temporal point. The subject under the influence of 
involuntary memory is simultaneously located both in the present 
and the past; this is a `condensation' which mysteriously 
`embraces two moments in time and two different spaces' 
(Kristeva, 1993, p. 48). To reconcile this split, Marcel declares 
that some essential core of the subject transcends time itself. 
The episodes of involuntary memory, are `diverse yet with this in 
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common': 
[... ] I had experienced them at the present moment and at 
the same time in the context of ,a distant moment, so that 
the past was made to encroach upon the present and I was 
made to doubt whether I was in one or the other. The truth 
surely was that the being within me which had enjoyed these 
impressions had enjoyed them because they had in them 
something that was common to a day long past and to the 
present, because in some way they were extra-temporal, and 
this being made its appearance only when, through one of 
these identifications of the present with the past, it was 
likely to find itself in the one and only medium in which 
it could exist and enjoy the essence of things, that is to 
say: outside time. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 904) 
The interdependence of empirical contingency and the frames of 
time and space ensure that `the essence of things' is indeed only 
available `outside time'. Such also is the realm of metaphysics 
and empty ideas. 
In Beckett's analysis too, given this `mystical experience' 
delivering 
`an extratemporal essence', `it follows that the 
communicant is for the moment an extratemporal being' (Beckett, 
1965, p. 75). That involuntary memory can excavate past 
experience demonstrates the fundamental continuity, of the 
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subject: an unchanging kernel of the self must persist through 
time to recognize the memory as one's own. Where Marcel 
finally celebrates the isolation of an essential and unified 
extra-temporal self, Krapp's continuous identity is intimated 
through repeated attempts at self-repudiation. The taped 
representation of Krapp-at-39 is driven to cancel the authority 
of an earlier representation: 
Hard to believe I was ever that young whelp. The voice! 
Jesus! And the aspirations! [Brief laugh in whichýKRAPP 
joins. ] And the resolutions! 
- 
[Brief laugh in which KRAPP 
joins. ] To drink less, in particular. [Brief laugh of KRAPP 
alone. ] [... ] Sneers at what he calls his youth and thanks 
to God that it"s over. [Pause. ] False ring there. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 218) 
Despite his perplexity concerning the condition of `Being - or 
the discontinuity of remaining' (Beckett, 1986, p. 219), 23 
identity Krapp wishes to emphasize on the last tape is thwarted 
by the repetition of a similarly phrased contempt for this 
earlier self: 
Just been listening to that stupid bastard I took myself for 
thirty years ago, hard to believe'I was ever as bad as that. 
Thank God that's all done with anyway. [Pause. ] The eyes she 
had! 
23 "[Reading from dictionary. ] State 
- 
or condition 
- 
of 
being 
- 
or remaining 
-a widow - or widower. [Looks up. Puzzled. ] 
Being 
- 
or remaining? ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 219). 
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(Beckett, 1986, p. 222) 
An insert in the performance text, as given in the Schiller 
production notebook, revises the record of Krapp's last tape. 
Here again Krapp repeats rather than transcends: `that stupid 
bastard I took myself for thirty years ago, hard to believe I was 
ever as bad as that. [The voice! Jesus! ]' (Beckett, 1992, p. 9). 
The square brackets mark an addition to the text, an addition 
that must recall the phraseology of the voice of the old tape: 
`Hard to believe I was ever that young whelp. The voice! 
Jesus! ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 218). Beckett's direction calls for 
an 'echo-effect'; the live actor `should here use tone and voice 
of the tape voice' (Cluchey and Haerdter, 1980, p. 140) when 
making the new recording. The mystical Proustian being exempted 
from the flux of time is supplemented by the extra-temporal 
Krapp, constituted by 'a consistent self-contempt, a persistent 
desire for bananas, a continued preference for jottings on the 
backs of envelopes to the composition of the autobiographical 
magnum opus, a steady isolation=` and chronic constipation. The 
nature of the self retained is such that Krapp is driven to 
repeated and self-defeating attempts to disown it. Krapp is 
forced to retain a sufficient characteristic propensity for 
failure and humiliation in order°to recognize "'that stranger 
whose contempt would cause one most pain 
- 
oneself"' (Beckett, 
1965, p. 64). 
_4 'Not a soul' at the Winehouse thirty years ago (Beckett, 
1986, p. 217J, `Hardly a soul' around the `bench by the weir' as 
`mother lay a-dying' (Beckett, 1986, p. 219), returning to `Not 
a soul' as Krapp `Sat shivering in the park' sometime during the 
current year (Beckett, 1986, p. 222). 
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V. Vacuity and empty ideas 
The representation and reproduction of time on the serial 
medium of Krapp's tapes is linear and consecutive. The unwinding 
of the reels must take place in time; the filling and emptying 
of the inter-dependent spools- physically marks the passage of 
time like the flow of sand between opposite ends of an hour- 
glass. The storage capacity of the tapes is merely such that 
certain aural characteristics of-time past (determined to some 
extent by spatial relationships) can be mechanically repeated in 
future time. The adequacy of the representation of time past 
contained on the tapes can be judged by the disparity between the 
recording made on Krapp's last tape and the action of the play 
in its entirety; the last tape and the experience of Krapp 
delineated in the time of the play are clearly not inter- 
changeable. Experience in its totality is not preserved. The 
time difference between the recording and its playback ensures 
that the two events are distinct. As Spivak argues, `Repetition 
leads to a simulacrum, not to the "same"' (Spivak, 1976, p. lxv). 
The logical formula A=A, asserting identity, betrays this 
difference in its statement. Two separate items are presented. 
This 'ideal tautology', as Beckett recognizes, `presupposes a 
relation'; between more than one item `the affirmation of 
equality involves only an approximate identification, and by 
asserting unity denies unity' (Beckett, 1965, pp. 69-70). 25' The 
25 The A=A equivalence, apparently a priori certain, can 
thus be made self-defeating or void; as Wittgenstein argues: 
to say of tw things that they are identical is nonsense, 
and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is 
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alteration of the priorities of the subject through time also 
emphasizes the disparity of the putatively identical. The 
aspiring metaphysician, replaying his insights, may very easily 
be transformed into a `stupid bastard', even in the opinion of 
himself (Beckett, 1986, p. 222). Contextual alterations ensure 
the impossibility of identity in repetition. The original moment 
of inscription does not have authority over subsequent contextual 
deformation: the very repeatability of the recordings leave them 
vulnerable to ironic re-evaluation. The final comments on spool 
five from box three become the final comments of the play; the 
rejection of repetition which is stated there has very different 
implications when it is inadvertently replayed thirty years 
later: 
Perhaps my best years are gone. When there was a chance of 
happiness. But I would want them back. Not with the fire 
in me now. No, I wouldn't want them back. 
[KRAPP motionless staring before him. The tape runs on in 
silence. ] 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 223) 
The implications of Marcel's claim to retrieve time past are 
similarly exposed or concealed according to context. Juxtaposed 
with Krapps Last Tape and Kant's rulings on time and space, 
problems and ironies are more easily perceptible. 
to say nothing at all. (Wittgenstein, 1974, §5.5302, p. 52) 
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Marcel's assertions of an escape from time all occur within 
time. It is difficult to see how this could be otherwise; if 
such assertions occurred at no time, they would not occur. 
Patently, they do: 
my anxiety on the subject of my death had ceased at the 
moment when I had unconsciously recognized the taste of the 
little madeleine, since the being which at that moment I had 
been was an extra-temporal being and therefore unalarmed by 
the vicissitudes of the future. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 904) 
The existence of the `extra-temporal being', that which is 
outside time, is brought into being at a certain `moment' in 
time. This `extra-temporal being' was that `which at that moment 
I had been': the escape from time has its own temporal date and 
location in time, a time which has passed. But the escape from 
time should translate into an entry into a timeless eternity: 
Fragments of existence withdrawn from Time: these then were 
perhaps what the being three times, four times brought back 
to life within me had just now tasted, but the 
contemplation, though it was of eternity, had been fugitive. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 908) 
In Beckett's words, Marcel experiences the `exaltation' of a 
`brief eternity' (Beckett, 1965, p. 75). This extra-temporal 
experience is `fugitive'; its existence is restricted in time, 
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the very limit which it is said to escape. Moreover, involuntary 
memory, the process responsible for `the extra-temporal joy which 
I had been made to feel by the sound of the spoon or the taste 
of the madeleine' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 911), is dependent upon 
particular sensory experiences which themselves can only be 
experienced in time. Experience within time is converted to its 
contradictory opposite, experience outside time. The route of 
escape from the parameters of space and time is itself trapped 
within them. 
The possibility of the restoration of past time, travel 
between times or an exit from time itself are not matters 
Conducive to agreement with Kant on the nature of time. 
Empiricists, with a distressing degree of 'sweet reasonableness', 
would prefer 'Time, proclaiming its day of the month and the 
state of its weather, to elapse in an orderly manner' (Beckett, 
1983a, p. 64). In Kant's account, 'Time has only one dimension; 
different times are not simultaneous but successive' (Kant, 1933, 
A31/B47, p. 75). The decree that time past coincides with time 
present is then impossible, 'for none of the parts of time 
coexist; they are all in succession to one another' (Kant, 1933, 
A183/B226, 
- p. 214). Further, all sensory provocations to 
involuntary memory, 'all objects of the senses', 'are in time, 
and necessarily stand in time relations' (Kant, 1933, A34/B51, 
P. 77). As it violates the very possibility of empirical 
intuition, an account of the extra-temporal is for Kant 
necessarily empty. Involuntary memory disqualifies itself as an 
experience by declaring its escape of the necessary spatio- 
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temporal frame of intuition. The freedom granted to Marcel to 
surpass the frame of time and space duplicates the procedures of 
the metaphysician; each, in their dissatisfaction with temporal 
succession and mere conditioned appearances, are betrayed into 
the production of concepts which, in principle, lack empirical 
grounding. 
Lacking independent existence, the objects of these empty 
ideas can never be possessed by the subject. The impossibility 
of such possession is the conclusion of Beckett's Proust. 
Marcel, in relation to Albertine, transforms this negative 
entailment into its optimistic opposite: 
When I had realized [... '] that my love, was not so much a 
love for her as a love in myself, I might have drawn various 
conclusions from this subjective nature of my love and in 
particular deduced that, being a mental state, it might 
survive the person for some time, but also that, having no 
real connexion with that person, it must, like every mental 
state, even the most lasting, find itself one day obsolete, 
be `replaced, ' and when that day came everything that seemed 
to attach me so sweetly, indissolubly, to the memory of 
Albertine would no longer exist for me. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 568) 
Duplicating metaphysical speculation, Marcel's idea of Albertine 
is disconnected from any existing object. Where Beckett's Proust 
maintains that the idea or dream thus cannot be fulfilled, Marcel 
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emphasizes the fictional nature of the idea in order to gain 
reassurance that, as a mental state, its demands for fulfilment 
are transient. As these demands are also impossible, to meet, 
their extinction is extremely convenient. A swift turnover of 
`unreal enchantments' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 381) is sufficient 
to emphasize their `enchantment' rather than their `unreality, 
and maintain at least the self-possession of the narrator. But 
the elevated procession of Marcel's mental states yet has a 
perilous proximity to Krapp's habit of appearing `staring 
Vacuously before him' (Beckett, 1986, p. 216). Mental vacancy is 
only problematically filled by concentration upon empty ideas. 
vi. Augustine: the mania in Manichaeism 
The allusions of Krapp's Last Tape to Manichaean metaphysics 
must be disconcerting to an interpretation of the play which 
would thus emphasize its objections to metaphysical speculations 
as such. However, the presence of the Manichaean `Wild stuff' 
is indeed confessed by the author (Beckett cited in Knowlson, 
1992, p. xxii), and its theory and correct dramatic manifestation 
given a prominent place in Beckett's production notebooks. 26 
Yet Krapp's relation to the Manichaean system is exclusively one 
of offence against its ethical and intellectual strictures. As 
in-the case of his Proustian inheritance, the Manichaean presence 
is signalled so that Krapp may mark his failure to adhere to its 
26 Two and a half pages are given over entirely to the 
elaboration of Manichaean precepts in the Schiller notebook (Beckett, 1992, pp. 131-141). In addition, instructions as to the 
construction of dark/light and black/white emblems at particular junctures in the play are appended throughout. 
150 
esoteric doctrines. The welter of Manichaean allusions 
inflecting Krapp's vision is detailed by McMillan and Fehsenfeld: 
The description of the physical scene begins with Beckett's 
own image of mingling: `Great granite rocks' (dark stone 
with embedded shiny crystalline flecks). It continues with 
a specifically Manichaean `emblem': the `foam' flying up in 
the light of the `beacon' is Beckett's representation of 
`vapour' [... ]. The `anemometer spinning like a propeller' 
is itself an ambiguous combination of the properties of the 
`quickening wind' of light and the `destructive wind' of 
darkness. 
(McMillan and Fehsenfeld, 1988, p. 246) 
Beckett's notebook lists twenty-seven instances of `Explicit 
integration light dark' (Beckett, 1992, pp. 132, my emphasis). 
The duty of the Manichaean, however, is the `Separation of light 
from darkness' (Beckett-, 1992, p. 137). Under the Manichaean 
scheme, Krapp is continually guilty of `intellectual 
transgression', `the duty of reason being not to join but to 
separate (deliverance of imprisoned light)' (Beckett, 1992, 
p. 141). Inverting empiricism, and any critique of metaphysics 
drawn from it, Mani ruled that sensory experience, ethically 
rewritten as sensual indulgence, is the outlawed element: 
The way of the true gnosis is an ascetic way: it is to get 
free of the entanglement with matter through abstention from 
sensuous enjoyment. Here appears the doctrine of the three 
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`seals' 
- 
the seals of the mouth, the hand, and the bosom. 
The first forbids the enjoyment of unclean foods (flesh and 
wine); the second forbids the use of any unclean elements; 
the third forbids all sexual community. 
(Hopper, 1955, p. 153) 
The boat story economically catalogues Krapp's violations, `his 
breech of the three seals': `my "face [signaculum oris] in her 
breasts [signaculum sinus 
... 
] my hand on her [signaculum 
Manus]"' (McMillan and Fehsenfeld, 1988, p. 246). Krapp's 
addiction to bananas does display a collateral adherence to 
Manichaean orders to release the stored light of fruit. The 
light liberated, however, is minimal; Beckett's Schiller notebook 
replaces the first and second `large banana' of the Faber text 
with unripened `Little green bananas' (Beckett, 1992, p. 169). 
A blending of black and white, light and dark, organizes 
Krapp's costume and props. Additionally to the Faber text, 
Beckett's notebook details Krapp's `Hair, face, trousers, 
waistcoat, shirt' as `grey ex black' or `grey ex white' (Beckett, 
1992, p. 133). An entry headed `PROPS COSTUME' emphasizes these 
black/white combinations: 
Leger Big, black, worn 
Boxes 9, varied, silver-coloured tin with 
, 
lids, held together with a dark-coloured ribbon 
(or loose) 
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Dictionary Very big and heavy, bound 
in light-coloured leather. 
Watch Silver `turnip' watch, light 
silver chain against black waistcoat. 
Envelope White, address recto 
in black ink, notes verso do. [ditto], white 
edge sticking out of top of 
waistcoat pocket. 
(Beckett, 1992, p. 189) 
Krapp's tape-recorder is be powered by a `Black cable [... ] 
Joined by Krapp to the white lead of the recorder' (Beckett, 
1992, p. 185). The brightly lit cagibi is sealed by a curtain at 
the beginning of the play; upon his first visit, Krapp `Draws 
cagibi curtain half open only, in which position till end' 
(Beckett, 1992, p. 217). A source of light is thus itself divided 
by an obscuring black curtain. The lighting of the stage set 
diminutively manifests the Manichaean design of light and dark 
sectors in its cosmological plans. Stage directions place "Ta big 
and immediately adjacent area in strong white light. Rest of 
stage in darkness' (Beckett, 1986, p. 215). Filtered through 
Augustine, Manichaean cosmology calls into being a `bright and 
holy region' bordered by `a land of darkness deep and vast in 
extent' (Augustine, 1872, p. 113). As the region of fallen 
sensuality, it is proper that Krapp finds a freedom in the 
darkness that, in Manichaean terms, is his imprisonment: 
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It is in the dark that his physical, sensual and emotional 
side is set free. In the dark he eats his bananas, drinks 
his whisky, lies propped up on the pillows and lets his mind 
wander, peoples the dark with memories: this he calls to `be 
again'. What irony that in the light he should consciously 
try to grapple with his memories, give them artistic form 
and meaning, only to fail. 
(Schotz, 1991, pp. 47-48) 
Such sensory impressions are those which, in the Manichaean 
scheme, must be rejected: 
At its core, Manichaeism was a type of Gnosticism 
-a 
dualistic religion that offered salvation through special 
knowledge (gnösis) of spiritual truth. Like all forms of 
Gnosticism, Manichaeism taught that life in this world is 
unbearably painful and radically evil. Inner illumination 
or gnösis reveals that the soul which shares in the nature 
of God has fallen into the evil world of matter and must be 
saved by means of the spirit or intelligence (nous). This 
knowledge is the only way to salvation. 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 1975, p. 776). 
This esoteric and spiritual truth is available only "via 
intellectual intuition. Manichaean truths are determinedly 
metaphysical; particular empirical intuitions cannot convict the 
empirical sphere as a whole of eternal evil. Manichaeism 
privileges the intellectual light, the metaphysical, at the 
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expense of the sensual `dark', the empirical. Its epistemology 
is directly opposite to that of Kant: for the Manichaean, only 
metaphysical knowledge proffers truth. 
For Proust and Marcel, similarly in pursuit of spiritual or 
metaphysical knowledge, the search does begin with sensory 
sensation; the darkness is the raw material which the intellect 
must transcend. In Marcel's aesthetics, `real books should be 
the offspring not of daylight and casual talk but of darkness and 
silence' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 934): 
the truths which the intellect apprehends directly in the 
world of full and unimpeded light have something less 
profound, less necessary than those which life communicates 
to us against our will in an impression which is material 
because it enters us through the senses but yet has a 
spiritual meaning which it is possible for us to extract. 
(Proust, 1981, vo1.3, p. 912) 
The abstraction of the spiritual meaning takes place as the 
impression is `freed from what is necessarily imperfect in 
external perception' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 901). Eventually 
abandoning its basis in the empirical, the insight of artistic 
and epistemological value is that which is `pure and disembodied' 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 901). Krapp recasts this process in 
paradoxical and levelling physical terms, `separating the grain 
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from the husks": " 
The grain, now what I wonder do I mean by that, I mean 
... 
[hesitates] 
... 
I suppose I mean those things worth having 
when all the dust has 
- 
when all my dust has settled. I 
close my eyes and try and imagine them. 
[Pause. KRAPP closes his eyes briefly. ] 
Extraordinary silence this evening, I strain my ears and do 
not hear a sound. 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 217-218) 
The review of Krapp's collection of intellectual intuitions 
`worth having" is swiftly completed; as the tape specifies, 
nothing is given to prolong the attention of the senses. 
The sensuous, the dark, falls under the heading of 
Manichaean vice, but, with the addition of the light of spiritual 
transcendence, under Proustian virtue. The interpretation of 
Krapp's vision is inverted according to which scheme is permitted 
to define the value of its `light' and `dark' emblems. The 
symbolic allusions of this opposition will not remain stable. 
Cluchey and Haerdter attempt to disentangle the vision passage 
with the aid of snippets of Beckett's direction: 
27 Krapp's agricultural metaphor is strangely consonant 
with the use of the `husk' of Mani's body following his 
execution, for `his skin was stuffed with chaff, and hung up in 
public in terrorem' (Dods, 1872, p. ix). The blending of the 
agricultural and the metaphysical realms yields a particularly 
gruesome result. 
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Under [the vision's] influence, he made a decision of grave 
consequence: `a farewell to love', and he resolved to turn 
away from `the life of the body, the sexual' life' and to 
turn towards `the life of the mind, an intellectual life'. 
These are not compatible for Krapp. This is the `Manichean' 
essence of the play which Beckett speaks of allusively. 
`Krapp is an absolute being, he chooses either black- or 
white. ' His decision is against the light and for the 
darkness which for him is filled with his own fire, `the 
fire in me'; a decision against a social life and for the 
solitude in his 
- 
finally unsuccessful 
- 
struggle for his 
`opus magnum'. This `opus magnum' is an `explanation of the 
dark side of humanity'. At the age of 39, Krapp has the 
vision that `in the darkness, the dark side of the mind, 
truth is to be found'. If up to this point he was convinced 
that `the dark cannot be formulated, that this darkness is 
impossible to describe, a material which cannot be 
communicated', he realizes now 'his chance as a writer in 
the research of this darkness'. 
(Cluchey and Haerdter, 1980, pp. 127-128) 
Beckett does not choose to cast the synthesizing light of 
understanding on the fragmented darkness of Krapp's vision here. 
In Manichaean terms, 
- 
dedication to the `life of the mind' is 
directly opposed to a `decision [... ] against the light and for 
the darkness'. Beckett's directorial comments concerning Krapp's 
Last Tape, may be `blatantly allegorical' (Murphy, 1990, p. 91), 
but the allegory is only heretically Manichaean. 
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Krapp's mingling of light and dark emblems manifests his 
failure to adhere to the Manichaean division. Beckett's staging 
modifications as director in fact emphasize a modulation between 
light and dark: the keynote becomes confusion and oscillation 
rather than separation of light and dark. The curtain=of Krapp's 
closet is to be made ' restless, undulating across the absolute 
separation of light and dark drawn and demanded by Manichaean 
metaphysics. Cluchey and Haerdter record Beckett's `thoughts on 
the "den"': 
`Light in the den at curtain-up but invisible till K's first 
visit to fetch ledger 
... 
Curtain only half drawn, -blocked 
on rod half-way across. At each visit to and return from 
den the curtain set in motion. Material of curtain such 
that this motion takes as 'long as possible to settle. 
Ideally curtain will be faintly stirring throughout play, 
helped perhaps by ventilator fan. ' 
(Beckett cited in Cluchey and Haerdter, 1980, p. 126). 
The physical staging of the play is to disrupt the intellectual 
oppositions of the Manichaean allegory attached to Krapp's Last 
Abe by Beckett himself. Krapp's recurrent references to eyes 
gain importance, according to Beckett, because `The eye is the 
organ of interruption between light and dark' (Beckett cited in 
Cluchey and Haerdter, 1980, p. 134). 28 The physical action of 
2' The play between light and dark also strikes Marcel in 
the `gleam' of `black eyes': 
whenever I thought of her, the memory of those bright eyes 
would at once present itself to me as a vivid azure, since 
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the opening and closing of an eye and the dilation of its pupil 
is sufficient to confuse a Manichaean evaluation based 
exclusively on a clear division between light and darkness. A 
commonplace physical movement can define the fixed and absolute 
divisions of Manichaean metaphysics as clumsy idealizations. A 
metaphysics predicated upon the eternal opposition of light and 
dark cannot cope with the blink of an eye. For the greater 
confusion of light and-dark, an accidental effect caused by the 
actor throwing the last tape to the floor is granted 
incorporation into the play: 
A few days ago Rick had caused the lamp to swing wildly 
during this violent action. While the lamp was swinging, 
Krapp's head was alternatively in the light and shadow, 
while he'carefully puts the old reel back on: the swinging 
stopped as Krapp become immobile for the final position. 
`Try to keep that', Beckett asks. He thought that this play 
her complexion was fair; so much so that, perhaps if her 
eyes had not been quite so black 
- 
which was what struck one 
most forcibly on first seeing her 
-I should not have been, 
as I was, so especially enamoured of their imagined blue. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 1, p. 153) 
As Krapp might exclaim, `The eyes she had! ' (Beckett, 1986, 
P. 222). Pinter's screenplay of A la recherche du temps perdu 
emphasizes in a sequence of shots the importance of the eye to 
Proust's work, as well as Beckett's: 
345. Marcel's eyes. 
346. The eyes of Gilberte at Tansonville. 
347. The eyes of the Duchesse de Guermantes in the street. 
348. The eyes of Odette in the Avenue des Acacias. 
349. The eyes of Mother in the bedroom at Combray. 
350. The eyes of Marcel in the lavatory in Combray. 
351. The eyes of Marcel. 
(Pinter, 1991, pp. 143-144) 
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of light and dark, motion and silence, was 'divine'. 29 
(Cluchey and Haeroter, 1980, p. 137) 
For the Manichaean, it should be the 
-separation of light from 
darkness which is `divine', not this oscillation-between them. 
w 
The design of the play introduces other physical 
oscillations, confusions of light and dark, which confound-the 
Manichaean intellectual division between them. Crucially, all 
representations of the privileged Manichaean element of light or 
white, claimed as symbolic of spirit or mind, are given in 
sensuous and empirical terms. 
- 
In the case of the meticulous 
phrased allusions to the forgotten `memorable equinox' (Beckett, 
1986, p. 217), residence `on and off with Bianca in Kedar Street' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 218), the `dark young beauty [... ] all white 
and starch' (Beckett, 1986, p. 219), `the light of the lighthouse' 
juxtaposed with 'storm and night' (Beckett, 1986, p. 220), and 
`the eyes just slits, because of the glare' opening 'in the 
shadow' (Beckett, 1986, p. 221), each reference is to a past 
experience of physical objects. In the case of Krapp's costume, 
dirty white and faded black, and the colour specifications of 
Krapp's props, black ledger and white dictionary, white envelope 
annotated in black ink, silver tins with dark ribbons (Beckett, 
1992, p. 189), the white or light instances of the supposed 
dichotomy are directly presented to the audience as actual 
physical objects. In the Manichaean scheme, the physical and 
29 The effect is anticipated in How It Is, where `the table 
glides from light to darkness darkness to light' (Beckett, 1964", 
P. 11). 
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material must fall on the side of darkness and sensuality; the 
white and the light should be purely spiritual with no polluting 
dark empirical admixture. In the staged play, the representation 
of the spiritual itself is degraded to the merely material, an 
operation matching the parodic degeneration of Marcel'S spiritual 
adventures into Krapp's physical, symbolically constipated, 
inertia. Krapp's 
-`throwing a ball for a little white dog' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 220), a ball which is, amongst its other five 
characteristics, black, earns special comment in Beckett's 
Schiller notebook: 
Note that if the giving of the black 
ball to the white dog represents the 
sacrifice of sense to spirit the form 
here too is that of a mingling. 
(Beckett, 1992, p. 141) 
If we have metaphysical aspirations, this formulation is 
obviously backwards: for Mani, as ultimately for Proust, the 
sensuous must be sacrificed to the spiritual. Given the status 
of the sensuous, from the radically evil in Manichaeism to that 
which must be transcended by Marcel, detachment from the physical 
should be regarded as a desirable escape rather than anything 
approaching a `sacrifice'. Beckett's inversion, however, has 
very different implications in a Kantian context. Here, 
rejection of- `the fruitful bathos of experience' (Kant, 1950, 
P. 122, note 2) necessitates that one henceforth operates only in 
the `spiritual' and intellectual realm of ideas which, upon the 
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sacrifice of empirical substantiation, must be empty. 
Manichaeism holds a privileged place in any critique of 
metaphysics. The philosophical and theological disrepute of 
Manichaeism is such that the system is made to suffer 
etymological comparisons with mania and its attendant grandiose 
delusions. As Augustine taunts the Manichaean disciple Faustus: 
You swear [ 
... 
] by your master Manichmus, whose name in his 
own tongue was Manes. As the name Manes seems to be 
connected with the Greek word for madness, you have changed 
it by adding a suffix, which only makes matters worse, by 
giving it the new meaning of pouring forth madness. 
(Augustine, 1872, pp. 344-345) 
Augustine continues a tradition which presumes that Mani `was 
providentially so named that men might be warned against the 
mania of his heresy' (Dods, 1872, p. viii). In the selection of 
a system of empty metaphysical ideas within which to entangle a 
protagonist, Beckett could not have selected for Krapp a 
philosophical or religious option more dead or discredited than 
Manichaeism. According to Manichaean doctrine, the escape of the 
light or spirit from the matter of the world is organized thus: 
Reservoirs were [... ] established for the liberated light 
- 
ten heavens and eight earths upheld by angels, plus the sun 
and the moon. The twelve constellations of the zodiac were 
then formed, and placed in such a way as to form a great 
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wheel with buckets. The light being liberated from the 
world was then caught in these buckets, wheeled upward into 
the heavens, and poured into the sun and the moon - the moon 
collecting the light for the first half of the month and 
then pouring it into the sun during the second half. 
(Hopper, 1955, p. 151) 
If the Manichaean allegory is to be maintained, the entire 
cosmos, complete with its never-discovered buckets, must stand 
ready to collect the release of light contributed by Krapp's 
consumption of bananas. " 
Augustine, Beckett"s known informant on matters theological, 
is presciently Kantian in his attack on the Manichaean system. " 
'° The thesis of the liberation of light necessitates this 
profligate postulation of cosmological equipment for its 
processing. The application of Occam's razor is called for in 
the case of a thesis entailing this amount of corroborative 
fabrication. 
31 Augustine's Confessions and other works can be counted 
as an epic in autobiography comparable with Proust. Again, the 
search for a visionary moment of `conversion' is central: 
The saint described his life as a quest for conversion, that 
is, an intense instant of awareness, a present moment, now, 
no longer put off, in which `the burden of habit and custom' 
will' be thrown off, detachment from worldly desires 
achieved, and intuitive union with the timelessness of God 
effected. (Rosen, 1976, pp. 177-178) 
Augustine's autobiographical and metaphysical opus magnum, in 
comparison to the results of Krapp's Manichaean inspiration, has 
had, at least, the greater success in `Getting known' (Beckett, 
1986, p. 222). In the Kantian scheme of things, Augustine's own 
metaphysics may ultimately be subject to classification with 
Manichaeism as another system of empty ideas. In competition 
with Mani's overtly outlandish cosmos, however, Augustine must be judged to have failed, in terms of institutional success, 
considerably better. 
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For Augustine and Kant, faith is not equivalent to knowledge. 
Augustine requires verification for Mani's claims, and, as is the 
custom in metaphysics, `there is no evidence' (Augustine, 1872, 
p. 547). Those Manichaean elements of Krapp's Last Tape which 
should have a purely spiritual existence are given physical 
manifestation; conversely, Augustine's attack charges Manichaeism 
with the illegitimate transformation of the physical into the 
metaphysical. According to Augustine, `Manichmus got the 
arrangement of his fanciful notions from visible objects' 
(Augustine, 1872, p. 131). The Manichaean ideas of good and evil 
are derived from an illegitimate transcendence and abstraction 
from the contingent prejudices of the senses: 
your idea of what is evil is 'derived entirely from the 
effect on your senses of such disagreeable things as 
serpents, fire, poison, and so on; and the only good you 
know of is what has an agreeable effect on your senses, as 
pleasant flavours, and sweet smells, and sunlight, and 
whatever else recommends itself strongly to your eyes, or 
to your nostrils, or your palate, or any other organ of 
senses. 
(Augustine, 1872, pp. 548-549) 
As in the Kantian critique, empirical and contingent evidence 
cannot support metaphysical conclusions. Deflating its symbolic 
significance, Augustine locates the Manichaean eternal realm of 
`light' in the `mere natural light', which the Manichaeans `love 
as flies do' (Augustine, 1872, p. 344). 
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It is the brightest coloured empirical objects that are held 
to imprison the greatest proportion of divine substance yearning 
for release. To properly follow the rigours of the Manichaean 
dietary code, Augustine considers that Faustus should supplement 
his gruel with `the scales of fish, or some worms and flies' 
which `all shine with a light of their own in the dark' 
(Augustine, 1872, p. 77). Krapp's trials with the digestion of 
bananas and resultant constipation mark a dereliction of 
Manichaean duty, for the divinity residing in the materials of 
his diet escape to fill the cosmic buckets only when digestion 
is going on in the body by means of internal heat' (Augustine, 
1872, p. 74). The flying off of the light is fatally blocked by 
the `utterly filthy' material by-products of digestion which 
remain too long within Krapp's internal constitution (Augustine, 
1872, p. 74). Retention of the `unclean dregs' is not the 
aspiration of the Manichaean disciple (Augustine, 1872, p. 74). 
Krapp's disposal of his second banana is overtly sinful, for the 
disciple must strive to `purify, as you call it, all that is 
given' (Augustine, 1872, p. 82). 32 It is unfortunate, for the 
32 For the greater liberation of the light, the Manichaean 
is `obliged to eat to excess'; the unwilling are not to be 
excused: 
So it was charged against some one at Rome that he killed 
some poor children, by compelling them to eat for this 
superstitious reason. This I should not believe, did I not 
know how sinful you consider it to give this food to those 
who are not elect, or, at any rate, to throw it away. So 
the only way is to eat it; and this leads every day to 
gluttony, and may sometimes lead to murder. (Augustine, 1872, p. 82). 
Half an uneaten banana, cast away into the darkness in Beckett's 
modification in the Schiller notebook, must surely damn Krapp irretrievably. 
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Manichaean scheme of things, that dung, `the most unclean product 
of flesh' is `also the most fertilizing manure' (Augustine, 1872, 
p. 366-367) in the production of valued fruits. Faustus is to be 
humiliated with the charge his `Jesus is produced in gardens 
watered by the filthy drains of a city' (Augustine, 1872, p. 367). 
Imprisoned in matter, Jesus `hangs in the shape of fruit from 
every tree' (Augustine, 1872, p. 367). Occam's razor is required 
once more, for given this abundance, there is some question 
concerning `how many Christs [... ] do you make? ' (Augustine,. 
1872, p. 368). 
In Augustine's account, Manichaean cosmology cannot be made 
compatible with either analytic or synthetic procedures of 
reasoning. Genuine metaphysics, for Kant, must satisfy both 
criteria of knowledge. In the first place, the cosmology 
propounded by Mani is internally incoherent. The kingdom of 
light is to be purely spiritual, the realm of darkness entirely 
material; the realm of light is to be bordered by that of 
darkness. Augustine explains what is wrong with Mani's 
organization of the universe with the aid of a homely analogy: 
As if, to give the simplest illustration, a piece of bread 
were made into four squares, three white and one black; then 
suppose the three white pieces joined as one, and conceive 
them as infinite upwards and downwards, and backwards in all 
directions: this represents the Manichaean region of light. 
Then conceive the black square infinite downwards and 
backwards, but with infinite emptiness above it: this is 
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their region of darkness. 
(Augustine, 1872, p. 118) 
Pieces of bread are amenable to such division and spatial 
organization: the spiritual, entirely immaterial and lacking 
extension in space, should not be so treated. In his account of 
analytic judgements, Kant finds that `I do not require to go 
beyond the concept which I connect with "body" in order to find 
extension as bound up with it' (Kant, 1933, A7/Bll, p. 48). A 
body must have extension in space; that which is extended is a 
body. The spiritual is the putative opposite of a body. In the 
Manichaean scheme, the spiritual region, in its spatial 
extension, is confounded with the a priori properties of material 
bodies. The border decreed between the region of light, defined 
as spiritual and immaterial, and the region of darkness, the 
fleshly and sensual, make this contradiction clear; the limits 
assigned to the light define it too as material: 
What, then, bordered on the side of the region which you 
call shining and sacred? The region, you reply, of 
darkness. Do you then allow this latter region to have been 
material? Of course you must, since you assert that all 
bodies derive their origin from it. How then is it that, 
dull and carnal as you are, you do not see that unless both 
regions were material, they could not have their sides 
joined to one another? How could you ever be so blinded in 
mind as to say that only the region of darkness was 
material, and that the so-called region of light was 
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immaterial and spiritual? 
(Augustine, 1872, p. 118) 
These `two regions cannot be joined at their sides unless both 
In Krapp's Last Tape, are material' (Augustine, 1872, p. 118). 33 
the sectors of light and darkness on stage can only be organized 
in space; as extended phenomena, empirically manifested, each of 
Krapp's zones are material and sensuous. The presentation of an 
immaterial zone of light, as such not amenable to sensory 
perception, would be an insuperable challenge to stage design and 
oblige the audience to intuit intellectually a presence which is 
absent from the stage. 
vii. Material inertia: upstaging the spiritual 
The metaphysical opposition between light and darkness 
drawn by Manichaeism cannot survive staged, empirical, 
manifestation. To be given to the senses, both sides of the 
division must become material. What Manichaeism can supply to 
Erapp's Last Tape is a bizarre, and blatantly fictional, system 
of dualist organization. Gontarski's analysis of Krapp as `a man 
who struggled against the fundamental cacophony of human 
character', maintains regard for this dualist impulse (Gontarski, 
1977, p. 64). This organizational opposition is indeed elevated 
to the status of `Beckett's most persistent theme': `the internal 
33 As the zone of light is the location of God, Mani must 
also give `to the nature of God limits and borders, as if God 
fiere a mat ial substance, having extension in space' (Augustine, 
1872, p. 113), a theological as well as logical heresy for 
Augustine. 
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conflict, Cartesian or Manichaean, of intellect and emotion, the 
attempted resolution of which has consumed Krapp's life' 
(Gontarski, 1977, p. 64). However, Krapp is consumed not by the 
elevated rigours attendant upon the heroic resolution of this 
opposition informing the human condition, but rather by the 
emptiness of its metaphysical terms. As the Schiller notebook 
specifies, Krapp is seized by empty `dreams': 
Aliter Opens and engulfs him. 
cf. in Träumen ertrunken [drowned in dreams]. 
[... ] 
Inhaltloser Traum [Empty dream] 
Traum 
- 
Nichts [Dream 
- 
Nothing] 
ein vom Traum (Nichts) gefressenes 
Leben [A life consumed by dream (nothing)]. 
beim Sinnliche sich ins geistliche 
wegträumen, beim geistliche ins 
Sinnliche [From the sensual dreams himself away into the 
spiritual, from the spiritual away into the sensual] 
Traumgefressener Mensch [Dream-consumed man] 
(Beckett, 1992, p. 241) 
The complete cycle of Krapp's habitual struggle with empty ideas 
reappears on the last tape. Empty ideas, dreams and fancies, are 
firstly denied by Krapp, then admitted in rationed portions, 
suddenly threaten to overwhelm him, become open to doubt and are 
finally degraded to their only available physical manifestation: 
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Last fancies. [Vehemently. ] Keep 'em under! [Pause. ] Scalded 
the eyes out of me reading Effie again, a page a day, with 
tears again. Effie.... [Pause. ] Could have been happy with 
her, up there on the Baltic, and the pines, and the dunes. 
[Pause. ] Could I? [Pause. ] And she? [Pause. ] Pah! [Pause. ] 
Fanny came in a couple of times. Bony old ghost of a whore. 
Couldn't do much, but I suppose better than a kick in the 
crutch. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 222) 
As a substitute for the desire to `eff' the ineffable `Effie', 
Krapp must be content with an available empirical object which 
fails to substantiate the romantic exultation of Effie's 
conceptualization. As Arsene counsels in Watt, in the case of 
`the unutterable or ineffable', `any attempt to utter or eff it 
is doomed to fail, doomed, doomed to fail' (Beckett, 1976, p. 61) 
. 
Inspired by the failure of `all that business of the vision' 
(Beckett cited in Cluchey and Haerdter, 1980, p. 139), Krapp has 
no more transcendent insights to record, `Nothing to say, not a 
squeak' (Beckett, 1986, p. 222). Instead a diatribe eventually 
emerges on `everything', recorded to be thrown away, beset by 
technical problems: 
[Broods, realizes he is recording silence, switches off 
broods Finally. ] Everything there, everything, all the 
- 
[Realizes this is not being recorded. switches on. ] 
Everything there, everything on this old muckball, all the 
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light and dark and famine and feasting of 
... 
[hesitates] 
... 
the ages! [In a shout. ] Yes! [Pause. ] Let that go! 
Jesus! Take his mind off his homework! Jesus! (Pause. 
Weary. ] Ah well, maybe he was right. [Pause. ] Maybe he was 
right. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 222) 
The `old muckball' may be a `Manichean image of the physical 
world as a "bolus" of dark excrement left after spirit and light 
are liberated from it' (McMillan and Fehsenfeld, 1988, p. 248) and 
`famine and feasting' may symbolize `all the contrarieties of a 
divided cosmos' (Knowlson, 1992, p. xxiv), but, rather than 
consolidating his Manichaean and metaphysical credentials, Krapp 
wants at last to `Let that go! ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 222). 
Metaphysical generality is replaced by the conditional and 
personalized `Maybe he was right' (Beckett, 1986, p. 222). 
Krapp's representation of the human condition is limited: 
RH But is the public supposed to think that he is a sort 
of Everyman? 
MH Oh no, no. Beckett once said something very, beautiful 
about this. He said that Krapp is not a way of looking at 
the world (keine Weltanschauung), and that in fact answers 
everything. No, this is just Krapp, not a world-view. 
(Martin Held interviewed by Hayman, 1980, pp. 69-70) 
Material debris, `just Krapp', dominates the stage; even the 
taped voices, reproduced mechanically, lack the animating spark 
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of consciousness which produced their original utterance. " 
Krapp's joy in `Spooool' (Beckett, 1986, p. 216) is drawn from the 
pleasure in producing and perceiving the sound; its semantic 
content is not relevant to the sensuous reward gained by making 
the utterance. Only the materiality of the word is emphasized. 
Metaphysical and artistic ambitions, predicated upon `the 
light of the understanding' (Beckett, 1986, p. 220), thus lose 
their prominence to a mimed imbecility gratified by minor sensual 
comforts. The artist now `puts end of banana in his mouth and 
remains motionless. staring vacuously before him' (Beckett, 1986, 
pp. 215-216). The very absence of thought must be portrayed in 
these physical terms. Elsewhere, the main insight the audience 
is granted as to the precise nature of Krapp's internal 
tribulations are reminders of his chronic constipation. Krapp's 
thoughts are not given: the critic is not entitled to conclude 
that Krapp `re-lives his past' (Campbell, 1978, p. 193), that `the 
timeless moment of his "farewell to love" [... ] continues to stir 
his imagination' (Campbell, 1978, p. 194), or that `upheavals in 
the depths of the memory' are occurring (Catanzaro, 1989, p. 406). 
For the performance of `somersaults' in `his inner life' 
(Catanzaro, 1989, p. 407), Krapp must first be believed to possess 
34 The impulse to privilege speech over writing, according 
to Derrida, arises precisely from the supposed presence in speech 
of the subject's consciousness, thought and animation. In 
Krapp's Last Tape, the voices on the tapes are no longer 
`exteriorizing a content of interior thought' (Derrida, 1982, 
p. 163); what they express is either disowned by Krapp in time 
present, or, fatally, not understood. When `exteriority' and 
`alterity' do interpose between `what I say and what I hear 
myself say' (Derrida, 1982, p. 287), the subject is alienated from 
part of his own `I'. In Not I, similarly, the subject's `I' is 
absent from its own `live' speech. 
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an inner life. Krapp's retention of such a thing is a matter 
which is not finally determined, although the opening mime goes 
to considerable trouble to raise doubts as to whether Krapp, like 
Willie of Happy Days, is `conceivably on the qui vive' (Beckett, 
1986, p. 148). Even if they are somehow considered to occur, the 
transports of involuntary memory are not presented to the 
audience of Krapp's Last Tape. The play is not an interior 
monologue. The external setting of Krapp's Last Tape does not 
change in accordance with the mental state of its protagonist, 
whereas this is precisely what can be effected by the narrative 
mode of A la recherche du temps perdu. For Marcel, given a 
stimulus to involuntary memory, the internal arena is able to 
superimpose a past empirical context upon that of the present; 
as Beckett writes in Proust: 
just as the Piazza di San Marco burst its way into the 
courtyard and there asserted its luminous and fleeting 
dominance, so now the library is successively invaded by a 
forest, the high tide breaking on the shore at Balbec, the 
vast dining-room of the Grand Hotel flooded, like an 
aquarium, with the sunset and the evening sea, and lastly 
Combray and its `ways' and the deferential transmission of 
a sour and distinguished prose, shaped and stated by his 
mother's voice, muted and sweetened almost to a lullaby, 
unwinding all night long its reassuring foil of sound before 
a child's insomnia. 
(Beckett, 1965, p. 71) 
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Krapp's `unwinding [... ] foil of sound' cannot effect the 
transformation of his physical location: his den is proofed 
against the returning flood of the lake and punt. Krapp's 
`surroundings' will not `vanish', nor permit the presence of `a 
bright and vehement interloper', the vision reproduced from 
memory (Beckett, 1965, p. 70). For Marcel, by contrast, `the 
distant scene [... ] grappled, like a wrestler, with the present 
scene' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 908). Marcel's position in space 
and his corresponding empirical sensations are confused and 
unstable: 
so complete are these resurrections of the past during the 
second that they last, that they oblige our eyes to cease 
to see the room which is near them in order to look instead 
at the railway bordered with trees or the rising tide, they 
even force our nostrils to breathe the air of places which 
are in fact a great distance away, and our will to choose 
between the various projects which those distant places 
suggest to us, they force our whole self to believe that it 
is surrounded by these places or at least to waver 
doubtfully between them and the place where we now are, in 
a dazed uncertainty [... ]. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 908) 
But even for Marcel, the effort to `re-create the former scene' 
is opposed by the `actual scene [... ] with all the resistance of 
material inertia' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 907). The mental 
exertions of Marcel and the modulations of scene possible in 
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narrative fiction co-operate to overcome the restriction of the 
present empirical scene and to allow the incursion of the past 
context to inform the sensory data of the subject completely. 
`Material inertia' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 907) entraps and 
defines Krapp externally and internally. The stage set is fixed: 
it will not transform itself into the manifestation of Krapp's 
past merely upon the word of a taped memory. Should the 
ontological sphere be subject to verbal or conceptual 
legislation, Mani's cosmos, as well as Krapp's past scenes, would 
be liable to spring into existence. 
viii. Bells, bananas and buffoonery 
Beckett's play emphasizes material inertia; Proust's 
interior narrative permits the instantaneous transport of Marcel 
between the empirical settings of past and present, as directed 
by involuntary memory. Homan's account of Krapp's Last Taps 
reads precisely as if he were confronted with Proust's A la 
recherche du temps perdu instead: 
At issue is how to make something literal into something 
symbolic. The physical, I believe, is here transformed 
rather than avoided. The search for the proper spool, 
Krapp's rifling through his desk, gives way to his larger 
search for himself. The opening of those drawers, facing 
us becomes Krapp's own exposure, for himself no less than 
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for us, the means of revealing his mind, his soul. " 
(Homan, 1984, p. 98) 
A reading emphasizing the rejection of transcendent insight must 
invert this diagnosis, as Krapp's Last Tape inverts the 
aspirations of Marcel and Manichaeism, by degrading the metaphors 
and symbols of their systems into parodically physical terms. 
The spiritual or intellectual credentials of each are confounded 
when these very ideas are expressed in the material sphere. 
Throughout Krapp's Last Tape, empirical particulars are designed 
both to recall and to, humiliate the pretensions of universal 
abstractions such as the `light' or `dark' which should more 
properly proclaim portentous significance. The play must inflict 
a sense of shame upon commentators attempting to figure 
metaphysical significance from bananas. The materials of the 
music-hall and clown, one would assume, do not express 
metaphysical meanings without comic damage to their dignity. 
McMillan and Fehsenfeld nevertheless remain unembarrassed in 
calculating the precise balance of Krapp's contributions to the 
release of light during his banana-walk: 
there are detailed entrances and exits into and out of the 
zone of light. He consumes the first half of the banana 
while pacing into the darkness. He counterbalances this by 
consuming'the second half only after re-entering the zone 
of light. The net result is no change in the balance of 
35 Unfortunately for Homan, the Revised Text places only 
one drawer to the side of Krapp's table, reducing its visibility 
to the audience. 
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light and dark. In the case of the second banana, Krapp 
remains in the `circle of light' to eat the first half but 
he undoes that action by throwing the second half into the 
darkness behind him. This rejection into darkness of what 
he should have retained in light is the obverse of his 
mistake with the first banana where by dropping the peel in 
front of his table, he retains in the sphere of light what 
he should have rejected into the dark. 
(McMillan and Fehsenfeld, 1988, p. 266) 
Despite the `net result' being `no change', the cosmic 
repercussions of the spatial position in which bananas are eaten 
have never received so much rapt attention. In different 
productions the universe is variously affected, for Krapp's 
movement in and out of the light is not, always forbidden. 
Evincing a cavalier attitude to metaphysical consequences and 
inordinate regard to the contingency of empirical stages, 
`Beckett does not regard this difference as being of any 
importance, commenting: "He may have to exceed lit area if too 
short for banana walk, without disappearing completely", 
(Knowlson, 1992, p. 274). Confusion between light and darkness 
is always preferred: 
`all this darkness round met 
- 
not complete darkness. He 
must be seen, however dimly, to and from den including first 
visit before light spills from den after curtain drawn. 
(Beckett cited in Knowlson, 1992, p. 274) 
177 
Manichaeans will have to begin calculations again using more 
complex terms, to take into account the exact proportion of the 
mixture of light and dark in order to assess Krapp's adherence 
to or violation of principle. Further, any fruit but bananas 
would serve Manichaean purposes better: supplying a protagonist 
prone to constipation with bananas, the only fruit of arduous 
digestion, seems designed to impede the release of the light 
rather than facilitate it. The running together of metaphysical 
arguments, bananas and constipation should not be a comfortable 
concatenation. Bananas and constipation are, in relation to the 
dignity of metaphysics, fatal things-" 
The function of objects in Krapp's Last Tape is to assert 
their material properties and tangibility. Symbolic or 
metaphysical processing toward their intellectual or spiritual 
significance would prefer instead de-emphasis of these material 
properties. Sufficient family resemblance, however, is 
maintained between the behaviour of Krapp's objects and their 
more respectable Proustian ancestors to mark their present 
degradation. A la recherche du temps perdu details the 
importance of metallic rings for Marcel and concludes with a 
meditation upon the significance of the chiming of a bell. Krapp 
is supplied with a series of metallic clatters. Marcel's 
36 Protagonists should display some concern for the 
sublimity of the objects crucial to them; accordingly, the 
narrator of The Calmative selects a cathedral as a hiding-place: 
I say cathedral, it may not have been, I don't know, all I 
know is it would vex me in this story that aspires to be the 
last, to have taken refuge in a common church. (Beckett, 1984, p. 41) 
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involuntary memory is provoked when `A servant, trying 
unsuccessfully not to make a noise, chanced to knock a spoon 
against a plate' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 900). This recalls the 
noise of the hammer with which a railwayman had remedied some 
defect on a wheel of the train while we stopped near the little 
wood' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 901). Among Beckett's 
modifications in the San Quentin production was the injunction 
that the curtain of Krapp's closet was to be `hung on a rod with 
heavy metal rings to make a clattering noise when opened' 
(Cluchey and Haerdter, 1980, pp. 132-133). Krapp's tapes are 
reassigned from cardboard boxes to `seven [or nine? ] biscuit 
tins' (Cluchey and Haerdter, 1980, p. 132). The clattering of the 
tins and tapes as Krapp scatters them on the floor is precisely 
timed to pre-empt the `bell': 
TAPE: [Strong voice, rather pompous clearly Krapp's at a 
much earlier time. ] Thirty-nine today, sound as a- 
[Settling himself more comfortably he knocks one of the 
boxes off the table, curses, switches off, sweeps boxes and 
ledaer__ violently to the around. winds tape back to 
beginning, switchep on, resumes posture. ] Thirty-nine today, 
sound as a bell [... ]. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 217) 
The same tape contains an abstract and assessment of the contents 
of an earlier recording, `Sneers at what he calls his youth and 
thanks to God that it's over. [Pause. ] False ring there' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 218). Ultimately, in A la recherche du temps 
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Pdi, Marcel's winding back to his beginning, to his childhood, 
is achieved as `the peal 
- 
resilient, ferruginous, interminable, 
fresh and shrill 
- 
of the bell on the garden gate' sounds `again 
in my ears' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 1105). The resurgence of 
memory proves to Marcel the fundamental continuity of 
consciousness, the `unbroken series' of its moments: 
in order to get nearer to the sound of the bell and to hear 
it better it was into my own depths that I had to re- 
descend. And this could only be because its peal had always 
been there, inside me, and not this sound only but also, 
between that distant moment and the present one, unrolled 
in all its vast length, the whole of that past which I was 
not aware that I carried about within me, When the bell of 
the garden gate had pealed, I already existed and from that 
moment onwards, for me still to be able to hear the peal, 
there must have been no break in continuity, no single 
second at which I had ceased or rested from existing, from 
thinking, from being conscious of myself, since that moment 
from long ago still adhered to me and I could still find it 
again, could retrace my steps to it merely by descending to 
a greater depth within myself. " 
37 The discontinuity of identity between sleep and 
wakefulness is earlier pursued by Proust, in contradiction to the 
conclusion ultimately reached in `Time Regained' above: 
Then from those-profound slumbers we awake in a dawn, not 
knowing who we are, being nobody, newly born, ready for 
anything, the brain emptied of the past which was life until 
then. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1014) 
In Molloy, this discontinuity is, characteristically, manifested 
(Proust, 1981, vo1.3, pp. 1105-1106) 
On his last tape, Krapp records a supplementary account of this 
impulse to `retrace my steps' towards the bells: 
Lie propped up in the dark 
- 
and wander. Be again in the 
dingle on a Christmas Eve, gathering holly, the red-berried. 
[Pause. ] Be again on Croghan on a Sunday morning, in the 
haze, with the bitch, stop and listen to the bells. [Pause. ] 
And so on. [Pause. ] Be again, be again. [Pause. ] All that 
old misery. [Pause. ] Once wasn't enough for you. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 223) 
Replicating Proust's reputedly favoured position for the 
composition of A la recherche du temps perdu, 3 Krapp issues 
what could be a summary of the Proustian autobiographical magnum 
opus, `Be again, be again', infiltrated by the impertinence of 
in parodic physical terms; Molloy awakens after Lousse's 
ministrations: 
I woke up in a bed, in my skin. [... ] I went to the door. 
Locked. To the window. Barred. [... ] I found my crutches, 
against an easy chair. It may seem strange that I was able 
to go through the motions I have described without their 
help. I find it strange. You don't remember immediately 
who you are, when you wake. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 38) 
As Kenner recognizes: 
[... ] Proust writing in bed brings up to date Belacqua 
dreaming in the shadow of his rock; clearly too, Molloy or 
Malone writing in bed is a hobo Proust. (Kenner, 1962, p. 42) 
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"And so on'. " The Schiller notebook provides additional 
directions for the delivery and emphases of this section: 
Leg dich ins Dunkel [Lie propped up 
in the dark] to Sei wieder, sei wieder [Be again, be again] 
uniformly quiet and simple, 
[erasure] with body still. This 
frozen body & voice, on All dies 
alte Elend [All that old misery]. But not anticipate 
extreme violence of Ein Mal 
war [Once wasn't enough for you] etc, with bowed head. 
(Beckett, 1992, p. 233) 
This `extreme violence' attacks the basis of the Proustian epic. 
Contingent circumstances make a difference to the desirability 
of the escape from linear time to `Be again': for Marcel 'Once 
wasn't enough'; for Krapp attempts at repetition are limited to 
the playback of the punt scene. It is the fault of the serial 
medium, whether the tape or a life lived in linear time, that 
other unwanted episodes must be dragged back with it. 
ix. Iteration and parody 
310 The phrase `be again' is to be found also in Texts for 
eng, subject to the same doubts concerning the wisdom of a 
return `Back above' to a life already known: 
Go then, no, better stay, for where would you go, now that 
you know? Back above? There are limits. Back in that kind 
of light. See the cliffs again, be again between the cliffs 
and the sea, reeling shrinking with your hands over your 
ears, headlong, innocent, suspect, noxious. (Beckett, 1984, Text II, p. 75) 
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Krapp's success in doubling experience is inter-textual, 
with flaws. Henning has already identified the players in this 
`intertextual dialogue' (Henning, 1988, p. 4): 
[ 
... 
] Krapp's Last Tape seems to provoke a dialogue with its 
own past textual double, Marcel Proust's monumental work, 
a dialogue mediated through Beckett's early critical 
monograph on Proust. Although critics have long seen Krapp 
as a derisory Marcel, the extent of the possible 
`conversation' between them has, to my knowledge, never been 
sufficiently investigated. 
(Henning, 1988, p. 144) 
Henning's own investigation of the relation of Krapp's Last Tan_ 
to the tributary of A la recherche du temps perdu retains a 
strong emphasis upon Beckett's play as tribute. Krapp's 'Be 
again' is considered evidence of a `renewed desire to step out 
of time altogether, that is, to immortalize oneself by 
(re)capturing the past' (Henning, 1988, p. 145). Kantian rigours 
will not allow such an escape; the `extreme violence' (Beckett, 
1992, p. 223) appended to the `Once wasn't enough' section, allied 
with the unceremonious disposal of this new recording, do not 
suggest Krapp's desire for such immortality either. The 
judgement as to whether Krapp's Last Tape is an `amiable or 
contestatory' dialogue with Proust has become unbalanced 
(Henning, 1988, p. 123). For example, to interpret the play as 
`an attempt to dramatize (and hence, support) what is central in 
the Proustian vision' (Oberg, 1966, p. 333), Oberg is prepared to 
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find, extraordinarily, that Krapp's vision, `establishes itself 
alongside other Beckett epiphany-like moments of clarity' (Oberg, 
1966, p. 335). Homan, as intimated earlier, appears to have 
swapped Krapp's Last Tape for A la recherche du temps perdu 
entirely. 40 
Profanation marks the movement between Krapp and Marcel; the 
spiritual imperatives of the Proustian narrator are confounded 
in the physical and empirical. As Marcel's degenerate double, 
Krapp shares the role of `hoary clown' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, 
p. 962) with Marcel's `personal enemy, M. d'Argencourt' (Proust, 
1981, vol. 3, p. 961): 
he had turned into a contemptible old beggarman, and the 
diplomat whose solemn demeanour and starched rigidity were 
still present to my memory acted his part of old dotard with 
such verisimilitude that his limbs were all of a tremble and 
the features of what had once been a haughty countenance 
'° Homan considers that `We are inside Krapp's head' (Homan, 1984, p. 97), that we witness `the "renaissance" of Krapp' 
as he enters the `road leading toward both the discovery and 
expression of one's self' (Homan, 1984, p. 99), and that `The 
women in Krapp's life [... ] stand in a line of growing 
inducements to creativity' (Homan, 1984, p. 99). Despite the 
expanse of water in question being a lake, `the women merge with 
his mother sea, and it is in and by the sea that Krapp has his 
lasting moments of revelation' (Homan, 1984, p. 100). Even Krapp 
would be unlucky to get a punt stuck in flags while at sea. 
Nevertheless, 
`the imaginative movement' of Krapp's 'present- 
tense recording' (meaning, inexactly, his last tape) is 
`dazzling' (Homan, 1984, p. 102). On the strength of this 
recording, Krapp is suddenly `immortal' for his `achievement as 
an artist dwarfs his own physical existence'; this allows Krapp 
to conclude the play in `a pose [... ] of Buddhist-like serenity' (Homan, 1984, p. 104). Evidently, he should at least be disturbed 
by having precipitately thrown away the tape Homan uses to rescue 
him. 
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were permanently relaxed in an expression of smiling idiocy. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 961) 
To identify the target of `this brilliant study in caricature, 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 963), Marcel must attempt to trace 
continuities between fractured images, the same process which 
might be used to establish his own link with Krapp: 
in order to identify the puppets with the people whom one 
had known in the past, it was necessary to read what was 
written on several planes at once, planes that lay behind 
the visible aspect of the puppets and gave them depth and 
forced one, as one looked at these aging marionettes, to 
make a strenuous intellectual effort; one was obliged to 
study them at the same time with one's eyes and with one's 
memory. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 964) 
The effect of this final reception of aged characters is re- 
emphasized in Krapp's Last Tape for once without need for the 
usual admixture of parody; in `Time Regained' itself, the party 
imposes upon Marcel `a spectacular and dramatic effect which 
threatened to raise against my enterprise the gravest of all 
objections' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, pp. 959-960). That objection 
is simply the passing of time. 
Krapp's Last Tape utilizes the potentialities of iteration, 
the re-contextualization of signs deployed in ,A la recherche du 
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temps perdu. Theorized by Derrida in `Signature Event Context' 
and `Limited Inc abc 
... 
', iteration exploits the `possibility 
of disengagement and citational graft' which `belongs to the 
structure of every mark' (Derrida, 1988, p. 12): 
A written sign [ 
... 
] is a mark that subsists, one which does 
not exhaust itself in the moment of its inscription [... ]. 
At the same time, a written sign carries with it a force 
that breaks with its context, that is, with the collectivity 
of presences organizing the moment of its inscription. This 
breaking force [force de rupture] is not an accidental 
predicate but the very structure of the written text. 
(Derrida, 1988, p. 9) 
When `Every sign [... ] can be cited' (Derrida, 1988, p. 12), 
`contextual transformation remains an always open possibility' 
(Derrida, 1988, p. 79). Further, `Iteration alters, something new 
takes place' (Derrida, 1988, p. 40). The sign, maintaining traces 
of a previous context, can suffer a re-deployment designed to 
undermine that earlier context. `" The replay of Krapp's tapes 
41 Bakhtin, as well as Derrida, recognizes the 
opportunities for distortion offered by re-contextualization: 
The context embracing another's word is responsible for its 
dialogizing background, whose influence can be very great. 
Given the appropriate methods for framing, one may bring 
about fundamental changes even in another's utterance 
accurately quoted. Any sly and ill-disposed polemicist 
knows very well which dialogizing backdrop he should bring 
to bear on the accurately quoted words of his opponent, in 
order to distort their sense. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 340) 
Iteration exploits latent meanings and implications which may be 
made manifest through re-contextualization of the sign. Equally, 
186 
is of a piece with this re-contextualization. For the purposes 
of parody in the play as a whole, iteration is the technique of 
deliberately and legitimately misunderstanding the intentions 
controlling the original use of the sign. " Incidents 
originally found in A la recherche du temps perdu suffer this 
distortion in their passage to re-contextualization in Krapp's 
Last Tape. Spiritual intoxication is degraded into the 
presentation of a stage drunk. Instantaneous transportation 
through mental space is confounded in Krapp's laborious physical 
movement. Marcel's stumble on the cobbles, which proffers the 
key to life and art, is re-enacted as a slip on a banana skin. 
The intellectual experience drawn from the taste of the madeleine 
bathetically reappears as the vacuous sucking of the end of a 
banana. The peal of Marcel's childhood bell becomes the 
clattering of Krapp's tin boxes as they are swept to the floor. 
Iteration, if under the control of involuntary memory, must evoke 
past items and experiences in their original and integral form. 
Krapp's Last Tape, internally and externally, will not collude 
the words of another may be quoted precisely, but `with irony, 
with a smirk' (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 69). Derrida's use of John 
Searle's essay `Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida' (Searle, 1977, pp. 198-208) in `Limited Inc abc 
... 
', (Derrida, 
1988, pp. 29-110) is itself a demonstration of the ludic powers 
of iteration. 
42 Here iteration closely parallels the structure of jokes 
as given by Freud: `the joke is produced by [... ] disregarding 
the meaning intended [... ] and catching on to the subsidiary 
meaning' (Freud, 1976, p. 89). The distortion of the props in 
ll py Days, as detailed in Beckett's production notebook for that 
play, is also a peculiar instance of this process where the 
`[General] principle' informing the shape of Winnie's parasol, 
toothbrush, mirror, revolver, bottle, lipstick and magnifying 
glass is `hypertrophy [... ] secondary, atrophy primary' (Beckett, 
1985, p. 119). What results, for example, is a parasol with an 
elongated handle and absurdly inadequate canopy. 
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with this delusive reproduction which considers itself to have 
found an exit from the differences attendant on the action of 
space and time. What iteration produces in Krapp's Last Tape is 
a parodic relationship between itself and Proust founded on 
difference and similarity simultaneously. Proust is incorrectly 
recalled. 
For Chabert in the Theatre d'Orsay production in 1975, the 
preparation of Krapp's tapes constituted `one of the most 
disturbing aspects of the acting', for the tapes too require a 
problematic `relationship between two voices, different yet 
similar (`ni tout ä fait la meme, ni tout ä fait une autre'); a 
voice that is a strange echo of itself' (Chabert, 1980, p. 90). 
Marcel, as `Someone offered to re-introduce me to a friend of my 
youth', suffers a visual and aural disturbance of the same order: 
The familiar voice seemed to be emitted by a gramophone more 
perfect than any I had ever heard, for, though it was the 
voice of my friend, it issued from the mouth of a corpulent 
gentleman with greying hair whom I did not know, and I could 
only suppose that somehow artificially, by a mechanical 
device, the voice of my old comrade had been lodged in the 
frame of this stout elderly man who might have been anybody. 
(Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 985) 
Such distressing physical degeneration, entwined with intimations 
of identity, figure Marcel's own relationship with Krapp. 
Kragp's Last Tape elaborates substantially upon Beckett's final 
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annotation in the edition of A la recherche du temps perdu he 
used in the composition of oust. `Balls', as Zurbrugg notes, 
would seem to signal that, even in 1931, all was not well in 
Beckett's estimation of the Proustian project (Zurbrugg, 1983, 
p. 178). 43 The intrusion of Kant into this intertextual quarrel 
gives point to the impulse of Krapp's Last Tape to convert 
Proustian ideas into physical terms. Augustine's anti-Manichaean 
writings, themselves anticipating Kantian strategies in the 
refutation of metaphysical claims, can perform the same function 
in relation to the play's treatment of Manichaeism. Metaphysical 
assertions are exposed as empty in Rough for Theatre II; Krapp's 
Last Tape insists upon providing the empirical expression of such 
ideas which is lacking in their original contexts. A necessary 
mismatch is evinced: to be manifested at all, the spiritual and 
intellectual must `suddenly [... ] fall' from their `eminence', 
relinquish their `stilts' (Proust, 1981, vol. 3, p. 1107) and 
degenerate into the physical terms which contradict their status 
as spiritual emblems. Metaphysical assertions, like young ladies 
whose purity guardians are keen to preserve, should not be put 
on the stage. 
43 As Zurbrugg reports, Beckett's comment is to be found in 
his copy of Le Temps retrouvd (36th edition, 1927 reprint, Paris: 
Gallimard, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Frangaise, 1929,3: 1033, 
P. 240) (Zurbrugg, 1983, p. 186, n. 26). Upon facing the many 
volumes of A la recherche du temps perdu requiring study for his 
monograph Proust in 1930, Beckett lamented to Tom MacGreevy: 
And to think that I have to contemplate him at stool for 16 
volumes. 
(Beckett cited in Knowlson, 1996, p. 117) 
A constipation to Krappian standards would be needed. 
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Chapter Three 
Metaphysical Fabrication and its Catastrophe 
i. 
`He'll have them on their feet' 
Catastrophe puts its vision of Beckettian Man not merely on 
the stage, but `midstage' and on an eighteen inch high plinth, 
to ensure that he may not be overlooked (Beckett, 1986, p. 457). 
In emphasizing its readiness to proffer a metaphysical vision of 
the human condition, Beckett's Catastrophe, it appears, does not 
share the Director's fastidious distaste for any `craze for 
explicitation! Every i dotted to death! ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 459). 
Critical explication seems eased by the familiarity of 
SAtastrophe, for the meticulous construction of a stage image and 
the technical experiments undertaken with its lighting recall 
outstanding features of almost every Beckett play, with those 
written for radio escaping the net merely by default. Neither 
would the inclusion of an exacting Director of rehearsals remove 
the impression that the scene of Catastrophe is located in 
Beckettian territory. Here, at this late stage in Beckettian 
aesthetics, there is no critical ingenuity in pointing to the 
existence of a stage image and surely little more in providing 
details as to its moulding; these are tautological with the text 
of Catastrophe itself. The actual critical obligation is as 
scripted as the applause of the audience, for all that remains 
is to `say it', to make explicit the significance of Protagonist 
and plinth. 
For those rising to the challenge, the solution is similarly 
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familiar. working toward `the one genuine meaning of this play', 
Libera finds `in the Protagonist, a picture of Man' (Libera, 
1984, p. 107). Taking note of the dismal aspect of the 
Protagonist, McMullan fine-tunes the identification of `The 
spectacle in preparation' to `an image of human suffering' 
(McMullan, 1993, p. 28). States, while acknowledging the 
promising fact that `in Beckett's theatre the stage tends to 
become "all the world, " and vice versa' (States, 1987, p. 14), yet 
hesitates from proffering an appropriately portentous conclusion, 
for 'The characters 
- 
all but one - are gainfully employed, in 
good health, and unacquainted with the metaphysical' (States, 
1987, p. 14). The worry of these departures is such that `you 
might miss Beckett entirely' (States, 1987, p. 14). To be 
`unacquainted with the metaphysical' is evidently to risk a 
definition as un-Beckettian. l Like the Director, however, 
States is courteous enough to give a second look ('Once more and 
I'm off' (Beckett, 1986, p. 460)) and Catastrophe is retrieved to 
the status of the properly metaphysical: `On closer reading [... ] 
it is unmistakably Beckett' after all, for `The absence of the 
muckheap, the void, or the terminal room in the ex-world is all 
an illusion of the eye' (States, 1987, p. 15). 2 Although driven 
to irony in the case of States, the critical pleasure in 
' This is to caricature: conceivably, one needs to be the 
victim of some opulence and to lack injuries or ills also, before 
non-Beckett may be concluded. States does not make clear whether 
these conditions are sufficient individually or only in consort 
to exclude the Beckettian hero. 
2 As one metaphysical lack is corrected to three 
recognizably Beckettian metaphysical scenes on second inspection, 
one may venture that the crucial element has come to the fore and is sufficient alone to assuage the initial three-fold worry. 
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discovering another variation on the theme of metaphysical 
pessimism and an image of human suffering as ostentatiously 
proffered in Catastrophe may be relieved of its oddity by 
recognition of the comfort of repetition. As the Beckett of 
Molloy wrote, `to see yourself doing the same thing endlessly 
over and over again fills you with satisfaction' (Beckett, 1959, 
p. 134). Acknowledgement of the `pleasure of the same' is also 
conceded by Derrida; repetition `always stems from the mastery 
of the dissimilar, from the reduction of the heterogeneous' 
(Derrida, 1987, p. 113). Gontarski is willing to have Beckett 
share in sixty years worth of such ease won by repetition: 
Catastrophe finally suggests that Beckett's vision has not 
mellowed with age. His estimate of the human condition is 
as unrelieved now as it was sixty years earlier. 
Catastrophe and Quadrat I& II are virtually companion 
pieces, since they make complementary comments on that human 
condition. What a curse mobility! What a curse immobility! 
What a curse life! What a curse death! 
(Gontarski, 1985, p. 181) 
These `complementary comments' exclude entirely any possibility 
of resting content with the human condition; its `curse' remains 
constant through all manifestation. From the 1920s to the 1980s 
(taking in Happy Days in particular), Beckett, even more so than 
the Director, has been impossible to please. 
The dedication of the play, however, `For Vaclav Havel, 
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(Beckett, 1986, p. 455), and its political ramifications, is not 
entirely consonant with recognized Beckettian territory, despite, 
as a dedication, not being entirely within the territory of 
Catastrophe itself either. This supplementary element moves 
Sandarg to provide the explicitation that Beckett `writes not 
from beyond space and time but from the cultural context of 
twentieth-century Europe' (Sandarg, 1988, p. 143). We might note 
the impossibility of not writing within time and space and some 
cultural context. As evidenced by Theatre II, however, to be 
positioned in a context of space and time, which would seem to 
be a necessary corollary of empirical existence, is an 
embarrassment to the metaphysician. Curiously, particularly in 
an essay entitled `A Political Perspective on Catastrophe', 
Sandarg will not allow 'Beckett's undeniable political 
engagement' in Catastrophe (Sandarg, 1988, p. 137) to interfere 
with his metaphysical duties: 
on the most universal level, Catastrophe delineates nothing 
less than the human plight. The Protagonist's suffering 
exemplifies that immemorial expiation to which all are 
condemned during la catastrophe lente, to use Henri 
Michaux's term, which is life itself. 
(Sandarg, 1988, p. 143) 
Beckett is in receipt of compliments both political and 
metaphysical, two spheres which are not unproblematically 
complementary: 
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Catastrophe is timeless while timely, specific while 
universal, artistically autonomous while politically 
committed. This outcry against forces both cosmic and 
concrete which strive to crush the human spirit is a 
distinguished addition to the canon of our preeminent living 
playwright. 
(Sandarg, 1988, p. 144) 
Under such a description, intervention against the workings of 
`concrete' forces serves merely to ensure that the `cosmic' 
variety might have more to crush. ' The metaphysical resonances 
of Sandarg's contention that `We are all prisoners' (Sandarg, 
1988, p. 143), does not seem sufficiently attentive to the sense 
in which Havel was a prisoner in 1982, in a mundanely empirical 
sense not shared by Beckett, Sandarg or, one guesses, the 
majority of critical commentators. Should Beckett be operating 
in that metaphysical realm where `We are all prisoners', it seems 
an unaccountable partiality on his part to select Havel, from 
`all', as recipient of the dedication of Catastro hie. 
To extend the import of Catastrophe to a universalized human 
condition is to dissolve all distinctions between the situations 
of its players, the objectified and objectifiers, the prisoner 
and those with the power to imprison. In a play of 
identifications around the metaphysical compartment of the 
`finally, at last human' (Pearce, 1992, p. 94), Pearce, in a 
Havel, by contrast, in a letter from prison in 1982, is 
not content to admit `the somewhat mystical claim that "all is 
lost anyway"' (Havel, 1990, p. 366). 
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variation from Sandarg, finds that in regard to its audience 
catastrophe `casts us in the role of the Protagonist' (Pearce, 
1992, p. 94), although merely until the universality of the 
`human' ensures that we have a turn at impersonating a 
necessarily absent participant: 
The audience [... ] can assume the role specifically of the 
artist Havel who in affirming his own role and identity in 
an isolating and debilitating environment characterizes life 
as a play and affirms the freedom of action in it. 
(Pearce, 1992, p. 95) 
Unquestionably, given a sufficient level of abstraction one can 
remove the jarring note struck by the imputation of Havel's 
`freedom of action'. At the time of the first performance of 
Catastrophe, one would be obliged to posit a level of 
understanding other than the bluntly empirical. Nevertheless, 
elevation to a station sufficiently metaphysical to permit one 
to discountenance empirical `accidents', simultaneously condemns 
Beckett's play, via this accredited universality, to the most 
trivial levelling of `conditions' and situations. The 
metaphysically unsophisticated may be tempted to judge the "human 
condition' of Havel in 1982 and the audience of Catastrophe as 
Pertinently unanalogous. If equality should be admitted here, 
there seems little recourse against the conclusion that the 
Protagonist of Catastrophe and its Director ultimately share an 
identical situation also. 
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To politicize the play by identifying political persecution 
with the theatrical process as detailed by Catastrophe runs 
similar risks of inadvertent trivialization. Where, according 
to Jackson, `Beckett compels his audience to connect the 
tyrannical power deployed by the dictator upon the individual 
with that exerted by the director upon actor and assistants' 
(Jackson, 1992, p. 24), a question also arises concerning the 
resonance between `tyrannical power' and the impulse to `compel' 
attributed to Beckett. Further, amidst these interconnections, 
identifications and equalities provoked by the levelling function 
of a `human condition', reasons should be found to account for 
the disinclination of anybody to proclaim the analogy of their 
activities with those of the Director. ' As Schopenhauer 
records, acceptance of `the metaphysical identity of all beings' 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 601) entails, despite the 
objectionable characteristics of certain beings, commitment to 
`the frequently mentioned formula of the Brahmans, Tat tvam asi, 
"This thou art"' (Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 600). For the 
audience of Catastrophe, the taking of parts extends beyond the 
preferences of compassion to involve uncomplimentary complements. 
ii. Moran and `everyman, above all others' 
Equality of station is incongruous with the introduction of 
` The law of transitive relations states that if `All Bs 
are Cs' and `All As are Bs' then `All As are Cs' (Hamblin, 1967, 
p. 179). With minor modifications to its usual notation, the law 
translates into the rule that if A=P and P=D then A=D. 
Some pertinence to Catastrophe might be claimed if A= Audience, 
P= Protagonist and D= Director. 
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an eighteen inch high block to set the Protagonist above his 
fellows. If Catastrophe delineates a universal human condition, 
then the selection of one individual to bear its dedication and 
another to be raised up upon a block as if he were an exceptional 
exemplification of the condition of all is unaccountable. Such 
are the difficulties incurred in the pursuit of universals. In 
Beckett's trilogy, Moran, as he takes over Molloy, contends with 
parallel difficulties during his forays into both the empirical 
and metaphysical realms in his assignment to find his narrative 
predecessor (Beckett, 1959, p. 111). The objective is to `discern 
my quarry', to find Molloy (Beckett, 1959, p. 111). Following the 
necessary empirical adjustments, (`I took off my coat and shoes, 
opened my trousers' (Beckett, 1959, p. 111)), the metaphysical 
search is conducted in bed: 
All is dark, but with that simple darkness that follows like 
a balm upon the great dismemberings. From their places 
masses move, stark as laws. Masses of what? One does not 
ask. There somewhere man is too, vast conglomerate of all 
nature's kingdoms, as lonely and as bound. And in that 
block the prey is lodged and thinks himself a being apart. 
Anyone would serve. But I am paid to seek. I arrive, he 
comes away. His life has been nothing but a waiting for 
this, to see himself preferred, to fancy himself damned, 
blessed, to fancy himself everyman, above all others. 
Warmth, gloom, smells of my bed, such is the effect they 
sometimes have on me. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 111) 
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The conceptual peculiarities attendant upon the election of a 
singular exemplification of `everyman' are an undercurrent: in 
a metaphysical rendering of Catastrophe, the `lonely' and `bound' 
`everyman' lodged as critical prey upon his block is positioned 
as `a being apart'; whether `damned' or `blessed', he is at least 
to `see himself preferred' (Beckett, 1959, p. 111). ' Critical 
fancies can raise him to the oxymoronic stature of 'everyman, 
above all others' (Beckett, 1959, p. 111), a universalization that 
is singular. Moran's ability to `find peace in another's 
ludicrous distress' (Beckett, 1959, p. 111) underlines his own 
assumed disconnection from `everyman', an assumption which is 
conducive also to the satisfaction involved in declaring the 
dismal `human condition' of the Protagonist. Preferable to the 
troubling formula `Tat tvamrasi' (Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, 
p. 600), is Moran's transcendent position of contemplation: `Far 
from the world, its clamours, frenzies, bitterness and dingy 
light, I pass judgement on it' (Beckett, 1959, p. 111). Such is 
the position scripted, until the last moment, for the audience 
of Catastrophe and its Director. 5 
Moran's initial search, although able to be pursued in bed 
unlike the empirical quest, harbours disadvantages. For the 
a In the trilogy, the things they carry about with them 
provide much material for speculation on the inter-relation of its characters. Similarly, Moran and the Director of Catastroph 
share both cigars and assistants to their endeavours, the former 
equally given to going out, the latter equally given to 
unsatisfactory responses to despatched imperatives. Moran finds 
the necessary explicitation more to his taste, however: `Find 
out, I said. He was looking more and more stupefied. 
Fortunately i rather enjoyed dotting my i's. ' (Beckett, 1959, 
P. 118). 
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investigator, operations in this realm `where of course no 
investigation would be possible' (Beckett, 1959, p. 111) presents 
difficulties. Further, as Kant wishes to distinguish `concepts 
of things' from `empty figments of the brain' (Kant, 1933, 
A770/B798, p. 613), Moran, despite feeling that `I should have 
invested my man, from the outset, with the air of fabulous 
being', worries that he `knew nothing of the circumstances in 
which I had learnt of his existence' (Beckett, 1959, p. 112). 
Membership of Kant's class of `heuristic fictions' (Kant, 1933, 
A771/B799, p. 614) might be suspected: `Perhaps I had invented 
him, I mean found him ready-made in my head' (Beckett, 1959, 
p. 112). The empirical realm must be tried: 
I get up, go out, and everything is changed. The blood 
drains from my head, the noise of things bursting, merging, 
avoiding one another, assails me on all sides, my eyes 
search in vain for two things alike, each pinpoint of skin 
screams a different message, I drown in the spray of 
phenomena. It is at the mercy of these sensations, which 
happily I know to be illusory, that I have to live and work. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 111) 
Moran's eyes, under the sensory assault of empirical 
particularity, `search in vain for two things alike' (Beckett, 
1959, p. 111); ' at the other extreme, under the gaze of the 
6 The passage evinces an inability to impose any synthesis 
whatsoever upon empirical perceptions, an inability profoundly 
at variance with Kant's prescriptions concerning the categories 
and schema of the understanding which organize perception so 
strictly as to guarantee the objectivity of the subject's sensory 
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metaphysically adept intellect, the players of Catastrophe, 
audience and Havel inclusive, can be synthesized into an 
undifferentiated human condition. To operate the connector 
`alike', one must hold on to the separation of things; `merging' 
is a preliminary to absolute confusion (Beckett, 1959, p. 111). 
According to Havel, `if we can't see individual, specific things, 
we can't see anything at all' (Havel, 1991, p. 13). 
It must be conceded that Catastrophe appears to play upon 
just such empirical non-particularity, despite the levelling 
effects of such imputed identities and mergers. In regard to its 
three staged characters, Beckett's directions are negatively 
informative in stating 'Age and physique unimportant' (Beckett, 
1986, p. 457). Pearce feels justified in co-opting the 
Protagonist as `the nameless without a history' (Pearce, 1992, 
p. 88); as Moran intimated, `Anyone would serve' (Beckett, 1959, 
p. 111). The Female Assistant has gone some way in obscuring any 
physical traces of individuality that may serve to particularize 
the Protagonist: 
D. Why the hat? 
A. To help hide the face. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 457) 
information. By contrast, the chaotic instability of sensory 
perception, far beyond any Cartesian mistrust of the senses, 
recurs in Beckett throughout Watt, Ill Seen Ill Said, Worstward 
HQ, Murphy and the trilogy. See below, Chapter Five, Section 
iii. Suffice it to say here, that the good repair of the 
metaphysical faculties cannot be concluded from the 
malfunctioning of the sensory apparatus. 
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Upon losing the services of the hat, adjustments are required: 
D: There's a trace of face. 
A: I make a note. 
[She takes out pad, takes pencil, makes to note. ] 
D: Down the head. [A at a loss. Irritably. ] Get going. 
Down his head. [A puts back pad and pencil, goes to P, 
bows'his head further. steps back. ] A shade more. [A 
advances, bows the head further. ] Stop! [A steps back. ] 
Fine. It's coming. 
(Beckett, 1986, pp. 459-460) 
Archetypal status is `coming' as remnants of individuality are 
going. 
Curiously, the-metaphysical provocation achieved by grooming 
the Protagonist into an unparticularized"archetype is effected 
only by minute attention to the very empirical details which 
should be irrelevant. To satisfy the Director, the angle of the 
head must be precisely determined; should a metaphysical deep- 
structure obtain universally, remaining constant behind the 
illusory flux of appearances, the precise empirical realization 
of the Protagonist should not be of sufficient importance to 
demand such pains. Would not `Anyone [... ] serve'? (Beckett, 
1959, p. 111). Regarding position, Clovis assessment of `there 
or elsewhere' should suffice (Beckett, 1986, p. 120). Neither 
should colour schemes come into it. The Director's revision of 
his Assistant's staging of the Protagonist, however, seeks to 
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shift the empirical emphasis, with perhaps some measure of 
petulance, from black to white: 
D: Why the gown? 
A: To have him all black. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 457) 
D: Why the hands-in pockets? 
A: To help have-him all black. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 458) 
A: Like that cranium? 
D: Needs whitening. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 459) 
It is unclear whether any metaphysical resonances are less 
neglected by the exchange of a black-clad Protagonist for what 
will be a stripped and whitened model. In fact, the general 
principle of `Whiten all flesh' is unapplied during the scene of 
catastrophe, for the Assistant will merely `make a note' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 460). The accomplished stripping, colouring 
the Protagonist neither black nor white but `ash', has its 
literary significance, however: 
The Director's-insistence on `more nudity' [... ] seems to 
be a ruthless depreciation or, humiliation of the Protagonist 
opposed to the image of the man in black, the Assistant's 
conception. The image she presents demonstrates qualities 
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of, perhaps, mystery, dignity, even tragedy. 
(Pearce, 1992, p. 88) 
The Director requires, revealingly, `the stark purity of the 
human being unaccommodated' (Pearce, 1992, p. 88), a formulation 
self-conscious in its allusion to the `Unaccommodated man' of 
another dramatic tragedy. Retaining his own furs, the Director 
orders the shaking off of the superflux by his Protagonist, for 
the prize of answering directly to King Lear: 
Is man no more but this? Consider him well. Thou owest the 
worm no silk, the beast no hide, the sheep no wool, the cat 
no perfume. Here's three on 's are sophisticated; thou art 
the thing itself. Unaccommodated man is no more but such 
a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art. Off, off, you 
lendings! Come on, be true. 
(Shakespeare, 1988,11.93-99, p. 927) 
Yet the object under Lear's inspection, Poor Tom, is not simply 
himself; even here, `the thing itself' and the instruction it 
offers as to the human condition is predicated upon disguise and 
deceit. Lear and the Director of Catastrophe may share in 
Vercko's prescient description of Beckett's later dramatic 
technique, where it is by 
-`By constant reduction and purification 
[that] he approaches the essence of human existence' (Vercko, 
1979, p. 37). But neither `reduction and purification' nor 
`Unaccommodated man' quite hit the note of the Director's 
pragmatic thoughts concerning the presentation of his Man. 
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`Could do with more nudity' (Beckett, 1986, p. 460) seems to lack 
metaphysical tone. 
Whether the Protagonist of Catastrophe is manifested in 
black, artificially whitened, ashen by virtue of exposure of his 
`night attire' (Beckett, 1986, p. 458) or simply flesh-coloured 
(although doubtless `made-up' too), he is equally fodder for 
metaphysical impositions. According to Pearce, `The Director and 
the Assistant conceive of meanings to be embodied in the 
Protagonist' and 'their conflict is a conflict of 
interpretations' (Pearce, 1992, p. 87). What remains constant is 
the objective of their deployment of signs, an effort toward the 
construction of an `image [... ] representative of some truth 
about what it means to be human' (Pearce, 1992, p. 87). The 
`image of the man in black' with its extrapolated attributes of 
`mystery, dignity, even tragedy' (Pearce, 1992, p. 88), is not 
easily compatible with the `poor, bare, forked animal' 
(Shakespeare, 1988,11.98, p. 927) left on the block after the 
Director's adjustments. Catastrophe is profligate in the truths 
concerning the human condition that it may be made to deliver, 
even though two or more conflicting essential truths must cause 
difficulties. The- signification of `human condition' remains 
although its content is subject to alteration, a worrying 
Provisionality where eternally valid revelations are involved. 
The audience can cheer the discovery of universal and essential 
`humanity', however the actual empirical image may change and 
however the `essential' truth drawn from it may modulate in the 
course of the play. In the Kantian critique, no empirical 
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evidence is adequate to the direction of any metaphysical 
conclusions whatsoever; in Catastrophe, however the empirical 
evidence may change, the proffered conclusion remains of the 
metaphysical order. Taking note of the empirical evidence, and 
being thus swayed in one's judgements of eternal truth, is not, 
by definition, the proper work of the metaphysical investigator. 
iii. Foucault and panopticism: `I can't see the toes' 
The battle between Director and Assistant over the empirical 
realization of the Protagonist abates on one point: their Man 
must be seen in his totality. A metaphysical diagnosis of the 
human condition would function identically; the aim must be to 
provide a total, complete picture of humanity. The neglect of 
part of this totality in the history of speculative metaphysics 
thus far is to be rectified: 
D and A contemplate P. Long pause. 
A: [Finally. ] Like the look of him? 
D: So so. [Pause. ] Why the plinth? 
A: To let the stalls see the feet. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 457) 
The Director's view of the correction needed to supply an 
unabridged portrait of Man might be inspired by the opening 
paradoxes of Beckett's Three Dialogues with Georges Duthuit: 
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Total object, complete with missing parts, instead of 
partial object. Question of degree. 
(Beckett, 1965, p. 101) 
It is indeed a `Question of degree'; the angle of theatrical 
sight-lines are crucial. The Assistant may not sit on stage 
content, for her eighteen inch block is not up to its job: 
D: [Off. plaintive. ] I can't see the toes. [Irritably. ] 
I'm sitting in the front row of the stalls and can't 
see the toes. 
A: [Rising. ] I make a note. [She takes out a pad, takes 
pencil. notes. ] Raise pedestal. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 459) 
Only with the restoration of his missing parts is the image of 
the Protagonist complete. It is a novel scruple, but the all of 
Man does indeed necessitate that attention to the toes should not 
be omitted. Total observation is required, not oversights. 
Critical compliments as to the metaphysical potentiality of 
Catastrophe 
-are a prerequisite for such intimations of parody to 
be discerned. The implications of the total observation of the 
body of the Protagonist, however, may be expanded beyond such a 
`Little gag' at the explicators' expense (Beckett, 1986, p. 459). 
The Director's assurance that his Assistant's physical version 
of the little gag is not needed to restrain the Protagonist is 
instructive: 
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A: He's shivering. 
D: Bless his heart. 
(Pause. ] 
A: [Timidly. ] What about a little 
... 
a little 
... 
gag? 
D: For God's sake! This craze for explicitation! Every 
i dotted to death! Little gag! For God's sake! 
A: Sure he won't utter? 
D: Not a squeak. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 459) 
Recourse to such primitive measures of discipline offends the 
sensibilities of the Director; his method of coercion operates 
at a far more sophisticated level and need not be betrayed by 
physical traces. ' As Foucault details, panopticism, total 
observation, is an alternative instrument of `Disciplinary 
power': 
Disciplinary power [... ] is exercised through its 
invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it 
subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In 
discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. It is 
the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to 
be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his 
7 The Protagonist is putatively an actor crucial to 'fig 
later ne' (Beckett, 1986, p. 457) of the play within a play of Sýtastrophe. The possibility of physically gagging an actor to 
ensure he `won't utter' (Beckett, 1986, p. 459), and thereby disrupt the Director's final tableau, is a problematic detail. It would suggest that, despite the record that `P submits inert, (Beckett, 1986, p. 458) to physical manipulation, his common cause 
with Director and Assistant must not be assumed. 
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subjection. And the examination is the technique by which 
power, instead of emitting the signs of its potency, instead 
of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a 
mechanism of objectification. In this space of domination, 
disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by 
arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the 
ceremony of this objectification. 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 187) 
Unlike `violent forms of power', observation, part of `a subtle, 
calculated technology of subjection', leaves no physical traces 
of its dominance over its subjects (Foucault, 1991a, p. 221). In 
Foucault's analysis, ' Bentham's model prison, the Panopticon, 
controls via the guarantee of absolute surveillance. Within its 
cells, its `so many small theatres', `each actor is alone' and, 
he is made to know, `constantly visible' (Foucault, 1991a, 
p. 200). If `solitude is the primary condition of total 
submission' (Foucault, 1991a, p. 237), visibility, a function of 
lighting, is its foundation: 
The panoptic mechanism [... ] reverses the principle of the 
dungeon; or-rather of its three functions - to enclose, to 
deprive of light and to hide 
- 
it preserves only the first 
The French publication of Foucault's Discipline and 
Pipi 
, 
from which the above citations are drawn, predates the 
writing of Catastrophe by-seven years. For other versions of the 
relevance of Discipline and Punish to Catastrophe, see McMullan (1993) and Jackson (1992). Here, Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledag (1972; first published 1969) and The Order of Things: 
8n Archaeoýogy of the Human Sciences (1970; first published 1966) 
Will be relevant to the discussion also. 
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and eliminates the other two. Full lighting and the eye of 
a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately 
protected. Visibility is a trap. 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 200) 
The spotlight upon the Protagonist is exemplary; exhibition and 
surveillance achieve the necessary submission: the Director never 
touches the object of his gaze. ' 
The central thesis of Foucault's Discipline and Punish is 
the transformation of European structures of punishment from 
`TORTURE' to `DISCIPLINE', from `The spectacle of the scaffold' 
to `Docile bodies' and `The means of correct training' (Foucault, 
1991a, p. v), from violent spectacle to total surveillance. The 
focus of the light demanded by the Director signals a parallel 
strategy, shifting from physical to mental domination: 
D: 
" 
Blackout stage. 
L: What? 
[A transmits in technical terms. Fade-out of general 
light. Light on P alone. A in shadow. ] 
D: Just the head. 
Compare Havel, writing in 1975, on `the ubiquitous, 
omnipotent state police' of Czechoslovakia, `the hideous spider 
whose invisible web runs right through the whole of society': 
even if most of the people, most of the time, cannot see 
this web with their own eyes, nor touch its fibres, even the 
simplest citizen is well aware of its existence, assumes its 
silent presence at every moment in every place, and behaves 
accordingly 
- 
behaves, that is, so as to ensure the approval 
of those hidden eyes and ears. (Havel, 1989, p. 7) 
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L: What? 
[A transmits in technical terms. Fade-out of light on 
P's body. Light on head alone. Long pause. ] 
D: Lovely. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 460) 
In accordance with Foucault's schema, the precise steps of the 
order are carried out by a staff of technicians; `bureaucratic 
concealment' of the exercise of power (Foucault, 1991a, p. 10) 
replaces its `emphatic affirmation' as symbolized by the 
`unrestrained presence of the sovereign' in the obsolete `liturgy 
of torture and execution' employed as a public spectacle 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 49). The Director and lighting-man are 
offstage at the moment of decree and execution, the Assistant ", n 
shadow' (Beckett, 1986, p. 460). -Yet this sequence merely 
emphasizes what is patently the opposite situation throughout 
catastrophe. Departing fundamentally from Discipline and Punish, 
the play stages that which Foucault defines as anonymous, 
discreet and invisible: it is the process of surveillance itself 
which is here delivered as a spectacle. '-" 
In Catastrophe, that which should remain `backstage', the 
preparation of the Protagonist, is itself observed by the 
audience. Directorial observation, assessment, dissatisfaction, 
minute manipulation and adjustment, the noting of necessary 
10 Discipline and Punish itself, however, in so far as it describes these procedures of surveillance, renders them 
similarly visible. In synthesizing spectacle and surveillance, Catastrophe works out an irony implicit in Foucault's text. 
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modifications, even the existence of an earlier version of the 
climactic `catastrophe', are exposed to view. Contrasted to the 
spectacle of the scaffold, surveillance, assessment and 
manipulation operate as `Punishment of a less immediately 
physical kind', evincing `a certain discretion in the art of 
inflicting pain' and combining to produce `subtle, more subdued 
sufferings, deprived of their visible display' (Foucault, 1991a, 
p. 8). The system of punishment Foucault describes functions 
through its own invisibility. Catastrophe stages these 
procedures. Yet in the play the objective of these specifically 
modern tactics of surveillance is the preparation of a public 
spectacle of a more ancient order. Again, Foucault holds the 
spectacle of public execution and the rationale of the 
observational mechanism apart both functionally and historically; 
Catastrophes presents the advances in domination possible via a 
synthesis of the two techniques. 
iv. `Now 
... 
let "em have it" 
Foucault documents the revelation of truth that was to be 
located in the spectacle of public execution. In `the old 
ceremonies of the scaffold', `the truth must burst forth in the 
full light of day' (Foucault, 1991a, p. 259); the `guilty man' 
must be made `the herald of his own condemnation' (Foucault, 
1991a, p. 43). To answer this imperative, the moment before 
execution `took up once again the scene of the confession': 
- 
It duplicated the forced proclamation of the amends 
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honorable with a spontaneous, public acknowledgement. It 
established the public execution as the moment of truth. 
These last moments, when the guilty man no longer has 
anything to lose, are won for the full light of truth. 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 43) 
Schopenhauer too considers public executions as the site of 
ultimate revelation; a moment of truth, indeed, promising 
insights to the benefit of speculative philosophy: 
[... ] I do not regard it as in any way unbecoming to the 
dignity of philosophy to record the statements of a few 
criminals before execution, although I might in this way 
incur the sneer that I encourage gallows-sermons. On the 
contrary, I certainly believe that the gallows is a place 
of quite peculiar revelations, and a watch-tower from which 
the person who still retains his senses often obtains a much 
wider view and a clearer insight into eternity than most 
philosophers have over the paragraphs of their rational 
psychology and theology. 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 631) 
The behaviour of the condemned during this spectacle is crucial; 
it is these moments `that all the spectators questioned: each 
word, each cry, the duration of the agony, - the resisting body, 
the life that clung desperately to it, all this constituted a 
sign' (Foucault, 1991a, p. 46). In the reading of this sign one 
could decipher crime and innocence, the past and the future, the 
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here below and the eternal' (Foucault, 1991a, p. 46). The 
Director of Catastrophe will not leave the constitution of this 
sign, proclaiming its truth in extremis even if not up for 
execution, to chance. 
Foucault juxtaposes two opposing `ideals' of domination, the 
old and modern, the spectacular exhibition of power and 
bureaucratic 
`leniency', the physical and the mental: 
The extreme point of penal justice under the Ancien Regime 
was the infinite segmentation of the body of the regicide: 
a manifestation of the strongest power over the body of the 
greatest criminal, whose total destruction made the crime 
explode into its truth. The ideal point of penality today 
would be an infinite discipline: an interrogation without 
end, an investigation that would be extended without limit 
to a meticulous and ever more analytical observation, a 
judgement that would at the same time be the constitution 
of a file that was never closed, the calculated leniency of 
a penalty that would be interlaced with the ruthless 
curiosity of an examination [... ]. 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 227) 
Under the Director's supervision, the latter methodology of 
surveillance is utilized to master, transform and improve the 
subjected body of the Protagonist in preparation for its use as 
a sign which will explode into revelation of the `truth' in 
public exhibition. This is public display of the arraigned man 
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subject to aesthetic design, a fusion of the cruelties available 
in Discipline and Punish. 
The construction of the spectacle and its signs benefits 
from the `calculation of the infinitely small', from apparently 
`petty forms of coercion' and the `meticulous, often minute, 
techniques' perfected by modern methodologies of discipline 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 139). These strategies represent `the 
coherence of a tactic': 
They are acts of cunning, not so much of the greater reason 
that works even in its sleep and gives meaning to the 
insignificant, as of the attentive `malevolence' that turns 
everything to account. Discipline is a political anatomy 
of detail. 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 139) 
''I 
In Catastrophe, the `discipline of the minute' (Foucault, 1991a, 
p. 140) controls absolutely the sign that will be exhibited. No 
aspect of the Director's `catastrophe' is `so small that it (is] 
not willed by one of his individual wishes' (Foucault, 1991a, 
p. 140). This "'new micro-physics" of power' (Foucault, 1991a, 
p. 139) exploits the `mystical calculus of the infinitesimal and 
the infinite' (Foucault, 1991a, p. 140). The programming of 
detail is crucial to the interpretative ramifications of the 
sign. A metaphysical rendering of Catastrophe confirms the 
Director's triumph in the manipulation of his sign: discipline 
has transformed the body of the Protagonist into an image of 
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`truth' and `revelation', proffering like Foucault's condemned 
man an insight into `the here below and the eternal' (Foucault, 
1991a, p. 46). For the benefit of those drawn to the spectacle 
of the `catastrophe' seeking elucidation of the human condition, 
the Protagonist has been made to `say it'. Yet the impact of 
this image bears a problematic relationship to the entirety of 
Beckett's play. 
Catastrophe itself stages the rehearsal of this spectacle, 
its preparation, manipulation and design, its fabrication. This 
process is the spectacle that Catastrophe delivers to its 
audience. In the very different play rehearsed by the Director 
and Assistant, their image of the Protagonist will be exhibited 
for public and critical delectation in isolation from its makers 
and their methods of construction. Director and Assistant have 
no parts in this play; the fabricators will not remain on stage 
to testify to the fact of fabrication. Neither will they leave 
behind any `little gag' (Beckett, 1986, p. 459) to signal their 
intervention. In this play within a play, only the bowed head 
of the Protagonist will be staged and lit, a sign charged with 
sufficient mystery and portent to instigate speculations on a 
metaphysical level. Between this play and Catastrophe, the 
opposition between theatrical `illusionism' and Brechtian 
alienation applies: 
The audience in bourgeois theatre is the passive consumer 
of a finished, unchangeable art-object offered to them as 
`real'. The play does not stimulate them to think 
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constructively of how it is presenting its characters and 
events, or how they might have been different. Because the 
dramatic illusion is a seamless whole which conceals the 
fact that it is constructed, it prevents an audience from 
reflecting critically on both the mode of representation and 
the actions represented. 
(Eagleton, 1989, p. 64) 
In Catastrophe, the fabricators are caught on stage in the very 
act of fabrication. Compliments as to a revelation of the human 
condition in Beckett's Catastrophe in fact applaud the illusion 
constructed for the Director's play. A fabricated image is not 
unproblematically `real' or `true'; rather, when fabrication is 
revealed, questions arise as to the agenda informing, and the 
power relations allowing, the manufacture of the putatively real. 
When a putatively metaphysical `reality' is involved, the 
exposure of the methods informing its construction may involve 
further disappointments. Metaphysically resonant images share 
a covenant with sausages: if one could see how they were made, 
the inclination to swallow them might diminish. A tendency 
towards a `little 
... 
gag' (Beckett, 1986, p. 459) might be 
encouraged by instruction as to their modes of manufacture. In 
Theatre II, the authority of the investigators to issue 
declarations concerning the human condition is punctured by their 
emphatic positioning in time and space; in Catastrophe, the same 
limitations apply. There are two additional imperatives 
informing the Director's vision of the human condition: it must 
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be decided under the pressure of time and positioned correctly 
in space. Worldly considerations compel the hurry: 
D: [... ] Get going. Lose that gown. [He consults his 
chronometer. ] Step on it, I have a caucus. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 458) 
For the un-omniscient, the spatial positioning of the observer 
must be reckoned with, even if time is a restriction: 
D: [... ] [He consults his chronometer. ] Just time. I'll 
go and see how it looks from the house. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 459) 
The limits of observation from this position determine 
alterations to the staging of the Protagonist. In the 
controversy of the toes, the Protagonist's pedestal must be 
raised; where `There's a trace of face' (Beckett, 1986, p. 459), 
his head must be `Downed' to take account of the angle operative 
from the 
-spectator's position. It is the image of the 
Protagonist, which should be timeless and eternal according to 
a metaphysical reading, that is the only variable term in these 
calculations. This Director is a pragmatist: the genuine 
metaphysician should demand that the theatre be moved to correct 
the sight-lines before violating the integrity of his image. 
The Protagonist is not the product of an incarnate vision 
or an instantaneous revelation; rather, he is in process and 
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subject to piece-meal manufacture. As the Assistant `Gets 
going', so the Director judges of his image, `It's coming' 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 459). Again, the procedures of Brechtian 
theatre can be recalled to oppose the `ideological belief', which 
a metaphysical reading must assert, that `the world [is] fixed, 
given and unchangeable': 
Against this, [Brecht] posits the view that reality is a 
changing, discontinuous process, produced by men and so 
transformable by them. [... ] The task of theatre is not to 
`reflect' a fixed reality, but to demonstrate how character 
and action are historically produced, and so how they could 
have been, and still can be, different. The play itself, 
therefore, becomes a model of that process of production 
[... ]. 
(Eagleton, 1989, pp. 64-65) 
The empirical machinations involved in representing the human 
condition for a theatrical production are laid bare in 
catastrophe, complete with missing parts: for mysticism, 
spiritual inspiration and revelation are humiliatingly absent. 
The manufacture of theatrical images must encompass the moulding 
and positioning of physical materials in space and time; the 
successful director must ensure, in Foucault's terms, that his 
available bodies are `meticulously prepared, calculated and used' 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 26). When sentient material is involved a 
certain amount of discomfort may be incidental to the process: 
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A: He's shivering. 
D: Bless his heart. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 459) 
There is no further consultation: as the image would be more 
aesthetically pleasing stripped, it must be so. Disconcertingly, 
however, a reputation for comparable ruthlessness informs certain 
aspects of Beckett's own history as a dramatist and director. 
Alan Schneider could be describing the complaints of the 
acting profession against the Director of Catastrophe: 
They feel he limits them too severely as artists, removes 
their creativity and individuality, constricts them too 
rigidly in their physical or vocal resources. They tell me 
that he must hate actors because he denies them the use of 
their own impulses, as well as more and more of their 
physical selves. After all, if they can not move freely 
about the stage, can not use their voices and bodies - their 
very means of reaching their audiences - what are they but 
impersonal or even disembodied puppets of his will? 
(Schneider, 1976, p. 285) 
In fact, these are the reasons, as garnered from Beckett's 
reputation as a director, -Schneider catalogues to explain why 
`After all these years, there are a number of actors (and 
directors) who still do, not respond to Beckett, or avoid doing 
his plays' (Schneider, 1976, p. 284). Admittedly, in contrast to 
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the author of Happy Days, Play and Not I, the Director of 
catastrophe will at least allow, indeed demands, total exhibition 
of his Protagonist's body. Total exhibition, however, entails 
that the application of Directorial discipline upon the actor's 
body is similarly complete. Emphatically, the Protagonist is a 
puppet of his will. The comments of actors concerning Beckett 
as author and director testify to a similar paucity of permitted 
self-determination: 
The text usually dictates everything that I do. 
(Whitelaw, 1989, p. 240) 
I will totally accept what he has written, and I will then 
try just to give him what he wants. 
(Whitelaw, 1989, p. 235) 
On the first day of rehearsal he gave me the key to my role: 
`Don't ask why 
- 
this is how it is! ' 
(Schultz, 1990, p. 22) 
The ideal Beckett actor matches the behaviour of an exemplary 
Protagonist: 
I feel that I place-myself totally at his disposal, and I 
can be a tube of paint or a musical instrument or whatever. 
I won't argue, I won't argue because I trust him totally, 
and have absolute respect for his integrity and his artistic 
vision. So really I just do as I'm told. 
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(Whitelaw, 1989, p. 235) 
Beckett's meticulous direction of Billie Whitelaw in Happy Days 
extended to the formulation of rules for `putting things down' 
precisely `on a syllable of a word' (Whitelaw, 1990, p. 5). Under 
Beckett's direction, self-abnegation on the part of the actor is 
a requirement: `you the actor' according to Whitelaw, are not to 
"get in the way' (Whitelaw, 1989, p. 238). " To avoid this 
obstruction to directorial will, the keynote of Catastrophe 
sounds again: the duty of Beckett's actor is `to be incredibly 
disciplined' (Whitelaw, 1989, p. 238). This functions in a double 
sense: the actor is `incredibly disciplined' by Beckett's 
prescriptions, in addition to cultivating self-control 
voluntarily 
- 
the better to follow'Beckett's prescriptions. As 
well as the impulse to construct stage images, the Director of 
Catastrophe thus shares with Beckett certain procedures conducive 
to their achievement, principally the discipline and manipulation 
of the actor who constitutes part of his artistic material. l' 
it The complaints of Rousseau against the actor, and 
Derrida's analysis of them, centre on just this quality of self- 
abnegation demanded by Beckett. Rousseau contrasts the orator 
who `speaks only in his own name, says, or ought to say, only 
what he thinks', with the `actor on the stage, displaying other 
sentiments than his own, saying only what he is made to say'; a 
process wherein the actor `annihilates himself' (Rousseau cited 
in Derrida, 1976, p. 305). Of Rousseau's `two men of spectacle', 
Derrida comments, only `the actor [... ] is not inspired or 
animated by any particular language. He signifies nothing. He 
hardly lives, he lends his voice. It is a mouthpiece' (Derrida, 
1976, p. 305). 
12 Appropriately, in Play, the faces of the actors, the 
only part of them which is visible, are made-up `to seem almost 
part of th urns' from which each protrudes (Beckett, 1986, 
p. 307). It is in regard to Play, however, that Beckett issues 
a rare warrant for the performative freedom of, not its actors, but the spotlight which activates their speech. As Beckett wrote 
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The Director's play may be `unspecified' in its particulars, but 
there is evidence apparent in his aims and methods of staging it 
which might persuade us that it is, as Gontarski notes, 
`something out of Beckett' (Gontarski, 1985, p. 181). 
At this point, it would seem that Catastrophe pits Beckett 
against himself: what is subject to exposure via the play's 
staging of the Director are techniques in direction and 
dramaturgy which can be seized upon eagerly as recognizably 
Beckettian. Yet the attempt to `use Beckett's text', in the case 
of Catastrophe, `to critique Beckett's practices' (Jackson, 1992, 
p. 39) is likely to stall, for given its status as part of 
'Beckett's practices', Catastrophe would be obliged to critique 
itself simultaneously. Catastrophe can hardly stand apart 
unimplicated, as Beckett's anti-Beckettian denunciation of 
Beckett. On the contrary: Catastrophe appears to incorporate 
aspects of the archetypal Beckett play. It is possible to 
suspect, however, that a critique predicated on Beckettian 
concerns could find reasons for discontent closely associated 
with this very 'archetypal' preconception, and here, a self- 
defeating identity with Beckett may not be inevitable. 
to George Devine: 
The inquirer (light) begins to emerge as no less a victim 
of his inquiry than they and as needing to be free, within 
narrow limits, literally to act the part, i. e. to vary if 
only slightly his speed and intensities. 
(Beckett, 1983a, p. 112) 
The risk of conceding a need `to be free' is immediately 
mitigated, if not cancelled, by the injunction that such freedom 
must be contained `within narrow limits'. Moreover, Beckett will 
grant this dubious liberty of being `free, within narrow limits, 
only to a mechanism and its anonymous operative. 
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V. `People were summoned as spectators' 
Critical perspicacity has not been lacking to observe the 
potential for Beckettian self 
-ref erentiality in Catastrophe; 
given a sporting chance, panoramic views across Beckett's own 
stage images, other `texts' and directorial demands may be given: 
The figure of the Protagonist, in his long robe and wide- 
brimmed hat, recalls other Beckettian figures, as in Eh Joe, 
Ghost Trio or Ohio Impromptu, and the final fade-down to 
focus in on the head alone, of f-handedly produced by the 
technician, Luke, is similar to the ending of many of 
Beckett's plays. [... ] Indeed, the discipline exercised bj 
the Producer is rivalled by the discipline exercised by 
Beckett in the miseen scene of his own work. 
(McMullan, 1993, p. 31) 
The very emphases of catastrophe, techniques of surveillance and 
the construction of spectacle, clearly reproduce aspects of 
'Beckett's theatre': 
Much of Beckett's theatre focuses on strategies of 
surveillance and spectacle 
- 
most of the bodies which appear 
in his plays are subject to discipline and cannot escape 
either the confines of the stage or the relentless glare of 
the spotlight. This is perhaps a major reason why the late 
plays are rarely performed in the round - precisely because 
of the way they set up a frame, offering that which appears 
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within it as spectacle. 
(McMullan,, 1993, p. 16) 
Catastrophe itself was first offered as a spectacle, incidentally 
to the considerable expense of the archetypal overview of 
Beckett, " at the Avignon Festival, an occasion organized for 
the benefit of the-Association internationale de Defense des 
Artistes. Inside the play, the Director's contribution of a 
spectacle is for the benefit of his audience. There is 
considerable critical agreement as to a primary signification of 
this offering, a signification which unites metaphysical and 
political readings., For Sandarg, the Protagonist represents `a 
statue of silent suffering' (Sandarg, 1988, p. 140). Suffering 
is also emphasized in the identifications McMullan finds 
appropriate: 
the Protagonist not only evokes the pathetic figure of Man, 
but the figure of Christ, offered up as sacrificial victim, 
the spectacle of his crucified body presented to the gaze 
of the multitude. 
(McMullan, 1993, p. 30) 
The ascription of the source may vary between the political or 
the metaphysical, " but recognition of persecution and suffering 
" As Sandarg asks in mock-disbelief, `Politics, commitment 
and society 
... 
a blasphemy of Beckett? ' (Sandarg, 1988, p. 137). 
" This can vary in the same account. Like Sandarg, 
McMullan's overtly political reading of Catastrophe can lapse into the metaphysical gestures of the citation above. 
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inform most responses to the Protagonist. This concern with 
`suffering' must further position Catastrophe within the category 
of the archetypically Beckettian. What is not archetypal, 
however, is the ease with which this interpretation may be made; 
the very obviousness of the Protagonist's `suffering' renders its 
discovery in Catastrophe as banal as at the scenes of public 
execution documented by Foucault. The spectacular fashion in 
which the Protagonist is directed to `suffer', and Catastrophe 
styled to refer to the `Beckettian', is perhaps a cause for 
suspicion. 
Comparisons with `the pathetic figure of Man' and `the 
figure of Christ' (McMullan, 1993, -p. 30) is considerable 
recompense for the Protagonist's performance- of his agonies. 
Yet, a peculiarity is devised precisely by such critical tributes 
to how impressively the Protagonist- is made to suffer. The 
cultivation of a taste for masterful and considered 
representations of human misery risks a certain perversity: 
aesthetic congratulation of Beckett under such terms posits an 
audience which can extract a good measure of enjoyment from 
witnessing atrocities well-performed. However, the credit 
accorded to Beckett for the artistic depiction of pleasurable 
pains must in the case of Catastrophe be lavished upon the 
Director. His definite opinions on what suffering humanity is 
wearing in the Absurd this season undoubtedly demonstrate a 
certain expertise in costuming the archetypal Beckett play. At 
the conclusion of his deliberations, the stylized look, complete 
with its appropriately Beckettian experimental lighting, is 'in 
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the bag' (Beckett, 1986, p. 460). Given Beckett's success in the 
presentation of such images, there should be no reason to 
withhold similar admiration from the spectacle the Director 
offers for critical delectation. Beckett's audience, if they 
arrive to see misery with the potential for co-option into a 
pessimistic system on a metaphysical scale, are well-served by 
this proxy Director. He even takes up the position of the 
audience to ensure that his staging decisions will fulfil their 
legitimate expectation for, as culled from their experience of 
Beckett, a vision of the complete human condition. According to 
Brater: 
When the Director leaves the set to check the effect from 
the stalls, `not to appear again, ' his offstage voice 
assumes the frightening impersonality of absolute assertion. 
(Brater, 1987, p. 142) 
This quality. may consolidate his authority to mould a 
metaphysical vision; " otherwise, it may emphasize just how 
completely Catastrophe intends to prostrate itself before the 
demands of an audience which knows exactly what it requires from 
the archetypal Beckett play. This voice of "absolute assertion", 
after all, comes from the stalls. The Assistant executes the 
is Any attempt to claim the Director as a disembodied 
intelligence functioning beyond space and time, as would be 
convenient for an impersonal voice of `absolute assertion' (Brater, 1987, p. 142), must be embarrassed by the traces of gross 
physicality left behind on the vacated seat of power on stage. 
The offices of a rag `vigorously-' applied to the `back and seat 
of chair' (Beckett, 1986, p. 459) are necessary before the 
Assistant can take the Director's place without active distaste. 
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necessary adjustments to ensure that Protagonist is the on-stage 
projection of demands emanating from the auditorium. Upon each 
experimental modification, she `steps back' (Beckett, 1986, 
P. 460) to allow Director and audience to contemplate the 
aesthetic progress of their substitute crucifixion. The 
Director's foray into the space of the audience to test the 
visible impact of his image signals his awareness of a crucial 
consideration: as the Protagonist is subject to his authority, 
so is the Director subject to the authority of the audience. His 
manipulation of the Protagonist is done in service of the 
audience. And this service is predicated to meet the demands, 
specifically, of Beckett's audience. If a signification of 
`suffering' is desired, we are to have what we want, and 
moveover, on a plinth. 
Throughout his manipulation and visual assessment, the 
Protagonist `submits, inert' (Beckett, 1986, p. 458). Until its 
final moments, Catastrophe replicates the division of power 
expressed in Foucault's analysis of the Panopticon. These 
relations are a function of visibility: 
The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being 
seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, 
without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees 
everything without ever being seen. 
(Foucault, 1991a, pp. 201-202) 
Such a model can be readily transposed into theatrical terms: 
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a darkened auditorium and spotlit Protagonist produces an 
identical one-sided distribution of the right to observe and 
assess. Via this `simple economic geometry', `those anonymous 
and temporary observers' positioned in the central tower 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 202) are awarded `a perpetual victory that 
avoids any physical confrontation' (Foucault, 1991a, p. 203). 16 
The Panopticon offers the same state of serene contemplation of 
the `constantly suffering' that Schopenhauer posits as available 
in artistic representation: 
the in-itself of life, the will, existence itself, is a 
constant suffering, and is partly woeful, partly fearful. 
The same thing, on the other hand, as representation alone, 
purely contemplated, or repeated through art, free from 
pain, presents us with a significant spectacle. 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 1, §52, p. 267) 
From the security of aesthetic distance we may applaud. ' 
Thus far we remain within the scripted response to the 
Protagonist supplied for the audience of the play within a play 
of Catastrophe. However, the tranquillity of contemplation owes 
much to the inability of the object thus fixed to return its 
16 The power to observe, and command, is transformed in 
Foucault from being the prerogative of monarchy to the right of 
the people; Catastrophe insinuates a parallel shift in authority 
from Director to audience. According to Foucault, `the power to judge should no longer depend on the innumerable, discontinuous, 
sometimes contradictory privileges of sovereignty, but on the 
continuously distributed effects of public power' (Foucault, 
1991a, p. 81). 
228 
audience's interrogative gaze. This is the `guarantee of order' 
of the Panopticon: 
Each individual, in his place, is securely confined to a 
cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; 
[... ]. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object 
of information, never a subject in communication. 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 200) 
The imposition of confinement, surveillance and objectification 
mark the relationship of the Director and audience with the 
Protagonist; the superiority of the former and subjection of the 
latter is pre-decided by their relative positions as observers 
and observed in the panoptical mechanism. Beckett's Catastrophe 
imposes a last minute revision which departs from this script: 
D: [... ] Now 
... 
let 'em have it. [Fade-out of general 
light. Pause. Fade-out of light on body. Light on 
head alone. Long pause. ] Terrific! He'll have them 
on their feet. I can hear it from here. 
[Pause. Distant storm of applause. P raises his heaä_ 
fixes the audience. The applause falters, dies. 
Long pause. 
Fade-out of light on face. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 461) 
The lighting of the `catastrophe' has erased the apparent 
fabricators of the image from notice: it is not the Director or 
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Assistant that the Protagonist `fixes', but the audience. The 
gaze is returned just as the audience is called upon to play 
their conventional role in the success of the spectacle. The 
`storm of applause' which is now finally due from the actual 
audience of Catastrophe is parodied and silenced within the play 
itself; can the disdained reaction be tendered again? The 
`abyssal dissymmetry that occurs when one is exposed to the gaze 
of the other' (Derrida, 1995, p. 28) favours the audience until 
the final action of the play. The focus of the interrogation is 
then abruptly switched. The Protagonist has been subject to 
scrutiny and correction throughout the play; suddenly each member 
of the audience must negotiate a `correct' response to a 
challenge proffered publicly. The timing of this strategy is 
unique in Beckett's theatre. " The last act of Catastrophe is 
to put its observers under surveillance and to demand a response. 
With parody and disdain of the role of the audience written 
into the text of Catastrophe, it must be asked in all innocence 
what has been done to merit such ill treatment. Foucault's 
I? In Happy Days, the interrogation of the spectator is 
both mediated by the Shower/Cooker surrogates and positioned 
within the play to occur when the audience is secure in the 
invisibility of a darkened auditorium. Neither are the audience 
obliged to provide a public rejoinder to the many ambiguous 
occasions in Play when responses, apparently to the operation of 
the spotlight, may equally be understood as referring to the 
players' perception of the demands implicit in the gaze of the 
audience. A method of switching the gaze of the spectators back 
on to themselves comparable to that of catastrophe might be found in Elizabeth Chitty's Demo Model; here, `the audience also is 
made into a scene by the flash and framing of the Polaroid camera 
the artist carries, which returns the aggression of the 
theatrical scene to the audience' (Monk, 1982, p. 166). 
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analysis of execution as a public spectacle again has 
ramifications for the strategies of Catastrophe: 
People were summoned as spectators [... ]. Not only must 
people know, they must see with their own eyes. Because 
they must be made to be afraid; but also because they must 
be the witnesses, the guarantors, of the punishment, and 
because they must to a certain extent take part in it. 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 58; my emphasis) 
The audience of Catastrophe are similarly implicated in the 
production of its spectacle of suffering. Witnesses are 
necessary to the definition of a spectacle. That which is 
unseen, whatever its inherent extravagances, cannot constitute 
a `spectacle'; to achieve this status, an audience must be 
summoned. '° Moreover, in so far as Catastrophe exploits 
18 The challenge to the audience in Catastrophe is 
structurally similar to that described by Beckett with regard to 
Caravaggio's The Beheading of John the Baptist, a painting 
recognized as an influence upon Not I (see, for example, 
Knowlson, 1996, pp. 588-589). Armstrong records Beckett's 
comments from September 1985: 
I stood there a long time in front of the painting. 
Gradually I noticed that I was not alone, that behind the 
screen at the side of the church [in the painting] was the 
face of a man watching me observe the scene of beheading. (Beckett cited in Armstrong, 1990, pp. 69-70) 
, As is the case in Catastrophe, the spectator is observed in his 
critical and aesthetic assessment of, as Armstrong describes the 
Scene of beheading, `a visceral assault on another individual' (Armstrong, 1990, p. 70). The repeated intimations of antagonism 
towards the audience in Endgame, Waiting-for Godot, Not 14 Play, 
happy Days and catastrophe might share a basis made explicit in 
Beckett's Eleutheria; there, the staged Spectator confesses that 
`by definition, I am partly despicable' (Beckett, 1996, p. 133). 
The demand that Victor explain himself, as pressed by the 
Spectator, is reproduced in Catastrophe in the necessity to 
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recognizably Beckettian techniques, the construction of this 
spectacle is undertaken with the expressed preferences of his own 
audience in mind. States' comments on the pliancy of the 
Director's Assistant' suggests a further analogy: 
of course, the Assistant 
- 
as assistants will be 
- 
is over- 
zealous: she would pull all the stops, over-do everything. 
(States, 1987, p. 17) 
The Director himself bears just such a relationship to his 
author; the explicitness of the Protagonist's dejection, the 
meticulousness of his staging, the ruthless manipulation of the 
`performer', the lighting plans, and, most of all, the 
ostentation of the plinth, `over-do' Beckettian methods just 
sufficiently to tip recognition of the `archetype' over into 
parody. The Director's objective in utilizing these methods, 
however, is to direct the expressive potential of the silent 
Protagonist. It is via these techniques that the Protagonist can 
be made to signify `suffering'; but, crucially, it is the 
application of these techniques which causes his suffering. 
Surveillance, assessment and manipulation, as detailed by 
Foucault, can be operated as the modern replacements for physical 
violence and torture. In the utilization of these methods, the 
behaviour of the spectators of Catastrophe is closely analogous 
to that of the Director. The speciality of the critical audience 
maximize the expressive potential of the Protagonist for the 
benefit of his audience. It is the existence of questioning 
spectators which create the impulse to make both Victor and the 
Protagonist 
`Say it' (Beckett, 1986, p. 457). 
232 
in particular is the imposition of its attentions upon its chosen 
material to inquire as to what it may be forced to `say'. 
It is thus also within critical discourse that the 
Protagonist may be moulded, manipulated and re-deployed as a sign 
whose significance is determined by the preference of the critic. 
Directorial and critical surveillance share an impulse to coerce 
this exhibited material into harmony with some systematic end. 
Interpretations paying their respects to Beckett's reputation as 
dispenser of metaphysical truths and those readings stressing the 
political implications of Catastrophe, are equally liable to 
supplement the Director's objectification of the Protagonist with 
their own. In service of a politicized reading, the silence of 
the Protagonist attracts comment: 
voiceless among the voices, he resembles a prisoner prepared 
for an official visit or a propaganda warning for all to see 
in his agony. 
(Sandarg, 1988, p. 140) 
Evidently, Sandarg must congratulate the Director on the 
expressive impact of his voiceless image. But this is Sandarg is 
voice and Sandargs version of what the Protagonist can be 
deployed to express. Statement of what the Protagonist `says' 
risks the reproduction of the same system of repression imposed 
by the Director, even when that system is the target of censure: 
Catastrophe plays upon the audience's awareness of the body 
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transformed into a sign, into material to be manipulated, 
disciplined, shaped. The body in representation is 
reproduced as a conditioned image in accordance with the 
dominant laws, while any attempt on the part of the 
powerless to speak or gesture is repressed [... ]. 
(McMullan, 1993, p. 28) 
Simultaneously with deploring the reduction of the status of the 
Protagonist to `material to be manipulated' and his conditioning 
`in accordance with the dominant laws', he is deployed for the 
benefit of McMullan's vision in a parallel manner. His 
objectification underlies the structure of the argument; the 
concepts of `the body transformed into a sign', `material to be 
manipulated' and `a conditioned image' replace the actual bodily 
manifestation of the Protagonist. The material object is 
converted into an expressive symbol, a conversion which does not 
acknowledge its sown potential investment in subtle techniques of 
manipulation. The Protagonist remains voiceless; it is these 
authoritative voices which display the ability to redescribe his 
significance, to add to the Director's version of how he might 
be positioned and seen in the best light. 
vi. Conceptualization 
Critical interpretation reworks the empirical manifestation 
of the Protagonist in conceptual terms. At the opening of 
Catastrophe, the body of the Protagonist is concealed beneath the 
black gown and hat supplied by the Assistant; when information 
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is required by the Director as to the empirical characteristics 
of this physical `material', he insists that the Assistant does 
not uncover the Protagonist for actual inspection, but that she 
`say it'. Conceptual definition of the Protagonist begins here: 
D: What has he on underneath? [A moves towards P. ] Say it. 
[A halts. ] 
A: His night attire. 
D: Colour? 
A: Ash. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 458) 
When the gown is removed, these conceptual descriptions serve to 
direct the response of the audience. We do not inspect the 
empirical appearance of the Protagonist entirely unprejudiced by 
implanted expectations., The Director requires further 
preliminary testimony as to the state of his object: 
D: [... ] How's the skull? 
A: You've seen it. 
D: I forget. [A moves toward P. ] Say it. 
A: Moulting. A few tufts. 
D: Colour? 
A: Ash. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 458) 
The Director's own empirical knowledge (`You've seen it') is 
superseded ('I-forget') by the conceptual determinations demanded 
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of the Assistant ('Say it'). Implicit judgement of the 
attributes of the empirical object under discussion resides in 
the terms chosen to denote them. The selections 'skull' and 
`Ash' are not neutral in their connotations. The linguistic 
choices of the Assistant impose an interpretative inflection upon 
empirical material which remains concealed from the audience at 
this point. These descriptions are the responsibility of the 
interpreter and not simply characteristics of an object 
objectively detailed. Remaining unavailable to empirical 
inspection, the Protagonist is being defined by conceptual 
discourse. The third sequence of this type extends the process 
further: 
D: How are they? [A at a loss. Irrita]2ly. ] The hands, how 
are the hands? 
A: You've seen them. 
D: I forget. 
A: Crippled. Fibrous degeneration. 
D: Clawlike? 
A: If you like. 
D: Two claws? 
A: Unless he clench his fists. 
D: He mustn't. 
A: I make a note. [She takes out pad. takes pencil, notes. ] 
Hands limp. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 458) 
Again the impression made by empirical observation is too weak 
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to be retained in the memory of the Director; the Assistant is 
ordered to supply replacement data in conceptual terms. "Fibrous 
degeneration', the decay of the physical, " is the fate of 
matter in the mind of the Director ('I forget') and the effect 
of the Assistant's conceptual exposition. In this exchange, the 
priority of conceptual definition over the empirical object 
itself is decisively established. Description of the hands of 
the Protagonist provokes for the Director the idea of `Two 
claws'; the physical- disposition of the Protagonist must 
henceforth replicate and emphasize this conceptual preference. 
In place of the search for concepts to describe the object 
adequately, the object must be manipulated in order to manifest 
the concept adequately. " 
The Director is shielded from any confrontation with 
materiality by the exertions of his Assistant. His manipulations 
are exclusively conceptual; he is never directly in contact with 
the body of the Protagonist. The discipline exerted by his 
19 Upon the first occurrence of the concept `Ash' (Beckett, 
1986, p. 457), the Director `takes out a ciga' and demands a 
`Light' (Beckett, 1986, p. 458). The materiality of this 
particular prop disintegrates into smoke and ash in time with the 
Director's increasing conceptual domination of the major stage 
prop on the plinth. 
20 Havel notes a similar inversion in relation to the 
operations of the Czechoslovakian regime in 1975: `the 
authorities, instead of adapting themselves to life, try to adapt 
life to themselves' (Havel, 1989, p. 28). The impact of 
`dialectical metaphysics' is analogous also, where `instead of 
the dialectic confirming itself by serving reality, it is 
supposed to confirm itself by having reality serve it' (Havel, 
1980, p. 8). In application `It mortifies, destroys and ruins 
things' for it `changes all around it into arguments favouring its own abstract truth. It is interested only in how to incorporate things into its scheme' (Havel, 1980, p. 9). 
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conceptual determinations is such that his mere decree is 
sufficient to exclude empirical actions not consistent with his 
wishes: 
A: Sure he won't utter? 
D: Not a squeak. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 459) 
As the Director declares, so it shall be. The idealist endowed 
with power may compel the reworking of the empirical to satisfy 
his conceptual definitions. In Endgame, Hamm ponders, a 
`rational being' might be `liable to get ideas into his head if 
he observed us long enough' (Beckett, - 1986, p. 108); in 
Catastrophe, the Director reverses the order of priority: `ideas' 
are to inform the material offered for observation. Hamm's 
`rational being', extracting concepts a posteriori from empirical 
observation, conforms his procedures to Kantian epistemology: 
Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it 
alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the 
understanding, and from the understanding arise co_nce tu_s. 
But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of 
certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and 
therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way 
can the object be given to us. 
(Kant, 1933, A19/B33, p. 65) 
The empirical basis underlying the Kantian scheme determines that 
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`In the absence of intuition all our knowledge is without 
objects, and therefore remains entirely empty' (Kant, 1933, 
A62/B87, p. 100). As the Protagonist remains robed during the 
sequences where the Assistant is required to `say' his empirical 
condition, the concepts she delivers to both the Director and the 
audience remain similarly `empty'. Conceptual assertions stray 
into the metaphysical realm when the nature of the objects 
required to fill or substantiate them `transcend the conditions 
of all possible experience' (Kant, 1933, A751-752/B779-780, 
p. 601). Amongst the metaphysical, ramifications posited in 
criticism upon Catastrophe, States's ability to point out the 
objects or intuitions corresponding to `the void, or the terminal 
room in the ex-world' (States, 1987, p. 15) must in particular be 
doubted. But the metaphysical nature of such entities of course 
also guarantees that no conclusive refutation of their existence 
can be given either. Where `assertions [... ] do not relate to 
objects of experience' (Kant, 1933, A742/B770, p. 595) battles are 
fought merely in a zone of ideas. The metaphysician may posit 
supersensible existence and `it is [... ] apodeictically certain 
that there will never be anyone who will be able to assert the 
Apposite with the least show [of proof], much less, dogmatically' 
(Kant, 1933, A742/B770, p. 595). The `spectacle' offered by 
combatants in metaphysical disputes is therefore literally 
immaterial: 
Both parties beat the air, and wrestle with their own 
shadows, since they go beyond the limits of nature, where 
there is nothing that they can seize and hold with their 
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dogmatic grasp. Fight as they may, the shadows which they 
cleave asunder grow together again forthwith, like the 
heroes in Valhalla, to disport themselves anew in the 
bloodless contests. 
(Kant, 1933, A756/B784, p. 604) 
The operations of the Director of Catastrophe introduce a crucial 
variation: his vision, originating equally in merely conceptual 
determinations, is to be forcibly made manifest upon the 
empirical material at his disposal. The substantiation of 
concepts via an object capable of empirical Intuition, which 
Kantian epistemology demands, is tö fulfilled. Under the 
Director's modification, however, the required object is not 
simply `given' (Kant, 1933, A19/B33, p. 65), but is to be 
fabricated. 
The Protagonist begins Catastrophe concealed and shapeless 
beneath a black gown; his eventual empirical manifestation is a 
function of the Director's organization of the potentialities of 
this inert material. Similarly, within Discipline and Punish, 
the `individual' is `fabricated' by a `specific technology of 
power': 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of 
power in negative terms: it `excludes', it `represses', it 
`censors', it `abstracts', it `masks', it `conceals'. In 
fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces 
domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and 
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the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production. ' 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 194) 
While the metaphysician merely manipulates ideas which can have 
no empirical application, the Director exercises the prerogative 
of power, to substantiate his conceptual determinations upon the 
body of the Protagonist. The Director's role in Catastrophe is 
to produce the `reality' that validates his conceptual vision. 
Critical speculations upon the `knowledge that may be gained' 
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 194) by examination of the vision embodied 
by the Protagonist must take account of what Catastrophe 
explicitly stages, that this vision is the result of modes of 
fabrication, manufacture and manipulation, not fortuitous 
discovery or independent existence. The evidence substantiating 
the Director's idea of his Man has been fabricated, 22 Attending 
to the image of the Protagonist produced by the Director, 
criticism bases its deliberations upon an object that has already 
been subject to unsparing interference. " Further, to claim the 
Protagonist as the embodiment of `suffering', of Man, of the 
human condition, of any conceptual package, entails the 
21 In Havel's analysis, the assumption of `the centre of 
power' is that it is itself `identical with the centre of truth' 
(Havel, 1989, p. 39). 
22 The Kantian priority of intuitions over concepts has 
been violated; now `Reality does not shape theory, but rather the 
reverse' (Havel, 1989, p. 47). 
23 The audience is never permitted to view the Protagonist in a state free of any external intervention: his `original' 
appearance in black gown and hat is determined by staging 
decisions made by the Assistant. 
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imposition of conceptual determinations upon the available 
material in precisely the way demonstrated by the Director. This 
is not an accidental oversight: merely to be reproduced in 
discourse, the empirical manifestation of, the Protagonist must 
be replaced by concepts. Conceptual reordering is the obligation 
of the enterprise that would parade the Director as a devious 
manipulator of his materials. 
The very impossibility of doing anything other in discourse 
than substituting conceptual formulations for empirical 
intuitions harbours comforts. The problem and the consolation, 
if a little irony can be tolerated, emerge for the Animator and 
Stenographer in Beckett's Rough for Radio II: 
A: (Pained. ] I chatter too much. 
S: Come, come, sir, don't say that, it is part of your 
role, as animator. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 283) 
While, one's putative object cannot remain precisely itself 
following its translation into conceptual terms, methods exist 
to maximize the measure of transformative corruption far beyond 
the merely inevitable. In his dealings with another piece of 
pointedly `Beckettian' text, the Animator of Radio II introduces 
the technique of simple addition to his interpretative 
strategies: 
S: `Have yourself opened, Maud would say, opened -1 
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A: Don't skip, miss, the text in its entirety if you 
please. 
S: I skip nothing, sir. (Pause. ] What have I skipped, sir? 
A: [Emphatically. ] `... between two kisses 
... 
' 
[Sarcastic. ] That mere trifle! [Angry. ] How can we ever 
hope to get anywhere if you suppress gems of that 
-magnitude? 
S: But, sir, he never said anything of the kind. 
A: [Angry. ] `... Maud would say, between two kisses, etc. ' 
Amend. 
S: But, sir, I- 
A: What the devil are you deriding, miss? My hearing? My 
memory? My good faith? [Thunderous. ] Amend! 
S: (Feebly. ] As you will, sir. 
A: Let us hear how it runs now. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 284) 
Similarly, critical supplements to the text of Catastrophe come 
in°varying degrees. The impulse of Liberals allegorical account 
of each player in Catastrophe is towards a replacement of the 
empirically staged play- by its "meaning". The empirical is 
transcended by its conceptual determination: 
Such an interpretation of the meaning of these characters 
can now shed light on the event depicted and render its 
significance truly moving. 
(Libera, 1984, p. 108) 
243 
It is the `interpretation', the conceptual property of Liberal 
that `can now shed light on the event'. As for the Director, it 
is the concepts brought to bear upon empirical material that take 
precedence. Each `shed light' by moulding their materials in 
accordance with conceptual preferences. Following his emendation 
to the text under consideration, the Animator of Radio II, would 
`hear how it runs now' (Beckett, 1986, p. 284); Liberals next 
line, following reorganization of Catastrophe in the light of 
`interpretation', is not so very dissimilar: 
Such an interpretation of the meaning of these characters 
can now shed light on the event depicted and render its 
significance truly moving. For we now have the following: 
[... ]. 
(Libera, 1984, p. 108, my emphasis) 
We now have something-different; Catastrophe transforms-into a 
scenario where `[... ], Satan has persuaded Man to reject God and 
the Scriptures as inculcating in him a feeling of guilt [ 
... 
] and 
limiting his freedom' (Libera, 1984, p. 108). Libera at least 
maintains his own freedom in the conceptual rewriting of 
Beckett's script. In the case of metaphysical interpretations, 
the tendency of-commentary to introduce conceptual additions to 
the text of Catastrophe-is redoubled. In Kant's analysis, in so 
far so `metaphysics consists [... ] entirely of a priori synthetic 
propositions' (Kant, 1933, B18, p. 55), it is entailed that 
`Metaphysics rests on concepts alone' and is obliged, by its very 
nature, to soar `far above the teachings of experience' (Kant, 
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1933, Bxiv, p. 21). 24 Where metaphysical assertions are 
concerned, the scene of their elaboration is necessarily 
restricted to conceptual discourse. To fit a metaphysical scheme 
onto Catastrophe is to guarantee that its empirical manifestation 
on any stage will be replaced by determinations that are 
exclusively conceptual. Concepts without intuitions are empty; 
metaphysical concepts, which are incommensurable with empirical 
intuitions, are necessarily so. In States' reading of 
Catastrophe, however, it is the absence of empirical 
substantiation for metaphysical concepts which is claimed as the 
`illusion': 
The absence of the muckheap, the void, or the terminal room 
in the ex-world is all an illusion of the eye. 
(States, 1987, p. 15) 
The order of priority between intuition and concept is again 
reversed; the determinations of the critical mind are assumed to 
be of an accuracy sufficient to correct the constraints of the 
empirical manifestation of Catastrophe itself. 
In States' account, the `artist's instrument of expression' 
is subject to an unavoidable flaw `because it is finally a thing 
made of words and not the thing itself' (States, 1987, p. 20). 
This is precisely the flaw which threatens the integrity of the 
relationship between conceptual determinations and their putative 
empirical objects. The burden of criticism is to undertake a 
24 See Chapter One, Sections i-iii. 
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reworking of Catastrophe in conceptual terms, a process analogous 
to the Director's insistence that his object be remoulded 
physically in order to substantiate a conceptual vision. It is 
not the duty of the empirical world, however, to replicate the 
conceptual preferences of its analysts; `there is nothing more 
tentative', according to Foucault, than the process of `grouping 
and isolating, of analysing, of matching and pigeon-holing 
concrete contents' (Foucault, 1970, p. xix). The `sick mind' 
attempting to sort strands of wool into conceptual categories 
serves as an extreme exemplification of the difficulty `of 
establishing an order among things' (Foucault, 1970, p. xix): 
the sick mind continues to infinity, creating groups then 
dispersing them again, heaping up diverse similarities, 
destroying those that seem clearest, splitting up things 
that are identical, superimposing different criteria, 
frenziedly beginning all over again, becoming more and more 
disturbed, and teetering finally on the brink of anxiety. 
(Foucault, 1970, p. xviii) 
Such anxiety results from the inability of any single conceptual 
determination to dominate and subsume empirical particularities. 
An adequate basis for conceptual organization cannot be settled. 
`[W]ays of ordering empiricity' are subject to discontinuity and 
fracture (Foucault, 1970, p. 220); the conceptual scheme that is 
`posited and affirmed in the luminous space of understanding' 
retains the potential `to topple down into error, into the realm 
of fantasy, into non-knowledge' (Foucault, 1970, p. 217). Any 
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domination accorded to a conceptual scheme can be overturned. 
Vii. Catastrophes 
The concept of `catastrophe' has been applied in this way 
to conceptual systems themselves. In Kuhn's analysis of 
revolutions in scientific understanding, the arrangement of 
`conceptual boxes' supplied by the paradigm of `normal science' 
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 5) can be pressured to a state of collapse by the 
occurrence of disruptive anomalies which eventually enforce an 
alternative `way of giving order to data' (Kuhn, 1962, p. 90). 
Such `overturning' can be extracted as the literal meaning of the 
Greek root of `catastrophe', katastrefein. 2° `Catastrophe 
theory', in its mathematical incarnation, focuses upon the point 
where the predictability of a system breaks down: 
a situation of generalized catastrophe is characterized 
essentially by a failure, phenomenologically, of Curie's 
principle: Any symmetry in the cause will lead to a symmetry 
of the effects. 
(Thom, 1975, p. 106) 
`According to this theory', in Boutot's analysis, `a catastrophe 
occurs when a continuous variation of causes produces a 
discontinuous variation of effects' (Boutot, 1993, p. 168). Where 
`nothing in the previous state contained the structural 
25 See Sportelli (Sportelli, 1988, p. 120) and States (States, 1987, p. 18). 
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ingredient to produce the subsequent one, the genealogy must 
describe a rupture or a reversal, a revolution or a catastrophe' 
(Derrida, 1976, p. 255). In engineering applications, the point 
of catastrophe marks the moment where the regular behaviour of 
a structure subject to a continuous application of stress 
abruptly alters. When the point of `critical load is reached the 
system does not merely incline slightly; it fails completely' 
(Saunders, 1980, p. 81). 36 Catastrophe theory retells the story 
of the straw and the camel's back. Philosophy charts catastrophe 
similarly as `a minimal disturbance that is amplified 
existentially' (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 154) or a `crazy imbalance 
of cause and effect' (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 155), both 
recognizable as `sudden escalations that surprise the course of 
things' (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 154). Behaviour following the 
point of catastrophe is subject to instability; if we attempt to 
continue analysis, `we cannot be sure that any further 
predictions are correct' (Saunders, 1980, p. 74). In its 
application to discursive regimes and conceptual systems, 
catastrophe marks an analogous `leap into irreducible 
difference', a `point of rupture' which destabilizes any 
predictable `law of discursive fatalities' (Foucault, 1972, 
p. 142). It is a disadvantage of `the perfect system' that it is 
26 An enigmatic connection between a point of failure 
describable as catastrophic and literature itself is almost drawn 
by Beckett in `La peinture des van Velde': 
On dirait l'insurrection des molegules, l'interieur dune 
pierre un millieme de seconde avant quelle ne se ddsagrege. 
C'est ga, la littdrature. (Beckett, 1983a, p. 128) 
A thousandth of a second splits the difference between the two. 
248 
most prone to such `sudden collapses': `a non-optimized system 
will exhibit some stable buckling first', `the optimized system 
will fail without warning' (Saunders, 1980, p. 82). A formulation 
of the collapse of `any system of thought' by Havel focuses on 
just this paradoxical weakness: 
the moment when any system of thought culminates and 
declares itself complete, when it is brought to perfection 
and universality, has more than once been described as that 
deceptive moment when the system ceases to live, collapses 
in upon itself (like the material collapse of a white dwarf 
star) and reality eludes its grasp once and for all. 
(Havel, 1990, p. 192) 
In its use in the analysis of the structure of drama, 
`catastrophe' denotes the culmination of the process, `the 
crowning moment, what we have come to see' (States, 1987, p. 18). 
Catastrophe follows the stages of exposition and conflict as 
their denouement. It is the point in mathematics, engineering, 
discourse and drama where the plot begins to unravel. 
The dominance of the Director's conceptual reordering of his 
empirical materials in Catastrophe is not absolute. The action 
which finally ruptures the integrity of his vision is explicitly 
forbidden during a conceptual wrangle with the Assistant: 
A: [Timidly. ] What if he were to 
... 
were to 
... 
raise his 
head 
... -an 
instant 
... 
show his face 
... 
just an 
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instant. 
D: For God's sake! What next? Raise his head? Where do 
you think we are? In Patagonia? Raise his head? For 
God's sake! [Pause. ] Good. There's our catastrophe. 
In the bag. Once more and I'm off. 
A: [jo L. ] Once more and he's off. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 460) 
Manipulation of the Protagonist has already rendered his 
empirical manifestation `Lovely' (Beckett, 1986, p. 460) and 
`Terrific! ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 461); the perfected system may now 
be left to run in the absence of its chief architect without 
further modifications. As the Protagonist `raises his head' and 
`fixes the audience' (Beckett, 1986, p. 461), however, the 
Director's outraged response to the idea of such an event, `What 
next! ' (Beckett, 1986, p. 461), imposes itself again. A response 
to the point of `catastrophe', the collapse of the Director's 
rehearsed and predictable system, is demanded of the audience. 
At the close of our theatrical entertainment, `the law of 
discursive fatalities' (Foucault, 1972, p. 142) demands the very 
`storm of applause' (Beckett, 1986, p. 461) that is revoked in the 
play. After the point of `catastrophe', the continuation of 
predictable behaviour is subject to rupture. " 
" Under a regime where 'a deadly order has been imposed', 
where 'all activity is completely organized and so completely 
deadened' (Havel, 1989, p. 26), Havel traces the disruptive forces 
unleashed upon the emergence of 'something unscheduled in the 
official calendar of "happenings"' (Havel, 1989, p. 28). The 
question 'what happens after that? ' (Havel, 1989, p. 29) is not 
open to conclusive analysis. 
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The point of Catastrophe, perhaps, is analogous. Prior to 
its rehabilitation to the properly metaphysical, States considers 
Qatastrophe `an unusual Beckett play' (States, 1987, p. 14); 
according to Zeifman too, 
almost every journalist and critic who has written on the 
play has categorised it as a radically new departure for 
Beckett's theatre: a play overtly about politics. 
(Zeifman, 1988, p. 133) 
catastrophe, marking for Sandarg `an undeniable political 
engagement on Beckett's part', `may lead us to reevaluate his 
entire canon from the perspective of social consciousness' 
(Sandarg, 1988, p. 137). In this disconnection from the paradigm 
of the archetypically Beckettian, Catastrophe plays the role of 
`the "dangerous supplement"' (Derrida, 1976, p. 259), `a 
negativity perfectly exterior to the system it comes to overturn, 
intervening in it therefore in the manner of an unforeseen 
factum' (Derrida, 1976, p. 259). Catastrophe, however, is only 
`a radically new departure for Beckett's theatre' (Zeifman, 1988, 
p. 133) in relation to the set of critical presuppositions which 
identifies metaphysical concerns as irreducibly Beckettian 
territory. Within this paradigm, inspection of earthly political 
matters is neglected as a point of principle. The rupture 
represented by Catastrophe is in relation to critical 
determinations of the Beckettian, a set of conceptualizations 
which cannot guarantee their identity with their putative object. 
catastrophe both provokes and parodies the application of the 
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conceptual boxes organizing the `archetypically Beckettian' to 
itself; it is an anomaly which destabilizes these conceptual 
determinations. In so far as these conceptualizations 
incorporate metaphysical assertions, they cannot have an adequate 
empirical basis in any actual production of Catastrophe. To 
impose a metaphysical interpretation upon the image offered by 
the Protagonist is to discount what has been staged empirically, 
not by the Director, but by Catastrophe: the fabrication and 
manipulation of that image, equally in service of conceptual 
determinations. The depreciation of empirical warrant in order 
to ease conceptual redescription is not a matter of urgent 
ethical concern in so far as such techniques are confined to 
critical accounts of Catastrophe. Similarly, the impropriety of 
inserting false testimony into a transcript which will be 
received as a verbatim record of the proceedings of an 
interrogation is a minor matter so long as Radio II is considered 
to refer to methods of critical interpretation. Within Beckett's 
Catastrophe, the manipulation of the Protagonist to satisfy the 
conceptual preferences of the Director begins to intimate the 
results possible from the conjunction of unfettered power and an 
impulse to rework the empirical according to a system of ideas. 
In a political and legal context, the systematic exploitation of 
such techniques has real consequences. The dedication of 
-Catastrophe should perhaps function as a remainder 
that the 
empirical actions of its recipient were defined as `criminal' by 
means of just such an ideological determination. " The 
'" Upon the suspension of his sentence on the grounds of 
ill-health, Havel speculated `I may find a summons in my mailbox, 
ordering me to report on such-and-such a day to complete my jail 
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catastrophic results following the authoritative subsumption of 
Navel's activities under this conceptual category were all too 
predictable. 
term [... ]. In the long term, as always, it will depend more on 
the overall political situation than on me' (Havel, 1991, pp. 237- 
238). See also Havel's essay `Article 203' (Havel, 1991, pp. 117- 
124) for an analysis of the ingenuity of the authorities in 
bringing criminal indictments based upon this Article in 
Czechoslovakian law. In both cases, it is not empirical actions 
in themselves which are crucial, but a separate ideological 
determination as to what can be categorized as `criminal'. 
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Chapter Four 
The Lost Ones and Aporia: Building In No Way Out 
i. Specifications without regard to harmony 
The narrator of The Lost Ones calls into problematic being 
a `flattened cylinder' as the site of the action he undertakes 
to describe (Beckett, 1972, p. 7). These two attributes are not 
easily compatible in the same object: conformity to cylindrical 
specifications may have been the past state of this object 
fundamental to The Lost ones, but it cannot at once be flattened 
and retain a shape that is unarguably cylindrical. ' Whereas a 
squashed tomato does not cease to be a tomato because of the 
alteration of its usual shape, any alteration to the shape of an 
object defined as a `cylinder' can revoke the validity of that 
definition. Within this strange entity, two important conditions 
obtain with regard to its relationship with its interior `lost 
bodies'; this is a container `Vast enough for search to be in 
vain. Narrow enough for flight to be in vain' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 7). The precise interior dimensions whereby conditions are 
determined to satisfy these two necessities is entirely 
enigmatic. Depending on the activities of the bodies, their 
I The narrator of How It Is, conversely, violates a 
statement of flatness by the introduction of an element of 
curvature: 
flat assuredly but slightly arched none the less 
(Beckett, 1964, p. 58) 
One may have one or the other shape; to claim both is contrary 
to the meaning of the words employed. 
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abode is specified as both `Vast' and 'Narrow'. 2 The narrator 
moves on to `The light' and `Its dimness' (Beckett, 1972, p. 7). 
The first quality of the `light' detailed by the narrator is its 
proximity to darkness. ' What is required, furthermore, is 
`Light in a word that not only dims but blurs into the bargain' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 38). This light, `with this slight reserve 
that light is not the word' (Beckett, 1972, p. 40), is subject to 
a certain `restlessness at long intervals' (Beckett, 1972, p. 7), 
a curious compound condition where an instability which is yet 
stable reigns. When the narrator goes on to refer to `every 
separate square centimetre' of the abode (Beckett, 1972, p. 7), 
the cylinder thus described in its entirety begins to float apart 
in accordance with the idea of every `separate' square centimetre 
of it. Yet it is this quality of being `separate' which is 
shared by, which unites, each square centimetre of the cylinder 
surface. 
' Compare the efforts of 
Try say. How small. How vast. (Beckett, 1983b, p. 11) 
Far and wide. High and low. That narrow field. 
(Beckett, 1983b, p. 18) 
Where in the narrow vast? (Beckett, 1983b, p. 28) 
The assignment of any particular dimension gives way to 
oxymoronic non-specificity. 
' As Watson notes, 'dim' is peculiar in its ability to 
signify simultaneously `both a presence and a lack of light' (Watson, 1991, p. 165). The paradoxical nature of this `dark 
light' (Bataille, 1991, p. 52) might be retrieved to sense if we 
refer light back to its source, for, as Derrida points out, `The 
heart of light is black' (Derrida, 1978, p. 86). 
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A conceptual entity which would satisfy these specifications 
can indeed be thought. In a piece of impeccable reasoning 
concerning his particular `defect of the understanding', Molloy 
ponders whether `such a thing is conceivable' and concludes that 
`such a thing is conceivable, since I conceive it' (Beckett, 
1959, p. 50). A flattened cylinder, vast and simultaneously 
narrow, a light whose primary quality is adjacent to darkness, 
an unstable stability and discrete pieces of a continuous surface 
are attributes of the abode which are similarly conceivable, 
since, demonstrably, they have just been conceived. But no 
empirical object could be built which would make these attributes 
available for physical inspection. In a trivial sense, no 
fictional world is amenable to empirical verification; it is the 
distinction of The Lost ones that the narrative specifies a world 
which is not merely fictional but empirically impossible. 
Within The Lost Ones, it is the non sequiturs of, the 
narrator which should be followed. The abode includes within 
itself a `distant ceiling where none can be' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 8). But for the implication that this is a ceiling `where [no 
ceiling] can be', this might be a conclusive statement debarring 
searchers from access to the ceiling. It must be modified again 
almost immediately, however, upon consideration of the compound 
height of longest ladder and tallest searcher: 
Bolt upright on the top rung of the tallest the tallest 
climbers can touch the ceiling with their fingertips. Its 
composition is no less familiar therefore than that of floor 
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and wall. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 9) 
The heights may add up; the physical possibility of any searcher 
managing to achieve a `Bolt upright' position on the top rung of 
a ladder is more dubious. The `inviolable zenith' of the 
cylinder (Beckett, 1972, p. 21), a further absolute, is also open 
to leisurely inspection upon certain conditions: 
On the same ladder planted perpendicular at the centre of 
the floor the same bodies would gain half a metre and so be 
enabled to explore at leisure the fabulous zone decreed out 
of reach and which therefore in theory is in no wise so. 
For such recourse to the ladder is conceivable. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 20) 
In order to violate that previously defined as `inviolable', the 
narrator considers that the searchers need display but the 
`instant of fraternity' required to maintain the ladder in its 
upright position (Beckett, 1972, p. 21). The unfortunate tallest 
searcher would perhaps prefer his ladder-holders to manage a 
little longer than an `instant' of co-operative fraternity in 
order to be entirely `at leisure' atop a perpendicular ladder. 
Yet the narrator's own description of the laws of ladder use 
forbid their transport any where near the position at `the centre 
of the floor' (Beckett, 1972, p. 20) required for these operations 
to commence: 
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the transport of the ladders is not left to the good 
pleasure of the carriers who are required to hug the wall 
at all times eddywise. This is a rule [... ] not lightly to 
be broken. Nothing more natural. For if for the sake of 
the shortcut it were permitted to carry the ladder slap 
through the press or skirting the wall at will in either 
direction life in the cylinder would soon become 
untenable. ' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 27) 
The narrator does not take this `natural' law into account in his 
advice to the searchers on the strategy necessary to gain access 
to the `inviolable zenith' (Beckett, 1972, p. 21). Under his 
former set of instructions, the ladder must be positioned in the 
centre of the arena, a place where no ladder can be. Discoursing 
upon the character of the ladders supplied within the abode, the 
narrator finds `They are single without exception and vary 
greatly in size' (Beckett, 1972, p. 9). one sentence later, the 
narrator proceeds to state that `Some are fitted with a sliding 
extension' (Beckett, 1972, p. 9). ° To reach the zenith, the 
` The tenability of the injunction to the carriers to `hug 
the wall at all times eddywise' (Beckett, 1972, p. 27) is not 
examined. But, unless suffering a curvature consistent with the 
circular base of the cylinder and its walls, a ladder `not less 
than six metres' in length (Beckett, 1972, p. 9) is more likely 
to collide with the wall at either end than `hug' it. If carried 
upright, there must be a risk of sweeping away ladders already 
propped against the wall. 
The inconsistency originates in the French text, 
DdPepi eur: 
Echelles. Ce sont les seuls objets. Tres varides quant a 
la taille elles sont simples sans exception. [... ] Plusieurs 
sont ä coulisse. 
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searcher would require `the great ladder fully extended' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 20). Later we hear again that `Only objects 
fifteen single ladders propped against the wall at irregular 
intervals' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17). The first assertion is never 
cancelled, indeed it is repeated, and co-exists with incompatible 
additional statements. The nature of these objects mutates 
according to the reader's position in the text. 
Given the prohibition on removing any ladder to the 
necessary spot within the arena and the difficulty of remaining 
upright on the top rung, the possibility of storming-the zenith 
would seem to be ruled out. What is important for the narrator, 
however, is that the bodies will not co-operate to achieve this 
end, this end which under the narrator's own explanation of the 
ladder laws is in any case outlawed: 
An instant of-fraternity. But outside their explosions of 
violence this sentiment is as foreign to them as to 
butterflies. And this owing not so much to want of heart 
or intelligence as to the ideal preying on one and all. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 21) 
Should this `ideal' be concerned with the discovery of the way 
out of the cylinder, it is an odd reason for failing to join 
forces to reach the zenith, for here precisely according to the 
`amateurs of myth lies hidden a way out to earth and sky' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 21). Bizarrely, also, `fraternity' is 
(Beckett, 1970a, p. 9) 
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displayed amongst the bodies during `their explosions of 
violence' against one another (Beckett, 1972, p. 21). The `ideal 
preying on one and all', an ideal which is here used to unite the 
entire population, is also cited as the very basis of their 
division. This common ideal is the reason why `An instant of 
fraternity' is never achieved (Beckett, 1972, p. 21). Universal 
`submission' to the ladder laws is one ground upon which the 
bodies may display their unity; for this display of solidarity 
to occur, however, an infringement of the universally respected 
rule is required: 
Certain infractions unleash against the culprit a collective 
fury surprising in creatures so peaceable on the whole and 
apart from the grand affair so careless of one another. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 21) 
Previously, an inability to cooperate was blamed on `the ideal 
preying on one and all' (Beckett, 1972, p. 21); now the bodies are 
defined as `careless of one another' with the single exception 
of the seemingly analogous `grand affair' (Beckett, 1972, p. 21). 
These are creatures which are `peaceable on the whole' while 
given to `collective fury'; the semantic parallel between the 
`whole' and the `collective' emphasizing the oddity of these 
opposing descriptions (Beckett, 1972, p. 21). Of course, to 
execute their `collective fury' the bodies require one of their 
number to be excepted from this collective to take on the role 
of the object of their fraternal attack. 
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The ladders give further cause for concern. According to the 
narrator `it takescourage to climb': 
half the rungs are missing and this without regard to 
harmony. If only every second one were missing no great 
harm would be done. But the want of three in a row calls 
for acrobatics. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 10) 
If precisely `half' of the rungs are removed, this does seem to 
call for a tribute to the harmony of this depletion. It is not 
the case that `every second one' is lacking: if this condition 
were fulfilled, it would be easier to ensure that the required 
`half' of all rungs were deducted from the ladders. The removal 
of `three in a row' problematizes this very formulation, for upon 
their disappearance, these rungs are not in a row: in regard to 
the ladder, they are not there at all. The situation is not yet 
desperate, however: 
These ladders are nevertheless in great demand and in no 
danger of being reduced to mere uprights runged at their 
extremities alone. 
(Beckett, 1972,, p. 10) 
Given the record of the bodies in their consideration for one 
another, demand for the ladders is not a conclusive reason-for 
their good repair. According to the narrator's comments on the 
ladders elsewhere, `The shortest measure not less than six 
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metres' (Beckett, 1972, p. 9): if this specification is trusted, 
such ladders may be put out of service long before the condition 
of being `runged at their extremities alone' is reached. An 
additional rung set at the three metre mid-height point would 
save the ladder from the disastrous state considered by the 
narrator and yet aid the climber little in putting this piece of 
equipment, still serviceable under the narrator's definition, to 
any use for an ascent. The reason why the ladders are required 
is swiftly explained: 
The purpose of the ladders is to convey the searchers to the 
niches. Those whom these entice no longer climb simply to 
get clear of the ground. It is the custom not to climb two 
or more at a time. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 10-11) 
The narrator does not choose to provide such a satisfying 
explanation as to the purpose of the niches. The neatness of his 
account as to the purpose of the ladders is somewhat dissipated 
by the exception which has to be made to cover those who prefer 
not to be conveyed to the niches after all. Their reasons for 
preferring to eschew the possibility of gaining a niche in favour 
of merely getting `clear of the ground' is not subject to 
exhaustive analysis either. The surprising possibility of 
climbing two ladders at once is nevertheless considered worthy 
of special mention. It is unclear how a single body could 
contrive to climb `two or more at a time'; nevertheless, the 
injunction against this seemingly impossible indulgence has 
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merely reached the liberal status of a `custom'. 
The niches of the upper abode `are disposed in irregular 
quincunxes'6 which, in harmony with their irregularity, are 
`cunningly out of line' (Beckett, 1972, p. 11). The precise point 
where irregularity is sufficient to forbid the identification of 
quincunxes could be the source of some controversy. There are 
the tunnels which connect `A certain number' of the -niches 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 12) to consider, ' however. Attempting to follow 
the narrator's disposal of the average number of entrances and 
exits to these tunnels entails an arduous crawl behind a leader 
subject to equivocation and confusion. Of these `tunnels opened 
in the thickness of the wall', 
most have no other way out than the way in. It is as 
though at a certain stage discouragement had prevailed. To 
be noted in support of this wild surmise the existence of 
a long tunnel abandoned blind. Woe the body that rashly 
enters here to be compelled finally after long efforts to 
crawl back backwards as best it can the way it came. Not 
that this drama is peculiar to the unfinished tunnel. One 
has only to consider what inevitably must ensue when two 
bodies enter a normal tunnel at the same time by opposite 
ends. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 12-13) 
6A `quincunx' might be represented as `: ": '; the proper 
appearance of an `irregular' quincunx, however, is imponderable. 
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The existence of the tunnels is introduced in connection with the 
niches, with the contention that some `certain number' of the 
niches themselves are connected by tunnels. It transpires, 
however, that `most' tunnels do not serve to connect different 
niches for `most have no other way out than the way in". Yet the 
`wild surmise' that discouragement accounts for the abandonment 
of this majority of tunnels is supported by reference to only one 
tunnel left `blind'. Where `most have no other way out than the 
way in', one would conclude that `most' have been `abandoned 
blind', not merely one among their number. Where the narrator 
may call much evidence in ý support of a `wild surmise", it is 
unaccountably neglected. ` Tiny verbal ambiguities re-enter the 
text as the fate of `the body that rashly enters' this entirely 
unexceptional `unfinished tunnel' is dramatised in accordance 
7 The term `wild surmise' is burrowed from Keats' `On First 
Looking into Chapman's Homer', a work concerned, like The Lost 
Qne 
, 
with the creation of an alternative world: 
Then felt I like some watcher of the skies 
When a new planet swims into his ken; 
Or like stout Cortez when with eagle eyes 
He stared at the Pacific, and all his men 
Looked at each other with a wild surmise - 
Silent, upon a peak in Darien. 
(Keats, 1970,1.9-14, p. 62) 
There may be another, bizarre, answer. In full, we learn 
of the niches that: 
A certain number are connected by tunnels opened in the 
thickness of the wall and attaining in some cases no fewer 
than fifty metres in length. But most have no other way out 
than the way in. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 12) 
As the circumference of the cylinder is also fifty metres, the 
length of the tunnel `in some cases' is sufficient to extend all the way around the cylinder so that the niche which serves as its 
entrance is also its exit. A tunnel may then be completed rather 
than `abandoned' in order for it to have `no other way out than 
the way in'. 
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with all its unprecedented difficulties. Does the body submit 
`to be compelled' only `finally' and `after long efforts' to make 
it so? If it is obliged to `crawl back backwards [... ] the way 
it came', is `the way it came' backwards? If so, it may 
presumably crawl out forwards, except that this would not be the 
way it came'. But should it have crawled in forwards, to crawl 
out backwards would violate the same condition. ° The narrator 
lets it be known that this drama is not peculiar to `fig 
unfinished tunnel' (Beckett, 1972, p. 12, my emphasis); this is 
indeed the case if the definite article implies singularity, for 
such are the risks attendant on entering `most' tunnels. " Nor 
do two bodies have to enter a tunnel with two entrances (which 
double as exits) `at the same time' for this drama to ensue. The 
second's entrance any time between the first's entrance and exit 
will suffice for these troubles to be conjured up. And it must 
be sufficient for one body only to retreat `the way it came', if 
such a thing is possible, without detriment to the objective of 
extricating both from a logjam. Most peculiarly, however, while 
`most' tunnels are unfinished with `no other way out then the way 
in', it is the remainder, those with a double exit or entrance, 
Watt's habit of walking backwards creates similar 
descriptive difficulties; what Sam perceives is the curious sight 
of Watt `advancing backwards towards me' (Beckett, 1976, p. 157). 
The narrator of The Lost Ones courts similar conceptual 
confusions concerning the use of the ladders. When a body begins 
to climb a ladder before the previous body has descended, the 
narrator describes how the laggard `hastens to descend preceded 
by his successor' (Beckett, 1972, p. 25). 
10 Alternatively, `# 
, 
unfinished tunnel' (Beckett, 1972, 
P. 12, my emphasis) could claim to name a generic type of tunnel 
and thus be itself plural. The title The Lost ones plays an 
analogous game with the singular and the plural; `lost ones' 
makes a plural of precisely that term which most obviously 
denotes singularity. 
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which the narrator chooses to categorize as `a normal tunnel'. 
The `normal' variety of tunnel, after the subtraction of `most' 
tunnels which are blind, are necessarily in the minority. The 
apparently abnormal is renamed `normal'; what pertains to `most' 
is treated as exceptional. 
There is no obligation, however, for even those bodies 
defined as `climbers' ever to explore the peculiarities of this 
system of niches and tunnels, or indeed for a `climber' ever to 
climb. To restrict the narrator to single sentences might be a 
strategy whereby simple facts concerning the cylinder can be 
extracted. Thus: `The truth is that no searcher can readily 
forego the ladder' (Beckett, 1972, p. 14). Unfortunately, this 
`truth' is dependent upon the whole technical apparatus of the 
ladder laws or climbers' code rather than simply affection for 
climbing. The searcher cannot `readily' forego any ladder 
because the ladder. can only be foregone after the process of 
queuing is completed, when `the ladder [is] virtually his at 
last' (Beckett, 1972, p. 46): 
once at the very foot of the ladder with between him and it 
only one more return to the ground the aspirant is free to 
rejoin the searchers of the arena or exceptionally the 
watchers of the intermediate zone without opposition. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 45-46) 
The lengthy wait for the point of permitted foregoing to occur 
ensures the `truth [... ] that no searcher can readily forego the 
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ladder' (Beckett, 1972, p. 14). `To be noted also' is `the 
possibility for the climber to leave the queue once he has 
reached the head and yet not leave the zone' (Beckett, 1972, 
pp. 46-47). Once successful in entering the jealously guarded 
zone of ladders, a body may spend its lifetime doing nothing else 
but accruing opportunities to forego the ladder. The only 
condition is that such rejection cannot be completed `readily': 
a demonstration of the body's aspiration to gain the ladder is 
a necessary preliminary to abandoning it without fear of 
opposition. 
Many of the narrator's statements inspected in isolation do 
not seem to provide matter for controversy. If certain other 
statements could become `lost ones' all might be well. The 
distinction of being capable of the most extreme violence to be 
encountered in the cylinder seems to belong unequivocally to that 
class of searcher known as the `sedentary': 
A sedentary searcher stepped on instead of over is capable 
of such an outburst of fury as to throw the entire cylinder 
into a ferment. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 28-29) 
This is confirmation of-the narrator's earlier specification that 
`the sedentary are those whose acts of violence most disrupt the 
cylinder's quiet' (Beckett, 1972, p. 14). No rivals in ferocity 
approach the unbecalmed sedentary for pages at a time. Yet in 
the penultimate section, when the accolade is almost theirs at 
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last, the narrator upstages their capacity for irascibility by 
reference to the furies of mere searchers still queuing for 
ladders, bodies which are two stages below the dignity of 
`sedentary' in the class system of The Lost Ones. Within the 
cylinder, the activity of searching `would clearly be a mockery', 
the narrator explains, `if in case of doubt it were not possible 
to check certain details' (Beckett, 1972, p. 58). Consequently, 
provision is made for the searchers to search their fellow 
searchers. There are certain details it is not possible'to 
check, however, even at the risk of reducing the search to a 
`mockery': 
To be noted finally the immunity in this respect of those 
queuing for a ladder. [... ] Woe the rash searcher who 
carried away by his passion dare lay a finger on the least 
among them. Like a single body the whole queue falls on the 
offender. Of all the scenes of violence the cylinder has 
to offer none approaches this. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 59-60) 
The searcher may not `lay a finger' on those queuing; the inverse 
does not hold in relation to the queue's right to come into 
contact with the offending searcher. The sedentary cannot after 
all claim the undisputed title of perpetrators of the most 
extreme violence. But the violated queues are not the clear 
winners either. According to the comments of the narrator, both 
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are the, worst. i' It is not clear how this is possible. " 
A similarly problematical logical status belongs to the 
narrator's reference to the `heightened fixity of the motionless' 
upon the occasion of a `lull' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17). A object 
which is already `motionless' does not usually have the ability 
to be yet more still; if it does, it should be made to relinquish 
its prior claim to be `motionless'. The narrator's account of 
the apparently irrational movement of belief between the two 
rival versions of the way out of the cylinder, by contrast, is 
eminently reasonable: 
11 Whether skin or eye qualifies as suffering the worst 
damage from the ravages of the cylinder's climate is similarly 
unfathomable. We begin with skin: 
It continues none the less feebly to resist and indeed 
honourably [a feeble and yet honourable resistance? ] 
compared to the eye which with the best will in the world 
it is difficult not to consign at the close of all its 
efforts to nothing short of blindness. [an unfortunate pun, 
between blindness and closed eyes? ] For skin in its own way 
as it is not to mention its humours and lids [eyes again? ] 
it has not merely one adversary to contend with. (Beckett, 1972, pp. 52-53). 
Skin resists, but in comparison to the eye, has a greater number 
of adversaries. To calculate the net result, ability to resist 
must be balanced against the severity of attack. The net result is not considered. 
12 Categories that can have, by definition, only one member 
such as the `worst' or `first' or `last' offer a clear 
opportunity for the narrator to perpetuate confusion. To award 
a superlative which is subsequent superseded, as in the case of the `worst' here, is a succinctly contradictory strategy. 
Compare the illogicalities of the narrator of How It Is: 
as weak as possible then weaker still 
(Beckett, 1964, p. 46) 
sinking a little at last having attained the bottom 
(Beckett, 1964, p. 112) 
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Conversion is frequent either way and such a one who at a 
given moment would hear of nothing but the tunnel may well 
a moment later hear of nothing but the trapdoor and a moment 
later still give himself the lie again. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 18-19) 
Providing the narrator will allow there to be such a thing as 
time, wherein there may be found the three distinct `moments' 
required for this switching of unshakeable convictions to take 
place, the sense of this sentence at least might be secure. A 
little later, however, the narrator exhorts attention to `this 
moment of time' and continues, disastrously, to declare that 
`there will be no, other' (Beckett, 1972, p. 35). " Now, 
presumably, there are not the required three moments, given that 
there is only one. It is also impossible now to permit the 
possibility that there are `those who every now and then stand 
still' (Beckett, 1972, p. 35) or that a lull can have the duration 
of `a brief ten seconds at most' or that, after a lull, `the 
throbbing is resumed and all is as before' (Beckett, 1972, p. 37). 
Now and then, duration, and such ideas as before and after, 
should be obsolete under the new time regime within which only 
a single moment is available. Reduction of time to one singular 
moment is 
-a severe restriction. Certain notable spectacles, 
wherein the concerned parties `strive in vain' `But [... ] will 
not give in' (Beckett, 1972, p. 8), would have to be given up: 
13 If we dispense with context, a judgement can be got from 
the narrator of How It Is that, as in The Lost Ones, it is `the 
same instant always everywhere' (Beckett, 1964, p. 121). 
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The spectacle then is one to be remembered of frenzies 
prolonged in pain and hopelessness long beyond what even the 
most gifted lovers'can achieve in camera. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 54) 
While `pain and hopelessness' are not adequate reasons for 
desisting, the absence of successive moments of time within which 
such efforts may be `prolonged' should cancel conclusively the 
possibility of any such lengthy enterprise beginning, persisting 
or ending. The narrator does not choose to make any such 
cancellation. 
There are more subjects of moment to be accounted for in the 
cylinder. A recourse to `logic' is promised in the narrator's 
account of the growing popularity of the `trapdoor' theory of the 
means of exit from the cylinder, at the expense of the niche-and- 
tunnel thesis: 
This shift has logic on its side. For those who believe in 
a way out possible of access as via a tunnel it would be and 
even without any thought of putting it to account may be 
tempted by its quest. Whereas the partisans of the trapdoor 
are spared this demon by the fact that the hub of the 
ceiling is out of reach. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 19) 
Under logical inspection, to posit a method of exit which is 
absolutely unreachable is to create for oneself a source of 
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solace. A desire which can never be satisfied is instantly 
satisfied. Yet, as specified earlier, the narrator also 
proclaims that this `fabulous zone decreed out of reach', is, 
with innovatory use of the tallest ladder, `in no wise so' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 20). Yet, we are to take note of `the fact 
that the hub of the ceiling is out of reach' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 19). These two statements, one declaring impossibility, the 
other possibility, of access, should not logically co-exist. The 
`demon' of temptation, the removal of which is the chief virtue 
of the trapdoor thesis, must return if the possibility of access 
does also. The disadvantage of the tunnel option of exit centres 
upon the possibility that it might be correct. Consequently, 
searchers `may be tempted by its quest', whereupon accessible 
tunnels `would be' or `may be' searched (Beckett, 1972, p. 19). 
The entire apparatus of the ladder laws, the division between 
zones, worries over the state of the ladders and attention to the 
exceptional rights of defence accorded to the queue, would 
suggest that these conditional tenses are fantastically 
understated: the-mere temptation to search countenanced here is 
answered throughout the first fourteen sections of The Lost ones 
by an insistence that this search is constant, obsessive and 
unrelenting. The search that bodies might be tempted to 
undertake is emphatically in progress. The logical exposition 
of these myths continues: 
Thus by insensible degrees the way out transfers from the 
tunnel to the ceiling prior to never having been. So much 
for 
,a first apergu of this credence so singular in itself 
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and by reason of the loyalty it inspires in the hearts of 
so many possessed. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 19-20) 
This `credence so singular in itself' is in fact double, 
transferring between trapdoor and tunnel. The peculiarities of 
sentence structure suggest a third possibility, the as yet 
neglected linguistic entity of `the tunnel to the ceiling'. 
There is indeed a singular kind of `loyalty' to be applied to the 
tunnel/trapdoor credence, however, for the bodies alter their 
allegiance moment by moment and the belief itself, despite the 
burgeoning popularity of the trapdoor thesis, is declining such 
that it will `never [have] been' (Beckett, 1972, p. 19). 
Like the narrative itself, the bodies switch between 
competing descriptions of what is putatively the same object. 
To posit two options for exit and to vacillate between them, 
however, whatever the peculiarity of its statement, is not 
logically incoherent. This status is reserved for the narrator's 
verbal formulations. Internal self-defeat is his speciality: 
Sucklings who having no longer to suck huddle at gaze in the 
lap or sprawled on the ground in precocious postures. 
Others a little more advanced crawl searching among the 
legs. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 30) 
`Sucklings who having no longer to suck' are a simultaneous 
273 
compound of the unweaned and weaned. The `precocious' are 
contrasted to `Others a little more advanced', a contrast which 
undermines their precocity. Consider the status of another 
group: 
never again will they ceaselessly come and go who now at 
long intervals come to rest without ceasing to search with 
their eyes. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 34) 
An ability to `come to rest without ceasing' might be extracted 
for its curiosity value. The change of state described is from 
a search `ceaselessly' pursued to one pursued `without ceasing'. 
The difference is indeed subtle. During a lull, `Those who never 
know a moment's rest-stand rooted to the spot' (Beckett, 1972, 
Pp. 36-37) ensuring immediately that they do know a moment's rest. 
The effect of a lull in the cylinder `is unspeakably dramatic to 
put it mildly' (Beckett, 1972, pp. 36), which is hardly to put it 
mildly. Those somehow `making unmakable love' (Beckett, 1972, 
P. 37) are interrupted. The response of all bodies to a lull is 
singular in its multiplicity: 
Whence invariably the same vivacity of reaction as to the 
end of a world and the same brief amaze when the twofold 
storm resumes and they start to search again neither glad 
nor even sorry. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 54-55) 
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The final unconcern and indifference of `neither glad nor even 
sorry' does battle with the `amaze' and `vivacity of reaction' 
stationed at the sentence's opening. The `amaze' attributed to 
the bodies seems to be provoked by their very maintenance of 
indifference. Whether the amazed can truly be said to be 
indifferent or the indifferent amazed is again a semantic puzzle. 
Neither is deciding the colour of objects in the cylinder 
facilitated by transparency of statement. We are to watch the 
progression of blindness, with particular attention to eye- 
colour: 
And were it possible to follow over a long enough period of 
time eyes blue for preference as being the most perishable 
they would be seen to redden more and more in an ever 
widening glare and their pupils little by little to dilate 
till the whole orb was devoured. " 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 38-39) 
Let us assume `a long enough period of time' and depreciate the 
earlier announcement of the existence of merely one moment, 
otherwise the conditional "were it possible" will never be 
14 In contrast to this progressive perishing of the eye in 
the cylinder, the human eye is, according to Bohr, so adapted to 
`the fundamental properties of the light phenomena' that `no 
instrument is imaginable which is more efficient for its purpose 
than the eye' (Bohr, 1958, p. 8). For Bohr, `this ideal 
refinement of the eye, [... ] suggests that also other organs [".. ] will exhibit a similar adaptation to their purpose' (Bohr, 
1958, p. 8). The desiccation of the skin of the bodies in the 
cylinder intimates the opposite, a calamitous inability to adapt 
to its environment. 
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negotiated. From blue to red is straightforward; but if the 
pupil finally devours the `whole orb', a final state of black 
would seem to be implied. These eyes need to become 
progressively more red and at once progressively more black. Up 
to this point, the searchers have been `devouring with their 
eyes' (Beckett, 1972, p. 29); now the narrator merely inverts 
these terms to give a formulation where the eye itself is 
devoured by the eye. 15 Reckoning skin tones appears simpler: 
. 
the skin of a climber alone on his ladder or in the depths 
of a tunnel glistens all over with the same red-yellow 
glister and even some of its folds and recesses in so far 
is Worstward Ho replicates the confusion as to colour 
pursued in The Lost Ones: 
The eyes. Time to try worsen. Somehow try worsen. 
Unclench. Say staring open. All white and pupil. Dim 
white. White? No. All pupil. Dim black holes. (Beckett, 1983b, p. 27) 
Ill Seen Ill Said too gives `Ample time' for `the iris to be 
lacking. Wholly. As if engulfed by the pupil' (Beckett, 1982, 
Pp. 57-58). What is paradoxically `foreseen' is again the 
reduction of the eyes to `two black blanks': 
Blackness in its might at last. Where no more to be seen. 
Perforce to be seen. (Beckett, 1982, p. 58) 
The narrator in each text must be spared in order to witness the 
universal blindness. To grant such an exemption is as self- 
defeating as C's hope in Theatre II of `living to see the 
extermination of the species' (Beckett, 1986, p. 242). Endgamma 
exchanges this self-defeating loop for the entirely inexplicable, 
Hamm's knowledge of the visual characteristics of his own blinded 
eyes: 
HAMM: Did you never have the curiosity, while I was 
sleeping, to take off my glasses and look at my eyes? 
CLOY: Pulling back the lids? [Pause. ] No. 
HAMM: One of these days I'll show them to you. [Pause. ] It 
seems they've gone all white. (Beckett, 1986, p. 94) 
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as the air enters in. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 40) 
This is in harmony with the light. We begin with `The light. 
Its dimness. Its yellowness' (Beckett, 1972, p. 7), but `the 
sensation of yellow is faintly tinged with one of red' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 38). One modification is not sufficient however; to 
conclude on `red-yellow' is to neglect the `desiccation' of skin 
by climate: 
This desiccation of the envelope robs nudity of much of its 
charm as pink turns grey and transforms into a rustling of 
nettles the natural succulence of flesh against flesh. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 53) 
Red-yellow turns pink which turns grey which, via a detour from 
visual to aural description, incorporates from `nettles' 
overtones of green, or, given the dryness conducive to 
`desiccation' and `rustling', hints of brown. All this is seen 
through a `Light [... ]--that not only dims but blurs into the 
bargain' (Beckett, 1972, p. 38). The description alone achieves 
an accomplished level of obscurity. The `prostration' of many 
`withered ones' (Beckett, 1972, p. 61) reflects the final 
exhausted state of the majority of the narrator's bodies; the 
state of the reader attempting to follow the specifications which 
have laid these bodies low is perhaps analogous. The desolate 
stability of such physical prostration, surely enacted in 
sympathy for the reader's troubles, is, nevertheless, complicated 
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by the additional fact that `Lying down is unheard of in the 
cylinder' (Beckett, 1972, p. 60). 
ii. Following the climbers' code 
A ladder is required in order to get off the ground again. 
The climbers" code should provide hints as to how firstly to find 
a ladder and then, if desired, a niche. Although `None has ever 
been known to seek out a niche from below' (Beckett, 1972, p. 55), 
the narrator is able to speak of a grounded climber's `desired 
niche' (Beckett, 1972, p. 56) and, of course, the ladders are in 
demand because `The purpose of the ladders is to convey the 
searchers to the niches' (Beckett, 1972, p. 10). Without 
unravelling this controversy further, a new problem arises. 
Locating the spot to set down a ladder so that a niche will be 
at the top of it is an intricate business: 
Floor and ceiling bear no sign or mark apt to serve as a 
guide. The feet of the ladders pitched always at the same 
points leave no trace. The same is true of the skulls and 
fists dashed against the walls. Even did such marks exist 
the light would prevent their being seen. The climber 
making off with his ladder to plant it elsewhere relies 
largely on feel. He is seldom out by more than a few 
centimetres and never by more than a metre at most because 
, 
of the way the niches are disposed. "" 
is It is difficult to envisage how this safeguard operates 
unless it implies that no gap between the niches is greater than 
two metres. Yet other data makes this claim surprising. The 
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(Beckett, 1972, pp. 55-56) 
If the ladders are `pitched always at the same point' even to be 
`out by [... ] a few centimetres' should be impossible. The 
surface of the wall and floor is entirely undifferentiated, for 
the striking of heads, fists or ladders against it fails to 
effect any indentation. Yet feeling the surface helps. The 
climber `relies largely on-feel', except when he relies upon the 
`guide', of which there had previously been none: 
There does none the less exist a north in the guise of one 
of the vanquished or better one of the women vanquished or 
better still the woman vanquished. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 56) 
When the description is perfected to the narrator's satisfaction, 
it is altered: `She is the north' (Beckett, 1972, p. 57). `To one 
bent for once on taking his bearings she may be of help' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 57); indeed, she is `so often taken for a 
distribution of the niches is described thus: 
In the upper half of the wall disposed quincuncially for the 
sake of harmony a-score of niches some connected by tunnels. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 17) 
The size of the mural area across which these niches are 
distributed is 400 square metres, that is, the upper half of the 
cylinder wall, which in total is 800 square metres (Beckett, 
1972, p. 16). It is not possible to locate twenty niches across 
a 400 square metre area so that no niche is more than two metres 
away from another. An average distribution would locate one 
niche every twenty square metres. The `irregular quincunxes' in 
which the niches are disposed are, furthermore, `roughly ten 
metres in diameter' (Beckett, 1972, p. 11). Some niches must 
therefore be not less than five metres apart. 
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guide' (Beckett, 1972, p. 62). The frequency is either `once' or 
`often'. North is `She rather than some other among the 
vanquished because of her greater fixity' (Beckett, 1972, p. 57). 
The position of some other vanquished, merely `stricken rigid' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 31) or `motionless' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17), must 
be dangerously subject to fluctuation. The `greater fixity' of 
the woman vanquished (Beckett, 1972, p. 57) wins out against even 
the `heightened fixity of the motionless' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17) 
attributed to her rivals. That `None has even been known to seek 
out a niche from below' (Beckett, 1972, p. 55) is a statement 
lacking harmony with the described use of this pole: 
For the climber averse to avoidable acrobatics a given niche 
may lie so many paces or metres to east or west of the woman 
vanquished without of course his naming her thus or 
otherwise even in his thoughts. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 57) 
The rule of circulation in the zone of ladder-carriers, however, 
declares that movement must be 'at all times eddywise' lest life 
in the cylinder `become untenable' (Beckett, 1972, p. 27). The 
carrier is not permitted to proceed either `east or west' 
according to convenience (Beckett, 1972, p. 57). To base one's 
calculations upon this fixed point while guarding against 
thinking of it as a guide is within the rules of cylinder, 
despite its evident peculiarity. 
The services of a ladder must be obtained, before one's 
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thoughts may practically turn to niches. As the `ladders are 
[... ] in great demand' (Beckett, 1972, p. 10), despite the 
wavering of belief in the tunnel-exit theory, a system of queues 
operates. one's turn at climbing a ladder arrives when the 
preceding body has both ascended and descended: 
All rests on the rule-against mounting the ladder more than 
one at a time. It remains taboo therefore to the climber 
waiting at its foot until such time as his predecessor has 
regained the ground. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 22) 
Should the exit be found, the next in line would never be allowed 
to follow the escapee. But although `All rests' on this rule, 
`there is no question of its applying without restriction' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 22). Permission to break the rule is not 
grounded upon the possibility of discovering the way out, 
however, but on the temptation to engross the ladder beyond a 
certain time-limit. Should provision not be made for this 
offence by the climber and should `others [... ] follow his 
example' the consequences would be dire: 
the spectacle would finally be offered of one hundred and 
eight-five searchers less the vanquished committed for all 
time to the ground. Not to mention the intolerable presence 
of properties serving no purpose. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 22-23) 
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The exceptional ability of the vanquished to leave the ground 
while all ladders are out of commission is not enlarged upon. 
What is crucial is that an `intolerable' state of purposelessness 
be ruled out by a new rule: 
It is therefore understood that after a certain interval 
difficult to assess but unerringly timed by all the ladder 
is again available meaning at the disposal in the same 
conditions of him due next to climb easily recognizable by 
his position at the head of the queue and so much the worst 
for the abuser. The situation of this latter having lost 
his ladder is delicate indeed and seems to exclude a priori 
his ever returning to the ground. Happily sooner or later 
he succeeds in doing so thanks to a further provision giving 
priority at all times to descent over ascent. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 23) 
The "priority at all times' of `descent over ascent' does not 
apply when the user of the ladder exceeds that mysterious 
`interval' of time which is at once `difficult to assess' and 
`unerringly timed by all'. If `all' time it correctly, this must 
include the abuser of the ladder who errs in his timing of it. 
His crime is the result of `a temporary derangement of his inner 
timepiece easy to understand and therefore to forgive' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 26). The body `due next to climb', and hence offended 
against, would be `easily recognizable by his position at the 
head of the queue' (Beckett, 1972, p. 23) but for the rule that 
it is only at this point that he may forego the ladder and so not 
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climb. It is climbing too soon, however, that is considered the 
most serious infringement of the climbers' code. Punishment for 
engrossing the ladder does not approach 
the fury vented on the wretch with no better sense than to 
climb before his time and yet whose precipitancy one would 
have thought quite as understandable and consequently 
forgivable as the converse excess. This is indeed strange. 
But what is at stake is the fundamental principle forbidding 
ascent more than one at a time the repeated violation of 
which would soon transform the abode into a pandemonium. 
Whereas the belated return to the ground hurts finally none 
but the laggard himself. 
- 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 26-27) 
The `principle forbidding ascent more than one at a time' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 26), which began as the `taboo' upon which `All 
rests' (Beckett, 1972, p. 22), temporarily weakens into a rule 
concerning which there is `no question of its applying without 
restriction' (Beckett, 1972, p. 22) but re-emerges at last as 
`fundamental' to preserving the abode from pandemonium (Beckett, 
1972, p. 26). Breaking this rule, by contrast, merely militates 
against the `intolerable' (Beckett, 1972, p. 23). Keeping this 
rule is 'fundamental', but always keeping it is `intolerable'. 
The identity of the body guilty of an infraction against the 
climbers' code is entirely dependent upon that fabulous interval 
which is `difficult to assess but unerringly timed by all' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 23). A body's attempt-to keep the ladder 
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beyond this period defines it as a `laggard' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 27) deserving to have its ladder removed; to remove or climb 
a ladder thus in service before this same period comes to an end, 
defines another body as a `wretch' upon which furies are to be 
vented in revenge for `precipitancy' (Beckett, 1972, p. 26). 
These two infringements of the code are only possible as the 
result of errors in calculating the correct interval, that is, 
in fact, `unerringly timed by all' (Beckett, 1972, p. 23). 
Prior to gaining a chance to abuse the rules of ladder use, 
the bodies must succeed in choosing a queue. Strict rules of 
conduct apply here also. Only one inspection of the available 
queues is permitted; the indecisive are then obliged to decide 
their preference: 
Some could [... ] revolve through thousands of degrees before 
settling down-to wait were it not for the rule forbidding 
them to exceed a single circuit. Any attempt to elude it 
is quelled by the queue nearest to the point of full circle 
and the culprit compelled to join its ranks since obviously 
the right to turn back is denied him too. That a full round 
should be authorized is eloquent of the tolerant spirit 
which in the cylinder-tempers discipline. 17 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 48-49) 
17 Such tempering of discipline with licence recalls 
Leibniz's desire to discover `the means of obtaining as much 
variety as possible, but with the greatest order possible', an 
end which is equivalent, Leibniz contends, to `obtaining as much 
perfection as possible' (Leibniz, 1973, §58, p. 188). See the 
Appendix at the end of this thesis for further elaboration of 
this reading. 
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Traditional reckonings put the number of `degrees' in a complete 
revolution at three hundred and sixty rather than the `thousands' 
feared by the narrator (Beckett, 1972, p. 48). Arsene in Watt, 
for example, considers that 360 different degrees are the limit 
even for a `desperate man': 
[ 
... 
] faster and faster through the grey air and further and 
further away, in any one no matter which of the three 
hundred and sixty directions open to a desperate man of 
average ability [... ]. 
(Beckett, 1976, p. 47) 
Beyond such quibbles, however, a further rule controlling entry 
to the zone of queues and ladders must be considered: 
access to the climbers' reserve" is authorized only when 
one of them leaves it to rejoin the searchers of the arena 
or exceptionally those of the intermediate zone. 
1° The curious nature of this `climbers' reserve' should be 
acknowledged. Minor difficulties enter at the point of the 
zone's definition: `All along the wall therefore a belt about one 
metre wide is reserved for the carriers. To this zone those also 
are confined who wait their turn to climb' (Beckett, 1972, p. 27). 
Neither `carriers' nor those `who wait their turn to climb' are 
quite the `climbers' for whom the zone is reserved (Beckett, 
1972, p. 27). More importantly, `It is curious to note the 
presence within this belt of a certain number of sedentary 
searchers sitting or standing against the wall' (Beckett, 1972, 
P-28). We might also like to notice here the additional presence 
`both sitting and standing' of `four vanquished out of five', 
despite the concession that `They may be walked on without their 
reacting' (Beckett, 1972, p. 29). This area `reserved for the 
climbers', comprises `an outer belt roughly one metre wide [... ] 
and strange to say favoured by most of the sedentary and 
vanquished' (Beckett, 1972, p. 43). Quite how this belt maintains its status as the climbers' reservation while under such 
profligate occupation is not explained. 
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(Beckett, 1972, p. 44) 
Entry cannot be made before a departure. The attempted 
`infringement of this rule' is a contingency the narrator has 
foreseen: 
While infringement of this rule is rare it does none the 
less occur as when for example a particularly nervous 
searcher can no longer resist the lure of the niches and 
tries to steal in among the climbers without the warrant of 
a departure. Whereupon he is unfailingly ejected by the 
queue nearest to the point of trespass and the matter goes 
no further. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 44) 
Only one obstacle remains to, the happy functioning of these 
rules. The narrator has previously taken great pains to 
emphasize the inability of any searcher to recognize any other 
searcher. We have learnt that `Whether relatives near and far 
or friends in varying degrees many in theory are acquainted', " 
but 'The gloom and press make recognition difficult' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 13). Again: 
Press and gloom make recognition difficult. Man and wife 
are strangers two paces apart to mention only this most 
intimate of all bonds. 
19 It might be thought that `relatives' and `friends' are in practice, rather than `in theory', `acquainted' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 13). 
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(Beckett, 1972, pp. 35-36). 
Recognition may not be forthcoming even during `the work of love' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 53), which presumably requires a proximity even 
greater than the `two paces apart' cited above as the `most 
intimate of all bonds' (Beckett, 1972, p. 36): 
Even man and wife may sometimes be seen in virtue of the 
laws of probabilities to come together again in this way 
without their knowledge. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 53-54) 
And yet the searchers forming the queue `nearest to the point of 
full circle' (Beckett, 1972, p. 48) are charged to recognize and 
thereafter pounce upon any body attempting to transgress the one 
circuit rule. All other searchers whose point of entry was 
different, must be permitted to complete their circuit unseized 
by every other queue. These creatures are considered capable of 
forgetting the lulls which are analogous `to the end of a world' 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 54-55), 3° but not the identity of a potential 
violater of the single circuit rule. That the twice repeated 
`gloom and press make recognition difficult' (Beckett, 1972, 
P. 13) is not a fact the narrator considers worthy of mention with 
regard to the assumed infallibility of this rule. No time limit 
applies to the completion of the circuit; when the tourer returns 
20 According to the narrator, `Irregular intervals of such length separate these lulls that for forgetters the likes of these each is the first' (Beckett, 1972, p. 54). Being the first 
of its kind for `forgetters', each lull should have no `likes'. 
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to the crucial point of entry,, every member of the nearest queue 
may have changed. The rules demand that he is still recognized. 
Furthermore, every queue must take note of any departure from the 
climbers' zone at any point, no matter how distant, and upon this 
information consider a new entrant `authorized' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 44). When the omniscience they do not possess informs them 
that no departure has taken place, they know that any new entrant 
is an unwarranted interloper, whereupon it is their duty to 
ensure `he is unfailingly ejected' (Beckett, 1972, p. 44). 
A second opinion on the character of the climbers' code may 
be instructive. For Dearlove, the ladder laws are rather better 
defined than the searchers themselves: 
Whereas the bodies remain relatively indistinct and 
impersonal, referred to as only `bodies' or lost `ones, ' the 
rules for the use of ladders are described in detail. 
(Dearlove, 1982, p. 133) 
Unfortunately, these detailed rules cannot work unless the 
`indistinct' bodies can be differentiated and identified. 
Dearlove nevertheless finds that `The laws themselves are simple, 
logical, and consistent' (Dearlove, 1982, p. 136). What ever they 
are, to agree at last with a verbal formulation of the narrator, 
they are not that. 
iii. Reckonings with the population 
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During the delineation of the laws of ladder use, the 
narrator points out that such laws are irrelevant to the 
operations of two categories of lost one: 
The sedentary call for no special remark since only the 
ladders can wean them from their fixity. The vanquished are 
obviously in no way concerned. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 52) 
If the ladders could not `wean' the sedentary `from their 
fixity', the narrator's disinclination to accord them Any 
`special remark' on the subject of the ladder laws would be more 
readily understandable. As might be expected, the vanquished 
too, who `are obviously in no way concerned' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 52), display their complete indifference to the ladders by 
climbing them: 
They may wait their turn at the foot of the ladders and when 
it comes ascend to the niches or simply leave the ground. 
They may crawl blindly in the tunnels in search of nothing. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 31) 
The vanquished may behave in a manner indistinguishable from any 
other class of searcher. The sorting of the lost ones into the 
Conceptual categories provided by a stable taxonomy is a 
endeavour made arduous by the narrator's complete inability to 
maintain any clear distinctions between his bodies: 
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Seen from a certain angle these bodies are of four kinds. 
Firstly those perpetually in motion. Secondly those who 
sometimes pause. Thirdly those who short of being driven 
of f never stir from the coign they have won and when driven 
off pounce on the first free one that offers and freeze 
again. That is not quite accurate. For if among these 
sedentary the need to climb is dead it is none the less 
subject to strange resurrections. The quidam then quits his 
post in search of a free ladder or to join the nearest or 
shortest queue. " 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 13-14) 
Allied with other specifications, the results so far are not 
auspicious. During a lull there is an `abeyance of all motion 
among the bodies' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17); consequently, there is 
no class of bodies which could quite be said to be `perpetually 
in motion' (Beckett, 1972, p. 13). The `perpetual' should not be 
subject to exceptions. All bodies placed in the first category, 
therefore, can also join the ranks of the second group, `those 
who sometimes pause' (Beckett, 1972, p. 13). Members of the third 
category have `won' a `coign' from which they may yet be `driven 
off' (Beckett, 1972, p. 13). As they are subject to being thus 
`driven off', their ability to `never stir' cannot be maintained 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 13). These pouncing sedentary may further 
violate their charge to remain in place `short of being driven 
21 It is debatable whether these comments comprise anything 
other than an according of `special remark' to the sedentary and 
their use of the ladders, an operation considered uncalled for 
some moments earlier. 
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off' from their unwon won coign (Beckett, 1972, p. 13), for the 
post may voluntarily be `quit' without interference from another 
body in favour of the ladders once more (Beckett, 1972, p. 14). 22 
Non-movement will not do to define the sedentary. Another 
distinction is to be considered: 
The fact is that these sort of semi-sages among whom all 
ages are to be admired from old age'to infancy inspire in 
those still fitfully fevering if not a cult at least a 
certain deference. They cling to this as to a homage due 
to them and are morbidly susceptible to the least want of 
consideration. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 28) 
Those merely `fitfully fevering' are to defer to the ascetic 
deliverance of those whose indifference reaches the level of 
being 
`morbidly susceptible' to behaviour counter to their 
wishes. The very basis of the distinction is incorporated into 
similarity. Classification of the fourth group, the vanquished, 
is again grounded on movement and its absence: 
normally abandonment freezes them both in space and in their 
pose whether standing or sitting as a rule profoundly bowed. 
It is this makes it possible to tell them from the sedentary 
devouring with their eyes in heads dead still each body as 
22 The `coign' in Le Depeupleur is a mere `place' (Beckett, 
1970a, p. 12). Yet, if a relationship can be claimed to the 
French 'coin', the circular base of a cylinder should not be 
suspected of harbouring any corners either to be `won' or `quit' 
by the sedentary (Beckett, 1972, pp. 13-14). 
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it passes by. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 31) 
Yet, as we have learned, the vanquished may climb the ladders, 
an option taxing for the securely frozen. Furthermore, the 
vanquished, allegedly distinguished from the moving unmoving 
sedentary by their identically incomplete non-movement, `may 
stray unseeing through the throng indistinguishable to the eye 
of flesh from the still unrelenting' (Beckett, 1972, p. 31). As 
the sedentary are found to persist with `devouring with their 
eyes' (Beckett, 1972, p. 31), perhaps the key to discrimination 
is to be located in the advantage of `unseeing' accorded to the 
vanquished (Beckett, 1972, p. 31). Indeed, `Eyes cast down or 
closed signify abandonment and are confined to the vanquished' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 30). Inexplicably, however, among the rabble 
of common searchers `The eyes are seldom raised' (Beckett, 1972, 
P. 55). Neither is it the exclusive prerogative of the sedentary 
to partake of a `devouring with their eyes' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 31); the narrator turns again to `the searchers in the arena' 
and their interest in the 'climbers' territory': 
When weary of searching among the throng they turn towards 
this zone it is only. to skirt with measured tread its 
imaginary edge devouring with their eyes its occupants. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 29) 
This devouring must presumably be accomplished by the same eyes 
that 
`are seldom raised' (Beckett, 1972, p. 55). The state of a 
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searcher's eyes and his passion for the ladders are equally 
unstable, for `The spent eyes may have fits of the old craving 
just as those who having renounced the ladder suddenly take to 
it again' (Beckett, 1972, pp. 31-32). The narrator is driven by 
such evidence of intolerable vacillation to inaugurate the 
inspired sub-category of the `ill-vanquished': 
the ill-vanquished may at long intervals and with each 
relapse more briefly revert to the state of the sedentary 
who in their turn count a few chronic waverers prone-to 
succumb to the ladder again while remaining dead to the 
arena. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 34) 
Yet the sedentary are said to be `Dead to the ladders to all 
intents and purposes' (Beckett, 1972, p. 28). It is the group 
superior in the hierarchy of indifference to searching of any 
kind, the vanquished, who are yet to be found roaming the arena, 
the temptation towards which is `Dead' in the inferior sedentary. 
No system of classification, whether based upon the need to 
frequent the ladders or to search, the position of eyes up or 
down, the freezing of position or a persistence of movement, will 
serve to organize the behaviour found in the cylinder. One 
general postulate only emerges from the morass of contradictory 
information: 
one has only to suppose the need to search no less 
resurrectable than that of the ladder and those eyes to all 
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appearances for ever cast down or closed possessed of the 
strange power suddenly to kindle again [... ]. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 14-15) 
One learns to suppose that every state which can be attributed 
to the bodies may be converted into its opposite. As stated, the 
controversy as to the way out being by means of trapdoor or 
tunnel is similarly infected by chronic wavering. The sub- 
division between acolytes of trapdoor and those of tunnel cannot 
be maintained for `Conversion is frequent either way' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 18). But neither can the division between believers and 
non-believers in the existence of any exit be assumed, for `Those 
who no longer believe so are not immune from believing so again' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 18). Even the heathen are chronic waverers in 
their disbelief. 
No classifier seeking to maintain stable categories can 
operate under this state of contingency. Emendation, refinement 
and conceptual overlaps mar each attempt at imposing a workable 
systematic taxonomy. " This has one further troublesome 
consequence. The population of the cylinder is calculated in 
proportion to the number of vanquished it contains. For this 
operation, the vanquished join forces to be the pole and guide, 
rather than the role being awarded exclusively to the rather 
23 For a taxonomy to function, as Priest notes, its 
categories must be `mutually exhaustive, and, particularly, 
mutually exclusive' (Priest, 1987, p. 86). When the bodies of one 
category display the characteristics which define another group, 
as each of the four groups does in The Lost ones, the 
classification system has, by definition, broken down. 
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unjustly favoured `woman vanquished' selected to be `north' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 56). The very existence of the bodies of 
categories one to three depends upon the number who can be 
counted as vanquished: 
may it suffice'to state that at this moment of time to the 
nearest body in spite of the press and gloom the first are 
twice as many as the second who are three times as many as 
the third who are four times as many as the fourth namely 
five vanquished in all. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 35) 
An earlier statement as to the number of vanquished was not 
lacking the customary measure of equivocation; " now, however, 
we have a declared number upon which to base all calculations. 
Working from the base of five, the population of the cylinder 
must be securely and mathematically known: four times five 
vanquished yields twenty sedentary; three times twenty sedentary 
gives sixty bodies of the second rank; two times this sixty 
24 Previously, we were informed: 
Eyes cast down or closed signify abandonment and are 
confined to the vanquished. These precisely to be counted 
on the fingers of one hand are not necessarily still. (Beckett, 1972, pp. 30-31). 
The `fingers of one hand' are not necessarily five. Of fingers, 
indeed, there are usually four. In Beckett's `The Image', 
however, we read of `four fingers including the thumb because one 
is missing not the thumb' (Beckett, 1990a, p. 32), a formula which 
would yield, were the missed digit returned, five fingers after 
all. Yet, a further implication of the phrase `These precisely 
to be counted on the fingers of one hand are not necessarily 
still' (Beckett, 1972, pp. 30-31) is that these bodies are `not 
necessarily still' to be counted as equivalent to the unknown 
number of `fingers of one hand'. 
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entails the existence of one hundred and twenty bodies within the 
first class. Total population in numbers is the sum of 5+ 20 
+ 60 + 120 or 205. The narrator's preference to speak in round 
numbers leads to a substitute figure of 200, but this minor 
modification can be borne. What causes difficulties is that the 
base number of vanquished is not constant. At the `moment of 
time' chosen by the narrator to introduce this method for 
computing the population of the cylinder, the vanquished number 
five. This has not always been the case: `In the beginning', we 
are told, `all roamed without respite' (Beckett, 1972, p. 34). 
At this moment, all bodies conform to the definition of the first 
category, `those perpetually in motion' (Beckett, 1972, p. 13). 
Accordingly, the base number of vanquished must be zero. The 
formula is now (4 x0= 0)+(3 x0= 0)+(2 x0= 0) and gives a 
grand total of zero. In the beginning when all bodies roamed, 
there were no bodies. This beginning is also simultaneous with 
the end of all. Elevation of these non-existent searchers to the 
status of vanquished is gradual: 
all [... ] roamed a vast space of time impossible to measure 
until, a first came to a standstill followed by a second and 
so on. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 34-35) 
As vanquished are selected from this entirely absent population, 
the population must change instantaneously with this increase in 
the foundation group. When one body enters the crucial category, 
the formula is reorganized as (4 x1= 4)+(3 x4= 12)+(2 x 12 
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= 24) and upon the instant 40 bodies are conjured into existence. 
Upon a second vanquished, the cylinder-must obey the mathematics 
of (4 x2= 8)+(3 x8 '= 24)+(2 x 24 = 48) and increase its 
population to 80. These considerations apply to the other 
categories also. Upon elevation from first class to second, one 
body is subtracted- from the number of the first as it is no 
longer of that class, but, is replaced according to the stated 
ratio by two entirely new bodies. As there must be twice as many 
bodies in the first as in the second class, every departure from 
the first class miraculously serves to swell its numbers by one: 
as one goes, two arrive. Any movement of bodies between 
classifications must be accompanied by this entirely inexplicable 
adjustment in population within the cylinder. And the bodies 
constantly switch categories: 
experience shows that it is possible to graduate from one 
to three skipping two and from one to four skipping two or 
three or both and from two or four skipping three. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 34) 
Bodies must be destroyed and created equally rapidly. These are 
bodies which, as the narrator states, `endlessly come and go' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 35), into and out of nowhere. " 
25 Beckett does have a history of such conjuring tricks. 
In Watt, the appearance and disappearance of a succession of 
servants is equally mysterious, as is the whereabouts of the lady 
and gentleman who initially appear on Mr Hackett's bench. All 
vanish from the narrative. Christy, hinny and cart disappear just as completely from the road of All That Fall. The narrator 
of How It Is calls into being and dismisses a procession of 
millions within several sentences. The title of the French 
version of The Lost Ones is recalled: 
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Moving between the ranks `In the other direction", are those 
`ill-vanquished' which may `briefly revert to the state of the 
sedentary' and the `chronic waverers' of the sedentary who 
vacillate between groups three and two (Beckett, 1972, p. 34). 
The sub-category of the `ill-vanquished' provokes special 
problems. Perhaps being neither properly vanquished nor 
sufficiently of the sedentary to decisively change category, they 
could be counted as equivalent to some fraction of a vanquished. 
Upon a serious relapse of one of the five vanquished to the 
status of ill-vanquished, that body might count as 0.3 of a 
vanquished rather than scoring a complete 1. The formula then 
states (4 x 4.3 = 17.2) +(3x17.2=51.6)+(2 x51.2=103.2). 
Because of the vagaries of this ill-vanquished, four fifths of 
both a perfectly innocent sedentary and a lower searcher must be 
abolished. One member of the second rank too will have to lose 
two-fifths of himself, both legs perhaps, in order to satisfy the 
sums. 
- 
There is this additional evidence to consider when the 
difficult reckoning of those responsible for the greatest 
violence in the cylinder is next undertaken. The narrator makes 
clear in his statement of the population formula that it is 
accurate only `to the nearest body' (Beckett, 1972, p. 35). 
Fractions of lost one are to be rounded up and made thereby to 
disappear from the reckoning. To collate or round up evidence 
[... ] Beckett's title is a reference to the famous verse 
from Lamartine's `Loneliness [Isolement]': `A single being 
is absent, and all is depopulated [depeupld]. ' (Henning, 1988, p. 217, n. 3) 
Depopulation is the explicit prerogative of the narrator in HgM 
I9-; in The Lost Ones, waves of depopulation are a repercussion 
of the loss of any member from the category of the vanquished. 
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of the possible existence of such pieces of lost one, however, 
will oppose their visibility to the disappearance preferred by 
the narrator. The strategy of rounding up permits both opposing 
results. 
As the number of bodies changes in accordance with the 
number of vanquished, `Relatives' are indeed `well represented' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 35). All figures submitted as the population 
of the cylinder are entirely relative. Each is drawn from a 
proportional calculation, founded on a `constant' which is 
subject to rapid alteration. As members of the vanquished 
decline to stay `vanquished for good and all' (Beckett, 1972, 
Pp. 33-34), the population cannot remain stable. When `the eyes 
suddenly start to search afresh' (Beckett, 1972, p. 32), some 
power must undertake a massacre within the cylinder; when 
-'for 
no clear reason they as suddenly close again or the head falls' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 32), re-population must be instigated just as 
suddenly. All calculations concerning the amount of space 
available to each body must also be revised upon each fluctuation 
of the population. The assessment `One body per square metre' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 13) cannot survive as absolute: it is a 
judgement relative to the number of bodies. Such are the 
difficulties attendant upon the peculiar task of counting how 
many `lost ones' can be found. 
iv. All strange away: factual extractions 
A failure to follow applies to each item in the text of The 
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Lost Ones and might also describe the experience of the reader. 
Like Belacqua of More Pricks Than Kicks, the narrator displays 
`a strong weakness for oxymoron' (Beckett, 1970b, p. 41). 2' A 
comparable condition is displayed within the opening remarks of 
The Unnamable: 
These few general remarks to begin with. What am I to do, 
what shall I do, what should I do, in my situation, how 
proceed? By aporia pure and simple? Or by affirmations and 
negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later? 
Generally speaking. There must be other shifts. Otherwise 
it would be quite hopeless. But it is quite hopeless. I 
should mention before going any further, any further on, 
that I say aporia without knowing what it means. Can one 
be ephectic otherwise than unawares? I don't know. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 293) 
26. Self-collapsing constructions are welcomed within this 
early text: 'moving pauses' (Beckett, 1970b, p. 41) give way to 
the protestation `he said Grüss Gott but I dident hear him' (Beckett, 1970b, p. 164). Another effort of the Smeraldina is 
clearly worthy of the narrator of The Lost Ones: upon inspection 
of the dead Belacqua, she feels `a spasm of anxiety, lest there 
should be anything the matter with this corpse that rigor mortis 
had apparently passed over' (Beckett, 1970b, p. 191). Well- 
designed oddities can be collected from many other texts: Still 
refers us to a hand `clenched lightly' on an arm-rest (Beckett, 
1984, p. 184). Worstward Ho can offer `No choice but up if ever 
down' (Beckett, 1983b, p. 17); a source of light `Dim undimmed' (Beckett, 1983b, p. 33) and suspicions concerning the devotion of 
a figure to be seen `forever kneeling', for he has done so only 
`So far' (Beckett, 1983b, p. 18). The essay `An Imaginative 
Work! ' refers us to `cowering skyscraper days' (Beckett, 1983a, 
p. 90). Gorman in The Old Tune laments the precariousness of 
modern building methods: `And on top of all no foundations [... ]' (Beckett, 1986, p. 340). A Piece of Monologue maintains that 
there is `No such thing as none' (Beckett, 1986, p. 426). The 
only thing of which there is certainly none, is what `none' 
itself denotes. 
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Amongst the ideas which can be associated with the `aporia', 
those of the `pure and simple' are an unusual choice. An 
independent connoisseur of philosophical terms catalogues the 
implications of the word in terms peculiarly appropriate to Ih 
Lost Ones: `aporia: with no way out, difficulty, question, 
problem' (Peters, 1967, p. 22). An ability to `proceed' via the 
cultivation of aporia is questionable; more commonly, `aporia' 
signals the occurrence of a disabling contradiction which imposes 
a halt upon proceedings. As the narrator of The Unnamable is 
unaware of the meaning of the term, such subtle equivocations 
around its associations must be the result of a marvellous 
accident. " Simultaneously, the quibbling deliberation is 
provoked and denied: a contradiction not unrelated to the 
workings of the aporia itself. 28 To call up the `ephectic' 
gives similar results, for the word can collapse itself by 
reference to its opposing implications. To `hold' judgement can 
be to suspend, check or refrain from judging; equally, to 'hold' 
can be expanded to insinuate that a judgement is maintained or 
secure. It is a term taken from the Sceptics: hence, it may be 
maintained, the little impersonation of the Sceptic's response 
to all matters epistemological, the `I don't know' which 
knowingly masquerades as a claim of ignorance. All, however, is 
27 As Malone speculates, `Nothing has been left to chance. 
Or is it a happy chance? ' (Beckett, 1959, p. 253). 
28 To supply an example of the problems occasioned by 
aporia while claiming to remain unaware of the significance of 
the term, creates a problem posed in a way disconcertingly 
relevant to the significance of the unknown term. 
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to be done `unawares' also (Beckett, 1959, p. 293). 29 
The narrator of Mercier and Camier knows better what he is 
about in replicating the procedures of his pseudo-counterpart in 
The Lost Ones. The place of meeting for the titular 
`pseudocouple' (Beckett, 1959, p. 299) `had something of the 
maze', a location, like the cylinder, `difficult to egress, for 
one not in its secrets' (Beckett, 1974, p. 9). Argumentative 
infelicities are the primary maze, however. A bicycle, two dogs 
and a 
-ranger are the extra participants required for a major 
philosophical symposium to get under way: 
You see that bicycle? said the ranger. 
I see nothing, said Camier. Mercier, do you see a 
bicycle? 
Is she yours? said the ranger. 
A thing we do not see, said Camier, for whose existence 
we have only your word, how are we to tell if it is ours, 
29 O'Hara can explain the reasoning behind this studied 
inattention towards the `ephectic' and concomitant inability to 
understand the `aporetic'. A particular expertise is displayed 
in this denial of knowledge: 
The reason for this denial is implied when the Unnamable 
asks if one can be ephectic 
- 
if one can suspend judgment - 
otherwise then unawares. Obviously if one is deliberately 
skeptical, if one deliberately suspends judgment as a matter 
of policy, then one's action is in itself a judgment; 
pretending to be skeptical, one has actually committed 
oneself to a belief. Both Beckett and his speakers know 
better than to fall into that trap. 
(O'Hara, 1970, p. 67) 
Such superior philosophical negotiations do not fit comfortably, 
however, with the narrator's claims to ignorance in T 
Unnamable. 
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or another's? 
Why would it be ours? said Mercier. Are these dogs 
ours? No. We see them today for the first time. And you 
would have it that the bicycle, assuming it exists, is ours? 
And yet the dogs are not ours. 
Bugger the dogs, said the ranger. 
But as if to give himself the lie he fell on them with 
stick and boot and drove them cursing from the pagoda. Tied 
together as they still were, by the post-coitus, their 
retreat was no easy matter. For the effort they made to 
escape, acting equally in opposite directions, could not but 
annul each other. They must have greatly suffered. 
He has now buggered the dogs, said Mercier. 
(Beckett, 1974, p. 15) 
The reasoning behind Mercier and Camier's conviction that 
ownership of the dogs is a crucial factor in determining 
ownership of the bicycle is as pleasingly obscure as any 
formulation in The Lost Ones. Sentence structure plays its 
tricks (can dogs curse? ); the order to `Bugger the dogs' is 
ignored by its dispatcher and thereby finally achieved by him. 
It is the unfortunate dogs and their attachment which supplies 
the most important link to the cumulative effect of sentences in 
Beckett's later text. To link the isolated assertions and 
statements of the narrator of The Lost Ones to one another is to 
build-up inconsistencies, contradictions and aporiai. There is 
no hierarchy of authority to which appeal can be made in order 
to accept one assertion and reject its contradictory or 
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inconsistent supplement. Dogs and sentences thus organized 
towards `acting equally in opposite directions' cannot help `but 
annul each other' (Beckett, 1974, p. 15). Like the Unnamable, the 
narrator of The Lost Ones favours `affirmations and negations 
invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later' (Beckett, 1959, 
p. 293). Mercier and Camier prefer the former strategy of 
instantaneous deadlock in their efforts to `annul each other' 
(Beckett, 1974, p. 15). To conclude a `long debate', `they would 
arrive simultaneously at often contrary conclusions and 
simultaneously begin to state them' (Beckett, 1974, p. 17). 
The narrator of The Lost Ones, however, does not choose to 
aid the reader by such explicit reflections upon the 
unworkability of his working method. When trying to follow the 
logical progression of Mercier and Gamier, the reader is warned 
to expect `deviations to right and left and sudden reversals of 
course' (Beckett, 1974, p. 67). `Nor let us', Camier counsels his 
followers, `hesitate to halt, for days and even weeks on end' 
(Beckett, 1974, p. 67) at advertised points of deadlock. The 
reader attempting to abstract secure propositions from the 
equivocations, of the narrator of The unnamable is informed that 
such hopes are `quite hopeless' (Beckett, 1959, p. 293). The 
narrative regime of The Lost ones does not even allow such a 
proposition declaring the insecurity of all propositions to stand 
secure. If all `affirmations and negations' of The Unnamable are 
to be `invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later' (Beckett, 
1959, p. 293), this affirmation must itself be subject sooner or 
later to the general invalidation it prescribes. To allow such 
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formulations to stand in isolation as secure descriptions of 
these texts in their entirety must be at the cost of depreciating 
their self-collapsing construction. Such propositions reproduce 
the logical tangles of the sceptic's thesis concerning the 
impossibility of secure knowledge, a thesis which must presuppose 
a single exception` amidst the universal insecurity of knowledge 
in order' to allow its own claim to stand unassailed by doubt. 
The sceptic, is embroiled in `the standard dialectic of self- 
defeat': 
If no proposition is true, then neither is this universal 
hypothesis about truth. If there is no proposition whose 
truth-value is knowable then this universal thesis about 
knowledge, though may be true, is nevertheless not knowable. 
(Nathan, 1980, p. 116) 
The narrative terms of The Lost ones seem designed to lead its 
readers into structurally identical procedures of self-defeat. 
The simplest, and quickest way to ensure one's defeat by this 
text is to extract selected statements from it to be treated as 
reliable facts about the cylinder system and to decline to take 
into account either the immediate or eventual invalidation of 
these `facts' elsewhere in the same text. The oscillation 
between contradictory terms is arbitrarily halted and one term 
selected as reliable. Via this strategy, unfortunately, one can 
maintain the veracity of an opposite or inconsistent `fact' and 
simultaneously claim equal fidelity to the text of The Lost Ones. 
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Lodging complaints that rival readings are not quite accurate in 
their details is an activity with an inherent tendency to 
misfire: 
Beckett writes of hell; Alvarez calls it purgatory. [... ] 
Kenner gets the image right: the cylinder is `some nether 
hell'; but he too is careless about details (falsely 
describing the vanquished searchers as immobile) [... ]. 
(Graver, 1974, p. 625) 
Rival statements made by the narrator define the vanquished as 
both immobile and mobile.. Neither description is false, although 
neither, either, is true. The combination of these embattled 
details gives the result that the vanquished are both mobile and 
immobile, which might be a satisfying conclusion to the 
controversy if it did not mar both attempts at providing their 
defining feature. When such a little detail is not amenable to 
determination, the possibility of describing the cylinder in its 
totality, quite as if every detail were determined, whether as 
`hell', 'nether-hell' or `purgatory', must be similarly doubted. 
Liberals reckoning of the number of inhabitants of the cylinder 
and their respective activities is accurate for so long as other 
inferences implicit in the narrator's assertions are discounted: 
20 of the cylinder dwellers sit (4 x 5), 60 pause (3 x 20), 
and 120 are in motion (2 x 60). 
(Libera, 1983, p. 147) 
306 
At the time, however, when `all roamed without respite' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 34) the same formula gives forth an entirely different 
result. Neither can the 20 sedentary sit when described as 
climbing ladders, or the 120 remain in motion upon the universal 
immobility demanded by the narrator during a lull. According to 
Zurbrugg, `individual lost ones find that their world is not yet 
bare as they suddenly remember "some unthinkable past"' 
(Zurbrugg, 1988, p. 267); to argue that to the lost ones `each 
lull seems the first', Brienza needs to establish in 
contradistinction to Zurbrugg that `there is no continuity of 
time and therefore no memory in the cylinder' (Brienza, 1977, 
p. 151). One might enquire also how an `unthinkable' past might 
enter thought as a memory, or how, lacking memory of any kind, 
the elaborate rules of the cylinder might be remembered. 
Further, as Cohn argues, we have no knowledge of any such mental 
states: 
The narrator never intrudes into the consciousness of any 
of these 205 people, but his clinical descriptions reveal 
suffering as pervasive. With parchment-dry skin, the 
cylinder-dwellers are tortured by touch, and the lack of 
space forces constant contact. 
(Cohn, 1973, p. 260) 
Neither can we be sure, however, that there are 205 people; at 
the point when the population formula states that there are no 
inhabitants, their sufferings must be somewhat less pervasive. 
The lack of space ýis then rectified also. Upon occasion, Brienza 
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finds it necessary to insinuate tiny modifications into the 
statements of the narrator to rescue them from their own 
inconsistency: 
The gradual, almost imperceptible, decline of life in Tjlg 
Lost Ones proceeds with a pace as slow but as inexorable as 
that in Endgame ( 
... 
]. Little by little the desire to climb 
is extinguished, but this is `[a] languishing happily 
unperceived because of its slowness and the resurgences that 
make up for it in part 
... 
' (15). Just as slow is the shift 
from belief in an escape via the tunnels to belief in escape 
via an upper trapdoor: `... of these two persuasions the 
former is declining in favour of the latter but in a manner 
so desultory and slow and of course with so little effect 
on the comportment of either sect that to perceive it one 
must be in the secret of the gods' (19). Little by little 
the strong light of the cylinder produces the `slow 
deterioration of vision'; the eyes are destroyed `[a]nd all 
by such slow and insensible degrees to be sure as to pass 
unperceived even by those most concerned 
... 
' (39). In 
short, the story is based on the premise that `here all 
should die with so gradual and to put it plainly so 
fluctuant a death as to escape the notice even of a visitor' 
(18). This idea determines the form of the story. 
(Brienza, 1977, p. 151) 
In the narrator's words, the perceived languishing of the desire 
to climb is `happily unperceived' (Beckett, 1972, p. 15); the 
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recognized shift in belief between the tunnel- and trapdoor-exit 
is so imperceptible that `to perceive it one must be in the 
secret of the gods' (Beckett, 1972, p. 19); the perceived 
destruction of the sensory capacity of the eyes is so 
`insensible' as to be `sure [... ] to pass unperceived even by 
those most concerned' (Beckett, 1972, p. 39); the noted and 
notable occurrence of the death of all will `escape the notice 
even of a visitor' (Beckett, 1972, p. 18). All these perceived 
events are described as imperceptible. As the imperceptible is 
patently perceived by the narrator, Brienza revises his 
insistence upon actual imperceptibility to the more reasonable 
diagnosis that each event is `almost imperceptible' (Brienza, 
1977, p. 151). Active contradiction is now averted; yet active 
contradiction is built into the primary text. 'O With regard to 
the languishing of the desire to climb, the narrator points out 
`the inattention of those concerned' (Beckett, 1972, p. 15) just 
as this phenomenon claims his own concern and attention. " The 
'° The narrator of Watt retreats under the pressure of this 
very contradiction concerning the perception of the 
imperceptible: 
And Watt was greatly troubled by this tiny little thing, 
more troubled perhaps than he had ever been by anything, and 
Watt had been frequently and exceedingly troubled, in his 
time, by this imperceptible, no, hardly imperceptible, since 
he perceived it, by this indefinable thing [... ]. (Beckett, 1976, p. 79) 
The narrator of The Lost Ones is not so amenable as to back down 
when confronted by the same contradiction. , In this instance, 
Brienza retreats with logic, but not the primary text, on her 
side. 
'1 From Brienza's citation above, the narrative continues 
on to further conceptual peculiarities: 
and the inattention of those concerned dazed by the passion 
preying on them still or by the state of languor into which 
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transfer of allegiances between tunnel or trapdoor as exit is 
described as `frequent either way' (Beckett, 1972, p. 18) in 
addition to being `so desultory and slow' (Beckett, 1972, p. 19). 
The `strong light of the cylinder' to which Brienza refers 
(Brienza, 1977, p. 151) is also distinguished by `Its dimness' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 7). The notable end of the cylinder which will 
not be noticed is further thought to be `unthinkable' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 60). These inconsistencies themselves are rendered 
imperceptible when criticism makes its selections from the 
narrative while choosing not to perceive the links and inferences 
which seek to put a stop to such inaccurate coherence. 
The interest of The Lost Ones in narrative incoherence is 
indeed undervalued. Kalb ascribes to the text `a persuasive 
weight similar to that of ancestral utterance' (Kalb, 1989, 
p. 134); furthermore, `[... ] The Lost Ones is a relatively 
straightforward tale', related by that bastion of reliability the 
`third-person omniscient narrator' (Kalb, 1989, p. 134). 
Dearlove's trust in the narrator is similarly striking: 
The prose of the first fourteen paragraphs is neither 
ambiguous nor elliptical. It describes a cylinder that can 
be measured, inspected and tested. The narrator speaks as 
imperceptibly they are already fallen. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 15) 
A further condition operating `imperceptibly' is nevertheless 
perceived. The `concerned' bodies, as well as the narrator, are 
also inattentive to their own condition. In order to be `dazed', 
`passion' and `languor' become functionally identical states, in 
addition to being opposites. 
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a scientist about a controlled and knowable system. 
(Dearlove, 1982, p. 138) 
The manuscript of the first fourteen paragraphs or sections of 
Le Ddpeupleur begun in October 1965 (Admussen, 1979, p. 35), the 
French original which was translated as The Lost Ones, was 
abandoned temporarily by its author around June 1966 (Admussen, 
1979, p. 127) `because of its intractable complexities' (Beckett, 
cited in Admussen, 1979, p. 22; p. 39). In Dearlove's analysis, 
the major part of The Lost ones remained insufficiently 
`intractable', despite being laid aside for that just that 
reason: 
Although Beckett had written the first fourteen paragraphs 
by 1966, it was not until 1970 that he was able to write the 
final paragraph. The differences between these two portions 
of the book suggest that Beckett sought to counterbalance 
the analytic statements of his initial paragraphs with a 
conclusion which would return mystery and uncertainty to the 
cylinder and to The Lost Ones. 
(Dearlove, 1982, p. 138) 
For Dearlove, it is `the primary function of the final section 
of The Lost Ones [... ] to make the whole work problematic, 
(Dearlove, 1982, p. 138). But problems, mystery and uncertainty, 
what one might term intractability, is endemic throughout the 
whole text. In criticism, however, three localized aspects of 
The Lost ones are granted sole responsibility for any ambiguity 
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the text may possess: the additional fifteenth section with its 
allegedly distinctive descent into equivocation; the occurrences 
of the refrain `if this notion is maintained' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 32; p. 39; p. 60; p. 63); and the narrator's explicit declarations 
that some of his calculations may only be considered 
approximations. To build a case concerning the particular 
difficulties presented by the appended section of The Lost ones, 
Dearlove is obliged to consider the main text exemplary in its 
clarity. This notion cannot be maintained. Henning, similarly, 
argues that `the last paragraph contradicts the normal 
functioning of the cylinder in order to force the end' (Henning, 
1988, p. 219, n. 27). Normality, logical or otherwise, is a scare 
commodity in-The tost ones from its first lines. According to 
Brienza's analysis, it is `The frequent repetition of the phrase 
"if this notion be maintained"" [that] undercuts any authority 
the narrative may have had' (Brienza, 1977, p. 157). The impact 
of the refrain is considerably dissipated upon appreciation of 
the scant degree of reliability that can be accorded to any part 
of the narrative. This phrase does not occur at all until the 
thirty-second page of the narrative as published by John Calder 
in 1972; inconsistencies and blatant contradictions must be 
negotiated from the point of the second sentence. " In order to 
32 Brienza's citation is not quite accurate, at least in 
relation to the John Calder text of 1972: in all four occurrences 
of the phrase, this text reads `if this notion is maintained' (Beckett, 1972, p. 32; p. 39; p. 60; p. 63). 
33 The opening sentence, `Abode where lost bodies roam each 
searching for its lost one' (Beckett, 1972, p. 7) is unusual in 
its logical good order, harbouring only the minor obscurity as 
to what the `lost one' of each lost body actually is. However, 
obscurity cannot count as a contradiction, primarily because it 
is difficult to know how to neatly contradict a statement that 
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throw into relief the disruptive qualities of this refrain, 
Brienza first posits, like Dearlove, `a narrator [... ] who is 
precise on each minute detail' (Brienza, 1977, p. 158). A 
`paradox' thus emerges from the fact that such a narrator is `yet 
ready to call into question the validity of the story as a whole' 
(Brienza, 1977, p. 158). '4 The imputation of the narrator's 
ability to be `precise on each minute detail' (Brienza, 1977, 
p. 158), however, is marred by Brienza's own citation of some of 
his finer approximations: 
He indulges in Latin terms [... ]. But with equal frequency 
he descends to the level of cliche (`roughly speaking, ' `to 
put it mildly, ' `for some reason or other') [... ]. Having 
a large vocabulary with a scientific flavor, the narrator 
strives for precision, but at times the cliched commonplaces 
undercut his accuracy: the lulls are `of varying duration 
I but never exceeding ten seconds or thereabouts' (17). Here 
the `thereabouts' contradicts the finality of the `never, ' 
and the sentence as a whole becomes laughable. 
(Brienza, 1977, p. 156) 
makes no clear assertion. 
" As this calling into question of `the validity of the 
story as a whole' (Brienza, 1977, p. 158) takes place within the 
very story which-calls itself into question, the statement of 
invalidity must be threatened by invalidity itself. Lessness, 
similarly, requires a `Figment' to act as the `dispeller of 
figments' (Beckett, 1984, p. 157); this `Figment' must thus work 
to de-create itself. This self-consuming structure informs Tjjg 
Lost Ones, Lessness, How It Is and The Unnamable. Each can be 
fundamentally destabilized by this variation on the liar paradox. 
See the Conclusion below, Section i. 
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As `cliched commonplaces undercut his accuracy' (Brienza, 1977, 
p. 156), Brienza cannot also have the narrator given over entirely 
to precision, the one required for the delineation of the special 
troubles caused by his saying `if this notion is maintained'. 
The authority of the narrative does not require undercutting by 
any of these devices. An authority and reliability which is 
entirely absent from the narrative of The Lost Ones is awarded 
to the text extraneously, so that we may find strategies to take 
it away again. Such an activity, however, is admirably in tune 
with its text. 
v. A first apergu of allegory 
With this parallel between the difficulties of The Lost ones 
and the troubles involved in their exegesis in mind, the lure of 
the allegory preferred by Brienza is almost irresistible. 
Brienza identifies a `critical consensus that one of the themes 
of the story is frustrated hope' (Brienza, 1977, p. 148). The 
frustration attending the efforts of the -searchers within the 
cylinder applies also to the critical search for secure 
statements concerning the text. According to Brienza: 
the reader is put 
-in the same position as the searcher. 
Just as the searcher must follow intricate, exact rules for 
climbing the ladders with little hope for a way out to the 
stars, so the reader must follow intricate, exact sentences 
with little hope of a way out to meaning. 
(Brienza, 1977, p. 158) 
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The analogy may be broadened towards an allegorical reading: 
The style of the story, from the morphological to the 
structural level, suggests fruitless waiting, futile 
searching, and unsatisfied hoping. Also, if the story 
presents a statement about man's futile search for order and 
meaning in the world, this statement translates easily into 
a comment on the reader's futile search for order and 
meaning in the piece itself. Thus the reader becomes one 
of the searchers trying to find a critical `way out' of the 
cylinder. " 
(Brienza, 1977, p. 148) 
It is perverse, but not arbitrarily so, to identify the possible 
success of this interpretation as the decisive factor in its 
failure. Once this reading is in place, it violates the analogy 
which is its basis, that between the `fruitless waiting, futile 
searching, and unsatisfied hoping' (Brienza, 1977, p. 148) of 
reader and searcher. A meaning for the reader, a `way out' of 
the cylinder, has been installed. A `search for order' which 
should be `futile' (Brienza, 1977, p. 148) if the analogy is to 
be maintained, is no longer so. The reader's ability to find in 
the work `a statement about man's futile search for order and 
's In Kalb's account of the Mabou Mines staged reading of 
The Lost Ones, `the designer Thom Cathcart's admittedly excellent 
idea to seat spectators amphitheater-fashion around the edges of 
a vertical dark-rubber cylinder', had the similar effect of 
`drawing an explicit parallel between the audience and the 
story's characters from the first moment' (Kalb, 1989, p. 136). 
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meaning' (Brienza, 1977, p. 148) immediately establishes the 
`order and meaning', coherence and purpose, that are deemed 
unavailable. The futile search has provided a meaning not only 
for The Lost ones, but also a `statement' about the ultimate 
nature of `the world' (Brienza, 1977, p. 148). The reader must 
escape the'nets of futility and frustration in order to identify 
these two qualities as inescapable features of either The Lost 
Ones or the universe. And it should not be within the power of 
futility to succeed so spectacularly. 
Brienza's allegory readily incorporates the instruction 
offered by Schopenhauer's reflections upon the futility of 
searching and striving. Schopenhauer's opinion of the `will-to- 
live' finds expression in terms appropriate to the disorder of 
activity within the cylinder: 
All push and drive, some plotting and planning, others 
acting; the tumult is indescribable. But what is the 
ultimate aim of it all? [... ] With this evident want of 
proportion between the effort and the reward, the will-to- 
live, taken objectively, appears to us from this point of 
view as a fool, or taken subjectively, as a delusion. 
Seized by this, every living thing works with the utmost 
exertion of its strength for something that has no value. 
But on closer consideration, we shall find here also that 
it is rather a blind urge, an impulse wholly without ground 
and motive. 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 357) 
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The obscurity cultivated in The Lost ones as to the ultimate 
objective of the search is analogous to the explicit basis of 
Schopenhauer's account of `lifeless longing without a definite 
object': 
It is fortunate enough when something to desire and to 
strive for still remains, so that the game may be kept up 
of the constant transition from desire to satisfaction, and 
from that to a fresh desire, the rapid course of which is 
called happiness, the slow course sorrow, showing itself as 
a fearful, life-destroying boredom, a lifeless longing 
without a definite object, a deadening languor. According 
to all. this, the will always knows, when knowledge 
enlightens it, what it wills here and now, but never what 
it wills in general. Every individual act has a purpose or 
end; willing as a whole has no end in view. 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 1, §29, pp. 164-165) 
Thus, perhaps, the information offered by the narrator that `The 
purpose of the ladders is to convey the searchers to the niches' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 10) and the omission thereafter to state the 
purpose of the niches or the search as a whole. Localized 
purposes only can be given; the purpose served by the purposive 
use of the ladders remains unstated. The cylinder's vanquished, 
according to Brienza, attain a Schopenhauerian recognition of the 
ultimate futility and frustration which accompany the activity 
of searching. Renunciation of the search is the proper exit from 
the tumult of the cylinder into `spiritual calm' and `wisdom' 
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(Brienza, 1977, p. 162); the "'vanquished, " those who have given 
up the search, can attain physical and mental rest and thus an 
escape of sorts' (Brienza, - 1977, p. 163). The tempting 
possibility of this `escape', however, signals a new entry into 
searching: 
The goal of the search then becomes the state which the 
vanquished have reached. Paradoxically, though, the way to 
attain this static condition is to give up the desire to 
search, to cease to hope for a way out. 
(Brienza, 1977, p. 162) 
As it is not established in the text of The Lost Ones that the 
lower searchers do aspire to the state of the vanquished, this 
allegorical reading has the double disadvantage of introducing 
an order to the search which is not articulated by the text, as 
well as being liable to a self-defeating loop. If it is upon the 
cessation of hope that one's hopes are realized, it would seem 
sensible for the searchers to hope for the cessation of their 
hoping. To hope for or aspire to the cessation of hope, however, 
is a self-collapsing disposition. " The paradox acknowledged by 
Brienza has its origin in Schopenhauer's own statement of the 
desirability of achieving a state untormented by desires. This, 
36 It is also one of Beckett's favourite paradoxes; as the 
narrator of Murphy confides, `There seems really very little hope 
for Neary, he seems doomed to hope unending' (Beckett, 1963, 
p. 113). With its `Vain longing that vain longing go' (Beckett, 
1983b, p. 36), Worstward Ho courts a similar impasse. As How it 
15 `screams abandon hope', it detects a `gleam of hope' that this 
might be achieved (Beckett, 1964, p. 52). It should also detect 
a self-defeating structure. 
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the 'most desirable state possible, cannot be desired without 
succumbing to self-defeat. Further, in Schopenhauer's account, 
it remains unexplained how the `peace of blessed nothingness' 
achieved upon renunciation of the will-to-live can be experienced 
as `infinitely preferable' (Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 640) 
when no part of consciousness remains to register such an 
experience or preference. " The `peace' which Schopenhauer 
recommends and the final state of the cylinder, precisely the 
point where such peace might enter in, each present ends which 
define themselves as `unthinkable' (Beckett, 1972, p. 60). 
This particular variant upon the allegory of `Reader as 
Searcher' (Brienza, 1977, p. 148) and the allegory itself, 
replicate the structure of sceptical self-defeat, for knowledge 
37 As Victor recognizes in Eleutheria, `If I was dead, I 
wouldn't know I was dead. That's the only thing I have against 
death' (Beckett, 1996, pp. 149-150). Moran has a solution to this 
problem which otherwise threatens to spoil the `unspeakable 
satisfactions'"of `the great classical paralyses' of the human 
faculties: 
To be literally incapable of motion at last, that must be 
something! My mind swoons when I think of it. And mute 
into the bargain! And perhaps as deaf as a post! And who 
knows as blind as a bat! And as likely as not your memory 
a blank! And just enough brain intact to allow you to 
exult! 
(Beckett, 1959, pp. 140-141) 
How It Is shares this solution: 
no more head in any case hardly any no more heart just 
enough to be thankful for it a little thankful to be so 
little there 
(Beckett, 1964, p. 112) 
A very fine balance is needed. Schopenhauer's `blessed 
nothingness' (Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 640) is so extreme as 
to leave nothing intact which could exult in the blessed state 
of its own non-existence. 
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of the key factor which the allegory needs to maintain as 
unknowable is assumed. In the case of The Lost Ones, the very 
nature of allegory exacerbates these difficulties. If it is the 
duty of the allegorist to give a more adequate account of the 
meaning of the cylinder world than is explicitly stated in the 
text itself, the allegorist must be able to assume a position 
which transcends that of the narrator. The allegorist aspires 
to reveal what the narrator and his cylinder allegedly. reveal 
only implicitly, to state what remains unstated by the narrator. 
The structural tendency of allegorical readings of The Lost Ones 
is to push aside the transcendent narrator of the text to install 
instead the allegorist in the problematic transcendent position. 
Rather than achieving a workable position of actual 
transcendence, this strategy of reading reproduces difficulties 
which the narrator encounters internally in the course, of his 
narrative. To repeat, even if unawares, is not to transcend. 
vi. Transcendent readings and their lapses 
It is difficult to take issue with Brienza's remark that Tg 
Lost ones 'seems to cry out for an allegorical interpretation', 
even if from the distorting distance of Watt "one can almost hear 
Beckett answering, '"No allegories where none intended"' (Brienza, 
1977, p. 148). At numerous places in the text, details can be 
expanded toward allegorical significance. " Materials may be 
'° See the Appendix to this thesis for a series of 
allegorical identifications with some potential to be imposed 
upon the narrative of The Lost Ones. The awkward positioning of 
such material is not unrelated to this chapter's wish to 
depreciate the methodology which supports allegorical readings, 
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gathered from The Lost ones to sustain an allegory concerning 
epistemological procedures with a particularly Kantian 
inflection. 
`To be noted in support of this wild surmise' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 12) is the possibility of identifying aspects 
of the futile search undertaken in the cylinder with methods of 
metaphysical investigation. " Ladders, the means of a 
searcher's elevation above the ground, may be mapped on to 
metaphysical procedures; that such ladders `vary greatly in size' 
and `are propped against the wall without regard to harmony' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 9) is not injurious to the Kantian scheme which 
would assess metaphysical systems as lacking harmony in their 
composition and erection while remaining identical in function, 
that of undertaking an exploration raised beyond the empirical. 
From such ladders `half the rungs are missing' and, as the 
narrator concedes, `the want of three in a row calls for 
acrobatics' (Beckett, 1972, p. 10). As Kant maintains, the ascent 
from the empirical ground to metaphysical heights is hampered by 
missing logical steps; to effect the transition between realms, 
epistemological leaps become necessary. Assembling evidence as 
to the necessary acrobatics of metaphysical reasoning and 
disabling the metaphysical systems of others are the traditional 
duties of the sceptic; accordingly, in the cylinder `The missing 
rungs are in the hands of a happy few who use them mainly for 
while lacking the resolve to reject them, and the philosophical 
resonance of their details, out of hand. As detailed below, any 
feature of The Lost ones which might be turned to Kantian account 
cannot be resisted. 
39 Helene L. Baldwin's chapter `The Way Out of the 
Cylinder: The Quest for the Lost Ones' in Samuel Beckett's Real 
Silence (Baldwin, 1981, 'pp. 125-135) also gives a reading of Th 
Lost Ones as an allegory of a metaphysical search. 
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attack and self-defence' (Beckett, 1972, p. 10). With regard to 
these rickety ladders, `It is the custom not to climb two or more 
at a time' (Beckett, 1972, p. 11); as specified in Kant's critical 
philosophy, internal consistency in a chosen metaphysical system 
is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for its proper 
functioning. Indeed, concerning their bolt-holes established 
above the empirical realm, the searchers take cognizance of this 
requirement for `each climber has a fondness for certain niches 
and refrains as far as possible from the others' (Beckett, 1972, ' 
p. 12). When' disparate metaphysical systems are available, 
consistency will be best served by maintaining'a preference for 
one among their number and despising the claims of all rivals. 
In parallel, `it is exceptional for a body in the first place to 
leave its queue and in the second having exceptionally done so 
not to leave the zone' (Beckett, 1972, p. 47). The circulation 
of metaphysicians is not between competing schools; 
disillusionment more normally entails abandonment of the zone of 
metaphysical investigation itself. 
The competing versions as to the way out of the cylinder 
might also be employed to posit a sub-division between empirical 
and metaphysical investigations: 
one school swears by a secret passage branching from one of 
the tunnels and leading in the words of the poet to nature's 
sanctuaries. The other dreams of a trapdoor hidden in the 
hub of the ceiling giving access to a flue at the end of 
which the sun and other stars would still be shining. 
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(Beckett, 1972, p. 18) 
The choice might be mapped as one between exploration directed 
toward discovery of the secrets of the empirical realm of nature 
and an exit which offers delivery into the cosmos rather than 
back down to earth. As Henning maps the distinction, the tunnel 
is `the immanent' exit (Henning, 1988, p. 193), the trapdoor, `the 
transcendent' option (Henning, 1988, p. 192). Yet this division 
between the `material' and the `ideal' or the empirical and 
metaphysical does not quite accord with the textual evidence or 
the allegorical speculations thus far, for both possible exits 
are theoretically accessible only via the ladders, or under 
allegorical terms, via metaphysics. Nevertheless, the narrator 
associates `nature' (Beckett, 1972, p. 18) and, by extension, 
empiricism, with the tunnel-exit'° which is not only not to be 
found but is situated in the realm of the cylinder, that raised 
above the ground, which the allegory wants to identify as 
metaphysical. The inaccessibility of the putative location of 
the trapdoor does reproduce, however, the quandary of metaphysics 
identified by Kant: 
{ 
Why has Providence placed many things which are closely 
bound up with our highest interests so far beyond our reach 
that we are only permitted to apprehend them in a manner 
lacking in clearness and subject to doubt - in such fashion 
that our enquiring gaze is more excited than satisfied? 
`° Until, that is, the narrator redescribes the trapdoor as 
the way out to both `earth and sky' (Beckett, 1972, p. 21). 
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(Kant, 1933, A743-744/B771-772, p. 596) 
But there remains something wrong, for the inaccessibility of the 
trapdoor-exit associated with the metaphysical is not the result 
of any a priori deduction but of practical difficulties; as the 
narrator concedes `the fabulous zone decreed out of reach [... ] 
in theory is in no wise so' (Beckett, 1972, p. 20). A genuine 
inability to determine truth status or existence can only be 
attached to `assertions of pure reason' which `transcend the 
conditions of all possible experience, outside which the 
authentication of truth is in no wise possible' (Kant, 1933, 
A750-751/B778-779, p. 601, my emphasis). Empirical experience of 
the fabulous zone is possible. The impossibility of proving or 
refuting the thesis cannot be grounded upon such an empirical 
accident as the absence of that `instant of fraternity' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 21) required to maintain the tallest climber, atop the 
tallest ladder in order to test the trapdoor thesis. The 
searchers' theoretical ability to determine the accuracy of the 
trapdoor-thesis is instrumental in frustrating the accuracy of 
this particular system of allegorical identifications. The 
emerging danger is not `in the neatness of identifications' 
(Beckett, 1961, p. 3), but their confusion. 
Henning is better advised in identifying `the arena proper', 
mundanely situated on `The bed of the cylinder' and `chosen 
hunting ground of the majority', (Beckett, 1972, p. 43) as the 
realm of empirical investigation. Within the arena, one 
undertakes to search `with the eyes': 
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Eyesight relates more to empirical-observation: the mere 
collecting of facts in the manner of the early scientists. 
The still-active searchers speculate or theorize on the 
basis of the experience acquired in their wanderings, but 
do so without the rigid methodological ladders of the 
climbers. This allows them more latitude but less support 
for-rising upwards. 
(Henning, 1988, p. 172) 
`From the Bible through Wittgenstein's Tractatus', on the other 
hand, `the ladder has referred to the search for essential 
knowledge' (Henning, 1988, p. 172): 
The only objects within the abode are a number of ladders 
varying in size and type. They suggest the various 
gnosiological schemes that men have employed in an effort 
to scale up to a commanding position from which they could 
explain the world and so bring it under at least cognitive 
control. 
(Henning, 1988, pp. 161-162) 
Henning avoids the argumentative incoherence involved in 
searching the text of The Lost Ones for fragments of information, 
a strategy of reading as disablingly random and undirected as 
`the mere collecting of facts in the manner of the early 
scientists' (Henning, 1988, p. 172). Instead, cognizance of the 
empirical occurrence of the ladders is elevated from the status 
of merely an isolated detail to play a part in Henning's own 
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allegorical scheme concerning the inadequacies of both the 
empirical and speculative procedures in epistemology. Henning 
finds the relative merits of each approach also `implicitly posed 
in Endgame': 
Whose activity is more authentic, that of the speculative 
Hamm or that of the empirical Clov? Is the real world the 
realm of everyday existence or that of ideas? From a 
materialist point of view, the ideal world is a fiction. 
From an idealist perspective, the phenomenal world is an 
illusion. 
(Henning, 1988, p. 94) 
The procedures of such allegorical reading in relation to TILQ 
Lost ones, however, are themselves deeply embroiled with the 
interests of the idealist and speculative side of this 
epistemological controversy. An allegorical system which values 
its own coherence cannot accord attention to textual details 
which are inconsistent with its own systematic and transcendent 
arrangement of conceptual categories. For Henning, it is the 
narrator who `works to eliminate' numerous irregularities that 
threaten `his search for a comprehensive overview' (Henning, 
1988, p. 159); in so far Henning's own epistemological allegory 
is comprehensive and consistent, however, a similar objection 
applies to her own strategy of reading. In her account, both 
narrator and Kant are upbraided for their attempts to `form a 
perfect system' from empirical data (Henning, 1988, p. 165): 
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we had regarded le depeupleur as one who (re-)establishes 
a state of oneness by eliminating from life all its 
incongruent, inconvenient corporeal elements. He ab- 
stracts. In that case the narrator to the extent that he 
analyzes with the surgical precision that was Kant's [... ] 
is himself a sort of depeupleur. His narrative shares that 
deadly, deadening quality that characterizes every attempt 
to elaborate closed systems purporting to account for life's 
complexities in purely `objective' terms. 
(Henning, 1988, p. 165) 
Henning elaborates an interpretative structure that is assured 
that `all traditional interpretative structures 
- 
scientific, 
historical, religious, psychological, political, and narrative' 
exhibit this `ddpeu 1 tendency' (Henning, 1988, p. 190). It 
remains obscure how Henning's own act of abstraction in service 
of this `state of oneness' (Henning, 1988, p. 190) can fail to 
implicate itself in its own disapproving diagnosis of this 
tendency. While the narrator of The Lost Ones is convicted of 
`obscuring the more troublesome irregularities' (Henning, 1988, 
p. 187) of the cylinder in favour of producing `a satisfying 
cognitive whole' (Henning, 1988, p. 185), Henning undertakes the 
same procedure with regard to Western epistemology in its 
totality. '1 
'1 According to Henning, `Beckett shares Mikhail Bakhtin's 
criticism of the repressive monologism that is so characteristic 
of Western thought with its penchant for abstract integrality' (Henning, 1988, p. 1). The `carnivalesque challenge' 
incorporating 
`paradox, play, incompleteness, difference, 
reciprocity, passion, laughter' may be employed to destabilize 
this entire `Western tradition' (Henning, 1988, p. 190). The 
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In so far as the irregularities of the cylinder threaten to 
`exceed the narrator's cognitive grasp and burst the bounds of 
his theoretical system'-(Henning, 1988, p. 184) and the `bodies 
display a propensity to unmanageable behaviour' (Henning, 1988, 
p. 193), The Lost Ones plays into the hands of Henning's own 
totalizing and transcendent thesis concerning the ultimate 
inadequacy of all such totalizing and transcendent theses. Under 
Henning's system, no discourse is immune from `review and 
revision': 
Any textual or discursive level can be invested with 
different'and differing points of view, or `voices. ' The 
privileged tendencies of a text or aspects of an idea may 
then be confronted by latent or repressed ones. The impulse 
to stage this confrontation entails what might be called the 
deconstructive strategy of dialogization that exploits the 
`loopholes' through which a subversive `voice' may insinuate 
itself into the discourse of the dominant perspective. 
single exception to the recommended violation of `repressive 
monologism' and `abstract integrality' is Henning's analysis of 
such authoritarian modes of thought. Henning's deployment of the 
carnivalesque neglects to challenge its own formulations during 
its challenging of all systematic abstractions. A fundamental 
inconsistency emerges in Henning's use of Bakhtin's carnivalesque in the form of a rigorous theory; according to Norris: 
Bakhtin's attitude, roughly stated, is one that holds 'the 
more the merrier', an outlook of undifferentiated pluralist 
`freeplay' that celebrates diversity for its own sake and 
equates such values as reason, truth and method with the 
working of a grim paternal law of oppressive `monological' 
discourse. 
(Norris, 1993, p. 166) 
Abstracting a methodology to be conscientiously pursued from such 
an attitude risks converting the carnivalesque itself into 
another system of monological discourse. 
328 
There [ 
... 
] this strategy may take advantage of unthematized 
reservations, hesitations, and contradictions to create 
ironic interferences that undermine the impression of self- 
identity or harmonious integrity. 
(Henning, 1988, p. 3) 
This theoretical framework predetermines the failure of any 
theoretical model to achieve an explanatory force free of points 
of inadequacy, qualification, or inconsistency. All discourse 
harbours repressed areas of incoherence, despite the fact that 
an exemption has-to be granted again to the discourse which 
elaborates the universality of this inadequacy. Henning's 
analysis is now in a position to transcend and diagnose the 
failings of every discourse; the narrator of The Lost ones simply 
proffers a discourse that has perfected its ability to operate 
as Henning knows it must: 
Neither the narrator's discourse [... ] nor the world he 
describes actually forms [... ] a closed and unified system. 
[... ] [L]ike the world that the narrator describes, his own 
processes of descriptive interpretation are also open to 
questioning, including self-questioning, and modification. 
The inquisitive probing into the fundamental principles of 
the hermeneutical, or. methodological, system that the 
narrator's models would forcibly repress within the cylinder 
reappears in his own discourse to call for a reappraisal of 
the whole enterprise. Indeed, if this notion is maintained, 
there is really no more insistent subtheme in the book. 
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(Henning, 1988, p. 194) 
Every detail that thwarts the narrator's `desire for a fully 
comprehensive, internally harmonious system' (Henning, 1988, 
p. 183), confirms the accuracy of Henning's own system; the 
persistence of `nagging irregularity' and every one of the 
`inadequacies' which `gradually undermine the narrator's 
confidence in his ability to see the full truth about the 
cylinder world' (Henning, 1988, pp. 180-181), acclaims the full 
truth of Henning's account. That such comprehensive success 
revokes the very basis of Henning's own theoretical framework is 
not acknowledged. 42 Positioned at such a transcendent height 
above all discourse, Henning's criticisms of the narrator's 
`superior vantage point' (Henning, 1988, p. 172) apply with even 
more force to the operation of her own analysis: 
As one who seeks an ideally cohesive and fully comprehensive 
system encompassing all levels of cylinder life, the 
42 Henning judges that a certain degree of collusion with 
the modes of totalizing thought `subjected to profound and 
sustained criticism' by Beckett is yet an `inevitable' feature 
of his writing: 
Harbouring an inevitable complicity with traditional modes 
and values, Beckett's work not only reproduces them but 
also, to some extent, contributes to their reinforcement and 
even legitimation. It is, in other words, symptomatic of 
its sociocultural context. 
(Henning, 1988, p. 196) 
No recognition is accorded to the complicity with totalizing 
discourse displayed by Henning's own text. That the only 
discourse immune from the `self-questioning' (Henning, 1988, 
p. 194) which Henning considers universally advisable should be 
her own is a testimony to the infection of her theoretical model 
by the `unthematized reservations, hesitations, and 
contradictions' it is used to theorize (Henning, 1988, p. 3). 
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narrator clearly belongs to the dominant tradition. 
Nevertheless, his formulations allow for and perhaps 
indirectly encourage a carnivalesque or hermetic 
interpretation of the information he himself provides with 
a straight face. At crucial junctures this alternative 
seems almost unavoidable, though it is never consciously 
considered, let alone accommodated within the narrator's 
rigid-, totalizing perspective. 
(Henning, 1988, pp. 190=191) 
It is Henning who must be in possession of a `fully comprehensive 
system' and a `rigid, totalizing perspective' in order to 
position the narrator's desire for such possessions so firmly 
within `the dominant tradition'. Henning's maintenance of a 
straight face at this `crucial juncture', a blatant point of 
access for a carnivalesque appreciation of self-reflexive ironies 
in her own discourse, is indeed to be admired. The carnivalesque 
model, which places such emphasis upon recognition of conceptual 
fracture and discontinuity within totalizing systems of 
discourse, is employed by Henning as just such a totalizing 
discourse, one which organizes the qualities of all other 
discourses around its own binary terms of `totalization' or 
`carnivalesque'. To carry on such an operation, Henning must 
assume a self-defeating immunity from fracture and discontinuity 
within her own analysis. 
The incoherence credited to the narrative of The Lost Ones 
finds a context within Henning's discourse which can re-describe 
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its behaviour as an exemplary textual system, for incoherence is 
the repressed tendency of all texts according to this analysis. 
In The Lost ones itself, as Henning concedes: 
the bits of knowledge, the little `truths' discovered along 
the way prove so unstable and indeterminate that they could 
never add up to a complex, mosaic version of absolute 
knowledge. Eventually, the narrator reveals the existence 
of a fundamental conflict between the passion for searching 
and the ethos of the search. In practice, the aspect of 
need or desire always threatens to exceed or transgress the 
laws that control and regulate it. 
(Henning, 1988, p. 165) 
The occurrence of inconsistencies in the narrator's account of 
the cylinder is precisely consistent with Henning's account of 
the operation of discourse. Where the coherence and 
comprehensiveness of other theoretical accounts of The Lost Ones 
are defeated by the instability of details in the narrative, 
Henning's account is sustained by just such anomalies. The 
`fundamental conflict' between `the passion for searching' and 
`the ethos of the search', presumably to discover what is sought, 
does not apply to her own analysis, for in the pursuit of 
anomalies Henning's search is easily satisfied. The opinion that 
criticism of The Lost Ones unenlightened by Henning's methodology 
replicates more closely the operation of the text itself, is 
perhaps an awkward detail genuinely troublesome to Henning's 
preference for anomalies. More importantly, once put to work 
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under the guidance of a transcendent theoretical perspective 
armed with conceptual categories for the collection of 
discontinuities, inconsistencies and anomalies, such disruptive 
qualities in the narrative of The Lost ones are transformed into 
regularities entirely consistent with the predictions of the 
theoretical scheme. The theoretical scheme organized to 
emphasize the importance of narrative disruption, in practice 
converts disruption into regularity within the context of its own 
theoretical perspective. The disruptions internal to the 
narrative of The Lost Ones cause no problem for Henning ,s 
critical account of the text. However, the fractures and 
contradictions considered endemic to discourse are displaced from 
the primary text only to re-emerge in the theoretical perspective 
under which The Lost Ones is transformed into a paradigm of 
discourse in general. It is here that the occurrence of 
anomalies and self-reflexive doubts are repressed. The way out 
of the contradictory narrative system of The Lost Ones offered 
by Henning operates at the cost of reinstating a system of 
unacknowledged contradiction within itself. 
The chaos associated with the narrator's undirected 
observation of properties of the cylinder, which is reproduced 
by a reading which- cannot get beyond the collection of 
inconsistent narrative statements in The Lost ones, is 
transcended by Henning's application of a theoretical 
perspective, the `intellectual complement' necessary to organize 
`sensible experience' (Henning, 1988, p. 172). From the `superior 
vantage point' gained, Henning joins forces with the narrator of 
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The Lost Ones as he `speculatively elaborates its system' 
(Henning, 1988, p. 172). Henning's description of this enterprise 
applies equally to the narrator's account of the cylinder and her 
own account of that account: 
his own `light,, ' taking the form of an all-encompassing 
descriptive explanation, exhibits a [... ] tendency to 
provide more or less adequate illumination of the broad 
surface of things while obscuring the more troublesome 
irregularities. 
(Henning, 1988, p. 187) 
Henning, also, in possession of `an all-encompassing descriptive 
explanation' of The Lost Ones, whether specifically allegorical 
or regulated by a fixed theoretical perspective, is also prey to 
these failings. Henning's system is notable in swapping the 
source of `troublesome irregularities' from The Lost Ones to her 
own all-encompassing explanation of it. As the narrative of the 
primary text is retrieved to regularity, the theoretical 
discourse, which "contrives thus to transcend and render 
instructive the contradictions and aporiai pursued by its object, 
lapses back into an identical system of fracture within its own 
formulations. This is a complex route to self-defeat. 
vii. Immanent analysis of The Lost Ones 
Allegory may claim transcendence in relation to the details 
of its text in a manner analogous to a metaphysical transcendence 
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of empirical phenomena. The parallel may be drawn from 
Schopenhauer's formulation of the function of Plato's `Idea' and 
Kant's `thing-in-itself': 
both declare the visible world to be a phenomenon which in 
itself is void and empty, and which has meaning and borrowed 
reality only through the thing that expresses itself in it 
(the thing-in-itself in the one case, the Idea in the 
other). 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 1, §31, p. 172) 
The apprehension which is `conscious of the true state of things' 
beyond the confusion of empirical detail and flux of appearances 
`is transcendental' (Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 1, §31, p. 173). 43 
The allegorist also is charged to discover the stable idea 
informing and organizing textual detail, and, in the case of The 
Lost ones, the confusion and flux of details concerning the 
cylinder. The opposing perspective, satisfied merely with the 
phenomenon in all its instability, Schopenhauer names `immanent' 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 1, §31, p. 173). 
The disadvantage of transcendent apprehension is that it 
requires of its followers the assumption of a perspective which 
" According to Schopenhauer, `the most characteristic and 
important step of my philosophy' is to be found in this return 
of attention to `the transition from the phenomenon to the thing- 
in-itself, given up by Kant as impossible' (Schopenhauer, 1966, 
vol. 2, p. 191). In Schopenhauer, as Desmond notes, `we have 
access (contra Kant) to the thing-in-itself in our own will' 
(Desmond, 1988, p. 105). This step marks Schopenhauer's 
reinstatement of metaphysical speculation in opposition to Kant's 
ritigue of Pure Reason. 
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is not available. Schopenhauer's pessimistic metaphysics, for 
example, require for their statement an overly optimistic 
estimation of Schopenhauer's ability to be conscious of the true 
state of things: 
To the eye of a being who lived an incomparably longer life 
and took in at a single glance the human race in its whole 
duration, the constant alternation of birth and death would 
present itself merely as a continuous vibration. 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 481) 
It is unaccountable how Schopenhauer can provide a statement as 
to what would be apprehended from this perspective when it is 
described in such terms as to preclude its availability to 
Schopenhauer. " Beckett's Malone is more adept in his 
metaphysical chicanery: 
I have pinned my faith to appearances, believing them to be 
vain. I shall not go into the details. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 210) 
The utility of faith in the detail of appearances is ruled out 
by their vanity, but neither will the transcendent perspective 
"` The narrator of The Lost ones includes among his 
repertoire an identical trick; consider his knowledge of the 
harmony of the niches: 
Such harmony only he can relish whose long experience and 
detailed knowledge of the niches are such as to permit a 
perfect mental image of the entire system. But it is 
doubtful that such a one exists. (Beckett, 1972, pp. 11-12) 
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which sustains belief in this vanity bear detailed attention. 
It is the vanity of appearances which condemns the chances of the 
immanent route in epistemology for Schopenhauer: 
naturalism, or the purely physical way of considering 
things, will never be sufficient; it is like a sum in 
arithmetic that never comes out. Beginningless and endless 
causal series, inscrutable fundamental forces, endless 
space, beginningless time, infinite divisibility of matter, 
and all this further conditioned by a knowing brain, in 
which alone it exists just like a dream and without which 
it vanishes 
- 
all these things constitute the labyrinth in 
which naturalism leads us incessantly round and round. 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 177) 
The existence of the cylinder in The Lost ones and its attendant 
intractable complexities are similarly the product of the 
`knowing brain' of the narrator; this labyrinth is constructed 
as an object of the narrative `without which it vanishes'. 
Consequently, to transcend the intractable terms of the narrative 
in favour of a transcendent or allegorical interpretation is to 
presume an ability to describe the cylinder more adequately than 
the narrator, when it is only from the basis of these terms that 
the cylinder can be thought at all. The narrator's version of 
the cylinder is the only account available. And to be led 
`incessantly round and round' by the contradictions and aporiai 
of this account, to read immanently rather than transcendently 
or allegorically, ý to refrain from stabilizing these unstable 
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terms by recourse to theories of their ultimate significance, is 
at least to read the narrator's text. The qualities of the 
cylinder are defined by `all the components' of the narrative, 
`the sum of which it is' (Beckett, 1972, p. 38). 45 
If the cylinder 'is tautologous with its blueprint in the 
narrative, analysis of the narrative should determine all that 
can be-known of its qualities. To revert to analytic judgements 
is not to, transcend the narrative, but to make explicit the 
implications' contained in the concepts employed to define the 
cylinder. Analytic explication of a concept should add nothing 
to that concept which is not already implicitly contained within 
it. In so far as this rule is observed, an analytical approach 
to The Lost Ones is tautological with the concepts of which the 
narrative is made: 
Analytic judgements really teach us nothing more about the 
object than what the concept which we have of it already 
contains; they do not extend our knowledge beyond the 
concept of the object, but only clarify the concept. 
(Kant, 1933, A736/B764, p. 591) 
A comparable analytical restriction to the dramatic situation `as 
stated' informs Beckett's rejection of any further `exegesis' in 
"s If allegories had not been foregone, proposition number 
one of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosoph 
, 
which 
states that `The world is all that is the case', might be, called 
to mind (Wittgenstein, 1974, §1, p. 5). That the system of the 
Tractatus should have been renounced by its author would 
doubtless appeal to the narrator's preference for unworkable 
methodologies in The Lost ones. 
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regard to Endgame: 
when it comes to journalists I feel the only line is to 
refuse to be involved in exegesis of any kind. 
- 
And to 
insist on the extreme simplicity of dramatic situation and 
issue. ' If that's not enough for them, and it obviously 
isn't, it's plenty for us, and we have no elucidations to 
offer of mysteries that are all of their making. My work 
is a matter of fundamental sounds (no joke intended) made 
as fully as possible, and I accept responsibility for 
nothing else. If people want to have headaches among the 
overtones, let them. And provide their own aspirin. Hamm 
as stated, and Clov as stated, together as stated, nec tecum 
nec sine te, in such a place, and in such a world, that's 
all I can manage, more than I could. 
(Beckett, 1983a, p. 109) 
To make the terms of Endgame `as stated' explicit in production; 
and nothing beyond this, introduces themes of enclosure, 
limitation and a precision approaching that of mathematics into 
the staging process itself. 46 Interpretative stagings, like 
faulty analytic judgements, `err [... ] through introducing 
characteristics which do not really belong to the concept" (Kant, 
46 It is the prerogative of mathematics, according to Kant, 
to `say with certainty that what it did not intend to represent 
in its object by definition is not included in it', for `the 
concept of the defined arises first from the definition, and it 
has no meaning at all other than that which the definition gives 
it' (Kant, 1949, §1, p. 276). Beckett claims a similar right, if 
not to define, then to state the terms by which Endgame is 
constituted and to `accept responsibility for nothing else' which 
goes beyond this statement (Beckett, 1983a, p. 109). 
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1933, A732/B760, p. 589); that is, introducing additions to how 
that concept has been stated in the text of the play which move 
beyond strictly inferential expansion. In the same manner, 
allegorical readings of The Lost Ones introduce conceptual 
additions which are strictly extraneous to the narrative `as 
stated'. Allegorical structures are `ampliative' or `synthetic' 
for `they add to the concept of the subject a predicate which has 
not been in any wise thought in it; and which no analysis could 
possibly extract from it' (Kant, 1933, A7/B11, p. 48). '1 
Analytical procedures, `adding nothing through the predicate to 
the concept of the subject', are charged with `merely breaking 
[the concept] up into those constituent concepts that have all 
along been thought in it, although confusedly' (Kant, 1933, 
A7/B11, p. 48). Analysis can infer and thereby make explicit what 
is `covertly' contained in the concept (Kant, 1933, A6/B10, 
p. 48). Analysis must be carried out immanently, within the 
narrative of The Lost Ones as stated. " What results are 
headaches, not among the imported overtones, but among the covert 
inferences which may be drawn from the concepts of the narrative. 
" If the cylinder is not available for empirical 
inspection separately from its blueprint as stated in the 
narrative, the allegorist encounters problems similar to those 
Kant poses for the metaphysician. When `I do not [... ] have the 
advantage of looking around in the field of experience' to 
confirm an ampliative or synthetic judgement, the question arises 
as to `Upon what, then, am I to rely, when I seek to go beyond 
the concept A, and to know that another concept B is connected 
with it? ' (Kant, 1933, A9/B12-13, p. 50). See below, Sections x- 
xii. 
`° 
- 
Examination of The Lost ones `as stated, ' means a 
restriction to what Kenner calls its `bleak externality of 
denotation', a process extended in ping, which `has not even 
verbs, simply specifications' (Kenner, 1973, p. 179). 
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viii. The beginning and the end: `The affair is thorny' 
The conceptual determination of the beginning and end of the 
cylinder as stated by the narrator offers a system for analysis 
which rivals the dance of Moran's bees for intractable 
complexity. " Without any-meddling in speculative allegorical 
identifications, the terms of the text itself provide what Moran 
discovers with 'rapture': `something I can study all my life, and 
never understand' (Beckett, 1959, p. 170). Although the narrator 
neglects to attend to it until 'past the halfway point of The Lost 
Ones, the beginning of the cylinder will be examined first: 
In the beginning then unthinkable as the end all roamed 
without respite including the nurselings in so far as they 
were borne50 except of course those already at the foot of 
the ladders or frozen in the tunnels the better to listen 
or crouching all eyes in the niches and so roamed a vast 
space of time impossible to measure until a first came to 
a, standstill followed by a second and so on. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 34-35) 
Nothing should exist of the cylinder or within it prior to its 
`beginning'. Qualities or states ascribed to the cylinder or the 
bodies prior to their beginning, belong to nothing and nobody, 
to entities not yet called into existence. Yet the statement of 
49 See Beckett, 1959, pp. 169-170. 
50 Such `nurselings' presumably have been born, if not 
`borne', to the usual extent. 
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the situation within the cylinder at its beginning includes 
reference to searchers `already' positioned `at the foot of the 
ladders or'frozen in tunnels' (Beckett, 1972, pp. 34-35). These 
positions must have been taken up prior to the `beginning' or 
existence of the cylinder. ' If the point of `beginning' ascribed 
to-the cylinder by the narrator is correct, the situation as 
stated is also one that is logically incoherent, for it assumes 
the existence of a state within the cylinder, complete with 
ladders and niches and ladder laws, prior to the beginning of the 
cylinder. What obtains `already' here obtains before the 
beginning. When something occurs before the beginning of 
everything, the point of beginning has been misplaced. a' The 
`already' stationed are thoroughly problematic: besides existing 
anterior to the beginning of the cylinder, they mar the first 
s' Similar considerations apply to Molloy, which begins 
prior to the protagonist's acknowledgement of its beginning: 
Here's' my beginning. It must mean something, or they 
wouldn't keep it. Here it is. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 8) 
Yet the work Molloy must clearly have commenced prior to any 
cogitations it contains concerning its own beginning. This 
beginning cannot be then be re-located further into the text by 
narrative fiat. The problem of assigning a beginning returns to 
exercise the narrator of The Unnamable: 
[... ] I am obliged to assign a beginning to my residence 
here, if only for the sake of clarity. Hell itself, 
although eternal, dates from the revolt of Lucifer. It is 
therefore permissible, in the light of this distant analogy, 
to think of myself as being here forever, but not as having 
been here forever. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 298) 
What results-is a Kantian antinomy: the proposition of eternal 
existence and its negation are both maintained, as is the case 
in the `First Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas' (Kant, 1933, 
A426/B454, p. 396). The Unnamable suggests an emotional 
solution: `One can be before beginning, they have set their 
hearts on that' (Beckett, 1959, p. 355). 
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notable attribute of its inhabitants for `In the beginning [... ] 
all roamed without respite' (Beckett, 1972, p. 34). `All' do not 
roam for some are already `frozen in the tunnels' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 35). These `frozen' bodies have also come to a standstill 
prior to the body described by the narrator as the `first' to do 
so. 52 The narrator's next line compounds all such conceptual 
convolutions: 
But as to at this moment of time and there will be no other 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 35) 
We have travelled from the beginning through `a vast space of 
time' (Beckett, 1972, p. 35) to find now that all future 
succession in time has been abolished. Being bereft of further 
moments, the controversy above as to relative movement and 
immobility should at least be dissolved. No body can now at one 
moment be in one position and alter this position in the next, 
for the two moments necessary for this change to take place are 
now denied those within the cylinder. Nevertheless, the narrator 
proceeds to catalogue the bodies that `endlessly come and go, ' and 
`those who every now and then stand. still' (Beckett, 1972, p. 35). 
The existence of only one moment should not offer the space of 
52 As noted earlier, the narrator experiences severe 
difficulties in deciding first places. After describing the 
impression made by the state of the ladders, the arrangement of 
the niches, the qualities of the tunnels, the categories of lost 
one, the peculiarities of the lulls, the cylinder walls, the 
rumours of a way out, the ladder laws and the zones within the 
cylinder, the narrator discovers that `What first impresses in 
this gloom is the sensation of yellow it imparts' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 36, my emphasis). 
343 
time needed to `every now and then' pursue an activity, let alone 
time for a pursuit to be undertaken `endlessly'. The sense of 
these statements exclude each other but are each stated. Such 
is the general state of the cylinder at its beginning as sullied 
by analytic attentions. As this beginning is also defined as 
`unthinkable' (Beckett, 1972, p. 34), both the narrator's account 
and these cogitations upon it must presumably be cancelled and 
forgotten if we are to remain true to this additional 
specification. 
According to Cohn, `only in 1970 did Beckett think of the 
"unthinkable end"' (Cohn, 1973, p. 260) of the cylinder, after 
beginning The Lost Ones in 1966. Taking merely four years to 
think the unthinkable is a considerable achievement. These 
conditions cannot exist together: if the unthinkable is thought, 
it is not unthinkable; if a thought is unthinkable, it cannot be 
thought. The `Lost Ones chooses to claim this Impossible 
disposition as its own by describing both the beginning and the 
end of the cylinder as `unthinkable' precisely at the points in 
the narrative when they are actually being thought. " Having 
6' The narrator of How It Is prefers to define its 
beginning and end-as `inconceivable': 
one day one night at the inconceivable outset 
(Beckett, 1964, p. 45) 
all here in position at the inconceivable start of this 
caravan no impossible 
(Beckett, 1964, p. 148) 
The conception of the end is similarly, contradictorily, to be 
conceived as the `inconceivable end of this immeasurable wallow, (Beckett, 1964, p. 154). As is the case in The Lost ones, 
however, we are lured into conceiving the beginning and the end 
of How It Is at these very moments when each is defined as 
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thought the unthinkable beginning and found it unthinkable by 
virtue of its contradictions, the beginning of the end may next 
be assessed: 
So on infinitely until' towards the unthinkable-end if this 
notion is maintained a last body of all by feeble fits and 
starts is searching still. There is nothing at first sight 
to distinguish him--from the others dead 'still where they 
stand'or sit in abandonment beyond recall. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 60) 
The conjunction of concepts appealed to in the construction 
`infinitely until' is concisely self-collapsing: a continuation 
that is stated to be infinite is pulled up short by its limiting 
condition, the `until' which demarcates its end. 34 The cylinder 
continues `infinitely until towards the unthinkable end': if the 
attribute of `infinitely' is to be retained by this continuation, 
then its, end is indeed `unthinkable'. If it is the progression 
`towards"the `unthinkable end' that continues `infinitely', then 
this end-will be put securely out of reach. The additional 
condition, `if this notion is maintained', could apply to the 
contradictory' conceptual compound `infinitely until', the 
existence of any movement `towards the unthinkable end', ' the 
possibility that this movement will continue `infinitely', the 
`unthinkable end' itself, or the existence and activities of the 
inconceivable. 
64 How It Is similarly foreshortens the `everlasting': 
`Lent everlasting then of a sudden Hallowmas' (Beckett, 1964, 
p. 18). 
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`last body'. The ambiguity as to which `notion' is to receive 
the attentions of this clause is irresolvable. The implications 
of the refrain `if this notion is maintained' are themselves 
equivocal: the phrase suggests that `this notion', whichever is 
meant, might be `maintained' while simultaneously suggesting its 
provisionality. 
To avoid continuing activities in the cylinder after its 
end, the obverse oversight to that previously committed by 
beginning its activities prior to its beginning, it might be 
conceded that the `last body' is `searching still' while the 
cylinder is merely moving `towards' its `unthinkable end'. To 
maintain this notion, the cylinder must have continued 
`infinitely until' it reached the point where a movement 
`towards' the `unthinkable end' comes into force. Infinite 
continuation then stops somewhere prior to its end. As the 
infinite cannot end, to call for its ending at a point anterior 
to where it could not previously end seems in fact to make 
matters worse. There is choice of inconsistencies; a choice so 
profuse that they are- inconsistent with each another too. 
Neither is the `last body of all' actually the last body in the 
cylinder, as there remain `others' from which `There is nothing 
at first sight to distinguish him'. Nevertheless, as he is the 
`last body', which he also is not, the narrator's description 
does distinguish him successfully from the ranks of the `others' 
and this at first sight. " This is, after all, the first apercu 
55 If `An observer will not be able to spot the last man, 
still stirring among the others who seem dead, "at first sight"I (Brienza, 1977, p. 154), it should indeed be asked how the 
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of the unthinkable end. 
The narrator begins to switch attention from the `last body' 
to the situation of those that contradict this description, his 
. 
companions: 
There is nothing at first sight to distinguish him from the 
others dead still where they stand or sit in abandonment 
beyond recall. Lying down is unheard of in the cylinder and 
this pose solace of the vanquished is for ever denied them 
here. Such privation is partly to be explained by the 
dearth of floor space namely a little under one square metre 
at the disposal of each body and not to be eked out by that 
of the niches and tunnels reserved for the search alone. 
Thus the prostration of those withered ones filled with the 
horror of contact and compelled to brush together without 
ceasing is denied its natural end. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 60-61) 
The bodies additional to the `last body' stand or sit "dead 
still' and yet are `compelled to brush together without ceasing' 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 60-61). 56 These immobile and moving bodies 
have now achieved a state of abandonment `beyond recall' 
narrator is able to perform this task. If an observer cannot 
spot the last body at first sight, knowledge of his existence at 
first sight is mysterious. Perhaps a non-observer would fare 
better in seeing him. 
56 This contradiction obtains whether the compound `dead 
still' emphasizes the immobility of the bodies or their 
continuation in being deceased. Movement would seem precluded 
in both cases. 
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(Beckett, 1972, p. '60), 'a statement which seems to be an absolute 
beyond equivocation. Although the tunnels and niches are 
`reserved for the search alone' (Beckett, 1972, p. 61), the search 
has been abandoned, except by the 'last body'. So privileged is 
the last searcher, that, all other bodies must suffer the 
privation of contact and an inability to find solace in 
prostration in order to reserve the tunnels and niches solely for 
his search. For lack of space, `Lying down is unheard of in the 
cylinder' (Beckett, -1972, p. 60), just as space is found in the 
narrative to let us hear what obtains concerning `Lying down'. 
The result of the unavailability of the prostrate position is 
`the prostration of those withered ones' (Beckett, 1972, p. 61). 
We may, however, choose to remember an earlier qualification to 
the disposition of such `non-searchers' and their committment to 
the abandonment of searching: 
By non-searchers and despite the abyss to which this leads 
it is finally impossible to understand other than ex- 
searchers. To rid this notion of some of its virulence one 
has only to suppose the need to search no less resurrectable 
than that of the ladder and those eyes to all appearances 
for ever cast down or closed possessed of the strange power 
suddenly to kindle again before passing face and body. But 
enough will always subsist to spell for this little people 
the extinction soon or late of its last remaining fires. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 14-15) 
According to Connor, `what there will be enough left of is the 
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capacity for diminishment' (Connor, 1988, p. 105); as this 
sufficiency will `always subsist' absolute extinction can never 
come about. "' The paradoxical completeness of `the all of 
nothing' cannot be reached so long as `the least less' can be 
subtracted from it (Beckett, 1972, p. 32). To maintain this 
notion revokes the, possibility of the end envisaged by the 
narrator. Similarly, the notion concerning the resurrectability 
of the desire'to search mars the final status of the non- 
searchers as `beyond recall' (Beckett, 1972, p. 60). Recall from 
this abyss has been achieved before: 
if among these sedentary the need to climb is dead it is 
none the less subject to strange resurrections. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 13-14) 
A capacity which is `dead' might be safely judged to be also 
`beyond recall' (Beckett, 1972, p. 60), but in the cylinder this 
is not quite accurate. The vacillation of bodies between 
categories of searcher and vanquished, a function of their 
`strange resurrections' (Beckett, 1972, p. 14), has previously 
caused difficulties in the reckoning of the cylinder's 
population. If we accept that during the `unthinkable end', the 
companions to the `last body' are `beyond recall' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 60) even for some interval of time and with whatever danger of 
5' Zeno's account of the arrow which can never reach its 
target or the race which can never be completed is an analogous 
paradox. The arrow or runner must complete half of its course, 
then a quarter, then an eighth and so on infinitely to ever 
smaller fractions, but never the zero distance which would signal 
the end of the journey. 
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resurrection, further diversion may be drawn from the formula 
granted us to calculate population figures. 
Bodies "beyond recall" (Beckett, 1972, p. 60) might be 
considered sufficiently vanquished to be allowed to swell the 
ranks of the five vanquished previously existent (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 35). At its point of having five extant vanquished, the total 
population of the cylinder works out to a figure of 205 complete 
bodies. Let it be assumed, despite evidence of wild fluctuations 
on the way, that at the `unthinkable end', the population remains 
at this figure. As the `last body' yet retains a desire to 
search, he must be subtracted from the ranks of the vanquished 
non-searchers, who number now 204.6' The population formula 
states that there are four times as many sedentary as vanquished 
(4 x 204 = 816), three times as many of the second order than 
sedentary (3 x 816 = 2448) and twice as many of the lowest 
searchers than of the second order (2 x 2448 = 4896). When there 
are only 204 vanquished bodies and one remaining searcher within 
the cylinder, the population formula also decrees the existence 
of 8160 other bodies shared between the three lower ranks. The 
total population is now 8365; when the last searcher relents and 
5' Two bodies are identified in the cylinder at this point, 
the last searcher and the woman vanquished, otherwise recognized 
as the north pole. Consequently, following the population 
formula backwards cannot be accurate, although to reverse its 
relations is not to depart from what can be inferred from its 
statement. If there is one searcher, and if he might be claimed 
as a lower searcher, the formula would give the result that in 
the second group there exists 0.5 of body (for group one's being 
twice group two also means that group two is half group one), 
0.16 recurring of a sedentary and 0.041666 of a vanquished. This 
is clearly not enough vanquished to fulfil the requirements of 
the narrative. 
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attains the status of vanquished, it will be 8405,8200 of which, 
if the sedentary may be included, will ruin the claim of the 
`last searcher' to be the last by continuing to search. The 
scarcity of space, it may be assumed, will become even more 
pressing. As the cylinder moves towards its end and in 
accordance more searchers become vanquished non-searchers, more 
unvanquished searchers are required to come into existence. If 
the notions of the population formula are maintained beyond the 
moment of their statement, the cylinder can never be populated 
solely by the vanquished, for concomitant with the creation of 
more vanquished is the creation of ever more searchers. As more 
searchers abandon the search, the number of bodies pursuing the 
search increases to an ever more exorbitant figure. Movement 
toward stasis in the cylinder, itself a conceptual curiosity, is 
rendered inherently self-defeating: the net result of additional 
abandonment and immobility amongst the bodies is an exponential 
increase in the frenetic activity of searching. When the 
cylinder takes one step toward its end, it multiplies the steps 
it takes back to its reactivation. 
It is not clear whether `The mite still in the white-haired 
woman's'clasp' (Beckett, 1972, p. 61) is to be counted among the 
population of the cylinder or to which category he might belong. 
What is curious is his continuation as a `mite' while the 
cylinder has progressed `on infinitely until' this point of `the 
unthinkable end' (Beckett, 1972, p. 60). The abode is now defined 
as `old' and the `vanquished of the third zone' as `aged' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 61) but the `mite' has not developed from this 
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condition since he and the white-haired woman were first noticed 
as a `Picturesque detail': 
Picturesque detail a woman with white hair still young to 
judge by, her thighs59 leaning against the wall with eyes 
closed in abandonment and mechanically clasping 'to her 
breast a mite who strains away in an effort to turn its head 
and look behind. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 30) 
At the moment of this description, many are `still unrelenting' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 31). During the interval between this moment 
and the supposed depletion of the unrelenting to merely one, the 
development of the mite is to regress towards an increasingly 
insubstantial state: 
The mite still in the white-haired woman's clasp is no more 
than a shadow in her lap. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 61) 
With reference back to the state of the cylinder prior to the 
coming of this unthinkable end, several other odd details emerge. 
For the end to occur, the `faithful who endlessly come and go' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 35, my emphasis), must have been earlier 
misdescribed. After the delineation of the rules governing the 
use of ladders, the prerogatives of the queue, a body's right to 
59 There is a certain novelty in making a judgement as to 
youthfulness upon the appearance of `her thighs' while ignoring 
the more usual evidence of `white hair' (Beckett, 1972, p. 30). 
352 
one complete circuit of the climbing zone and the regulations 
governing access and departure from that zone, the narrator 
leaves the system to its autonomous operations: `And so on 
infinitely' (Beckett, 1972, p. 50). With hindsight, the system 
does not continue `infinitely'. Earlier, a-searcher of the arena 
may have been forced to endure an `interminable' wait for a 
departure from the ladder zone filled to capacity by climbers and 
carriers; now, the system has broken down: 
At the foot of the ladders propped against the wall with 
scant regard to harmony no climber waits his turn. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 61) 
Either the rules of climbing have been abandoned, so that `no 
climber waits his turn' but climbs at will, or the ladder zone 
itself has been abandoned. In the case of either possibility, 
the system previously inaugurated has not carried `on infinitely' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 50). 
With regard to the final state of the twin storms of 
temperature and light within the cylinder, reference backwards 
reveals unexpected accuracy from the narrator. As the last 
searcher ceases, the environment within his world responds in 
kind: 
He himself after a pause impossible to time finds at last 
his place and pose whereupon dark descends and at the same 
instant the temperature comes to rest not far from freezing 
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point. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 62) 
Describing the condition at the `last state' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 63) of the cylinder very early in his narrative, the narrator's 
second sentence is thoroughly consistent with his own final 
reckoning: 
Then light and climate will be changed in a way impossible 
to foretell. But the former may be imagined extinguished 
as purposeless and the latter fixed not far from freezing 
point. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 15) 
A query might be lodged as to what purpose the light `that not 
only dims but blurs into the bargain' (Beckett, 1972, p. 38) 
served at any time in the cylinder, but nevertheless the 
narrator's prediction here is for once in harmony with his second 
a ercu of the same subject. The only difficulty associated with 
this exact foretelling of the climatic alteration of the cylinder 
at its climax, its climatic condition we might say in a double 
sense, is that the narrator also chooses to assure us that it 
would `be changed in a way impossible to foretell' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 15). In this rarest of cases, where two of the 
narrator's statements display admirable consistency, a third 
exists to deny the possibility of the accord that has actually 
been achieved. Here, where the narrator is proved right, he 
proves himself wrong in the same sentence. 
- 
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An accusation of consistency on the part of the narrator, 
then, is "Hushed in the same breath" (Beckett, 1972, p. 62). 
Instantaneously with the `rest' of the climate, `all the faint 
breathings put together' of the individual bodies are replaced 
by the collective silence of `the same breath': 
Hushed in the same breath the faint stridulence mentioned 
above whence suddenly such silence as to drown all the faint 
breathings put together., 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 62) 
The noise of `breathings' cannot compete to be heard above the 
odd din of this silence which drowns them out. This paradoxical 
event is the last of any kind in the cylinder: 
So much roughly speaking for the last state of the cylinder 
and of this little people of searchers one first of whom if 
a man in some unthinkable past for the first time bowed his 
head if this notion is maintained. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 62-63) 
The impossible task has changed. Narrator and reader are now 
suddenly thinking of the cylinder in its `unthinkable past' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 63). The end of cylinder was to occur 
`imperceptibly' so as to catch the searchers `unawares' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 15); the narrative has played precisely this trick upon 
the reader. Between the gap of this last sentence and its 
predecessor, wherein the cylinder still existed to be drowned in 
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silence, its `unthinkable end' has occurred leaving only its 
`unthinkable past' to be thought. In the last words of the 
penultimate sentence, concepts concerning the condition of the 
cylinder were still being `put together' to describe its 
progression toward the end (Beckett, 1972, p. 62). ' While 
something existed-to progress towards dissolution, the state of 
the cylinder could continue to be narrated; upon completion of 
the process of dissolution, nothing remains of the cylinder to 
describe. The actual point where progression towards absence 
transforms into completion, the climactic, crowning moment of the 
narrative, is contained between a full stop and a capital 
letter. " 
So much for the `unthinkable end' for, as the end of the 
cylinder has pre-empted the'end of the narrative, we now have its 
`unthinkable past' with which to contend. As the end of the 
cylinder was `unthinkable', thinking about its past, which the 
narrator undertakes to do after this impossible end, presents its 
own difficulties. Furthermore, the narrator is now profligate 
with his use of `first' and `last', absolutes which have in the 
thinkable past proved especially troublesome. The `first' of 
`this little people of searchers', then, has `bowed his head' and 
this in the past tense. The last action described in the 
60 The exaggeration of understatement into an absence of 
statement on some crucial event occurs earlier in Molloy; as 
Kenner notes: 
[... ] Moran meets a man who resembles himself, enquiring 
after an old man with a stick. [... ] He kills this man. It 
is the most perfunctory killing in literature, occurring as 
it does in the interval between two sentences. 
(Kenner, 1973, p. 99) 
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narrative is not contemporaneous with the moment of its 
narration; the `bowed' head of which we are now thinking is an 
object of the cylinder's unthinkable past. Hitherto, we have 
been waiting for the `last of all' searchers (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 62) to become `motionless and bowed' like the `aged vanquished 
of the third zone' who `has none about him now but others in his 
image' (Beckett, 1972, p. 61). But the last sentence cannot 
describe the last searcher's decision to submit to becoming 
vanquished: the narrator instead reminisces about `one' from 
among `this little people of searchers' who was distinguished as 
being the `first' to have `bowed his head' (Beckett, 1972, p. 63, 
my emphasis). We are at the other extreme to the searcher who 
bows his head `last of all' (Beckett, 1972, p. 61). Yet a 
connection between these two opposites, the `last' searcher 
before the end of the cylinder and the `first' referred to by the 
sentence which comes after its end, is installed by the narrator. 
The 'last of all' has a special conditional clause attached to 
him: 
And sure enough there he stirs this last of all if a man 
[... ). 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 61) 
There he opens then his eyes this last of all if a man 
[... ]. 
- 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 62) 
In the last sentence too, this is a recurring condition: 
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So much roughly speaking for the last state of the cylinder 
and of this little people of searchers one first of whom iL 
a man [... ] bowed his head [... ]. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 62-63, my emphasis) 
These two bodies are connected by a conditional clause and 
opposed by the narrator's certainty that they are the first and 
last respectively. Like the light, they occupy `contiguous 
extremes', a conceptual compound which is indeed `shaken by a 
vertiginous tremolo' each time an attempt is made to think it 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 16). And it may indeed be inquired whether the 
`first' among the `little people of searchers' to bow `his head' 
was `a man' (Beckett, 1972, p. 63), for the `first among the 
vanquished' (Beckett, 1972, p. 62) to whom the last among the 
vanquished returns, may be re-identified by her `red head sunk 
to the uttermost' (Beckett, 1972, p. 61) and position as a `guide' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 62) as `the woman vanquished' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 56). 
The inspection to which she is subjected by the last 
searcher is not the first of its kind. At all times in the 
cylinder, the searcher is at liberty to `raise the lid to examine 
the eye' (Beckett, 1972, pp. 57-58) of a vanquished body. In the 
last act of searching in the cylinder, the last searcher returns 
to the first to desist: contiguous extremes meet again. 
Throughout his delineation of the `unthinkable end' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 60), the narrator's main focus has been upon the `last 
of all' (Beckett, 1972, p. 62); in his last sentence, the 
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narrator, with all of `this little people of searchers' from 
which to choose, also returns to the first of all: 
So much roughly speaking for the last state of the cylinder 
and of this little people of searchers one first of whom if 
a man in some unthinkable past for the first time bowed his 
head if this notion is maintained. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 62-63) 
The last act of the narrative is to switch attention from the 
`last state-of the cylinder' to the first `bowed [... ] head' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 63). ° Having moved beyond the end of the 
cylinder, the narrative thinks- itself back to a situation 
contemporaneous with merely the beginning of the end. The 
actions of the last searcher to relent returns him to the first. 
At the end of the cylinder, the first does not come to the last; 
the last moves towards the first. There is one other example of 
contiguous extremes: the beginning and ending of the narrative 
itself. The penultimate sentence of the narrative is the last 
apercu of the cylinder: 
Hushed in the same breath the faint stridulence mentioned 
above whence suddenly such silence as to drown all the faint 
breathings put together. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 62) 
The first aoercu of the cylinder presents almost immediately a 
teasing statement, of this end: 
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The light. [... ] Its restlessness at long intervals suddenly 
stilled like panting at the last. Then all go dead still. 
It is perhaps the end of their abode. A few seconds and all 
begins again. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 7) 
Less than `A few seconds' separates the end of the narrator's 
penultimate sentence and the beginning of his last, where we are 
thought back to the time of the `first' searcher to desist 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 63). From this temporal position onwards, `all 
begins again' (Beckett, 1972, p. 7). Tunnelling analytically 
through the narrative as stated towards to its point of exit, 
drops us, suitably breathless by now, back to the original point 
of entrance into this labyrinth. 
As `time flies' between beginning the narrative and coming 
to the point of its end; we find like the Unnamable that: - 
the metamorphosis is accomplished, of unchanging future into 
unchangeable past. Eh? Another thing, but of a different 
order. The affair is thorny. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 370) 
At the completion of the narrative, its past terms are 
`unchangeable' and, as the reader is positioned by its end back 
at its beginning, the terms of the narrative promise an 
`unchanging future' (Beckett, 1959, p. 370) for its contradictions 
and inconsistencies are to be gone through again. And at last, 
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having been unable to negotiate these terms again, " we reach 
the end again and all begins once more. Yet a `metamorphosis is 
accomplished' (Beckett, 1959, p. 370), for possibly there is `The 
dulling effect of habit, how do they deal with that? '; equally, 
`suffering' (Beckett, 1959, p. 370) may be lessened, constant or 
increased, for the Unnamable is at least comprehensive in the 
inconsistent options he supplies. Neither is this analogy an 
explanatory way out of The Lost Ones, unless contradictory terms 
may be thought to elucidate contradictory terms: " it is rather 
another thing, but of the same order. 
ix. More residua 
Like the tunnels constructed by the searchers which are 
either `abandoned blind' or lead back into the cylinder (Beckett, 
1972, p. 12), the route of analysis through The Lost ones leads 
to the discovery of many little dead-end aporiai which lie 
covertly in the terms of the narrative and ultimately, just when 
an exit is promised, to the major aporia of the text, the return 
to the beginning whereupon all the little aporiai may be 
activated again. The well-constructed maze, after all, 
encourages its inmates to go round in circles as well as bringing 
them to dead-ends. According to Kant, however, analytic 
61 A journey undertaken `first in one disorder, then in 
another' as the dust-jacket to Lessness has it (Beckett cited in 
Pilling, 1979, p. 173). 
62 How a `metamorphosis is accomplished' in relation to 
entities which are `unchanging' and `unchangeable' respectively 
is at least thorny; the distinction between `Another thing' and 
one that is `different' (Beckett, 1959, p. 370) is also admirably 
subtle. 
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judgements should display the capacity `to dispel falsehood and 
error' and, additionally, in their `positive employment', 
facilitate `the knowing of truth' (Kant, 1933, A151/B190, p. 190). 
It is `The principle of contradiction' which `must [... ] be 
recognized as being the universal and completely sufficient 
principle of all analytic knowledge' (Kant, 1933, A151/B191, 
p. 190): 
if the judgement is analytic, whether negative or 
affirmative, its truth can always be adequately known in 
accordance with the principle of contradiction. The reverse 
of that which as concept is contained and is thought in the 
knowledge of the object, is always rightly denied. But 
since the opposite of the concept would contradict the 
object, the concept itself must necessarily be affirmed of 
it. 63 
(Kant, 1933, A151/B190-191, p. 190) 
To unpack analytically the concepts of the narrative of The Lost 
ones as stated, is to find endemic contradiction and 
inconsistency between conceptual terms. Being contradictory, the 
notions contained in these terms cannot at one and the same time 
be true: the narrator states how the cylinder is, and analysis 
63 For example, `if I say, no unlearned man is learned, the 
proposition is analytic, since the property, unlearnedness, now 
goes to make up the concept of the subject, and the truth of the 
negative judgement then becomes evident as an immediate 
consequence of the principle of contradiction' (Kant, 1933, 
A153/B192, p. 191). Neither does the analytic judgement go beyond 
what is implicity thought in the concept; that `learnedness' 
excludes `unlearnedness' is a tautology. 
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must maintain that the cylinder cannot be like that. But 
howsoever the narrator's `point of view' cannot be maintained, 
it is also true,, as stated in Imagination Dead Imagine, that 
`there is no. other' (Beckett, 1984, p. 146). 
In The Lost ones, according to Dearlove: 
the narrator's powers of perception separate him from us. 
If it were not for the narrator, we would draw false 
conclusions about the cylinder. 
(Dearlove, 1982, p. 134) 
The narrator, it may be contended, does little else but draw 
conclusions about the cylinder which are subsequently proved 
untenable by the addition of further inconsistent conclusions. 
Judgement as to the state of the cylinder is caught between 
inconsistent assertions, a state of `antinomy' between the 
`thetic' and `antithetic': 
If thetic be the name for any body of dogmatic doctrines, 
antithetic may be taken as meaning, not dogmatic assertions 
of the opposite, but the conflict of the doctrines of 
seemingly dogmatic knowledge (thesis cum antithesi) in which 
no one assertion can establish superiority over another. " 
" The first `antinomy of pure reason' which Kant examines 
divides into a conflict between the thesis that `The world has 
a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space' and 
the antithetical proposition that `The world has no beginning, 
and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and 
space' (Kant, 1933, A427/B455, p. 396). Starting from either 
thesis or antithesis, Kant's analysis aims to demonstrate that 
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(Kant, 1933, A420-421/B448, p. 393) 
Were it not for the narrator, however, nothing whatsoever would 
obtain of the cylinder: its conceptual existence is not separable 
from the narrative of The Lost Ones. Amongst the residua, Closed 
Place, a- text which revisits more than the topography of The Lost 
Ones, chooses to state explicitly the reader's absolute reliance 
upon the'narrator: 
Closed place. All needed to be known for say is known. 
There is nothing but what is said. Beyond what is said 
there is nothing. What goes on in the arena is not said. 
, Did it need to be known it would be. No interest. Not for 
imagining. 
- 
Place consisting of an arena and a ditch. 
Between the two skirting the latter a track. Closed place. 
Beyond the ditch there is nothing. This is known because 
it needs to be'said. Arena black vast. Room for millions. 
Wandering and still. 
(Beckett, 1984, p. 199) 
Beckett refused to `accept responsibility' for anything placed 
under the auspices of Endgame beyond its situation `as stated' 
(Beckett, 1983a, p. 109). Amongst the residua, 'the restriction 
that 'There is nothing but what is said, (Beckett, 1984, p. 199) 
`the assertion of the opposite has, on its side, grounds that are just as valid and necessary' (Kant, 1933, A422/B449, ' p. 394). 
Both may be equally supported, yet each excludes the other. 
Analysis of The Lost ones involves the reader in comparable 
conceptual tangles, on comparable subjects, as the narrator 
maintains two or more incompatible statements where the 
maintenance of one should cancel support of the others. 
364 
reappears as a crucial factor in the interior definition of their 
conceptual objects. "' These conceptual entities increase in 
complexity as the narrative adds to their definitions. It is the 
prerogative also of the narrator to introduce alterations to 
these definitions; thus, in Closed Place, `The lots still bright 
are square. Appear square' (Beckett, 1984, p. 199). The 
qualification is implemented as quickly as it can be thought: 
dealing in conceptual structures, their nature can be transformed 
purely by fiat. What is `known' of these conceptual objects is 
entirely dependent upon `what is said' (Beckett, 1984, p. 199). 
When what is said alters or modulates, the concept transforms 
itself simultaneously. The residua inaugurate worlds by 
narrative fiat. These texts are not, in Kant's terms, 
`reproductive' or representative of a pre-existent object, but 
are rather autonomously `productive' of their own imaginative 
objects (Kant, 1952, Part I, §22, p. 86). The narrator of each 
text is endowed with a `performative power to make all by fiat' 
(Miller, 1987, p. 70): 
The genius, according to Kant, imitates nature not by 
copying it, but by duplicating the manner of its production. 
As God spoke nature into existence by means of the divine 
word and by means of his Son, the Word, so the genius [... ] 
speaks into existence a heterocosm which adds something 
hitherto unheard-of to nature. [... ] This new beauty is 
beyond measure by any slavish standards of mirroring 
6' As Pilling points out, Lessness is also `intent on 
demonstrating that there is literally nothing beyond the 
propositions that are being uttered' (Pilling, 1979, p. 151). 
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correspondence to things as they are. 
(Miller, 1987, pp. 66-67) 
In Beckett's Three Dialogues with Georges Duthuit, 
representation, whatever its shifts in focus `from fruits on 
plates to low mathematics and self-commiseration' (Beckett, 1965, 
p. 124), is merely one stop on `a dreary road' of artistic 
convention (Beckett, 1965, p. 103). The narrator of The Lost 
Ones, however, might claim common cause with M. C. Escher's 
`impossible staircases, architectural Möbius strips' and other 
`teasing constructions of visual nonsense' (Albright, 1981, 
p. 14). Such empirically impossible structures are as 'genuinely 
antimimetic' (Albright, 1981, p. 14) as Miller could desire. In 
Cdzanne's painting, inconsistencies begin the disruption of 
reference to the real: 
Inconsistencies in Cdzanne's paintings have frequently been 
pointed out: the most famous being his Kitchen Table (jeu 
de Paume, Paris), in which, if we follow the edge of the 
table under the tablecloth, it does not meet at the other 
end. But in the extraordinary Still Life with a Gingerjar 
and Eggplant (Metropolitan Museum, New York), we are 
dealing with more than such simple inconsistencies. [... ] 
[Cdzanne] was prepared to invade the world of the objects 
and rearrange their relationship to the natural world. It 
mattered not a jot to Cezanne that if you hold a plate at 
a certain angle everything will roll off it [... ]. 
(Peter, 1987, pp. 224-225) 
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Chirico's The Philosopher's Conquest (1914; Art Institute of 
Chicago) similarly incorporates both `unmoving clouds of smoke' 
and `flags fluttering in the wind' as part of `an a-logical 
visual scheme' (Peter, 1987, p. 233). The paintings of Cezanne 
and'Chirico, as well as Matisse, Braque and other Cubists, `bear 
the mark of a despotic artist, who imposed himself upon reality' 
(Peter, 1987, p. 225). As Albright speculates, `If mimesis cannot 
be slain, perhaps it can be tricked into committing suicide' 
(Albright, 1981, p. 14) via such techniques as these. Allegorical 
readings of The Lost ones which endeavour to restore a 
referential function to the text must similarly founder on its 
cultivation of 
-empirical impossibilities. The work of each 
artist here endeavours to remove itself from what Beckett 
depreciates in Three Dialogues as `the plane of the feasible' 
(Beckett, 1965, p. 103). 
Where the definition of a conceptual object is thus purely 
the product of the interior determinations of a text, rather than 
guided by reference to the real, an opportunity is created for 
exhaustive analysis of that concept, for it contains only what 
has been put into it via `what is said' (Beckett, 1984, 
-p. 199), -. - 
The fabricated conceptual objects of Beckett's residua hold out 
the temptation of "complete exposition, that is, [... ] 
definition' (Kant, 1933, A730-731/B758-759, p. 588): 
A concept which I have invented I can always define; for 
since it is not given to me either by the nature of the 
understanding or by experience, but is such as I have myself 
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deliberately made it to be, I must know what I have intended 
to think in using it. 
(Kant, 1933, A729/B757, p. 587, my emphasis) 
Analogously, in 1967, between the composition of ping and 
Lessness, Beckett is reported to have associated `the value of 
the theatre' with the satisfaction of defining an artificial 
structure, `a world of one's own': 
One must make a world of one's own in order to satisfy one's 
need to know, to understand, one's need for order 
... 
There 
for me, lies the value of the theatre. One turns out a 
small world with its own laws, conducts the actions as if 
upon a chessboard [... ]. 
(Beckett cited in McMillan and Fehsenfeld, 1988, p. 15) 
Ping opens with the declaration `All known' (Beckett, 1984, 
p. 149); 66 it closes with the exact judgement `ping over' 
(Beckett, 1984, p. 151). The cylinder of The Lost Ones is exactly 
what every statement of the narrative makes it. In the completed 
text, these 'terns are fixed and unchangeable. In alliance with 
his counterparts in the other residual texts, the narrator of I 
Lost Ones must be permitted to make a striking declaration: 
in the cylinder alone are certitudes to be found and without 
66 If the situation of ping is co-extensive with its 
statement in the narrative then it may be correctly asserted that 
`All' is indeed `known' concerning this situation. The narrative 
itself is necessarily the exclusive source of knowledge about its 
own invention; what is not said does not exist in relation to it. 
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nothing but mystery. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 42) 
In the context of the residua, where `There is nothing but what 
is said' and `Beyond what is said there is nothing' (Beckett, 
1984, p. 199), no irony need be attached to the narrator's 
contention. Each statement as to what obtains in and of the 
cylinder is fixed and certain: the concept of the cylinder simply 
is what these statements define it to be. There exists no 
independent object-exterior to the narrative in comparison to 
which the narrator's conceptual determination of the cylinder 
could be judged to be inadequate. 
x. `What is it I want? [... J I want to see the dog' 
The'accuracy of the narrator's version of the cylinder in 
The Lost Ones cannot be disputed as if some other object were 
available separately from the text for the purpose of verifying 
these specifications. In respect of critical complaints 
concerning the narrator's mistaken delineation of the cylinder, 
the question must be posed, as compared to what? Murphy is 
particularly unhappy with the final section of The Lost Ones: 
The narrator (like Beckett) is trapped by the cylinder, by 
the realities of his creation or discovery. Section 15 
attempts `a way out' of this dilemma by imagining the end 
of the searchers. The epilogue is, however, a patent 
falsification of the reality of the work in the interests 
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of a rhetorical closure that will satisfy the narrator's 
need for order'. 
(Murphy, 1982, p. 74) 
Whether thinking an end that is simultaneously defined as 
`unthinkable' (Beckett, 1972, p. 63) is the best way to satisfy 
a `need for order' (Murphy, 1982, p. 74) is matter for a different 
dispute. This section, however, cannot be a `falsification of 
the reality of the work' (Murphy, 1982, p. 74), when it is the 
reality of the work. There is nothing exterior to the text which 
it can be judged to falsify. The fifteenth section is the end 
of the narrative; like moments in the cylinder, `there will be 
no other' (Beckett, 1972, p. 35). If the ending is considered 
inconsistent with the logic of the rest of the text, this 
inconsistency is also the reality of the work: it can be 
concluded-that the ending is inconsistent, but not that it is a 
`falsification' (Murphy, 1982, p. 74). The ending, like the rest 
of the cylinder, simply is what its statement makes it. 
According to Murphy again: 
the reader need not be a silent victim of the author's 
designs; we are not compelled to accept the form in which 
the work is cast nor to believe it. 
(Murphy, 1990, p. 106) 
Declining to `accept the form in which the work is cast' (Murphy, 
1990, p. 106) would seem to be identical with rejecting The Lost 
ones as an object of discussion. The work takes no other form 
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than the one in which it is cast. Brater is more circumspect in 
recommending departures from the text: 
Sometimes it [... ] becomes necessary to reposition elements 
in a sentence or to add new elements to them in order to 
extract some elementary point of reference. Yet in these 
instances the reader experiences the same insecurity in 
'correcting' the sentences in The Lost Ones as he does in 
checking the figures of the narrator's mathematics: we are 
never quite sure that the adjusted syntax sufficiency 
transmits the true sense of what the grammatically 
'inaccurate' sentences have been designed to imply. 
(Brater, 1983, p. 105) 
Again, nothing is available for inspection in comparison to which 
these sentences may be judged as being in need of "'correcting"' 
(Brater, 1983, p. 105). Their `true sense' is not something 
distinct from what they actually -state. If statements are 
grammatically inaccurate and cultivate obscurity as to even `some 
elementary point of reference', this is a quality which cannot 
be conjured away by replacing ambiguous statements with their 
`true sense' (Brater, 1983, p. 105). As Brater makes clear, in 
the case of ambiguity it is this `true sense' which is missing, 
but what is absent 
-cannot be appealed to in order to dissolve 
ambiguity. 
In The Lost Ones, the reader is given `nothing but what is 
said' (Beckett, 1984, p. 199); by virtue of this restriction, the 
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reader is considerably disadvantaged in relation to the searchers 
of the cylinder, for notable provisions are made in the cylinder 
to prevent their `quest' from becoming a `mockery': 
It is enjoined by a certain ethics not to do unto others 
what coming from them might give offence. This precept is 
largely observed in the cylinder in so far as it does not 
jeopardize the quest which would clearly be a mockery if in 
case of doubt it were not possible to check certain details. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 58) 
The defining feature which converts the good order of the search 
intoa `mockery' comes into force when `in case of doubt' it is 
not possible `to check certain details' (Beckett, 1972, p. 58). 
For the reader, it is never possible to check any of the manifold 
doubtful details of the cylinder. There is nothing beyond any 
of the narrator's doubtful assertions to which an appeal may be 
made for adjudication. The searchers, by contrast, may instigate 
direct empirical investigations in order to gain `elucidation' 
with respect to their doubtful `details': 
Direct action with a view to their elucidation is generally 
reserved for the persons of the sedentary and vanquished. "' 
Face or back to the wall these normally offer but a single 
aspect and so may have to be turned the other way. But 
67 It is to be `the persons' of the sedentary and 
vanquished who are open to investigation (Beckett, 1972, p. 59); 
the ambiguity of this sentence converts the bodies which are to 
be investigated momentarily into those of the investigators. 
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wherever there is motion as in the arena or among the 
watchers and the possibility of encompassing the object 
there is no call for such manipulations. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 58-59) 
The cylinder itself cannot be manipulated in the same way by the 
reader. Each detail concerning the cylinder is `Seen from a 
certain angle' (Beckett, 1972, p: 13), that determined by the 
narrator. 68 Where the reader receives `but a single aspect', he 
cannot independently turn this conceptual object the other way 
around; the. adjustment needed to permit `the possibility of 
encompassing the object' (Beckett, 1972, p. 59). Where a second 
or third apergu is undertaken into what are putatively the same 
details, the majority of the results stated are inconsistent. 
In both cases, what obtains in and of the cylinder is always 
mediated by the narrator; direct empirical inspection to verify 
incomplete or incompatible details is not possible. 
To sort out the conceptual clashes supplied by the narrator 
of The Lost Ones, we should need to follow the empirical 
procedure envisaged by Molloy, designed to provide determinate 
evidence concerning the objects which exercise him: 
68 The partiality of the angle of vision assumed by the 
narrator is often acknowledged. The `two narrow rings turning 
in opposite directions about the teeming precinct' is an 
`impression' which may `at times' be given, but only when the 
scene is `suitably lit from above' (Beckett, 1972, p. 29). What 
is seen from other angles is not stated. `[T]he wall' that 
`presents an unbroken surface all the way round and up to the 
ceiling' presents this appearance only when `Seen from below' (Beckett, 1972, p. 55). 
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What is it I want? Ah that tone I know, compounded of pity, 
of fear, of disgust. I want to see the dog, see the man, 
at close quarters, know what smokes, inspect the shoes, find 
out other things. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 13) 
Lacking this chance of verification, Molloy's speculations 
concerning his objects remain entirely groundless: `all that 
proved nothing, refuted nothing' (Beckett, 1959, p. 12). Within 
The Lost ones, the narrator at least is not going to have 
hypotheses maintained when an appeal to empirical evidence 
suggests the opposite conclusions. Empirical observation is 
needed, inappropriately, in order to determine the proper 
progress of the destruction of the searchers' eyes: 
It might safely be maintained that the eye grows used to 
these conditions and in the end adapts to them were it not 
that just the contrary is to be observed in the slow 
deterioration of vision ruined by this fiery flickering murk 
and by the incessant straining for ever vain with 
concomitant moral distress and its repercussion on the 
organ. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 38) 
Empirical observation pierces the `flickering murk' to see `the 
slow deterioration of vision'; it can be seen that all 
`straining' to see is `for ever vain' (Beckett, 1972, p. 38). A 
hypothesis is refuted by empirical observation and the latter 
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procedure vindicated. Except, that on the facing page, attention 
to empirical evidence leads to a `mistaken conclusion' on the 
same subject: 
And the thinking being coldly intent on all these data and 
evidences could scarcely escape at the close of his analysis 
the mistaken conclusion that instead of speaking of the 
vanquished with the slight taint of pathos attaching to the 
term it would 'be more correct to speak of the blind and 
leave it at that. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 39) 
Data and evidences, 
-the basis of the empirical method, are now 
unreliable. It should also be noted that the evidence appealed 
to in this case is additionally defined as `insensible' and 
`unperceived' (Beckett, 1972, p. 39), qualities would seem to 
disqualify its eligibility for empirical apprehension. For the 
reader, every scrap of the `data and evidences' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 39) cited by the narrator is unverifiable and perceived only 
conceptually. The reader has no empirical evidence whatsoever 
concerning the cylinder, but rather incommensurable hypotheses. 
Similarly, the narrator's thoughts about the swiftness or 
otherwise of queues appeal to a merely illusory empirical 
grounding:, 
The short queue is not necessarily the most rapid and such 
a one starting fifth may well find himself first before such 
another starting tenth assuming of course they start 
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together. This being so no wonder that the choice of the 
queue is determined by considerations having nothing to do 
with its length. 
- 
f (Beckett, 1972, pp. 47-48) 
If the narrator were really watching the progress of his 
exemplary queues, rather than marshalling support for the 
hypothesis of the searchers' other `considerations' when choosing 
a queue, he might notice that the examples employed to 
substantiate his original contention in fact contradict it. To 
verify the notion that `The short queue is not necessarily the 
most rapid', the narrator points to the useful example of a 
searcher at a shorter queue gaining first place more rapidly than 
a searcher waiting at a longer queue. 69 The narrator's example, 
in relation to his hypothesis, is wrong; the narrator's 
hypothesis, in relation to his example, is also wrong. If it 
were established that the longer queue might be the more rapid, 
69 Amiran picks the right example for the wrong reasons to 
qualify his judgement that The Lost Ones presents a `world of 
high certainty' (Amiran, 1993, p. 168): 
At the same time, Beckett carefully infuses [... ] a spirit 
of randomness and unaccountability. The climbers in Ig 
Lost Ones, for instance, may wait long at the queues to the 
niches, or they may not, so that the wait for a ladder does 
not correlate with the length of a line to that ladder, as 
compared to the wait at another line. Just when it appears 
that life is regular and predictable, our information is 
made imprecise by intangible factors (here the whim of the 
climbers). (Amiran, 1993, p. 172) 
In the first place, if the longer queue were determined as 
quicker in the narrator's example, this departure from the 
`regular and predictable' would actually have been predicted; 
regularly, such irregularities may occur. This would increase 
precision rather than otherwise. In the second place, the 
narrator does not unproblematically maintain any such thing. 
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it would then be `no wonder that the choice of the queue is 
determined by considerations having nothing to do with its 
length' (Beckett, 1972, p. 48); as this is not decisively 
established, this second contention breaks down also 
. 
7" For the 
reader, there is no empirical access to the cylinder to verify 
or disqualify either side of the narrator's claim. The example 
the narrator cites is itself merely another conceptual statement 
about what may be observed in the cylinder: as far as the reader 
is concerned, it has nothing to do with direct empirical 
observation. What the reader actually has to contend with once 
more are two incompatible conceptual hypotheses with no way of 
choosing between them. Upon the basis of the statements provided 
by the narrator as to the relative merits of the shorter or 
longer queue, the searcher should be similarly bereft of reasons 
to prefer one to the other. 
xi. `It's all a bubble' 
Molloy's recourse to a strategy of empirical inspection 
retains within his narrative merely the status of one further 
hypothesis concerning what may be done with the undetermined 
objects which temporarily attract his speculative attentions. 
Empirical research does not in fact serve as the way out of the 
fantasies woven by ungrounded hypotheses, as its pursuit does not 
itself get beyond the stage of the hypothetical: 
70 Exasperation may be increased further by proceeding to 
the narrator's next contribution: `Not that all choose nor even 
the greater number' (Beckett, 1972, p. 48). For the `greater 
number' of searchers this whole protracted controversy as to the 
most rapid queue is utterly irrelevant. 
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I knew I 'could catch him, lame as I was. 
- 
I had only to want 
to. And yet no, for I did want to. To get up, to get down 
on the road, to set off hobbling in pursuit of him, to hail 
him, what could be easier? He hears my cries, turns, waits 
for me. I am up against him, up against the dog, gasping, 
between my crutches. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 13) 
The point where the empiricist reaches sufficiently `close 
quarters' (Beckett, 1959, p. 13) to begin a direct investigation 
of these objects is a fiction within the larger fiction of 
Molloy. 
- 
From `He hears my cries' onwards (Beckett, 1959, p. 13), 
Molloy is writing up the postulated behaviour of man and dog from 
the resources of an additional speculative hypothesis as to what 
would be empirically apprehended from `close quarters', a 
proximity that is never achieved. These empirical results are 
themselves hypothetical. For the reader here, as in The Lost 
Ones, no direct determination of the empirical attributes of 
these objects is available to put an end to Molloy's ungrounded 
speculations concerning them. Trivially, no exit from fictional 
determinations is possible from any fictional text. However, the 
objects which Molloy speculates that he might wish to `inspect', 
being dogs, men, smoking materials and shoes (Beckett, 1959, 
p. 13), do not in their nature rule out the theoretical 
possibility of his doing so within his own fiction. Neither is 
there anything to hamper the theoretical possibility that the 
reader might be able to inspect objects of the same order, 
although not the particular ones that exercise Molloy, in the 
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mundanely empirical world exterior to the text. The conceptual 
objects which constitute the narrative of The Lost Ones are 
somewhat different. 
If the reader has encountered in his travels through the 
world a'man, a dog, a cigar and a pair of shoes, it is a matter 
of little controversy whether such things may exist empirically. 
Whether ladders of the type in use in the cylinder of The Lost 
Ones could ever be empirically apprehended even by the most 
experienced explorer is more debatable. What are required are 
ladders that `are single without exception', although 
simultaneously `Some are fitted with a sliding extension' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 9). The ladders which would satisfy both of 
these specifications at once cannot be built. Some are to 
incorporate a `sliding extension' while all of their number are 
to be bereft of such an attribute. This is how the ladders must 
be, but empirical ladders cannot be like this. Further, all 
`vary greatly in size' although `The shortest measure not less 
than six metres' (Beckett, 1972, p. 9): in ordering the ladders 
for a-working model of the cylinder, it can be determined that 
none should be shorter than six metres and all should be of 
different lengths, but the actual sizes of the ladders are 
undetermined. All empirical ladders are of an actual size, 
whatever that size is. A decision as to length would have to 
made in the absence of determinate information as to the proper 
length required. This problem applies to all the instances where 
the narrator supplies merely approximate information, for 
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approximations cannot be manifested empirically. 71 As stated, 
the `Floor, and wall' of the cylinder `are of solid rubber or 
suchlike' (Beckett, 1972, p. 8): if the cylinder is built, its 
floor and wall will either be fabricated from rubber or from a 
material like rubber although not rubber. In either case, the 
material must be determined as either rubber or not; the 
indeterminate specification `rubber or suchlike' cannot be 
empirically reproduced. Similarly, the cylinder's `total 
surface' cannot, be actualized to fulfil the specification that 
it measures `some eighty thousand' in square centimetres. " If 
the total area built is 79,999 square centimetres or 80,000 
square centimetres or 80,001 square centimetres or any fraction 
between these points, then this is its exact total mural area. 
Strictly, none of these possible empirical measurements respect 
the specification that the surface area of the cylinder is some 
eighty thousand' square centimetres (Beckett, 1972, p. 7, my 
emphasis). When empirically constructed, the surface area of the 
71 Approximations, it may be maintained, are to be found in 
`our descriptions of reality' rather than as `a feature of 
reality' (Sainsbury, 1995, p. 25, n. 4). Real objects must lack 
certain aspects of the vagueness attributed to them in The Lost 
Ones; as Wittgenstein remarks: 
A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, 
must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by 
colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the 
sense of touch some degree of hardness, and so on. 
(Wittgenstein, 1974, §2.0131, p. 6) 
As actual ladders must be of some determinate measurement, so, 
Wittgenstein agrees, `Every rod has a length' (Wittgenstein, 
1968, Part I, §251, p. 90). 
72 There is a disagreement between editions of The Lost 
Ones as to whether eighty thousand square centimetres should 
refer to mural, rather than total, area of the cylinder surface. 
See below Chapter Six, Section xi on this controversy. 
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cylinder will actually be something exact and determinate, 
whereas the narrator specifies that it is to be an approximation. 
Whereas the narrator states that the oscillation of 
temperature in the cylinder between its extremes takes `about 
four seconds' (Beckett, 1972, p. 8), the time taken for this 
change in the empirical model will be determined as either four 
seconds or not, and this determination too will violate the 
approximation required. Application of the instruction that 
lulls are of `varying duration but never exceeding ten seconds 
or thereabouts' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17) must cope with the 
impossibility of actually reproducing the specification of "ten 
seconds or thereabouts': an exact duration must be chosen which 
is at liberty to be some fraction less than or exactly ten 
seconds. But it cannot be other than a determinate time. In 
regard to the temperature, `remission never lasts more than a 
little less than a second' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17). If unravelling 
of this specification can proceed past the conceptual perplexity 
engendered by `more than a little less than', in application, 
empirical exactitude must make inaccurate the approximation `a 
little less than a second'. Where the narrator describes the 
temperature of the cylinder as "more or less hot or cold' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 8), the temperature is determined in such a way 
as to avoid determining it at all. " In an empirical 
73 It is the temperature's `regular variation of five 
degrees per second' (Beckett, 1972, p. 16), which appears to be 
an entirely straightforward statement, which ultimately works out 
into a further source of indetermination. We know that the 
temperature `passes from one extreme to the other in about four 
seconds' (Beckett, 1972, p. 8). It seems apparent, then, that the 
drop of temperature from the maximum of twenty-five degrees to 
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reconstruction, the temperature may be anything, but it must also 
be something. The empiricist must pick a temperature upon the 
basis of information which takes care not to make a 
specification. 
If we are to have ladders, and in an astonishing recourse 
to determinate numbers we are to have fifteen of them (Beckett, 
1972, p. 17), we will also need niches and tunnels to avoid `the 
intolerable presence of properties serving no purpose' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 23). Discovery of the nature of the niches themselves, 
however, so that they may be reproduced empirically, is not so 
easy: 
twenty takes one second, another drop from twenty to fifteen 
degrees takes one second, another from fifteen to ten degrees one 
second and one second also passes as the temperature drops from 
ten degrees to the minimum of five degrees. The possibility of 
regularity is available to the narrator; it is a chance of 
simplicity not taken: 
Does this mean that with every passing second there is a 
rise or fall of five degrees exactly neither more nor less? 
Not quite. For it is clear there are two periods in the 
scale namely from twenty-one degrees on on the way up and 
from nine on on the way down when this difference will not 
be reached. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 41) 
It is also clear that it is not only at these two points where 
the average move of five degrees per second might be breached. 
The only information which remains stable concerning the movement 
of temperature is that it moves between its extremes of twenty- 
five to five degrees in four seconds. The average movement is 
thus five degrees per second, but these limits are actually 
compatible with all kinds of sudden fluctuations. For example, 
a slow movement of temperature from five to six degrees in three 
seconds complemented by a rapid rise from six to twenty-five 
degrees in one second is quite compatible with the average of a 
five degree shift per second. How the temperature should 
actually move between its maximum and minimum limits is entirely 
undetermined. The statement of an average is uninformative as 
to actual behaviour. 
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A more or less wide mouth gives rapid access to a chamber 
of varying capacity but always sufficient for a body in 
reasonable command of its joints to enter in and similarly 
once in to crouch down after a fashion. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 11) 
As the size of a body is not stated, the narrator does not give 
away any hint as to the actual dimensions of such niches. 
Without knowing the dimensions of a searcher, the statement that 
the mouth of a niche is large enough to permit his `rapid access' 
is entirely uninformative as to its actual measurements. The 
interior of a niche, ýfurthermore, is `sufficient' to contain a 
searcher only upon the condition that he is in possession of `a 
body in reasonable command of its joints', begging the question 
as to what is `reasonable' in such circumstances, and then only 
to permit such a body `to crouch down after a fashion' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 11). The actual position denoted by `after a fashion' 
is not stated. ` An empirical model, if it wishes to put its 
searchers in niches, and it must, will be obliged to ride 
roughshod over all such indetermination and fashion niches and 
searchers to dimensions not given by the narrator. These niches 
are then to be positioned empirically such that their regularity 
gives the impression of `quincunxes' and their irregularity the 
simultaneous impression of `irregular quincunxes' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 11). Of the tunnels, `most have no other way out than the way 
in' (Beckett, 1972, p. 12) but `a normal tunnel' may be entered 
`at the same time by opposite ends' (Beckett, 1972, p. 13). 
Whether the majority of tunnels that we must carve are to comply 
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with the specification of `most' or with the opposing 
specification'of'the `normal' is not possible to decide. Real 
tunnels must conform to one specification or the other, and once 
built the type in the majority can be determined or a draw 
declared. But this is to depart from the narrative as stated, 
wherein the majority cannot be decided. Similarly, as the 
narrator 'specifies the difficulties attending the bodies' 
recognition of one another, the climbers' code regulating the use 
of ladders and circulation between zones will not properly work 
in practice; but the narrator also states that in the cylinder, 
the operations it demands are carried out `unfailingly' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 44). If other statements concerning the non-recognition 
of one searcher by another are played out empirically, the 
climbers' code cannot simultaneously function in application. 
If the climbers' code is to work, the specifications of non- 
recognition must be not put into practice. But the searchers 
cannot be empirically set in motion with orders to recognize each 
other and not to recognize each other at one and the same time. 
In an empirical model, recognition would either be possible or 
impossible and each option excludes the other. Again, this would 
be to violate the inconsistency which obtains in the cylinder as 
stated. The' possibility of representing empirically the 
qualities of that `certain interval' of time which divides the 
climbers into either ladder-engrossing laggards or precipitantly 
climbing wretches must also be doubted (Beckett, 1972, p. 23). 
If we can observe that the bodies' calculation of this interval 
is `unerringly timed by all', the narrator's statement that it 
is "difficult to assess' would lack any substantive evidence 
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(Beckett, 1972, p. 23). If we can observe in our empirical model 
that the bodies find this interval `difficult to assess', this 
apprehension can only be substantiated by evidence that it is not 
`unerringly timed by all' (Beckett, 1972, p. 23). Only one side 
of the specification can be visible empirically at any one time: 
in the cylinder, it is the nature of this `interval' that it is 
at once `difficult to assess but unerringly timed by all' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 23). This definition cannot be made manifest 
empirically. It will also be difficult to demonstrate the 
`heightened fixity of the motionless' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17) in 
empirical terms, for the `motionless' would seem to be bereft of 
any further options for demonstrating their `heightened fixity'. ' 
Convincing an observer that the belt "along the wall of the 
cylinder is actually `reserved for the carriers' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 27) would not be facilitated by the narrator's specification 
that `a certain number of sedentary searchers sitting or standing 
against the wall' (Beckett, 1972, p. 28) and `four vanquished out 
of five' (Beckett', 1972, p. 29) must be also stationed in this 
zone. The empirical representation of this reservation also'must 
make manifest that it is not `reserved for the carriers' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 27) just as we are trying to construct it to 
make manifest the specification that it is. Quite how `Sucklings 
[... ] having no longer to suck' (Beckett, 1972, p. 30) could be 
presented so as to assure the observer that they remain 
`Sucklings' also presents a challenge to the model-builder. 
Empirically, it would be possible to observe whether the 
skin or the eyes of the searchers are destroyed first under the 
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conditions of the model we have set up; to be true to the 
cylinder, however, there should be no possibility of determining 
this fact. The eyes of the searchers, however, would have to be 
`seen to redden more and more' while `their pupils little by 
little [... ] dilate till the whole orb was devoured' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 39), that is, be observed becoming increasingly red while 
becoming increasingly black. Neither do we know whether our 
model searchers are to be coloured red, yellow, red-yellow, grey, 
green, brown, or some tone derived from a mixture of all or some 
of these colours. If these bodies are to be manufactured 
empirically, they will have to be of some determinate colour, a 
necessity which again violates the lack of information provided 
in the narrator's specification. It may be possible to replicate 
empirically the effect of a `dim omnipresent light' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 55), even if the narrator does define it as a light 
which, being : `dim', is barely there and at the same time, being 
`omnipresent', is everywhere. It may even be possible to 
contrive that this light renders the cylinder `uniformly 
luminous' (Beckett, 1972, p. 40), for it is decreed that `Niches 
and tunnels are subject to the same light and climate as the rest 
of the abode' (Beckett, 1972, p. 13). The interior `depths of a 
tunnel' which more usually display less brightness than is 
present externally, in the cylinder must not (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 40). With sufficient ingenuity, this specification might be 
followed. Whether lighting arrangements can be found which 
reproduce the additional effects required by the narrator, 
however, is more doubtful, for this must also be a `Light in a 
word that not only dims but blurs into the bargain' (Beckett, 
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1972, p. 38). A light that dims rather than illuminates what it 
shines upon would be a unique empirical effect. 
Before beginning this empirical construction, however, we 
must `already' have in place some searchers `at the foot of the 
ladders or frozen in the tunnels' (Beckett, 1972, pp. 34-35), a 
task which will be made more difficult by the fact that before 
we have begun making the cylinder neither ladders, tunnels nor 
searchers yet exist. After we have managed to incorporate this 
impossible feature into the model cylinder, we must ensure that 
one searcher later qualifies as the `first' to come `to a 
standstill' despite the fact that other have already been 
deployed `frozen' in the tunnels (Beckett, 1972, p. 35). As this 
empirical model progresses toward its specified end, we must 
ensure that `dead still' non-searchers (Beckett, 1972, p. 60) are 
also `compelled to brush together without ceasing' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 61). All the qualities of the cylinder and its bodies 
which the narrator' defines as `unperceived' (Beckett, 1972, p. 15; 
p. 19) and `insensible' (Beckett, 1972, p. 39) must be perceived 
to be imperceptible by the perceptual apparatus of the observer. 
It would be as well to ensure that the `insensible' nature of 
these features be made manifest to the senses of the observer 
too. " Apprehending the end of this empirical reconstruction of 
the cylinder presents particular problems for the observer: 
" Ping plays similar tricks as to what is known and not 
known: `Ping elsewhere always there but that known not' (Beckett, 
1984, p. 150); `Planes meeting invisible one only shining white 
infinite but that known not' (Beckett, 1984, p. 150). A 
description is given in each statement prior to the content of 
that statement being described as `known not'. 
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here all should die but with so gradual and to put it 
plainly so fluctuant a death as to escape the notice even 
of a visitor. 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 18) 
In accordance with what the narrator states, an empirical version 
of the cylinder must make clear to its observers that `here all 
should die', for this proposition is part of what the model must 
demonstrate. But it must also ensure that this proposition, 
which has to be made manifest so that its workings may be 
empirically perceived, is made manifest in such a way as `to 
escape the notice even of a visitor' (Beckett, 1972, p. 18), or, 
to put it plainly, so that its workings may not be empirically 
perceived. It must-also find a way to present an occurrence 
recognizable as `a death' which is yet `fluctuant' (Beckett, 
1972, p. 18), without cancelling the observer's judgement that `a 
death' had occurred. This `death' and its `fluctuant' nature 
are, at the same time, `to escape the notice' of the observer. 
But, to be true to the terms of the narrative as stated, it must 
also to be brought to the notice of the observer that precisely 
these occurrences, of which he now has no clue, have escaped his 
notice. To be aware if this, and to be aware of the nature of 
what he has missed, these occurrences must be made manifest 
again. And now it cannot be made manifest that they have escaped 
notice, for they are brought to the notice of the observer so 
that he may perceive the nature of what he has not noticed. 75 
's Whether these features are perceived or sensed or not is 
now the subject of some confusion. The situation is analogous 
to position of Henry's long-johns in Embers: 
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Within conceptual terms, the narrator's proposition that 
`all should die [... ] so fluctuant 'a death' as to be 
imperceptible is doubly contradictory, but it is a combination 
of contradictions that can be thought; otherwise, not even its 
contradictory nature could be determined. Empirically, however, 
no object could simultaneously make manifest all the incompatible 
statements issued by, the narrator concerning the cylinder. " 
ADA: [... ] Did you put on your jaegers, Henry? 
HENRY: What happened was this, I put them on and then I took 
them off again and then I put them on again and then 
I took them off again and then I took them on again and 
then I- 
ADA: Have you them on now? 
HENRY: I don't know. 
(Beckett, 1986, p. 257) 
76 In"relation to How It Is, according to Pilling: 
The impossible to be uttered, needs to be put in the form 
of a contradiction, but as Wittgenstein has pointed out (Tractatus, 4.464) a contradiction's truth is impossible. 
The contradiction negates itself; it is the nearest 
approximation to actual absence that the literary work can 
support. (Pilling, 1976,. p. 51) 
In The Lost Ones, contradictions do not work to cancel either 
term: for contradiction to occur both terms must be equally 
present. To maintain that both terms can be rendered absent by 
the presence of both is a proposition that does negate itself, 
but the concepts thought in this proposition do not thereby 
disappear. As Schopenhauer confirms: 
Even a logical contradiction is only a relative nothing; it 
is no thought of our faculty of reason; yet it is not on 
that account an absolute nothing. For it is a word- 
combination; it is an example of the unthinkable which is 
necessarily required in logic to demonstrate the laws of 
thought. ' 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 1, §71, p. 409) 
The contradictions of The Lost Ones remain intact to be 
reactivated each time the terms of the narrative are thought. 
What is necessarily absent is any possibility that a 
contradictory description of an object could be manifested 
empirically. To paraphrase Pilling, the narrative of The Lost 
Ones presents an `[empirical] void that is also a [conceptual] 
plenum' (Pilling, 1976, p. 51). 
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Actual ladders are either single or fitted with an extension. 
Objects are either in motion or immobile. An immobile object 
cannot display additional fixity. Light does not make dim what 
it. illuminates. What is perceived is not also unperceived. 
Approximations cannot remain securely indeterminate when what 
they do not exactly measure is built. It may be -safely 
maintained that if one of these specifications is carried out 
empirically, its complementary opposite cannot be. 
The Lost ones departs fundamentally from texts which deal 
with events and objects which could theoretically be made 
empirically manifest. The fiction constructed by All Strange 
Away, for`example, 
"is indeed considerably less strange: 
Light out, long dark, candle and matches, imagine them, 
strike one to light, light on, blow out, light out, strike 
another, light on, so on. Light out, strike one to light, 
light on, 
-light all the same, candlelight in light, blow 
out, light out, so on. No candle, no matches, no need, 
never were. 
(Beckett, 1984, p. 118) 
The narrator of The Lost Ones might be trusted to reformulate 
this eminently possible fiction as light out, blow out, light on, 
strike another, light out, and so on to more elaborate 
inconsistencies. The cylinder of The Lost ones is an impossible 
object in addition to being a fictional object. Not only is 
there no object separable from the concatenation of inconsistent 
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conceptual terms of The Lost Ones which could adjudicate between 
these terms, the possibility of constructing such an object is 
ruled out precisely by virtue of these inconsistencies. " The 
specifications of the cylinder are entirely at the mercy of the 
narrator's fiat, and this privilegexis employed for the 
furtherance of ever greater conceptual disorder. According to 
Schiller: 
we must surely call divine any tendency which has as its 
unending task the realization of that most characteristic 
attribute of Godhead, viz., absolute manifestation of 
potential (the actualization of all that is possible), and 
absolute unity of manifestation (the necessity of all that 
is made actual). 
- 
(Schiller, 1967, pp. 75-77) 
77 The consistency of invented fictional detail can be a 
source of concern to Beckett's other narrators: 
Buttons of all shapes and sizes. Worn upright the skirts 
swept the ground. That seems to hang together. (Beckett, 1984, p. 209) 
When my chamber-pot is full I put it on the table beside the 
dish. Then I go twenty-four hours without a pot. No, I 
have two pots. They have thought of everything. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 185) 
The narrator of All Strange Away is concerned that his fictional 
construct `might well be imagined' (Beckett, 1984, p. 123). His 
is an empirically plausible and non-contradictory, if bizarre, 
invention. In this text the measurements of its `rotunda' must 
be revised when the narrator admits `suddenly clear these 
dimensions faulty' (Beckett, 1984, p. 124). The narrator of I 
Lost Ones is not disposed to such confessions or corrections. 
Reflection upon itself is as dangerous to The Lost Ones as 
silence for The Unnamable: `they dare not be silent for long, the 
whole fabrication might collapse' (Beckett, 1959, p. 351). 
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The fiat of the narrator is abused to precisely the opposite 
ends. Rather than the actualization of the possible, the 
narrator prefers the conceptual elaboration of the impossible. 
The narrative respects neither the constraints of empirical 
possibility nor the limits of logical consistency between 
conceptual propositions. 
In its first English translation in 1972, disrespect is 
accorded to mathematical laws also. '° The height of the 
cylinder in Le Depeupleur is given as sixteen metres; in the 
first edition of The Lost Ones, it is eighteen. In this English 
text, this measurement, in alliance with the fifty metre 
circumference with which the French text agrees, is not in 
harmony with the `some eighty thousand' declared square 
centimetres of the cylinder's `total surface' (Beckett, 1972, 
p. 7). In David Warrilow's account, Beckett was brought to 
`ruefully' confess `that the figure eighteen was indeed a most 
regrettable error' (Warrilow, 1986, p. 87); whether it is a 
regrettable error of the narrator or author, however, is not 
stated. If responsibility does lie with the narrator, the 
miscalculation can be counted as something other than an error. 
How suspiciously appropriate such unaccountable accidents, or 
intractable complexities, are in relation to The Lost Ones. The 
critical excitement expended upon the mistake made in the 
provision of two figures which are incompatible, however, is a 
discourtesy to all the other manifold ranks of conceptual 
'"1 See below Chapter six, section xi for what obtains 
concerning the dimensions of the cylinder in later English 
editions of The Lost ones. 
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inconsistencies harboured within the narrative. Each may protest 
with the Unnamable that `I too have the right to be shown 
impossible' (Beckett, 1959, p. 379). 7' Empirical construction of 
the cylinder system in its totality as stated is not possible, 
even if the extra help accorded by the error as to cylinder 
height in the English text is unreliable. To wish the impossible 
more so is analogous to pointing out the `heightened fixity of 
the motionless' (Beckett, 1972, p. 17). Remarks of the Unnamable 
are suggestive in regard to the status of the cylinder itself, 
and perhaps the source of the narrator's mistake: 
they'll give up, saying, It's all a bubble, we've been told 
a lot of-lies, he's been told a lot of lies, who he, the 
master, by whom, no one knows, the everlasting third party, 
he's the one to blame, for this state of affairs, the 
master's not to blame, neither are they, neither am I, least 
of all I, we were foolish to accuse one another, the master 
me, them, himself, they me, the master, themselves, I them, 
the-master, myself, we are all innocent, enough. 
(Beckett, 1959, p. 379) 
If we abandon hopes of seeing the cylinder constructed 
empirically, following the example of Molloy's inspection left 
79 The mathematical error can be detected a priori, without 
recourse to empirical evidence, but this is the case in the 
narrator's logical contradictions also. The specification of 
ladders that are `single without exception' while `Some are 
fitted with a sliding extension' (Beckett, 1972, p. 9) is 
similarly an a priori contradiction. Recourse to a posteriori 
experimentation is not necessary to find such specifications 
contradictory: it is the contradiction that they state which 
rules out the possibility of constructing them. 
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undone, we will be `innocent' (`enough'), `of wanting to know, 
wanting to be able, of all this noise about nothing' (Beckett, 
1959, p. 379). No one should be held responsible for the fact 
that a cylinder which cannot exist does not have a determinate 
height. In a specifically Kantian sense, we cannot help but be 
innocent of knowledge concerning this purely conceptual `bubble'. 
xii. Empty ideas 
The Unnamable's judgement above is rather harsh in one 
respect concerning the cylinder system of The Lost Ones, - for we 
have not quite `been told a lot of lies' (Beckett, 1959, p. 379). 
We have been supplied with specifications which are 
contradictory, inconsistent and unworkable. The complete 
conception of the cylinder supplied by the narrative is the sum 
of all these specifications. While this conception is more or 
less crazed as a result of the nature of these specifications, 
it is neither a lie nor nothing. " In the absence of the 
possibility of empirical verification, however, this conception 
°° To assert that a concept that is contradictory negates 
itself in so 'far as to become nothing, is a variation on the 
`subreptic fallacy': 
one way of committing the subreptic fallacy would be to deny 
even logical existence to a concept - and thus declare it 
`absolutely impossible' 
- 
as a result of a defective 
application of a sensible predicate to an intellectual 
concept: in other words to conflate [... ] the realm of the 
ontological with that of the epistemological. 
(Winterbourne, 1988, p. 118) 
What cannot exist, may still be thought. The beginning and the 
end of the cylinder cannot be made empirically manifest, but it 
cannot be maintained that the concept of the beginning and end 
are `unthinkable' (Beckett, 1972, p. 34), especially as they are 
being thought when this charge is made. 
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remains a `bubble' (Beckett, 1959, p. 379); while the cylinder is 
conceivable it is not properly knowable. These two procedures 
are not identical: 
To think an object and to know an object are C... ] by no 
means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: 
first, the concept, through which an object in general is 
thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition, through 
which it 'is given. For if no intuition could be given 
corresponding to the concept, the concept would still indeed 
be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would-be 
without any object, and so no knowledge of anything would 
be possible by means of it. [... ] Now, [... ] the only 
intuition possible to us is sensible; consequently, the 
thought of an object in general, by means of a pure concept 
of understanding, can become knowledge for us only in so far 
as the concept is related to objects of the senses. 
(Kant, 1933, B146-147, pp. 161-162) 
The concept of the cylinder system fabricated by the narrative 
of The Lost Ones cannot be verified by the construction of any 
empirical object perceivable by the senses. An earlier appeal 
to Kant in this chapter to sustain the narrator's right to 
elaborate the concept of the cylinder in whatever manner desired, 
repressed a crucial qualification to the prerogative of free 
conceptual invention: 
A concept which I have invented I can always define; for 
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since it is not given to me either by the nature of the 
understanding or by experience, but, is such as I have myself 
deliberately made it to be, I must know what I have intended 
to think in using it. I cannot, however, say that I have 
thereby defined a true object. 
(Kant, 1933, A729/B757, p. 587, my emphasis) 
The invention of `this arbitrary concept of mine does not assure 
me of the existence or of the possibility of its object' (Kant, 
1933, A729/B757, p. 587). The narrator's fabrication of arbitrary 
concepts which can be verified by no possible empirical 
experience is more usually the preserve of metaphysicians. Such 
is Kant's charge against Leibniz: 
No'philosophy at all is required to say what name I will 
attribute to an arbitrary concept. Leibniz thought of a 
simple substance [... ] and he called it a sleeping monad. 
In so doing, he did not explain this monad; rather, he 
invented it, for the concept of it was not given to him but 
was created by him. 
(Kant, 1949, §1, p. 263) 
In such cases, speculative reason `exalts itself to modes of 
knowledge which so far transcend the bounds of experience that 
no empirical object can ever coincide with them' (Kant, 1933, 
A314/B371, pp. 310-311). These conceptual determinations are 
outside the bounds of possible experience: it is not merely an 
accident of history that no sleeping monad has yet been 
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empirically encountered. Empirical apprehension of the 
`hyperphysical' (Kant, 1933, A63/B88, p. 101) is impossible in 
principle. To substantiate a claim to `knowledge' certain 
demands must be met: 
We therefore demand that a bare concept be made sensible, 
that is an object corresponding to it be presented in 
intuition. Otherwise the concept would, as we say, be 
without sense, that is, without meaning. 
(Kant, 1933, A240/B299, p. 260) 
The determination of the cylinder supplied in The Lost ones is 
distinct from the empty conceptual propositions of the adept 
metaphysician, ' however, in that its manifold internal 
contradictions ensure that even its merely conceptual elaboration 
does not make sense. According to Kant, `much is possible which 
is not actual' (Kant, 1933, A231/B284, p. 250); " accordingly, 
most fictional texts are content to specify events and conditions 
which, while not actual, are possible. The difference between 
these fictions and actuality maps on to `the distinction in 
Kant's philosophy of mathematics between what is "merely 
logically possible" and what is real' (Winterbourne, 1988, 
p. 108). ' Crucially, `merely logical existence means, for Kant, 
freedom from contradiction' (Winterbourne, 1988, p. 111). Non- 
contradiction is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the 
'1 In Rousseau's opinion, `it is good logic to reason from 
the actual to the possible' (Rousseau, 1973, p. 237); what is 
actual has indeed established its possibility. But what is 
actual does not exhaust the realm of what is possible. 
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existence of what a concept describes: 
even if our judgment contains no contradiction, it may 
connect concepts in a manner not borne out by the object, 
or else in a manner for which no ground is given, either 
.4 
priori or a posteriori, sufficient to justify such judgment, 
and so may still, in spite of being free from all inner 
contradiction, be either false or groundless. 
(Kant, 1933, A150/B190, pp. 189-190) 
The cylinder of The Lost Ones, however, cannot proceed past even 
the `negative' condition'of logical existence: 
The universal, though merely negative, condition of all our 
judgements in general, whatever be the content of our 
knowledge, and however it may relate to the object, is that 
they be not self-contradictory; for if self-contradictory, 
these judgements are in themselves, even without reference 
to the object, null and void. 
(Kant, 1933, A150/B189-190, p. 189) 
Metaphysical speculation, gods and winged horses fall at the 
fence of empirical substantiation while their logical possibility 
remains unscathed by internal contradiction. If that which is 
properly known and determined must exhibit logical possibility 
and be amenable to empirical verification, the nature of the 
cylinder of The Lost Ones is of an unrivalled obscurity. 
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Analysis of the concept of the cylinder specified by the 
narrative of The Lost Ones cannot dissolve this obscurity. In 
the first place, without an object to verify its explicative 
results, a priori analysis of `arbitrarily invented concepts, 
(Kant, 1933, A729/B757, p. 587) can never declare itself 
completed: 
[... ] I can never be certain that the clear representation 
of a given concept [... ] has been completely effected, 
unless I know that it is adequate to its object. But since 
the concept of it may, as given, include many obscure 
representations, which we overlook in our analysis, although 
we are constantly making use of them in our application of 
the concept, the completeness of the analysis of my concept 
is always in doubt, and a multiplicity of suitable examples 
suffices only to make the completeness probable, never to 
make it apodeictically certain. 
(Kant, 1933, A728-729/B756-757, pp. 586-587) 
Analysis of an invented concept, which only is what is put into 
it, cannot be assured of its exhaustiveness in the absence of any 
object which could verify this claim to complete adequacy. To 
conclude a list of intractable queries concerning the circulation 
of bodies between zones in the cylinder, the narrator throws out 
a distinct challenge to the powers of inferential analysis to 
complete the conceptual account of the cylinder from the basis 
of the specifications given: 
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What principle of priority obtains among the watchers always 
in force and eager to profit by the first departure from 
I among the climbers and whose order of arrival on the scene 
cannot be established by the queue impracticable in their 
case or by any other means? Is there not reason to fear a 
saturation of the intermediate zone and what would be its 
consequences for the bodies as a whole and particularly for 
those of the arena thus cut off from the ladders? Is not 
the cylinder doomed in a more or less distant future to a 
state of anarchy given over to fury and violence? To these 
questions and many more the answers are clear and easy to 
give. It only-remains to dare. 
(Beckett, 1972, pp. 51-52) 
Through mere faint-heartedness, the last two sentences insinuate, 
answers which reside covertly in the narrative and thus should 
be `clear and easy to give' upon analysis of the terms as stated, 
are passed over. Concerning the regulations of circulation and 
the additional questions which are posed concerning them, 
however, it is beyond the power of analysis to do anything more 
than make explicit that the answers required are not implicitly 
stated in the narrator's account. What does emerge is that the 
`daring' to state answers readily available is not the missing 
element, but rather the availability of these answers themselves. 
The completeness of analysis must founder on the statement which 
immediately precedes this passage: 
All has not been told and never shall be. 
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(Beckett, 1972, p. 51) 
Analysis which would wish to be exhaustive must take into account 
the specification that `All has not been told and never shall be" 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 51), for this is as much part of the concept 
of the cylinder as any other narrative statement. But any 
ambition harboured by analysis to be exhaustive by according 
equal consideration to this aspect of the cylinder, violates what 
is stated by this very conceptual determination as to the nature 
of the cylinder. Analysis should be tautological with what is 
stated: in this case, it cannot help but contradict this status, 
either by editing out this particular statement or by ignoring 
what it states. " 
The additional specifications which would yield the `All' 
of the cylinder, which would complete its conception, are 
determined in no form whatsoever. That `All has not been told 
and never shall be' (Beckett, 1972, p. 51) ensures that the 
S2 The narrator of How It Is makes a similarly paradoxical 
assessment of his text: 
without its being said all is not said almost nothing and 
far too much 
(Beckett, 1964, p. 72) 
This shared impasse is, perhaps distantly, related to Goedel's 
Incompletion Theorem; according to Priest: 
Goedel's theorem [... ] bears witness to the general fact 
[... ] that there is a necessary trade-off between 
consistency and completeness: consistency forces on a theory 
a certain incompleteness. 
(Priest, 1987, p. 59) 
In both The Lost Ones and How It Is, 'completion forces upon 
analysis a certain inconsistency. 
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cylinder cannot even be thought in its totality. The narrator 
does not deign to supply `the mere concept' of the cylinder in 
its entirety: 
In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its existence is 
to be found. For though it may be so complete that nothing 
which is 'required for thinking the thing with all its inner 
determinations is lacking to it, yet existence has nothing 
to do with all this [... ]. 
(Kant, 1933, A225/B272, p. 243) 
In the case of what `has not been told and never shall be' 
(Beckett, 1972, p. 51), the reader lacks even unsubstantiated and 
contradictory ideas concerning the nature of the cylinder. As 
a consolation, it should be recognized that the sum of secure 
knowledge yielded by concepts which are not given in any way and 
by those which are unverifiable or contradictory is not 
substantially different. 
In the absence of empirical verification, none of the claims 
made by analysis concerning the narrative of The Lost Ones can 
be known to be properly adequate, let alone exhaustive, in 
relation to the nature of the cylinder. Analysis of the concepts 
of the narrative merely elaborates what is thought within them; 
the lack of any empirical object in comparison to which these 
elaborated concepts could be verified remains unchanged. 
Analysis does not find a way out of the conceptual bubble of the 
cylinder. Its sole function in this chapter is to explicate 
402 
unverifiable concepts by blowing forth the conceptual bubbles 
which are covertly contained in the narrator's terms as stated. 
No contact with the object described is achieved. The analysis 
of the terms of The Lost Ones carried out remains exclusively 
conceptual. These additional concepts remain empty, in many 
cases contradictory and in all cases unsubstantiated by reference 
to any possible empirical object. And as Schopenhauer, in 
Kantian mode, emphasizes: 
Concepts and abstractions that do not ultimately lead to 
perceptions are like paths in a wood that end without any 
way out. 
(Schopenhauer, 1966, vol. 2, p. 82) 
In strictly Kantian terms, in the absence of any possible object 
to which a concept refers, that concept cannot be made properly 
comprehensible. Inferential analysis of the concepts supplied 
by the narrator cannot make any clearer `what sort of a thing is 
[... ] meant" by these concepts: 
We cannot define any one of them in any real fashion, that 
is, make the possibility of their object understandable, 
without at once descending to the conditions of sensibility 
[... ]. For if this condition be removed, all meaning, that 
is, relation to the object, falls away; and we cannot 
through any example make comprehensible to ourselves what 
sort of a thing is to be meant by such a concept. 
(Kant, 1933, A240-241/B300, p. 260) 
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Analysis does not know any better than the narrator what sort of 
thing is meant by his contradictory, inconsistent, empty and, if 
all is not told, absent, concepts. Dutifully, this chapter has 
endeavoured to make unclear that it does not know what it has 
been talking about. It could yet be rescued by a conclusion 
declaring the cylinder of The Lost ones strictly unknowable. 
But, according its own terms, the nature of the cylinder cannot 
be known sufficiently well to substantiate the claim that the 
inherent nature of the cylinder is to be unknowable. If such a 
claim could be securely established, the nature of the cylinder 
would be known after all. To assert the impossibility of a true 
understanding, one must depreciate the ability of this 
understanding to contradict its own alleged impossibility. For 
to master the terms of The Lost ones so far as to understand that 
they cannot be understood, with the concomitant supply of 
reasons, citations and supportive philosophies, is to understand 
altogether too much for harmony with one's original contention 
to be maintained. Upon an instant of self-reflexive 
consideration, contradictions, inconsistencies and aporiai 
reappear in a discourse which is much less adept than The Lost 
Ones in putting them to good use. To be obliged to conclude that 
this chapter cannot be saved is a most unfortunate outcome. It 
smacks of a mockery. A rueful confession of the error of these 
ways will have to be submitted. 
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